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Abstract 
 
 
The research gives a detailed overview of Information Security Risk Management (ISRM), a 
phenomenon ranked as a top issue of concern to Information Systems Management. The 
research was an in-depth conceptualisation of ISRM activities and the approaches towards 
these activities. The research identified two main approaches to ISRM; the functionalist 
rational approach and the incremental approach. The aim of this research was to understand 
how functionalist approaches and the incremental approaches are manifested in ISRM 
activities. New insights and meaning to the ISRM activities were presented when the 
incrementalist approaches to ISRM and the functionalist approaches to ISRM were examined 
holistically. Improvisation, for the purpose of this research, was used to explain this holistic 
understanding. Finding the manifestation of improvisation in ISRM activities as the holistic 
approach was therefore the main purpose for this research. The analogy of musical 
improvisation and jazz was the foundation for the insights about improvisation. The research 
problem posed in this research was that there was little evidence in literature to suggest that 
improvisation had been considered in ISRM activities. The research adopted a single case 
study strategy (of a multinational organisation). The research data collected was qualitative 
data, obtained through in-depth interviews, observations and review of the organisation’s 
internal documents. The researcher also formulated an a priori theoretical framework, termed a 
Sensitising Device that was used as a lens for qualitative data analysis. The data obtained was 
analysed, interpreted and conceptualised using qualitative grounded theory techniques. The key 
knowledge claim (the key contribution to ISRM literature) for this research was that ‘generally 
improvisation is manifested in ISRM activities and these manifestations occur in a variety of 
ways’. One of the findings that support this claim was that there was a general trend toward 
process improvisation, being a more conceptually dense form of improvisation than any other 
improvisation type in ISRM activities. This research concluded by identifying implications of 
these findings for the scholarly community and for practical use.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter introduces important issues that relate to Information Security Risk Management. 
The chapter presents and justifies a need for research into this area. A distinction is drawn from 
the many approaches that aim at optimal allocation of information security resources, (including 
cognitive resources) in protecting systems in an organization.  The chapter briefly introduces 
improvisation as one of the approaches. A problem statement is formulated to give direction into 
the research.   
 
 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
 14 
 
 
 
Table of Content  
 
Chapter One 
 
 
1.0 BACKGROUND TO INFORMATION SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT… 15 
1.1 NEED FOR RESEARCH INTO ISRM ……………………………………….... 17 
1.2 NEED FOR RESEARCH INTO IMPROVISATION…………………………… 18 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT………………….. 19 
1.4 RESEARCH PURPOSE………………………………………………………. 20 
1.4.1 Research Value………………………………………………………… 20 
1.5 THESIS OUTLINE……………………………………………………………… 21 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
 15 
 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.0 BACKGROUND TO INFORMATION SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT 
(ISRM) 
 
Modern organizations have become dependent on information technology (IT) and IT has come 
to be seen as increasingly vulnerable. It has been noted that while the spending on IT 
infrastructures has increased proportionately with time, so has the level of spending on 
information security (Middleton 2006).  Studies that focus on how organisations deal with 
information security show that information security management is really about risk 
management of IT and processes (Smith et al. 2003).  
 
Information security management and therefore risk management has increasingly been placed 
on a high priority scale. Organisations that understand the importance of information security 
management and risk management, have taken proactive steps to place these two management 
structures at par. This has resulted to these organisations having to spend less on information 
security and risk management.  
Information Security Risk Management (ISRM) is seen as the process of administering people, 
policies, and programs with the objective of assuring safety, protection and continuity of 
operations. ISRM has moved from a situation whereby it was completely ignored, (Straub and 
Welke 1998) to one where it is now ranked as one of the top concerns by IS management 
(Luftman and McLean 2004). The relevance of ISRM, its knowledge, understanding and 
awareness by organizations have attracted interest among information security researchers (e.g. 
Thompson and Von Solms 1997; Straub and Welke 1998; Siponen 2000; Von Solms and Von 
Solms 2005;Vorster and Labuschagne 2006).  
Chambers et al. (2005) list examples where organizations around the world have created security 
risk awareness through training programs that help boost their strategic security needs. Many 
large organisations continue to develop comprehensive approaches to information security which 
incorporate enterprise complexities (Chambers et al. 2005). The comprehensiveness of 
approaches to security is deficient if awareness of security issues is not prioritised. That is why it 
has been imperative for organisations to create security awareness programs that help users 
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understand how to value their assets, how to examine threats to these assets and finally how to 
safeguard the assets (Smith et al. 2003). 
In the United States, the level of importance placed on ISRM is clear. The federal government 
has initiated an innovative program that addresses security risks and awareness by assisting its 
federal agencies in conforming to requirements stipulated by the Federal Information Security 
Management Act (FISMA) (Schultz 2005). The FISMA initiative is considered essential in 
providing assurances to its users of “confidentiality, integrity, and validity of federal systems” 
(Schultz 2005). Similarly, in Singapore, the government has initiated its InfoComm Security 
Master Plan “to provide momentum for developing the manpower needs to manage the growing 
number of cyber threats”. The National InfoComm Security Committee and the InfoComm 
Development Authority (IDA) have set up a program that focuses on organisations, that seeks to 
enhance training and to augment skills of security professionals (Schultz 2005). 
 
In South Africa, ISRM processes and methodologies have been driven by compliance 
requirements brought about by regulatory acts such as the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act (for US 
companies with branches/subsidiaries or close ties within South Africa), the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the Electronics and Communication 
Transactions Act (ECT Act) (Middleton 2006; Vorster and Labuschagne 2006). The Regulation 
of Interception of Communications Act (RICA), the Provision of Communications Related 
Information Act and King II have also featured on a lesser scale within the South African 
information security landscape.  Many South African organisations have been slow in taking 
account of these new trends in legislation. This has had an adverse impact on the South African 
information security landscape. Nonetheless, for matters pertaining to information security, 
South African organisations have been keen to follow the limited legislation available, including 
the ECT Act, RICA and King II amongst others (Middleton 2006). 
 
Ernst and Young (2004) found that 67% of South African organisations sampled rated 
information security as critical to achieving overall business objectives compared to 26% who 
rated information security as 'somewhat important'. It can be concluded that South African 
organisations are “giving information security top-level priority compared to their global 
counterparts” (Ernst and Young 2004). 
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1.1 NEED FOR RESEARCH INTO INFORMATION SECURITY RISK 
MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES 
 
 
The importance of understanding Information Security Risk Management (ISRM) is great when 
consideration is given to the many risks and vulnerabilities associated with information systems 
and technologies.  The importance of also understanding how ISRM is carried out in an 
organisation is equally great and has a profound impact on the quality of information to be relied 
upon to efficiently run organisations (Straub and Welke 1998). This research begins with 
understanding what constitutes the entire spectrum of ISRM activities and how these activities 
are carried out.  It is generally agreed among information security practitioners that research that 
draws our attention to ISRM activities has become increasingly important. This is especially so 
when research on ISRM helps information security practitioners understand how to contextually 
cope with uncertainties, vulnerabilities and risks caused by increased usage of computers and the 
internet (Siponen and Kukkonen 2007).  
 
Anecdotal evidence from information security practitioners suggests that during times of 
heightened uncertainty, structured managerial activities focused on imposing control and order 
are usually required. There has not yet been conclusive research which suggests that these 
control and order measures are sufficient. Furthermore, there are some researchers who have 
suggested clear structured policies as being the only way to deal with risks and uncertainties. 
These clear structured policies are, for the purpose of this research, classified as functionalist 
approaches.  Noting the functionalist approach to Information Security, Hu et al. (2007) 
considered how modern organisations have established routines and order to cope with internal 
and external influences of information security risk. Not surprisingly, the functionalist approach 
to order is evidenced by numerous publications that offer normative guidelines for designing, 
implementing and managing secure information systems (Baskerville 1988; Straub and Welke 
1998). In their studies in Information Security, Dhillon and Backhouse (2001) have noted the 
dominance of the functionalist paradigm that emphasizes formalized rule structures in designing 
and managing security.  
 
There are some researchers that have countered functionalist claims to ISRM and have called for 
the need for broader responsibilities by management regarding information security issues (Von 
Solms and Von Solms 2004). These researchers have become aware of an increasing number of 
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‘new’ approaches that explore alternative perspectives related to the interpretive, radical 
humanist and radical structuralist paradigms. These latter paradigms are based on sociological 
and philosophical theories (Hu et al. 2007). Researchers using these latter approaches which call 
for alternative ways of understanding ISRM have been classified as incrementalists.  South 
African organisations have started to develop comprehensive approaches to ISRM that 
incorporate the complexities of their enterprises (Chambers et al 2005), the people and resources 
in an attempt to adhere to local compliance requirements. It is how South African organisations 
approach ISRM from a functionalist, incrementalist or both approaches that is of interest to this 
research. The research concerns itself with understanding how the information security 
practitioners attempt to mirror best practices by setting local baselines.  This contextual 
understanding has justifiably generated great interest amongst quite a few South African 
information security researchers and many others across the globe (e.g. Thompson and Von 
Solms 1997; Straub and Welke 1998; Siponen 2000; Von Solms and Von Solms 2005).  
 
1.2 NEED FOR RESEARCH INTO IMPROVISATION  
 
Individual role improvisation is a phenomenon researched by social scientists due to its 
perceived importance in emergency response and planning (Webb 2006).  However, there is 
little indication by way of publication that this phenomenon has been researched in ISRM and 
more specifically in the management and planning of information security risk. Webb (2006) 
appreciates the magnitude of problems faced by planners who have attempted to embrace 
approaches that emphasise centralised command and control (functionalist approach), a by-
product of which discourages creativity. By extension, planning and managing information 
security risk from these centralised forms impedes reflexivity. A myriad of written rules, 
policies, guidelines, frameworks and standards that spell out exactly how security risk 
practitioners should perform their activities is an example of such an impediment.  Webb (2006) 
depicts the strength of effective planning and management as means to encourage creativity and 
reflexivity as opposed to the rigid approach characterised by centralised control.  The focus of 
the research has been geared towards exploring and conceptualising the presence of or 
impediments to reflexivity and improvisation in ISRM activities outside of functionalist 
approaches.  
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1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT    
 
 
ISRM is embedded with characteristics that transcend ordinary risk management areas. There 
are functionalist rational approaches that characterize ISRM (Von Solms and Von Solms 2005; 
Schultz 2005) as well as creative reflexive approaches present in organisations (Suchman 1987; 
Zuboff 1988).  New meaning to the ISRM process is presented when the incrementalist 
approaches to ISRM (reflexive and creative) and the functionalist structured approaches to 
ISRM are examined holistically. Improvisation for the purpose of this research is used to explain 
this holistic examination. (Improvisation is explained in depth in the subsequent chapters). The 
following problem statement therefore defines this research: 
 
How is improvisation manifested in Information Security Risk Management 
(ISRM) activities and how can improvisation in ISRM be conceptualised? 
 
This research therefore focused on how practitioners managed information security risks and 
incidents. Finding meaning attributed to the management and intervention processes in ISRM 
remained the focus of this research. The goal of the research was to provide insightful new 
awareness of the contrasts between de-facto routinised interventions to ISRM and those that 
were identified to be creative, spontaneous and improvised actions. Flowing from this main 
research problem are the following sub-questions: 
 
 What ISRM activities are in an organisation and how are they carried out? 
 How is improvisation manifested in these ISRM activities in the organisation? 
 How can improvisation in ISRM be conceptualised? 
 How can improvisation be used as a foundation for Positive ISRM?  
 
The research problem presented by these questions opens up understanding of conceptual issues 
and approaches to ISRM activities that have not been given much research attention. In a general 
sense, Chapter 2 starts by explaining the general ISRM activities in an organisation. Chapter 3 
and Chapter 4 give an indication as to the manifestations of improvisation in organisations, 
specifically extending these to ISRM activities. Chapter 6 explains the outcomes of 
improvisation in ISRM activities, while Chapter 7 conceptualises improvisation in ISRM. It is 
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by conceptualising the above questions and issues that a sharper focus of the ISRM process is 
brought to bear.   
 
1.4 RESEARCH PURPOSE 
 
Literature on ISRM is heavily functionalist and does not consider the soft approach of 
improvisation. Therefore this research is an attempt to address this gap in the literature. It 
follows then that the nature of the research targeted those specific and improvised interventions 
that mitigated risk. Studies that go a step further in the review of the meaning assigned to human 
behaviour with Information Systems use are encapsulated in the works of Boland (1991); Deetz 
(1996); Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991).  These studies have revealed that understanding human 
behaviour is gained only through understanding meaning assigned to phenomena. Understanding 
meaning is achieved through social constructions such as language, consciousness, shared 
meanings, documents, tools, and other artefacts.  This research looks at understanding the 
meaning of improvisation in ISRM by significantly considering previous research on situated 
action constrained by time (Suchman 1987; Zuboff 1988). This consideration aims to offer 
convincing reasons as to the meaning behind certain ISRM actions and is demonstrated in the 
latter sections of this thesis.  
 
1.4.1 Research Value   
 
It was anticipated that a detailed in-depth case study would be appropriate to research 
improvisation. The case would demonstrate rich cognitive insights from information security 
risk practitioners. The research is characterised by the appropriate use of information security 
risk terminology that captures ISRM cognitive aspects.  The themes and cognitive aspects 
inductively and deductively provide a substantive theory that recognises improvisation in ISRM. 
The value of the research after conceptualisation is explained in the following section.   
 
This research was undertaken to provide deeper insights into ISRM and enrich the literature in 
Information Systems and Security, by revealing the softer areas that have so far received little 
research attention in ISRM. The assigning of meaning to the role that reflexive activities 
(including improvisation) play adds value by providing deeper insights into the phenomenon of 
improvisation in organisations. The underlying motivation for the research and the intended 
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beneficiaries (academics and information security practitioners alike) has been discussed in this 
chapter. The chapter has also raised awareness of issues and that may be deemed important in 
ISRM generally. The following section describes how this awareness is developed and gives an 
outline of the thesis.  
 
1.5 THESIS OUTLINE  
 
 
This thesis consists of eight (8) chapters. Chapter I started by introducing ISRM and why it was 
necessary to carry out this research. Chapter 2 discusses the general approach towards ISRM 
activities by giving a detailed explanation of what these ISRM activities are. This was achieved 
by carrying out a detailed literature review on ISRM.  This chapter unpacks terminology 
common to information security risk practitioners. Chapter 3 discusses how these ISRM 
activities are carried out in organisations. The chapter introduces two main approaches to ISRM 
and discusses the first approach (structured functionalist approach) in greater detail. Chapter 4 
explains the incremental approach (reflexive approach) to ISRM. Chapter 4 also provides a 
holistic synergy between the functionalist and incrementalist approaches by presenting a fusion 
framework: the holistic approach. This chapter concludes by explaining how improvisation is 
manifested as a fusion of these two approaches. Chapter 5 discusses the research methodology 
and the methods used to carry out this research. This chapter outlines how knowledge about 
improvisation in ISRM was scientifically generated. Chapter 6 discusses the outcomes of 
improvisation in ISRM activities using an in-depth qualitative data analysis technique.  Chapter 
7 interprets and conceptualises improvisation in ISRM through a combination of primary 
interview data and document analysis. Chapter 8 gives an overall conclusion on the research 
findings. Figure 1 (next page) illustrates the research outline.  
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Figure 1.  Thesis Layout 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter unpacks the concept of information security risk and how this is managed. The 
chapter is an  attempt to better understand the nature of risk and how the technical and the social 
issues within an organization influences practitioners’ actions for improving information systems 
security. The chapter places significance on the need for conceptualising information security 
risk.  
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW OF 
INFORMATION SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
The significance attached to the need for conceptualising information security risk management 
(ISRM) should be high when consideration is given to the following statistics. In 1998, the 
Computer Security Institute (CSI) and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) conducted a 
survey of information security managers. The survey generated responses from over 400 
respondents. 64% of these respondents had reported computer security breaches, while 54% 
indicated that their organisations were attacked via internet connections. 70% of the respondents 
also reported unauthorised uses by insiders (Forno and Baklarz 1999). Given the above statistics, 
ISRM predicatively, is given much attention particularly in rapid environmental turbulence and 
unpredictability where breaches and vulnerabilities keep occurring.  On account of turbulence 
and unpredictability, organisations have gone to great lengths to leverage their security postures. 
Some have performed exceptionally well while others have performed dismally.  
 
Planning and structure (referred to as functionalism) in this research can have negative 
consequences to ISRM because they consume time and resources and provide counterproductive 
guides to action when the context changes faster than the planning cycle (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 
1995). This is particularly so in rapid environmental turbulence and unpredictability. There is 
constant frustration among unsuccessful organisations due to security incidents that have largely 
been unpredictable, making functionalist guidelines and standards less effective. The frustration 
is exacerbated by information security practitioners’ inability to identify effective strategies in 
times of unpredictability, uncertainty and chaos. 
 
This research conjectures that what makes a difference and is the key distinguishing element 
contributing to success in ISRM practices stems from significant contextual and cognitive 
differences in approach to ISRM by information security practitioners. This chapter aims to 
elaborate on how organisations currently manage information security risk. It will do this by 
focussing on typical functionalist structured implementing procedures and guidelines as 
contained in standard codes of practice such as ISO IEC  17799 (ISO 17799). 
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In order to understand cognitive and contextual differences that influence the approach to ISRM 
by information security practitioners, it becomes necessary to understand the science and 
practice of ISRM including the many associated activities at a deeper conceptual level. This 
chapter contributes to a deeper understanding of ISRM by examining the concept of information 
security risk and its importance.  The chapter closely examines the main concepts of information 
risk as an important managerial issue and the value attributed to protecting organisational 
information. The chapter aims to give clarity about risk to information systems, about 
information security in organizations by examining threats and vulnerabilities to information 
and, finally, about the management process of these attributes.  
 
The next sections of this chapter are divided into five sections. The first section looks at 
concepts associated with information security.  The second section examines in detail concepts 
of risk. The third section draws a distinction between the use of various concepts and 
terminologies associated with information security risk. This section clarifies the use of these 
terminologies. The fourth section talks of the process of managing information security risk in 
organisations and contextualises the South Africa perspective. The last section gives an overall 
summary of this chapter.  
 
2.1 INFORMATION SECURITY  
There are concerns that deal with information systems (IS) that tend to revolve around 
information security. Information systems as a discipline refers to a system of people, data 
records and activities that process the data and information in an organization, and it includes the 
organization's manual and automated processes (Trcek et al. 2007). Information security on the 
other hand means protecting information and information systems from unauthorized access, 
use, disclosure, disruption, modification or destruction. 
 
At a meta level, the science of the main components of the Information Security process 
considers three components: confidentiality, availability and integrity of information (Tudor 
2001). The understanding of these three concepts should be placed in the following perspective:  
1) that many organisations have increasingly placed a high value on information and 
classified certain sections of it as assets to be treated confidentially and accessed by only 
those who are designated to do so;  
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2) that organisations have placed security on information systems making information 
available to only those authorised to do so; 
3)  that the information to be accessed and used for managerial activities passes integrity 
checks by way of accuracy checks, completeness and freedom from unauthorised 
manipulation. 
 
Parker (2002) extended the components explained by Tudor (2001) with the incorporation of 
additional concepts such as; utility, deterrence, possession, prevention, detection, mitigation, 
transference, sanctions and rewards, recovery and correction of loss. 
2.1.1 Information as a Valued Asset 
 
When organizations speak of information as being assets they consider a resource that should be 
controlled. Peltier (2001) extended the idea of the intangible nature of the information asset 
being the intellectual property of organizations, characterized by the skills and knowledge of 
employees.  
2.1.2 Importance of Information Security  
 
Forno and Baklarz (1999) saw the need for information security to be considered a management 
issue primarily because they understood the nature of the information security program as being 
dependent upon those they managed, namely people. They argued for active management 
support and engagement with information security risk programs. They also argued the need for 
the people who administered these programs to be exceptionally skilled and knowledgeable.  
Forno and Baklarz (1999) acknowledged the relevance of addressing management and people 
first before technology and postulated the following pillars of Information Security:  
a) the pillar of protection that enables managerial activities to be focused on understanding 
the value of information being protected, and how the planning for protection would 
occur;  
b) the pillar of detection which places managerial emphasis on activities that attempt to 
recognize the unknown information system vulnerabilities;   
c) the pillar of reaction which places managerial concerns in the quantification of 
information security activities already planned for and put into place to address system 
breaches;  
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d) the pillar of documentation which aids information security managers establish trends 
that could influence an organisation’s risk rating, and finally; 
e) the pillar of prevention which emphasises the way managers understand the 
multifaceted nature of security risks when they initiate programs for risk assessments 
and risk mitigation.  
2.2 RISK AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
Much research done on risk in terms of risk attitudes and risk perceptions has focused on a 
value/positive approach (Dyer and Sarin 1982; Weber and Milliman 1997). These researchers 
have denoted risk to have an associated positive appeal. This means they have seen risk as 
having some intrinsic benefit or value. Researchers such as Sarin and Weber (1993) described 
the ‘intuitive appeal’ to risk value. They saw risk as an open choice dependent on the ‘riskiness 
of the gamble’ and its value.  There has also been research that associates risk with 
organisational success as demonstrated by Weber and Milliman (1997) which primarily deals 
with attitudes towards risk derived from choice.    
 
In this research, the concept of risk should not be seen as an association in the positive. The 
association of risk in the negative contrasts this research in ways that are significantly different 
from  research  done on risk attitudes and risk preference particularly in the theoretical 
frameworks for decision making under risk, namely risk return also known as risk-value. This 
research considers the negative value associated with risk. In this research, risk is seen as 
contrary to value or benefit to information systems. Conversely, the negative impact risk has on 
information system introduces this research to successful ways and activities that would manage 
risk in ways that reduce or mitigate the negative impact of risk.   
2.2.1 Concept of Risk- Negative Association  
 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-30, 
indicates a negative association with the word risk.  This standards publication considers risk as 
a net negative impact resulting from information systems vulnerability. This means risk is seen 
as a function of threat-sources which adversely affect target organizations (NIST SP 800-30).  
The NIST (SP 800-30) classifies system vulnerabilities as logical (IT related), physical (non-
IT-related) or in combinations of both.  Negative association with risk was seen in a study by 
Peltier (2001) who recognized threats against information systems as ‘intents’ to act in a 
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negative way against these systems.  Browne et al (2000) equally established this negative 
association and, in an attempt to measure risk, created a framework that drew a correlation 
between system vulnerabilities and human activities (such as poor system administration, 
including failure to apply patches regularly).  From the above illustration of negative risk, it is 
easily recognised that the whole process of managing risks by information security risk 
practitioners is considered difficult and daunting. Some of the ISRM activities carried out by 
information security practitioners require comprehensive strategies for achieving acceptable 
information security postures. The view that risk can be managed requires the acceptance of 
formalised procedures that determine the proper way to respond to risk while determining the 
number of controls to put in place to either eliminate risks or mitigate impacts.  
 
Table 1. suggests a formalised but structured (functionalist) way of determining the appropriate 
response against threats and vulnerabilities when placing sound controls. Table 1 illustrates 
three broad categories in responding to threats. It should be noted that information systems are 
affected by risk and vulnerabilities in three major ways; severe risk, significant risk and minor 
risk.  It should be noted that severe risk to information systems has the potential to cripple 
business operations; significant risk can cause serious damage to business processes, while 
minor risk can cause breakdowns that typically affect day-to-day operations. A systematic and 
structured approach to determining risk levels and how to respond appropriately to risk is 
illustrated by Table 1 below;  
Table 1. Degree of Impact and Vulnerability Determine Controls. Source: Smith et al (2003). 
 
Degree of Impact and Vulnerability Determine Controls 
 
 
Severe 
Impact to information 
system 
Significant 
Impact to 
information system 
Minor 
Impact to 
information system  
High Vulnerability 
 
Conduct 
Vulnerability 
Analysis 
Must improve controls 
 
improve controls 
 
Vulnerability 
analysis necessary  
Medium Vulnerability 
 
 
improve controls 
Minimal 
Vulnerability 
Analysis 
improve controls  
 
improve controls 
Low Vulnerability 
 
 
 
controls necessary  
 
improve controls 
Little-no 
Vulnerability 
Analysis 
controls 
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Degree of Impact and Vulnerability Determine Controls 
 
 
Severe 
Impact to information 
system 
Significant 
Impact to 
information system 
Minor 
Impact to 
information system  
unnecessary 
 
When there is severe impact to information systems and the systems have high vulnerability, it is 
mandatory to improve controls (Smith et al 2003). When there is significant impact to 
information systems and the systems have medium vulnerability, information security 
practitioners address these threats by improving controls. It should be noted that with scenarios 
of medium vulnerabilities, it is still essential for information security practitioners to improve 
controls (Smith et al 2003). When there is minor impact to information systems and the 
information systems have low vulnerability, the resources available to information security 
practitioners will make it feasible to ignore security threats and hence make controls 
unnecessary. Table 1 therefore shows the essential need to conduct vulnerability analysis for 
both severe and significant risks, particularly where controls are weak for more vulnerable 
systems. 
 
This research explores activities related to the information security practitioner’s cognitive 
understanding and responses to both the likelihood component (vulnerability) and the probability 
component (controls) that establish the existence of negative risk in information security risk 
management. These attributes are designated for conceptualization.  Figure 2 (below) provides a 
graphical representation of the likelihood and probability component relationships. Parkinson 
and Baker’s (2005) perception of managerial activities considers the risk management process as 
that of assessing risk. They note that this process requires internalised practitioner skills and 
knowledge of vulnerabilities in information systems that may lead to potential system failure. 
They depict three types of risks: Inherent Risk (IR) or risk that presents itself in the normal 
course of doing business; Control Risk or risk that the controls set by an organisation will not 
detect adverse events; Residual Risk (RR) or the risk after controls have been taken into 
account.  
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Figure 2.  Managing Risk at Various Levels. Source: Parkinson M.J.A. and Baker N. J. (2005) 
 
As pointed out in Figure 2 above, threat is assessed upwards. By associating risk in the negative, 
it is established that if the likelihood of threat is low, but consequences are high, it is still very 
necessary for the managerial processes to initiate and pursue effective control risk policies. 
Figure 2 also indicates that the threat and vulnerability components should be applicable to each 
of the groupings of both the tangible and intangible information assets.   
2.2.2 Managing the Negative Risk; Threats and Vulnerabilities 
 
The NIST SP (800-30) defines Risk Management as "the process of identifying risk, assessing 
risk, and taking steps to reduce risk to an acceptable level" (Burton Group 2005). Risk 
Management (in information systems) is a threefold process that includes identifying risk, 
assessing risk, and taking steps (managing) to reduce risk to an acceptable level. This NIST 
perception suggests two components of risk, i.e. likelihood and probability. To understand this 
definition it is important to understand the nature of information systems threats like hackers 
who exploit information systems vulnerabilities. This means the management process looks at 
the likelihood component of risk from, for example, a hacker’s perspective while seeking to 
reduce the vulnerability of the information systems e.g. from lack of proper patching, weak 
passwords etc which could be exploited. The risk management process seeks also to understand 
the probability component, i.e. the probability that a hacker could exploit vulnerabilities. 
According to the NIST (2003), vulnerabilities have been associated with system weakness, in 
cases where there were omissions of control mechanisms for the systems or in cases where the 
controls were not sufficiently robust.  Essentially, risk management allows organizations to 
approach information security in a more structured manner. This is seen as a functionalist 
approach to ISRM.  
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As early as the 1990’s, threats and the negative aspects of risk were being reported in 
information systems; this lent to the formal recognition of ISRM. Studies by Neuman (1995) 
highlighted the importance of recognizing threats to information systems as potential dangers 
since vulnerabilities could lead to undesirable consequences.  The common view of associating 
threats in negative terms is still maintained as evidenced by more recent studies. Siponen (2000) 
gives recognition to scientific studies on information security in computer science. Some of the 
studies, for example, show that organisations engage actively in dealing with information 
security but respond differently to security threats.  Studies by Stoneburger et al. (2001) 
illustrate the way intentional or accidental triggers could exploit systems (or assets) rendering 
them vulnerable.  There are four generic steps that Stoneburger et al. (2001) defined for risk 
management: identification, measurement, monitoring and control. These generic steps are 
explained as follows:  
 
a) Identification  
Part of the risk identification process suggested by Stoneburger et al. (2001) included listing and 
characterizing individual elements of risk and breaking these down into basic components in 
order to achieve an effective risk assessment. This process is seen as a useful way of identifying 
the assets, threats and vulnerability components. 
 
b) Measurement   
The measurement process considers consequences and likelihood of risk. Researchers have come 
up with numerous and varying approaches to risk measurement. Peltier (2001) identified a Risk 
Value formula as follows;  
 
    Where   Rv =   Risk   
                  P   =   Probability (Qualitative or Quantitative probability) 
                  I    =   Impact (Qualitative or Quantitative impact) (Peltier 2001). 
                   
The above functionalist formula by Peltier (2001) can be contrasted with Browne et al.’s (2000) 
mathematical framework that associates exploits with system vulnerabilities and of the reporting 
of such exploits. This formula is shown below as follows:  
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 Where    C   = cumulative count of reported risk incidents; 
                M = time since the first exploit cycle; 
I and S are regression coefficients determined by analysis of the incidence report 
(Browne et al 2000). 
 
c) Monitoring  
In this process, managers and security risk practitioners are mandated to periodically review and 
evaluate risk to determine the need for additional risk management.  
 
d) Control 
Risk management control activities are designed in ways meant to avoid or mitigate adverse 
events on the organization. Once risks have been identified and measurement components 
assigned, controls are then put in place. The controls are essential for planning and 
understanding the likelihood of threat-sources exercising potential vulnerabilities. Actions taken 
depend on the organization’s risk appetite (tolerance for risk).  
2.2.3 Framework for Risk Identification, Analysis and Control 
 
 
In general, Information Security Risk Management (ISRM) has two important goals; i) to assess 
security risks and ii) to select protection measures to reduce security risks (Yue et al. 2007). The 
main activities identified by Stoneburger et al. (2001) earlier include risk identification, 
measurement and monitoring (analysis) and risk control.  It has been found that typically when 
information security practitioners do not have a complete view of the information security 
remedies, they follow a structured (functionalist) security planning framework to reduce system 
risks (Yue et  al. 2007). The first step, risk identification, involves finding out information 
systems asset values, potential threats and potential countermeasures. The second step deals with 
analysing (measuring and monitoring) potential security risks for individual systems. Risk 
analysis, requires the identification and documentation of critical organizational resources (e.g. 
information, people, processes, and technologies) among a huge number of total information 
resources that are used to support the organizational mission (Finne 2000). Risk analysis 
includes the consideration of potential financial impacts when information systems are 
compromised; sometimes referred to as impact analysis (Yue et al. 2007). The third step, deals 
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with controlling risk by considering the cost and benefit relationship between risks and 
determining acceptable risk. This is illustrated in Figure 3 below. 
 
 
Figure 3: Framework for Risk Identification: (Yue et  al.(2007) 
2.2.4 Emergent Nature of Threats and Vulnerabilities  
 
Threats and vulnerabilities that give rise to information security risk are highly emergent, highly 
continuous, filled with surprises, difficult to control, highly tied to circumstances and more 
affected by what people pay attention to than by formal plans and methodologies (Weick 
1993b). It is in regard to the emergent nature of threats and vulnerabilities that information 
security practitioners show commitment and discipline towards putting optimal security postures 
in organisations.  Ambivalence and recklessness on the part of information security practitioners 
to following sound security practises are some qualities that exacerbate risk (Forno and Baklarz 
1999). Recklessness with technology has been identified by Forno and Baklarz (1999) as a 
quality of information security risk. They advise caution with the use of technology and stress 
the importance of continuous training for information security practitioners to be effective. They 
recognise training as ‘the jewel of knowledge and power’.  
2.3 INFORMATION SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT TERMINOLOGY 
 
This section discusses the associated terminology that is used interchangeably within the 
information security and risk management field. When terminology such as Information Systems 
Risk Management, Information Technology Risk Management is used, sometimes these terms 
refer to ISRM. Figure 4 below brings conceptual clarification to this ambiguity by classifying 
the following groupings; Information Security Risk Management (ISRM), Information 
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Technology Risk Management (ITRM), Risk Assessment, Risk Analysis and Mitigation 
Planning.  
 
Figure 4.  Information Security Risk Management: Sub-set relationships (Blakley et  al.2001; 
Njenga and Brown 2008) 
2.3.1 Information Security Risk Management (ISRM)  
 
Information security risk management (ISRM) is much broader than and encapsulates these 
other terminologies. ISRM is the process of administering people, policies, and programs with 
the objective of assuring continuity of operations while maintaining strategic alignment with the 
organizational mission (Choobineh et al. 2007). ISRM activities are driven by organizational 
objectives so that no resources are expended on information security without an understanding 
of how they support the organizational mission. ISRM is therefore much broader than and 
encapsulates both information systems and the underlying technologies and platforms that 
support these systems. 
 
ISRM often deals with activities that are associated with the assessment and mitigation planning 
for risk and identifies the optimal protection strategy when constrained by limited information 
security resources. ISRM has evolved as a required function within organizations which are 
concerned with their ability to mitigate the effects of a breach of information security (Finne 
2000). These breaches are sometimes referred to as “incidents.” ISRM requires an estimation of 
the value the resource provides to the organization based upon how it supports the organization’s 
strategic objectives mission (Choobineh et  al. 2007).  
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2.3.2 Information Technology Risk Management (ITRM)  
 
Information Technology Risk Management (ITRM) is a sub-component of ISRM and looks at 
Risk in Information Technologies and how these are managed. The Burton Group (2005) defines 
the Risk Management Planning Methodology as a framework for dealing with the risk 
assessment and mitigation planning efforts and usually considers the possibilities of threats that 
exploit vulnerabilities in information technologies to induce sometimes fatal consequences 
(Burton Group 2005). 
 
2.3.3 Risk Assessments  
 
Parker (2001) talks of risk assessments pertaining to information security as being a means 
whereby information security practitioners are provided with information needed to understand 
factors that can negatively influence operations. Risk assessment takes the form of making 
informed judgments concerning the extent of actions ne ded to reduce risk (Parker 2001).  
According to Choobineh et al. (2007), informed judgments about risk assessments takes 
cognisance of the attitudes, technologies, behaviours and other phenomena that are incorporated 
into the risks and activities under consideration.  
 
Assessing risk is seen as one element of a broader set of risk management activities. Other 
elements include establishing a central management focal point, implementing appropriate 
policies and related controls, promoting awareness, and monitoring and evaluating policy and 
control effectiveness (Parker 2001).  Several researchers have tried to examine the risk 
assessment process itself, particularly in terms of the common challenges faced by managers in 
approaching and executing the process (Baskerville and Portougal 2003).  
 
2.3.4 Risk Analysis and Mitigation Planning 
Information security risk analysis is used to identify events/incidents that can adversely affect 
an organisation’s operations (Baskerville and Stage 1996). There are many ways in which a risk 
analysis can be performed. Some of the more sound risk analysis methods are based on an 
international best practice. One suggested international best practice includes the use of CobiT 
(Von Solms 2006). Risk analysis can use both quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis. 
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Quantitative methods take the form of formal specialised ways of determining the probability of 
an event/incident occurring and the likely loss should it occur (Von Solms 2006).  
Quantitative risk analysis makes use of statistical data to produce a numeric probability called 
the 'Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE)' or the 'Estimated Annual Cost (EAC)' (Yue et al. 2007). 
This is calculated for an event by simply multiplying the potential loss by the probability. 
Qualitative risk analysis is by far the most widely used approach to risk analysis. Probability 
data is not required and only estimated potential loss is used. This approach makes use of 
estimating threats and vulnerabilities. When the information security risks have been analysed, 
an action plan is established (Finne 2000). This plan is called the risk mitigation plan. The risk 
mitigation plan aims to minimise the ALE or the EAC. The risk mitigation plan contains 
information security objectives, principles and implementation practices approved by an 
organisation (Finne 2000). 
2.4 UNDERSTANDING INFORMATION SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT  
 
Historically, ISRM activities have been conducted in order to establish controls and security 
over information systems (Choobineh, et al. 2007). ISRM has therefore been a consistent way of 
strengthening security controls and practices at the organization level through risk analysis and 
continual improvement. ISRM activities such as risk analysis are usually structured in ways that 
assist in the management of information system threats being exploited by information system 
vulnerabilities (Burton Group 2005). The ISRM process has mechanisms in place designed to 
facilitate information security risk mitigation (Holappa and Wiander 2006) and is driven by 
organizational objectives. The approach to risk analysis and risk mitigation in information 
security provides for the characterization of the rewards or benefits of using sensitive data and 
information for decision making that is free of any associated risk (Choobineh, et al. 2007).  
Baskerville (2005) has described two problems faced by information security practitioners which 
limit the effectiveness of risk analysis practices. These include the lack of reliable empirical data 
concerning the frequency and amount of losses attributable to information security compromises, 
and the relative rarity of many kinds of information security compromises. Risk analysis and risk 
mitigation techniques are seen to vary in detail according to the information security risk, the 
purpose of the analysis and/or mitigation, and the required protection level of the relevant 
information.  
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Traditional risk analysis processes are designed to identify and evaluate threats and 
vulnerabilities in order to decide on the appropriate measures and controls to manage them 
(ENISA, 2006). Risk analysis as conducted by informational security professionals involves 
establishing the feasibility of information systems controls (Baskerville 1991).  
 
In order to better understand how information security practitioners balance the risk-reward 
equation, this research conceptualises the nature and responses of the risks involved in securing 
information systems and the activities undertaken by information security practitioners to 
manage those risks. The research draws from studies done by several researchers in ISRM. To 
begin with, several researchers have tried to examine the information security risk in terms of the 
common challenges faced by information security practitioners in approaching and executing the 
ISRM process (Baskerville and Portougal 2003).  
 
Conventional methods of examining information security risk proposed by these studies include 
checklists, risk analysis and evaluation (Baskerville 1993; Birch and McEvoy 1992; Dhillon and 
Backhouse, 2001). Miller and Engemann (1996) have argued that these techniques are deficient 
because they encourage perpetrators to learn the system and then circumnavigate the system. 
Some of these techniques have also been faulted particularly when technology changes and the 
checklists used do not contain all potential information security risks. The limitations of these 
techniques have been exacerbated by not including the socio-organisational aspects of 
information security, which researchers have found to be an important element in the 
development of an information security strategy (Backhouse and Dhillon 1996; Dhillon and 
Backhouse 2001).   
 
In recent times also, the formulation of information security policies has tended to ignore issues 
such as the strategic information systems plan (SISP) which has minimised their effectiveness 
and made the process of information security deficient (Doherty 2006). Doherty (2006) has 
proposed the alignment of formulation of information security policies and SISP to make the 
process of information security risk management rich. 
 
In order to better understand ISRM, it is important to introduce some of the concepts used by 
standards and best practices. (Standards, guidelines, methodologies and frameworks used in 
ISRM are discussed in detail in Section 3.1.1). The standards and frameworks used in ISRM 
describe the stages for managing the security of information systems.   
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The PDCA (plan, do, check and act) framework, introduced by Deming (1986), is an example of 
an ISRM standard proposed in ISO27001 (ISO/IEC 2005) which describes the process for 
establishing, implementing, operating, monitoring, reviewing, maintaining and improving an 
organisation’s Information Security Management System (ISMS). Apart from this framework, 
there are other structured (functionalist) models based on sequence of stages of ISRM activities, 
such as the CobiT framework (discussed in detail in Section 3.1.1).  The PDCA model reflects 
the principles set out in the OECD Guidelines (2006) governing the security of information 
systems and networks.  By having a general understanding of some of the frameworks 
mentioned above, what comes across is that that many of these frameworks are guided by two 
main types of ISRM activities: evaluation activities and implementation activities (Deming 
(1986). These ISRM activities are illustrated in Figure 5.  
 
 
Figure 5.  Suggested Structured Functionalist Information Security Risk Management Activities 
(Adopted from Deming 1986) 
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2.4.1 Evaluation Activities in ISRM 
 
The evaluation activities in ISRM are performed by the ISRM practitioners and consist of the 
elements of assessment of the current information security situation (“plan”). These sorts of 
ISRM activities take into account factors such as the effectiveness of the implemented 
information security controls, and external events. To perform evaluations (i.e. planning and 
checking) on information assets within an organisation, the effectiveness of ISRM activities is 
typically assessed by asking questions. For instance, questions could be raised about activities 
related to data protection and controls as well as the security of the operating system, platform, 
and networks (Deming 1986). 
 
ISRM evaluation activities are done at both physical and logical levels (Deming 1986). In the 
case of logical security, checks are, for instance, done on the strength of passwords. There is a 
higher level of information security risk if passwords are weak or have not been changed for a 
long time and if there are weak controls in the information systems to check this.  Checks are 
also done on vulnerable information systems with the intention of obtaining knowledge of the 
tools intruders or hackers could use against information systems.  ISRM evaluation procedures 
many be qualitative, semi- quantitative or quantitative or a combination of these. During ISRM 
evaluation, decisions have to be made concerning which risks need treatment and which do not, 
as well as focusing on the treatment priorities.  
 
1. Information Assets Acc ss and Data Control  
 
The ISRM activity related to evaluating controls focuses on access control of information assets. 
According to ICASA (2008), top managers’ major concern was with compliance of financial 
reporting. The key area that top managers felt was most important was that of using evaluating 
tools for managing access and changes to data (ISACA 2008).  Farahmand et al. (2003) have 
argued that the lack of an access-control mechanism is a vulnerability that could allow an 
intrusion to occur and information assets to be compromised.  They have proposed the need for 
organisations to conduct vulnerability assessments which involve the examination of weaknesses 
that could be exploited by identified threats.  The need for organisations to conduct vulnerability 
assessment should take cognisance of the environment and existing safeguards. Farahmand et al. 
(2003) have proposed a model and framework on how this can be done. Within specific aspects 
of ISRM, there are many other information access control models and frameworks that have 
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been suggested by Castano et al. (1995). There have also been other methods that have 
incorporated information access control by considering design and security specification for 
information systems (Baskerville 1998; Dhillon and Backhouse 2001; Dhillon 1997). The 
research considers ISRM activities that relate to information assets access and data control as 
flagged activities for conceptualisation (see Section 4.5.1). 
 
2. Information Security Event Monitoring  
 
Another activity that is prominent in ISRM is that of events monitoring. It has been reported 
(Chickowski 2007) that when information security practitioners get on stage at conferences, one 
of their favourite analogies is that of sports car brakes. The question they often pose is, “What is 
the purpose of brakes on a sports car?” The obvious answer would be, “To stop the car.” 
However, the real answer the information security practitioners are looking for is, “To enable the 
car to safely go faster” (Chickowski 2007). 
 
It may be explained that similar to the brakes on a sports car, information security and security 
monitoring allows the IT departments to employ cutting-edge technologies to make 
organisations more successful, in other words, “to go faster”, while at the same time mitigating 
the risks (“brakes”) of doing so (Chickowski 2007). This becomes possible with the help of 
emergent technologies. Technologies such as the SIM or SIEM (security incident management 
or security incident and event management) systems that use applications such as netForensics 
(nFX) and TriGeo Security Information Manager help automate the information security event 
monitoring process (Chickowski 2007).  
 
Technologies that enable information security event monitoring can contribute towards a 
streamlined event-analysis that provides localized real-time protection of the more widely used 
network services on the Internet. This means that information security practitioners can track 
trends and gain visibility into network behaviour which may or may not always be classified as 
incidents or events (Chickowski 2007). Event monitoring activities as part of the general ISRM 
activities have also been flagged for conceptualisation (see Section 4.5.1).  
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2.4.2 Implementation Activities in ISRM 
 
 
The “check” ISRM activities focus on the understanding of information security controls in the 
implementation process performed in the organisation. Implementation represents a critical part 
of the ISRM activities as contained in the widely accepted standard based approaches. The 
“check” part of the ISRM activities ensures that information systems are properly configured, 
coded, and the processes are working harmoniously. Information security testing ensures that 
any changes to the systems do not degrade organisations’ security objectives (Burton Group 
2005). When information security practitioners detect anomalies and vulnerabilities through 
systems testing, these findings should feed into policy decision and information security risk 
management services that determine responses to situations (Burton Group 2005). 
 
In the description of the “act” stage of the ISRM activity, the ISO27001 standard considers the 
need for any organisation to first understand its risk assessment approach. As defined by 
ISO27001, the organisation should identify a risk assessment methodology that is suited to its 
self and to identify its business information security, legal and regulatory requirements (ISO/IEC 
2005).  The organisation should develop criteria for accepting information security risks, and 
should identify acceptable levels of information security risks. The ISO27001 standard also 
suggests that the risk assessment methodology to be implemented should ensure that information 
security risk assessment procedures produce “comparable and reproducible results” (ISO/IEC 
2005). 
 
Information security practitioners develop policies that determine the roles for specific ISRM 
implementation (Burton Group 2005). Often, information security practitioners derive policies 
from feedback in the form of information security analysis, information security risk 
measurement, and other forms of monitoring. For organisations concerned, the policies address 
behavioural and business contexts as well as the lifecycle of people, information systems, data, 
and the business itself (Burton Group 2005). 
 
There are a number of important facets that contribute to the success of implementing ISRM 
activities. Baskerville and Siponen (2002) make mention of information security policies as one 
of those facets that reflect on business objectives. They note that a successful ISRM 
implementation approach guided by information security policies is one that is compatible with 
an organisation’s culture and also one that has support and commitment from management.  
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3. Information Security Architecture  
 
An Information Security Architecture (ISA) is a layered architecture that is necessary for 
securing an environment; crucial to this are the kinds and types of controls layered into such an 
environment (Cavusoglu 2004). Questions have been asked about how the security controls 
within the organisation’s architecture interact with each other and how they are implemented 
together within the same ISA (Cavusoglu 2004). 
 
It has been cited that, often times, organisations need assistance in developing and implementing 
comprehensive and flexible enterprise Information Security Architecture (ISA) to protect the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information and the information system resources 
(Killmeyer and Tudor 2006). Killmeyer and Tudor (2006) suggest eight components essential to 
effective information security architecture. These components are listed as follows: 
1. Security organisation/infrastructure 
2. Security policies, standards and procedures 
3. Security baselines/risk assessments 
4. Awareness and training programs 
5. Compliance 
6. Monitoring and detection 
7. Computer incident/emergency response 
 
It has been realised that organizations are organic, dynamic entities that change over time 
(Choobineh et al. 2007). It is this fact that is often seen to undermine or invalidate sound 
Information Security Architecture (ISA) if an organisation is not adaptive (Choobineh et al. 
2007).   Given that ISA may be invalidated by the dynamic nature of the environment, which in 
turn affects the nature of the layering of security components (the architecture), questions have 
been asked about the value of having an ISA that is layered with multiple controls and then re-
arranging these when organisations change, rather than having independent controls applied 
individually to each application (Cavusoglu 2004). It is questions like this that make the process 
of understanding ISRM and the ISA component interesting for conceptualisation. This activity 
has also been flagged for consideration in this research (see Section 4.5.1).  
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4. Information Security Policies  
Implementing information security and assurance policies (as part of the ISRM activities) are the 
vehicle for managing the identified risks to the organization (Doherty and Fulford 2005). A great 
deal is unknown regarding the proper management and use of information security policies. 
Doherty and Fulford (2005) have raised a concern that the guidelines for developing and 
implementing security policies in organizations might not have been “tested” and are more “tied 
to theory”. Another concern raised has been the time after which the information security 
policies should be retired.  A few researchers have been looking into this issue (Doherty and 
Fulford 2005). This researcher will conceptualise ISRM activities that centre on the 
implementation of information security policy. This is discussed in a later section of this 
research paper (see Section 4.5.1).  
5. IT Governance and Regulatory Compliance  
 
IT governance is defined as “specifying the decision rights and accountability framework to 
encourage desirable behaviour in the use of IT “(Weill and Ross 2004). As part of the ISRM 
implementation procedure, Information Technology Governance (ITG) activities are an integral 
part of enterprise governance and consist of the leadership and information technology structure 
and processes which ensure the organisation sustains and extends its strategy (ITGI 2003).  IT 
governance is the responsibility of executives and the board of directors, and consists of the 
leadership, organisational structures and processes that ensure that the enterprise’s IT sustains 
and extends the organisation’s strategies and objectives (ITGI 2003).   
 
Implementing ITG requires the location of decision rights and accountabilities (Weill and 
Woodham 2002; ITIG 2003). It can be noted that ITG is a part of a strategic ISRM activity that 
aligns Information Technology (IT), IT Risk and businesses to achieve business value for the 
enterprise (Webb et al. 2006). In order to achieve organisational goals, Webb et al. (2006) 
emphasise effective information security controls, performance management and risk 
management in order to maximise the business value through strategic alignment of IT and 
businesses. The research also considers IT governance and compliance as part of conceptualising 
ISRM activities (see Section 4.5.1).  
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6. Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity  
 
Business activity is subject to disruptions, such as technology failure, flooding, utility disruption 
and terrorism (ISACA 2008). Disaster recovery/business continuity management, which was 
ranked as the second most important issue for IT management professionals, has been a 
traditional area of focus for IT professionals (ISACA 2008). In response, some enterprises 
implement business continuity management (BCM) programs to improve their resilience in the 
event of disaster. For implementing Section 11 of the ISO IEC 17799, Eloff and Eloff (2003) 
have designed a framework whereby organisations can determine the weak areas that need 
improvement in business continuity planning and compliance. In this framework, the 
strengthening of an information security control area (e.g. business continuity) and the 
implementing and managing of the processes for that specific control area is achieved through 
understanding the different protection classes (inadequate minimal, reasonable and adequate 
controls). In case of business continuity, they have highlighted the need for adequate controls.  
 
Choobineh et  al. (2007) identified business continuity planning and disaster recovery planning 
as salient issues in ISRM that are concerned with the implementation and maintenance of an 
organisation’s information security program. They have proposed a need for further research to 
understand why certain firms are able to effectively implement and execute business continuity 
plans (which encompass various aspects of information security), whereas other firms  have been 
struggling to do so in the face of various incidents affecting information assets (Choobineh et  al. 
2007).  The research considers part of the research needs raised by Choobineh et al. (2007) and 
conceptualises business continuity (see Section 4.5.1). 
2.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION      
 
As was stressed earlier, the purpose of this chapter was to examine concepts associated with 
information security risk management (ISRM) and to increase the understanding of ISRM 
thereof.  This chapter examined various concepts and terminologies associated with information 
security risk management and gave clarity to the use of these terminologies. The chapter 
contributes to the overall research in two ways. First, by building on existing work on 
information security risk management, this chapter adds to the building of a cumulative tradition 
in ISRM, particularly on development research. Second, this chapter contributes to 
understanding (explanatory) knowledge on information security risk management.
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter presents the idea that unpredictability of the business environment drives 
Information Security Risk Management (ISRM) activities. The chapter challenges functionalism 
and structure, and presents the need to factor aspects such as unpredictability and uncertainty 
when assessing ISRM activities. The idea of contrasting the functionalist and incremental 
approaches to ISRM is also introduced.  The chapter infers a gap in the literature on both the 
functionalist approach and the incremental approach to ISRM. The chapter concludes by 
suggesting that the two approaches to ISRM are inherently deficient.  
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CHAPTER THREE: STRUCTURED FUNCTIONALIST 
vs. INCREMENTAL APPROACH TO ISRM 
 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
Information security risk practitioners at managerial levels have on a number of occasions been 
faced with different approaches to conducting information security activities. Smith et al. (2003) 
consider any approach to information security as deficient if the awareness of information 
security issues is not prioritised. According to Burton Group (2005) approaches that are meant to 
serve particular risk objectives are defined for the overall architecture of the organization. These 
approaches are oriented towards stable security frameworks that fall broadly within the 
following categories: integrity, availability, confidentiality, use, control and accountability.   
There have been several organisational studies conducted on information security that address 
issues including planning, managing risk and assessing risk. The approaches to these issues have 
followed many sociological paradigms. The sociological paradigm or approach, i.e. the 
functionalist paradigm, has been predominant (Dhillon 1997; Dhillon and Backhouse 2001; 
Hirschheim et al.1996).  The functionalist paradigm places emphasis on formalized rule 
structures in designing and managing security (Dhillon and Backhouse 2001).  The functionalist 
structured approach is also evident in the information security planning methodologies suggested 
by Straub and Welke (1998) and more recently McFadzean et al. (2007). 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to increase our understanding of an alternative approach to 
functionalism and structured approach to ISRM.  The chapter reviews literature on the nature of 
functionalism in organizational management. The chapter also introduces the alternative 
approach i.e. the incremental approach.  
 
This chapter is divided into six sections. The first section starts by providing an overview of 
existing structured and functionalist ISRM approaches characterized by guidelines, frameworks 
and standards. The second section challenges functionalism and structure. The third section 
introduces the concepts of organizational complexity and uncertainty that give rise to challenges 
faced by structure. The fourth section proposes an alternative view point that challenges 
structure and exemplifies the incremental approach. The fifth section examines the functionalist 
approach and the incremental approach and suggests that these two approaches are insufficient 
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when looked at in isolation. The sixth and final section summarizes the discussions in the 
chapter and concludes the sections.  
 
3.1 FUNCTIONALIST APPROACHES TO MANAGEMENT 
 
The general definition of functionalism is borrowed from sociological theory and looks at how 
functionalism “involves designing a society as a functional body made up of institutions and 
social structures acting as organs of this body” Parsons (1949). The leading thinker of 
functionalism in America was Parsons (1949) who believed that behaviour was driven by 
individual effort to conform to the moral code of society.  
 
At the core of the operational, tactical and strategic levels of ISRM lie several functionalist 
structured methodologies, standards and frameworks that organisations deem suitable to meet 
the unique diverse and high technology risks associated with running computerised systems.  
 
 Hu et al. (2007) have catalogued studies that offer prescriptive and normative guidelines for 
managing secure information systems based on studies by Baskerville (1998); Staub and Welke 
(1998) and others. 
 
3.1.1 Discipline Specific Guidelines, Frameworks and Standards: 
Predictive Knowl dge 
 
The functionalist paradigm emphasizes formalized rule structures in designing and managing 
security (Hu et al. 2007). The school of thought assumes that society and by extension 
organisations have a concrete existence and follow a certain order. The thinking concerns itself 
with providing explanations of the status quo, social order, social integration, consensus, need 
satisfaction, and rational choice (Hirschheim and Klein 1989).  
 
It is the notion of predictive knowledge that has influenced the functionalist approach to 
formulating policies for monitoring and control. Predictive knowledge reinforces the 
functionalist paradigm by viewing designers and practitioners as solely technical experts 
(Wheeler and Venter 2006). Predictive knowledge assumes the intent by users to follow order, 
maintain status quo and reinforce rational choice (Wheeler and Venter 2006). It should be noted 
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that the question of the management of predictable and unpredictable knowledge of threats has 
also been investigated by Baskerville (2005) in his work “Information Warfare”. It is therefore 
by a closer examination of the ISRM process and specifically the policy adoption process that it 
is realised that information security activities are guided by an approach that is multi-faceted and 
not restricted to only following standards and frameworks in a purely functionalist manner.   
 
In terms of this research, it should be explained that functionalist assumptions suggest the 
existence of an objective and value-free world that can produce true explanatory and predictive 
knowledge of the reality “out there”. Indeed this predictive knowledge has influenced 
approaches to systems design and reinforces the functionalist paradigm when viewing designers 
as solely technical experts (Wheeler and Venter 2006). 
 
Creators and designers of organisational and discipline specific standards, frameworks and 
methodologies that guide the proper running of organizations assume the intent by users/agents 
to follow order, maintain status quo and reinforce rational choice.  Closer examination of the 
ISRM process shows that ISRM activities are guided by standards and frameworks that place an 
emphasis on formalized rule structures, thus reinforcing the functionalist notion (Wheeler and 
Venter 2006). 
 
Within information security, the functionalist processes that are defined by social order include 
identifying, measuring, controlling and monitoring information security risk. These activities are 
typically run in a top down hierarchical approach that leaves little room for reflexivity.  Based 
on these steps, senior management evaluate business tradeoffs and manage risks accordingly.  
 
The functionalist classical top-down approach in management has been well documented by 
researchers. Researchers such as Cunha (2004) have described the classical mechanistic 
approach whereby activities were viewed as objects of structured planning and stable design and 
where organizations worked in a systematic and predictable manner (Browne et al. 2000; Office 
1996; Howard 1997). Dhillon and Backhouse (2001) note that information security research 
emphasises formalized rule structures in designing and managing information security.  
Information security researchers have recognized the significance of well planned, sound risk 
management policies that focus on clear methodologies and programmes (Von Solms and Von 
Solms 2005; Schultz 2005). Figure 6 (below) points to one of the many structured functionalist 
approaches to ISRM, which employ guidelines, various methodologies and standards. 
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Figure 6.  Structured Functionalist Information Security Risk Management Approach (Njenga 
and Brown 2008) 
3.1.2 Guidelines 
According to Burton Group (2005) a guideline is “any document that aims to streamline 
particular processes according to a set routine”. By definition, following a guideline is never 
mandatory although these should be seen as essential to the process of governance. Following 
guidelines is never mandatory. ISRM is endowed with rich functionalist guidelines, which 
provide direction activities or processes to achieve set goals. The guidelines are defined for the 
complete risk management process. The Capability Maturity Model for Security (CMM-SEC) is 
an example of a guideline that defines the process an enterprise must go through to move from 
limited security capabilities to increasingly optimizing protection postures (Burton Group 2005).  
The NIST has issued guidelines under the banner of the Risk Management Guide for Information 
Technology Systems in its Special Publication 800-30 (NIST SP 800-30). The guide consists of 
various sections that address risk mitigation, including mitigation options available, mitigation 
strategies, an approach for control implementation, control categories, control cost-benefit 
analysis and residual risk. 
 
The ISO/IEC Guide 73 released jointly by the International Organization of Standards (ISO) 
and the International Electro-technical Commission (IEC) provides specific guidance on terms 
and definitions of concepts related to risk management. By design, the sections of the guide 
address risk from both the negative and positive impact it can have on an organization. Within 
the context of this research, the research considers only the negative aspects. The ISO/IEC 
Guide 73 operates on the assumption that a proper communication channel exists within 
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organizations with the general aim of highlighting risk. The guide places great weight on the 
communication process.  
3.1.3 Methodologies and Frameworks  
 
Methodology refers to “the rationale and assumptions that underlie a particular study” 
(Creswell 2003). According to the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (2009), Methodology is 
defined as;  
1. "the analysis of the principles of methods, rules, and postulates employed by a 
discipline". 
2. "the systematic study of methods that are, can be, or have been applied within a 
discipline". 
3. "a particular procedure or set of procedures." 
 
Frameworks on the other hand refer to a “structure supporting or containing something” 
(Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary 2009). ISRM frameworks that define the methods, 
rationale and core sets of assumptions for the general ISRM methodology incorporate activities 
that identify, measure, control and monitor information security risks. Frameworks that guide 
these sets of activities are gathered from some of the following sources: 
 CobiTTM 
 Turnbull Framework 
 KING II Report 
 IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL) for IT service management  
 Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX)  Act 
 
Each of these functionalist methodologies is discussed briefly as follows: 
 
CobiT
TM 
CobiT (Control Objectives for Information Technology) was considered in depth in this research 
and comprises inputs to the development of a Sensitsing Device (in Section 4.5) released by the 
Information Systems Audit and Control Association. The framework explains 34 major 
components of the IT processes termed domains (grouped in 4 high level domains) and how 
these can be used to deliver information to the business process in order to assist organizations 
meet defined objectives. The 4 high level domains are planning and organization (PO), 
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acquisition and implementation (AI), delivery and support (DS), and monitoring (MO). 
The framework looks at the business requirements and evaluates controls in terms of how the IT 
resources are to be used, affected or targeted. This framework then aligns these requirements to 
IT processes. Within the framework was an additional release termed the Management 
Guidelines. The additions introduced the following perspectives: Key Goal Indicators (KGIs), 
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), Maturity Models (MMs) and Critical Success Factors 
(CSFs). These assist management in better assessing risk and success at the higher managerial 
levels. These are definition and measurement tools that explain the ‘how’ part of the processes 
(KPIs), scoring and grading tools to outline strategic thinking (MMs) and tools that outline 
important issues or actions for management to achieve control over their IT processes.  
 
 
Turnbull Framework 
 
In 1999, the Turnbull Framework was developed by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales (ICAEW) and provides management with clarity on maintenance of sound 
internal controls, how to review these controls, and the overall effectiveness of these controls 
(Rushton 2005). The ICAEW committee was chaired by Nigel Turnbull, a Finance Director, to 
prepare guidance for boards on internal control. This committee clarified the purpose of internal 
control as being “to help manage and control risk rather than to eliminate it”. The objectives of 
the Turnbull framework are (Rushton 2005) 
 
a) to reflect sound business practice whereby internal control is embedded in the business 
processes by which a company pursues its objectives; internal control should be 
embedded in business processes and should not be a separate compliance exercise; 
internal control is seen as integral to achievement of business objectives  
b) to remain relevant over time in a continually evolving business environment;  
c) to enable companies to apply the guidance in a manner which takes account of their 
particular circumstances (Rushton 2005).  
Sections of the report that provide an adequate framework for senior management in 
organizations to play key roles in the development of risk management programmes are relevant 
to this research.  
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KING II Report 
In 1993, a committee chaired by former judge Mervyn E. King was established to investigate the 
role of boards of directors in South African firms. This committee released two reports: a) the 
King Report on Corporate Governance, 1994 - to be subsequently known as King I and b) the 
King Report on Corporate Governance in South Africa, 2002 - to be subsequently known as 
King II (Von Solms 2006). 
 
King I includes a Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct, and was the first of its kind in South 
Africa. Companies listed on South Africa's JSE Securities Exchange are mandated to comply 
with King II which itself requires compliance with Global Reporting Initiative guidelines (Von 
Solms 2006). In South Africa, the King II Report is a framework designed for corporate 
governance and addresses the power checks in management in terms of accountability and 
responsibilities (Von Solms 2006).  Of relevance to this research is a section of King II that deals 
with Risk Management (section 2) which places emphasis on risks associated with the use of 
information technology and considers risk management and record retention.  
 
 
IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL)  
The ITIL (Information Technology Infrastructure Library) Framework is an IT service related 
set of sub-frameworks that focus on aligning the IT infrastructure with the service delivery needs 
of the organization (ISACA 2006).  The main ITIL framework consists of several sub-
frameworks that address specific functions within IT service delivery, the key elements being 
Service Support and Service Delivery. Within ITIL is the inherent security focus on security 
tenets/components of information availability, confidentiality and integrity (See Section 2.1; 
Tudor 2001). There are aspects within each sub-framework that address information security and 
ISRM. The more useful tenets are Availability Management that addresses availability 
management tools, cost of availability and managing availability. The IT Service Continuity 
Management tenet focuses on recovering facilities, and considers the recovery efforts to 
physical infrastructure, data and processes within a specified time frame. In this research 
Business Continuity Management is considered part of ISRM and looks at elements that can 
impact on continuity and recovery of operations in case of adverse events.  
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Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act 
Of relevance to this research on information security risk and control in the SOX Act of 2002 is 
section 404.  Section 404 has in mind the technology components of control and requires that in 
an annual report rules be prescribed (often by a commission) that will state the responsibility of 
management for establishing an adequate internal control structure. Though SOX was by design 
meant to be followed by Public Accountants in organizations, the process of financial reporting 
is now heavily dependent on advanced applications and information technology and systems. 
The reporting should therefore be seen as a means of ensuring an assessment of the effectiveness 
of the internal controls and processes of these IT systems. 
3.1.4 Standards 
 
The term "standard" is sometimes used within the context of information security policies to 
distinguish between written policies, standards and procedures (Dhillon 2007). According to 
Dhillon (2007), a technical standard is “an established norm or requirement” and is “a formal 
document that establishes uniform engineering or technical criteria, methods, processes and 
practices”. Technical Standard can be “controlled artifacts” and Reference Standards “certified 
reference materials have an assigned value by direct comparison with a reference base”. 
 
A "standard" is a low-level prescription for the various ways the company will enforce the given 
policy (Dhillon 2007). Information security policies are high-level statements or rules about 
protecting people or systems. Standards are functionalist in nature and are continually developed 
for the purpose of serving as measures for organizations to achieve desirable ends, though they 
fall short of the main purpose of guidelines and frameworks. The tenets of security standards are 
designed to work well for the more stable technologies. However, with emergent technological 
changes, the rules keep changing.  
 
ISO/IEC 17799 and ISO 27005 
A prominent standard approved by the South African National Standards is the ISO/IEC 17799 
standard adopted from the British Standard BS 17799 (SABS 2000). Another prominent 
standard is the Australia Standard/ New Zealand Standard, AS/NZS 4360, which is a risk 
management standard whose objective is to provide a generic framework for establishing the 
context, identification, analysis, evaluation, treatment, monitoring and communication of risk. A 
body mandated to develop standards and best practices is the Information Security Forum (ISF) 
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which consists of representatives from over 200 organizations worldwide. The ISF has 
developed a risk management methodology known as the Fundamental Information Risk 
Management (FIRM) methodology available to member organizations.  
 
The most recent standard, the ISO 27005 is an example of a series of standards covering ISRM. 
ISO 27005 is the name given to the prime 27000 series standard covering information security 
risk management. The standard provides guidelines for information security risk management 
(ISRM) in an organization, specifically supporting the requirements of an information security 
management system defined by ISO 27001. These series of standards are designed to assist the 
satisfactory implementation of information security based on a risk management approach.  
These standards are applicable to all types of organisations although they do not recommend any 
specific methodologies. Some of the contents of these standards relate to; 
 Information Security Risk Assessment (ISRA) 
 Information Security Risk Treatment (as explicated by ISO 27005 this occurs through 
the use of prevention and detection controls, avoidance of risk, acceptance of risk, 
transfer of risk to another entity and some combination of these). 
 Information Security Risk Acceptance 
 Information Security Risk Communication 
 Information Security Risk Monitoring and Review 
Researchers have argued that this functionalist approach, exemplified by the above discussions 
on guidelines, frameworks and standards is based on formal and comprehensive planning. This 
functionalist approach is seen as the key to a successful ISRM posture. There is an alternative 
view point to this as explained in the next section. 
 
3.2 CHALLENGING FUNCTIONALISM AND STRUCTURE  
 
Fundamental research in ISRM assumes that composition or planning (functionalism) for 
information security risk usually occurs first and is followed at a later time by implementation or 
execution of risk mitigation strategies (Straub and Welke 1998; McFadzean et al. (2007). It has 
been argued that planning based on the functionalist approach has its limitations due to 
complexity and the emergent change in the business environment.  
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Present day business environments are seen as hyper-competitive, high speed and fast changing 
(Cunha 2004). Activities and behavior in hyper-competitive, high speed and emergent 
technology is seen as transcending mechanical routines and functionalism (Cunha 2004). Ciborra 
(1996) underscored the importance of action and behaviour that was influenced by environment 
uncertainties and unpredictability resulting from emergent technologies and the rapid change of 
technologies. The argument was that dynamism dismantles existing structures (frameworks) and 
functionalism, and gives rise to transformation of new cognitive frames, cultural views and new 
structural arrangements. Ciborra (1996) showed that emergent technologies created technology 
paradigm shifts which required an exit from functionalism.  
 
3.2.1 Transformation: Breaking the Barrier of Functionalism  
 
Key to breaking the barrier of functionalism is the realisation that functionalist approach means 
that organisations are more focused on paying disproportionate attention to beginnings and 
endings but not much attention to ongoing temporal coordinated activities (Barrett 1998). 
According to Barrett (1998) this limits innovation since organisations are too segmented, with 
members not sharing mutual orientations. 
 
In the early 1970’s, Kegan (1971) did a study on ways in which organisations provided 
employees with a supportive environment that enabled employees to generate new ways of 
behaving. The supportive environment was unrestricted and was effective in providing ways in 
which employees would perceive their own reality. Behaviours were based on open norms, with 
a spirit of enquiry, expanded consciousness and the recognition of choice. A fundamental theory 
developed then was that there would be times when constant contextual awareness was 
appropriate. The learning process involved employees being aware of additional options and 
hence being better able to choose when these options would be appropriate for a specific 
situation (Kegan 1971). 
 
The early 1970’s also saw scholars and researchers of systems thinking (Cleveland 1973) 
generate ideas concerning the need for a holistic systems approach. Cleveland (1973) argued for 
the need to match ‘unsystematic reality’ with constructive ambiguity. The argument was based 
on the premise that the management systems then were too exact, too clear and therefore too 
rigid, i.e. too functionalist. It is not surprising to find that the same attributes are still present to 
date in many organisations.  Cleveland (1973) argued that the main problem with systems 
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thinking then, was that in an effort to build efficient systems, scholars were attempting to 
analyse everything systematically (Cleveland 1973). The shortcomings of these systematic 
analyses were that these early attempts did not see organisations as essentially having elements 
of spontaneity, but as structured and planned (Kegan 1971). Kegan (1971) saw spontaneity as 
permitting maximum utilisation of resources available at the moment to reach goals appropriate 
to the situation at hand. Structure and planning on the other hand were seen as permitting the 
accumulation of resources (cognitive skills, knowledge etc.) as defence against the future.  At 
this stage it was understood that even with structure and planned processes in place, 
organisations still encountered resistance and unanticipated dysfunctions (Kegan 1971). The 
solutions proposed then were to have a blend between structure and spontaneity that would be 
contextual to the clients, the organisation, and the environmental conditions.  
 
The increased competitive pressures in organisations forced transformation along the dimensions 
of spontaneity, reflexivity and efficiency.  Adler et al. (1999) pointed to ways in which managers 
began oscillating between functionalism suited to routine tasks, (e.g. to minimise risks), and 
those suited to non-routine innovative tasks. They suggested four kinds of mechanisms which 
would influence transformation. These included:  
(i) Metaroutines:  these were functionalist and systematised the creative process; 
(ii) Job enrichment: enables workers to be more innovative and reflexive in the course 
of their routine tasks 
(iii) Switching: functionalist and at the same time reflexive with differentiated roles for 
dealing with the two kinds of task thus allowing workers time to focus on each; 
(iv) Partitioning: both functionalist and at the same time reflexive.  This was achieved by 
the differentiated structures for dealing with each kind of role and the resulting 
specialisation but also permitting routine and non-routine activities to be carried out 
simultaneously in parallel.  
 
In arguing for efficiency, Adler et al. (1999) pointed out that these oscillating strategies relied on 
metaroutinisation. They illustrated for instance that in a Total Quality Management (TQM) 
environment, production workers doing their activities could be attentive simultaneously to the 
efficient implementation of routine production procedures (functionalism) and at the same time 
to the non-routine tasks (reflexivity) when identifying improvement opportunities.  These 
workers might  not have sat down to document suggestions or an act out of procedure, but they 
were still successful in their endeavours.  
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It was this gradual transformation caused by organizational complexities and uncertainties that 
forced the re-thinking of functionalism and made theorists and scholars argue for a better 
framework for understanding behavior and activities. The concerns of the gradual re-thinking 
and transformation was not on being prescriptive to any particular style of behaviour but to help 
in the understanding of the diverse options that feed on actions and behaviours. Reflexivity and 
exercising choice through increased knowledge of probable consequences of these activities or 
options was seen to play a key role (Kegan 1971). 
3.2.2 Breaking Functionalism in ISRM 
 
Scholars such as Ciborra (1996) began to understand and give useful insights as to how high-
tech organisations were gradually undergoing transformation and encountering a blend between 
functionalism and reflexivity. A key characteristic of these organisations was that when task 
uncertainty was pronounced, the consequence was to amend or blend the organisational 
structures in favour of dynamic perspectives (Ciborra 1996).  
 
Currently many authors agree that information security risk management is not only a matter of 
technical controls or measures (Power 2000; Dhillon 2001; Dhillon and Moores 2001; Gonzalez 
and Sawicka 2002; Schneier 2000). Information Security systems also involve people, 
organizational factors, technology, tasks people and the working environment (Carayon and 
Kraemer 2002; Carayon and Smith 2000). The ill-structured approach in ISRM brought about by 
dynamism and uncertainty has created ISRM actions that narrow the time gap between 
planning for risk and acting (Dhillon and Moores 2001).  
 
Forno and Baklarz (1999) considered information security risk management as a ‘soft’ 
management issue primarily because “the information security program is dependent upon those 
who manage”, namely people. Forno and Baklarz (1999) proposed that management be 
supportive of the information security risk programs that were reflexive, with the people 
administering these information security risk programs being knowledgeable. They 
acknowledged and emphasised the skilled worker first, before technology.  A more coherent 
socio-organizational framework that explains a deviation from functionalism to a socio-cognitive 
has been proposed by Hu et al. (2007). They propose a framework that explains why managers 
and users behave in certain ways. The next section explores the rise of organizational 
complexities and the apparent need for transformation in much more detail.  
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3.3 ORGANISATIONAL COMPLEXITIES, UNCERTAINTIES AND 
UNPREDICTABILITY 
 
With emergent, complex and uncertain technologies being used, organisations began 
increasingly finding themselves faced with situations of limited resources and unpredictability. 
Scholars began noticing the manner in which these organisations dealt with these uncertainties, 
challenging the functionalist approach. Organisations found themselves faced with the need to 
act flexibly, to subdue and be adaptive to change. This called for being dynamic. In this regard, 
theories of dynamism began to emerge, such as the theory of dynamic perspective (Ciborra 
1996). The next section introduces dynamism with regard to functionalism and explains 
dynamism as leading to an alternative view to functionalism. 
 
3.4 INCREMENTAL APPROACH TO MANAGEMENT: ALTERNATIVE VIEW 
TO FUNCTIONALISM  
 
Incrementalism is defined as “a method of working by adding to a project using many small 
(often unplanned) changes instead of a few (extensively planned) large jumps” (Quinn 1978). 
The incremental approach to management has been popular in understanding situations of 
dynamism, turbulence and chaos (Minzberg 1994; Minzberg and Quinn 1996). It should be 
understood that the theory that deals with dynamism is the ill-structured or incremental 
approach. Dynamism has led to the incremental approach which is posited as the oppositus of 
the functionalism approach. The section describes the increasing popularity of this approach and 
why some scholars predicted this to be of higher value and yield to organisational success than 
the functionalist approach.  
3.4.1 The Dynamic Perspective: An Alternative to Functionalism 
 
The dynamic perspective viewed organisations as contexts out of which specific structures are 
extracted, tried out and discarded in a pragmatic manner. According to Ciborra (1996), 
dynamism was expressed within a meta-organisation, where formative contexts occurred and 
these contexts would mould structures and routines, shaping them into well-known forms such 
as hierarchy, the matrix and networks, but on a highly volatile basis. The incremental approach 
to management posits that emergent changes and uncertainties overarched by an informal 
conscious socio-centric approach is contrasted with functionalism (guidelines, frameworks and 
standards) and is characterised by unique methodical behaviour. Often the behaviour is seen to 
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position itself outside of centralised command and control and takes the form of internalised 
intuitive appeal. The incremental approach, it is argued, often leads to success as compared to 
the functionalist approach particularly in situations of uncertainty, complexity and 
unpredictability.   
 
It should be noted that in contrast to comprehensive planning and functionalism, organizations 
are increasingly practicing an incremental approach (Salmela et al. 2000). For them, planning 
focuses on a few or perhaps just one theme and policies and decisions are made on a one-by-one 
basis (Salmela et al. 2000). 
 
3.4.2 The incremental Approach and Organisational Practises  
 
Salmela et al. (2000) highlighted principles of the incremental approach, when observing a 
particular organization’s activities. They described the incremental approach as highly reflexive, 
with decisions being made at any time.  The way in which the incremental approach in 
organizations was observed can also be compared with theories related to reflexivity such as 
contingency theory. Adler et al. (1999) exemplified contingency theory when making reference 
to efficient organisations which were designed to fit the nature of their primary tasks. This 
thinking entertains the adoption of mechanistic forms for simple stable systems, with efficiency 
being the primary goal and the adoption of organic forms for complex systems with the primary 
goal being reflexivity.   
 
It should be noted that some organisations practise the incremental approach whereby 
functionalism takes a small part while activities and decision making are made on a one-by-one 
basis. The activities are informally conducted in small team units that enable actions to be 
independently derived. There is no specific model for these actions. Employees at operational 
levels are allowed and even encouraged to tinker using local cues and heuristics and to construct  
whatever tools and routines are at hand (bricolage) in order to make ad hoc decisions (Ciborra 
1994).  
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3.4.3 The Incremental Approach in ISRM 
 
In the minds of many information security risk practitioners/planners, planning for risk is firmly 
associated with the structured and rational ipso facto approaches (Salmela et al. 2000). As 
opposed to these ipso facto approaches, the incremental approach calls for the mutual sharing of 
ideas by small (information security risk) teams to develop a common understanding 
(Sambamurthy et al. 1994). This is achieved by informal contacts amongst (information security 
risk) practitioners and this facilitates interpretation and sense making behaviour required to 
understand risk (Sambamurthy et al. 1994). 
 
The incremental approach helps in the searching for satisfactory solutions that deal with threats 
and opportunities yet remain within the current organisation’s resources (Salmela et al. 2000). 
This means decisions rely on personal experience and judgment. According to Pyburn (1983), 
incrementalism allows decision-makers to choose a time horizon appropriate to current 
circumstances.  It is these informal contacts and experiences that help practitioners remain 
continually appraised of ongoing threats and opportunities. Decisions can be made at anytime 
and through such practices that incremental practitioners believe they are likely to succeed in 
turbulent environments (Salmela et al. 2000).   
 
Table 2 below summarized these two main contrasting approaches discussed above as they 
relate to ISRM. 
 
 
Table 2. Summary of Functionalism and Incremental approaches to ISRM  
  
 
Functionalist Approaches  in ISRM 
 
Incrementalist Approaches  in ISRM 
Rich in composition for planning for 
information security risk management.  
Rich in ill-structure and non-planning 
characterised by unique methodical 
behaviour for information security risk 
management. 
This approach in ISRM suggests the 
existence of an objective and value-free 
world that can produce true explanatory and 
predictive knowledge of the reality “out 
there”. 
This approach in ISRM suggests formative 
and subjective contexts occurring and 
moulding structures and routines, shaping 
them into well-known forms such as 
hierarchy, the matrix and networks, but on a 
highly volatile basis. 
Relies on predictive knowledge and  involves 
firstly planning then later  on followed by 
Does not rely only on predictive knowledge 
but subjective contexts for implementation 
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implementation or execution of risk 
mitigation strategies 
 
and execution of risk mitigation strategies. 
In ISRM assume the intent by users/agents to 
follow order(centralized command), maintain 
status quo and reinforce rational choice.   
In ISRM assume the behaviour as positioning 
itself outside of centralised command and 
control and takes the form of internalised 
intuitive appeal. 
The approaches are typically run in a top 
down hierarchical approach that leaves little 
room for reflexivity. 
The approaches are typically run in a bottom 
up hierarchical approach with reflexivity 
evident at the bottom and at times driving 
agendas. 
 
3.5 STRUCTURED FUNCTIONALISM AND INCREMENTAL APPROACHES: 
TWO EXTREMES THAT ARE NOT INDEPENDENTLY SUFFICIENT      
  
The previous sections introduced two approaches; functionalism and incrementalism into ISRM. 
This research posits that looking at these two approaches independently will not yield sufficient 
insight and knowledge to understanding ISRM. What is proposed and is examined in this 
discourse is that both have an inherent limitation when looked at independently and in isolation. 
The next sections discuss the predominant and common inherent flaws and limitations.  
3.5.1 The Functionalist Approach: Limitation 
 
The ISRM process entails planning and managing for risk and has its own formal methodologies 
and frameworks with predefined criteria for mitigating information security risk. In the ISRM 
functionalist approach, there are inherent structures of control and command processes by which 
practitioners act and make decisions based on formally established criteria and methods 
(frameworks, guidelines, standards). Strategic information systems planners view these methods 
as guaranteeing that environmental trends including risk are considered (Salmela et al. 2000). 
The shortcoming of this viewpoint, however, is that environmental trends are unpredictable and 
full of unexpected events, uncertainty and contingencies. What follows is that functionalism falls 
short of incorporating unpredictability.  In the face of these uncertainties, some scholars have 
advocated for organizations to choose a methodology which emphasizes external analysis 
(Bergeron et al. 1991). 
 
From a strategic information systems planning point, there are advocates of functionalism who 
argue that when following structure and methods, there is a likelihood of a high chance of 
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success particularly in a turbulent environment (Salmela et al. 2000). Critics would defer and 
argue that in fact this would increase the chances of failure. These critics have suggested that the 
need to rely on formal methodologies, frameworks and predefined criteria can trivialise decision 
making activities so much that it becomes merely a simple top-down exercise (Vitale et al. 1986; 
Sambamurthy et al. 1994). ISRM activities are likely to follow the kind of activities suggested 
by Sambamurthy et al. (1994) particularly when information security practitioners perform 
information security activities/decisions under uncertainty and turbulence with little time to 
follow structure. Earl (1993) also points out that general practitioners in organizations consider 
comprehensive and formal methods costly and remote. Critics of functionalism and structure 
warn that change in a turbulent environment may be so rapid that plans become obsolete before 
they can be implemented (Lederer and Mendelow 1990; Salmela et al. 2000).  
 
According to Salmela et al. (2000), arguments such as these make methodologies and 
frameworks susceptible to wasted efforts, misdirected investments and low morale (Vitale et al. 
1986) When there is volatility and unpredictability in the business environment, plans, 
frameworks and methodology simply may not provide the necessary reflexivity to be effective 
(Pyburn 1983; Ciborra 1994).  
 
3.5.2 The Incremental Approach: Limitation 
 
The risk to the incremental approach is that this approach has not been widely examined (Earl 
1993). There have been reports on why the incremental approach might not be feasible at all 
times. Some practitioners have expressed concern that incremental planning fails to address 
critical needs (Earl 1993).  
 
Some scholars such Ciborra (1994) have suggested that small scale solutions from team efforts 
resulting from the incremental approach may not be fully recognized and appreciated by 
organizations. Ciborra (1994) gives an illustration of an instance whereby when certain team 
members developed  new systems locally, the potentially strategic applications of these systems 
were dismissed as ‘just end-user hacking’ and never got sufficient resources to become 
organization-wide innovations (Ciborra 1994).  
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There have been some concerns raised by scholars about how the incremental approach would 
affect and generate future structure, methodologies and planning themes. New employees into an 
organization would not fully appreciate these efforts. New leadership from say, a chief executive 
officer (CEO), management team, or management style could erode the incremental planning 
process (Earl 1993). According to Raster (1994) the incremental approach has its limitations in 
that it creates little transparency and covers limited re-organization and re-structuring potential 
thus only leading to small local improvements.  
 
3.5.3 A Proposed Holistic Approach between Functionalism and 
Incrementalism 
 
Given the shortcomings of these two approaches, scholars suggest that a multi-faceted approach 
may prove more useful.  Formulation of information security policies that take cognisance of 
both functionalism and incrementalism i.e. information security risk management, and strategic 
information systems plan (SISP) has been proposed by Doherty (2006) as a way to reducing the 
shortcomings of incrementalism in both disciplines. This way these two important organisational 
disciplines would benefit from an explicit and careful alignment which ensures outcomes of 
strategic importance to information system initiatives that are not compromised by security 
related problems.  
 
The attributes of an approach that takes cognizance of functionalism and incremantalism has 
been called the rational adaptive approach.  It has been confirmed in several studies that the 
rational-adaptive approach is the most successful approach (Doherty et al. 1999). In this 
approach, rationality is reflected as follows: 
 
a) It is highly formalised 
b) It is a top-down approach that is comprehensive in the making of decisions; and 
c) It is focused on control (Doherty et al. 1999; Segars and Grover 1999). 
 
Adaptation is reflected as follows: 
a) Frequent informal planning cycles 
b) Broad informal participation (participative) 
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c) Flexible and loose integration with organisation strategy (Segars et al. 1998; Doherty et 
al. 1999). 
 
According to Grover and Segars (2005), this balanced rational–adaptive approach is shown to 
be more effective and provides strong implications for both research and practice. This research 
extends the above discussed views and proposes that a multi-faceted approach incorporating 
functionalism and incremental approaches be used. In this research, this rational–adaptive 
approach would be viewed as being among other expressions of the multi-faceted 
improvisation. In general improvisation is to be taken as the key central fusion of these two 
approaches. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
3.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION   
    
The chapter called for a paradigm shift to facilitate the understanding of functionalism and its 
influence on approach towards ISRM activities. The chapter also explained an alternative 
approach, namely; the incremental approach. This was not, however, suggested as a replacement 
of functionalism. The chapter showed that both approaches when adopted in isolation are 
incomplete, reactive and do not address or include all the variables and disciplines related to the 
ISRM processes.  The chapter ends with a caution that any new approach must be built on the 
strengths of both approaches while being comprehensive and holistic. The chapter has built a 
foundation for examining a more holistic guide to ISRM.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
 
 
 
The previous chapter called for a paradigm shift to facilitate the understanding of functionalism 
and the incremental approaches to ISRM activities based on identified shortcomings. This 
chapter grounds this understanding and attempts to close the gaps by building on the strengths of 
both the incremental and the structured functionalist approaches. The chapter argues for a 
comprehensive and holistic approach known as improvisation.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: SYNTHESIS OF APPROACHES TO 
ISRM 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
While the previous two chapters discussed and distinguished between functionalism and 
incrementalism as two contrasting approaches to ISRM, this chapter seeks to propose an 
alternative approach. The chapter argues that the proposed approach should combine these two 
approaches to describe the holistic approach. This view should be held with the understanding 
that the reality of ISRM underlies the importance of having holistic information security 
practises by information security professionals.  
 
Understanding ISRM from a holistic view entails viewing the entire spectrum of an 
organization’s ISRM activities and procedures, and the approach to these ISRM activities and 
procedures by skilled information security practitioners. A holistic understanding of how human 
expertise effectively handles uncertainty in ISRM is ppreciated by looking at human expertise 
in other disciplines and how such skilled expertise handles creativity, innovation in situations of 
uncertainty and ill-structure. In the case of this research, the best example has been drawn from 
Jazz.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the constraints to the functionalism and incrementalism 
approaches to ISRM discussed in the previous chapter and to propose viewing the duality of 
these two approaches i  a holistic manner. This chapter grounds our understanding of the 
theories of social and cognitive sciences in the management disciplines. The Jazz metaphor and 
analogy adopted from the social sciences will henceforth become a useful lens in understanding 
ill-structure in ISRM activities. The jazz metaphor therefore helps explain the holistic approach. 
Creativity and improvisation in Jazz will become a useful way of bringing understanding into 
creativity and improvisation in ISRM.  
 
The chapter is divided into six sections. The first section establishes the context for a holistic 
approach by suggesting that the approaches be seen as a combination and not as isolated choices 
of approach to ISRM. The second section argues for holistic examination and suggests 
improvisation as essentially comprising these dual elements of structure and instrumentalism. 
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The third section provides a lens of understanding improvisation from a jazz metaphor context 
while the fourth section contextualises improvisation in ISRM. The reasoning in all these 
sections filters into the fifth section which provides solid ground for researching improvisation 
in ISRM. The sixth section concludes by proposing the creating of a sensitizing device that 
incorporates a fusion of the two approaches. The sensitizing device is deemed a useful tool in 
framing the research. 
4.1 NOT A MATTER OF EITHER STRUCTURE OR INCREMENTAL BUT 
BOTH: A SYNTHESISED APPROACH  
 
The researcher posits that the holistic synthesised approach sees information security risk 
practitioners as being faced with a two way synergy between the incremental approach and that 
of functionalism i.e. as improvisation (Njenga and Brown 2006b; Njenga and Brown 2008). It is 
proposed that this two way synergy eventually creates a holistic approach to ISRM. Galbraith 
(1977) established a concern about orthodoxy and bureaucratically designed structures and 
system use and offered an alternative perspective particularly by introducing improvisation as a 
phenomenon of interest. He notes that the “picture of organisational human action which seems 
to rule out improvisation [is] derived from a particular approach to the analysis and design of 
organisations, the information-processing perspective”. The research adopts Galbraith’s (1977) 
perspective in evaluating ISRM by observing extemporaneous and spur-of-the-moment action 
like improvisational action outside of ordinary hierarchies of planning (Galbraith 1977). The 
complexity of human sense-making as the situation emerges will be a critical area of focus 
(using recognised qualitative methods of evaluating information systems) as demonstrated by the 
works of Kaplan and Maxwell (1994).  
 
It becomes important to understand reflexivity and extemporaneous actions outside of ordinary 
hierarchies of planning and to use the understanding as lenses for creating explanatory 
frameworks. The fundamental emphasis of reflexivity and extemporaneous actions are based on 
the idea that there will be times when constant contextual awareness is appropriate, that 
behaviour and actions would be based on open norms, with a spirit of enquiry, expanded 
consciousness and the recognition of choice (Kegan 1971). The research proposes to give 
perspective to a new way of evaluating ISRM through viewing the expert/skilled human mind as 
an open system subject to external influences that results in extemporaneous actions derived 
from tacit knowledge (Polanyi 1966; Baumard 1999; Njenga and Brown 2006a). Tacit 
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knowledge can be “tweaked” by system inputs/influences such as system exploits, security 
awareness, and security experience (Baumard 1999; Njenga and Brown 2006a). There has also 
been growing realisation that ISRM is no longer a “computer security matter” but an 
“information assurance issue” (Parker 2001).  Indeed Parker (2001) acknowledges a wider 
window of perspective of risk management by suggesting that “auditors must realize that any 
proposed solution to an information security problem should not fixate solely on technology”. 
Parker (2001) also acknowledges that the security process must be continuous and that each part 
of the solution to the problem has about an 18-month half-life (doing it over and over and over 
again).   
 
4.1.1 Introducing a New Alternative and Synthesised Approach  
 
Researchers such as Bjo¨rck (2004) have realized the need to look at organizations afresh by 
postulating a neo-institutional theory in studying IT security issues in organizations. Bjo¨rck 
(2004) argues that the revolutionized modern organization requires new ways of explaining why 
formal security structures and actual security behavior differ and why organizations often create 
formal security structures without implementing them fully. Furthermore, the increasing 
emphasis on techno-based compliance issues derived from explicit methodologies as awareness 
tools, has helped draw attention away from actual security activities (Jackson 2006).  The danger 
here is that getting too involved with compliance issues may not necessarily translate to 
improved security (Jackson 2006).    
 
Cleveland (1973) realised that future managers would be living in environments where nobody 
would effectively be in charge, hence the exponential multiplications of decision-making 
activities, and the enormous personal responsibility of hundreds of decision-makers for the 
organisation’s sense of direction and “playing it by ear”.  The managers would then have no 
higher priority task than keeping his/her eyes and ears on the purpose.  Organisations have 
tended to forget how much improvisation and bricolage are required to complete daily tasks. 
According to Cunha (2004), bricolage is facilitated ‘by the ingenious use of intimately known 
materials’. Barrett (1998) contends that organisations tend to de-skill tasks by breaking them into 
formal descriptions of work procedures to be followed automatically. The outcome therefore 
becomes controlled and stifles creativity.  
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4.1.2  Responding to Contingencies and Emergencies 
 
 
Some authors see ‘playing it by ear’ or ‘taking things as they come’ as acceptable ways of 
responding to unforeseen contingencies (Ciborra 1999). Contrary to much held conventional 
wisdom, “people continually learn and improvise while working” (Brown and Duguid 1991). A 
lot has been written concerning improvisation, strategy formulation and implementation (Perry 
1991).  Much of Perry‘s (1991) work on strategy formulation particularly in emergency 
situations can be contextualised as inferences for improvisational roles for strategic choices and 
problem solving in ISRM.  
 
Many of the actions taken to respond to contingencies and uncertainty bear empirical 
characteristics influenced by the emergent nature of technology and knowledge (as examined 
earlier). These actions provide for reflexivity in the sense that they could be done ‘now one way, 
now another and each way may perfectly or finely fit the situation’ (Scribner 1984). This 
reflexivity is a reactionary outcome in emergencies and would normally be considered useful, 
since improvisation can be deployed to fill the unavoidable gaps between formal 
procedures/standards and emergent events. The researcher posits that understanding 
improvisation as a problem solving technique in management in general and ISRM in particular 
can be useful in helping align everyday activities of (information security) practitioners with 
organisational value (Scribner 1984; Njenga and Brown 2008).  Information security 
practitioners may not have time to analyse a problem, though they may come up with a plan and 
develop responses by acting on the problem as the situation occurs (Njenga and Brown 2008). 
4.2 IMPROVISATION AS AN EXAMPLE OF SYNTHESISED 
FUNCTIONALIST AND INCREMENTAL APPROACH  
 
Information security research is often premised on standards, planning, analysis and structuring 
risk (functionalism). Functionalist studies have made a contribution to ISRM by highlighting 
risk in computer usage and have suggested formal ways (standards, methodologies and tools) to 
address vulnerabilities and mitigate risk (Browne et al 2000; Office 1996; Howard 1997).  These 
studies are useful and form a foundation for a synthesis with the incremental approach. From an 
incremental approach, researchers investigating creativity have noted that practitioners 
sometimes use resources that are material and cognitive (characterised by acquired skills, 
knowledge and memory) in their day-to-day managerial activities (Cunha 2004).  
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Cunha (2004) posited the most efficient way of using cognitive resources is when practitioners 
become familiar with their every day routines, which create patterns of insights capable of 
behavioural novelty (improvisation). From this view, it is noted that the practitioners do not 
abandon functionalism (which is embedded cognitively) but creatively draw from functionalism 
in an incremental way (ill-structured way) to generate new ways of achieving an intended 
outcome, namely improvisation (Njenga and Brown 2008).  The foundation for this view point 
was developed by Ciborra et al. (2000) who considered improvised activities as simultaneously 
structured (functionalist) and unpredictable; planned but emergent; purposeful but opaque; 
effective but irreflexive; discernible after the fact but spontaneous (incrementalism) in its 
manifestation. The holistic approach therefore sees improvisation as a fusion between these two 
extreme approaches, namely the functionalist approach and the incremental approach to ISRM 
(Njenga 2007). The approach is illustrated below in Figure 7:  
 
 
Figure 7. The holistic view of ISRM (Njenga 2007) 
 
Many studies in information security do not account for positive extemporaneous actions 
sometimes evident in ISRM.  Anecdotes and literature about ISRM suggest that information 
security practitioners follow a functionalist approach that include the comprehensive review of 
risks, threats, vulnerabilities, technical controls, governance, and a host of closely related issues 
(Browne et al. 2000; Peltier 2001; Von Solms and Von Solms 2005;Yue et  al. 2007).  
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Despite the wide acceptance of the view that ISRM constitutes structured functionalist 
techniques and methodological frameworks, this process should increasingly be seen as an art 
rather than a science (Winkler 2007; Njenga and Brown 2008). It is possible to see inherent 
shortcomings of functionalism in ISRM using solely standards and frameworks (Chebrolu et al 
2005). In order therefore to obtain a richer picture of how information security practitioners’ 
handle both structured by ill-structure activities, it is essential to have a different (qualitative-
interpretivist) assessment (Chebrolu et al. 2005), an assessment which considers improvisation 
as drawing from functionalism.  
 
The value of improvisation can be exemplified in the following example. When an information 
security practitioner detects inherent vulnerabilities and exploits by a hacker, the functionalist 
approaches suggests information security risk planning (Winkler 2007). The danger is that the 
practitioner will plan for exploits and vulnerabilities he/she is trained to detect. It requires a 
creative skilled information security practitioner to plan, detect and act on novel attacks, 
unknown attacks or even variants of common attacks (Chebrolu et al 2005). This therefore 
requires a mix of skills and resources, cognitive or otherwise (e.g. improvisation), since the 
reactive approaches embodied by functionalist methods are not feasible for detecting malicious 
attacks (Chebrolu et al 2005). What may be postulated is that a more descriptive and holistic 
understanding of how information security practitioners go about addressing threats by 
employing extemporaneous, cognitive and innovative abilities to counter these threats becomes 
necessary. The next sections describe this holistic understanding by introducing improvisation, 
its nature and typology.  
4.2.1 Improvisation 
 
Improvisation, derived from the Latin word “improvisus” is defined as “situated performance 
where thinking and action occur simultaneously and on the spur-of-the-moment” (Ciborra 1999). 
Improvised activities are deemed purposeful and “simultaneously rational (functionalism) and 
unpredictable”, meaning these activities are discernible only after the fact.  Barrett (1998) uses 
the Latin term of “improvisus” meaning “not seen ahead of time”.  It is the highly exploratory 
and tentative nature of this action that creates worries for potential failure and incoherency.  
Weick (1993b) sees improvised action as “deliberate and extemporaneous”. Improvisational 
performance may only be relatively novel, meaning that it had been done before but that it was 
never (1) used by those undertaking the improvisation and / or (2) in the situation that triggered 
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the improvisation (Moorman and Miner 1998).  Improvisation is also considered from the 
context of social negotiations as a “coherent sequence of relational, informational, and 
procedural actions and responses created, chosen and carried out by the parties during the 
process of social interaction” McGinn and Keros (2002). 
 
Cunha et al (1999), also suggest that improvised activities “occur during action”. Ciborra 
(1999) perceives such activities as “falling outside the glance of rational, awake attention during 
the action” and reckons “they could be inferred by an outsider, or made explicit by the actor, but 
as a result of a reflection after the fact”. There is consensus with both Weick (1993b) and 
Ciborra (1999) that improvisation is a human practice from which there is purposeful action; as 
such, the actions or activities represent a tool for communication and interaction that seems 
crucial in the context in which they occur.  McGinn and Keros (2002) viewed improvised acts as 
inherently both active and interactive and contained both familiar moves and unique approaches. 
They noted that interaction between parties reflected the social contexts within which the 
interactions took place.  
4.2.2 Dimensions of Improvisation 
 
The major dimensions of improvisation have to do with: (1) impromptu action in an 
organizational context, and (2) bricolage, or the ability to draw on the available material, 
cognitive, affective and social resources, in order to solve the problem at hand (Cunha 2004). 
Impromptu action is seen as improvised since such action did not have previous routine to tackle 
issues and the action is required, not optional (Cunha 2004). The qualities of improvisation are 
summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3. Qualities of Improvisation (Cunha 2004) 
 
Qualities  
 
Description  
Deliberate Intentional efforts on  behalf of the organization and/or any of its 
members 
Extemporaneous An attempt to enhance the deliberateness of the emergent part of 
organizational strategy and action 
Occurs during 
action 
Organizational members do not stop to think of what would be the best 
response to a problem or the best way to take advantage of an 
opportunity. Instead they develop their response by acting on the 
problem or opportunity  
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Qualities  
 
Description  
Uses resources The resources used are:   
(i) Material: encompasses all those resources that lay ‘outside’ the 
individual and the organizational social system. 
(ii)  Cognitive: comprising the set of mental models held by the 
individual members of the organization. 
(iii) Social: the social structures present among members performing 
improvisation. These structures include not only formal 
relationships, but also explicit and tacit rules and informal patterns 
of interaction. 
 
4.3 ANALOGY: UNDERSTANDING IMPROVISATION IN ORGANISATIONS 
- USING THE JAZZ METAPHOR   
 
Organisational structures are much more reflexive and more often improvised than usually 
recognised (Barrett and Peplowski 1998). By using anecdotal and empirical evidence (Crossan 
and Sorrenti 1997; Moorman and Miner1998), formal definitions of organizational 
improvisation were developed. By means of grounded theory, propositions that aimed at 
explaining organisational improvisation in organizational settings were developed and tested by 
Moorman and Miner (1998). They defined organisational activity as ‘actions taken by one or 
more individuals on behalf of a team, an rganization and / or a project’ while looking at 
improvisation as ‘the conception of action as it unfolds, drawing on available material, 
cognitive, affective and social resources’. Organisational improvisation is seen as transposing 
within the organizational context the characteristics of both improvisation and bricolage 
(Crossan and Sorrenti 1997).  
4.3.1 Organisational Improvisation and the Jazz Metaphor 
 
The idea whereby organisations could be designed for maximising learning and innovation was 
noted by Barrett (1998). In organisations, some employees have a passion for learning and 
innovation; similarly, jazz musicians have a passion for creating new musical material, 
surprising themselves and others with spontaneous, unrehearsed ideas (Barrett 1998).  With jazz 
music, improvisation is possible since what the jazz musician does with the notes is what 
actually counts. This reflexivity makes it possible for the jazz musician to turn a bad situation 
into a good one. Barrett and Peplowski (1998) point out that in jazz “there is no such thing as a 
bad note”. The transformation of the jazz musician is actualised when the musician is able to 
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export material from different contexts and vantage points and by combining, extending, and 
varying the materials adding and changing notes, varying accents, to produce something new 
(Barrett 1998). They are able to “breathe life into these forms” (Barrett 1998).  
 
The linking of organisational improvisation by applying the jazz metaphor has been considered 
in great depth by several scholars (Barrett 1998; Ciborra 1999; Weick 1993b). These scholars 
note that the main difference between jazz music and the various kinds of organisational activity 
is that, in jazz, there is no clear prescription of what is to be played. Barrett and Peplowski 
(1998) pointed out that the secret to the success of jazz musicians was in improvisation and in 
the way they ‘learn how to listen’. This is important because, without it, jazz musicians would be 
going off in all directions creating a sort of musical anarchy. Improvisation in jazz therefore took 
the form of “reworking pre-composed designs in relation to unanticipated ideas conceived, 
shaped and transformed under the special conditions of performance” (Barrett and Peplowski 
1998).          
 
While understanding both the way jazz musicians think while they are playing and their ability 
to master the structured rules that govern musical progression, Barrett (1998) suggested ways in 
which organisational improvisation could be understood. He further outlined that after many 
years of practicing and absorbing music, jazz musicians train their ears to recognise what 
phrases fit between different forms, the various options available, within the constraints of 
various chords and songs. Once the music was integrated into their mental frames, the jazz 
musicians’ rules for chords and songs become tacit and amenable to complex variation and 
transformation (Barrett 1998).  Barrett (1998) draws a parallel between what jazz players do and 
what managers in organisations would be doing to fabricate and invent novel responses without 
a pre-scripted plan and without certainty of outcomes, discovering the future of their actions as it 
unfolds.  
                                      
Barrett (1998) was able to translate jazz improvisation into the organisational setting by 
examining a model of diverse specialists living in a chaotic turbulent environment, making fast 
and irreversible decisions, highly interdependent on one another to interpret equivocal 
information.  The interdependence and working together was also noted by Mcginn and Keros 
(2002). They saw improvisation in organisations taking the form of opening up, working 
together or haggling (Mcginn and Keros 2002).  
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4.3.2 Analogy of Jazz Musicians and Information Security Practitioners 
 
Many authors are in agreement that organisational improvisation aims to solve particular 
problems or to manage events. This form of organisation improvisation happens in varying 
degrees and occurs along a continuum ranging from the spur-of-the-moment action to entirely 
structured planning (Cunha et al. 1999; Moorman and Miner 1998).  Barrett (1998) suggested 
that any improviser employs automatic thinking to execute patterns and that the improviser is 
free to plan strategy while, in a sense, being aware of sub-routine details at peripheral levels and 
reserving the central conscious control for strategic planning.   
 
Drawing the analogy into ISRM, in conditions of complexity and uncertainty, where ISRM and 
planning have little effect, ISRM practitioners can learn from jazz musicians when looking at the 
jazz band as a sort of corporation engaging in an activity. Though not much has been written on 
ISRM and jazz, Barrett (1998) makes a point that managers in general  (including information 
security practitioners) often find themselves doing what jazz players would be doing, e.g. 
inventing novel contextual responses without certainty of outcomes.  
 
Within ISRM activities the need to solve problems, such as securing systems, designing and re-
designing systems, all have to take place in conditions of unprecedented complexity and 
uncertainty (Rosenhead and Mingers 2001a). Unprecedented complexities and uncertainty are 
situations that would allow ISRM practitioners to improvise. 
 
Barrett (1998) outlines seven characteristics that allow specialists (including information 
security practitioners) to improvise coherently in conditions of complexity. The outcomes while 
being purposeful, serve to maximise social innovation in a co-ordinated manner.  These include:  
 
(i) Provocative competences, or deliberate effort to interrupt habit patterns;  
(ii) Embracing errors as a source of learning; 
(iii) Shared orientation towards structures that allow maximum reflexivity;  
(iv) Distributed task- continued negotiation and dialogue towards dynamic 
synchronisation;  
(v) Reliance on retrospective sense making; “Hanging out”- membership in a 
community of practise; and  
(vi) Taking turns soloing and supporting.  
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4.3.3 Improvisation in Managerial Disciplines: Relevance to Information 
Security Risk Management 
 
The foundation for improvised activities in management discipline in general and specifically 
ISRM lies on the premise that information systems are no longer stable, discrete entities, but part 
of elaborate networks and information infrastructures that are subject to constant adjustments 
and adaptation (Ciborra et al. 2000). This understanding suggests a calling for a unique way of 
managing information system security as an art form (Winkler 2007). 
 
When trying to understand how information systems developers deal with unstable, discrete 
systems, Ciborra et al. (2000) considered how these practitioners improvised and noted that their 
activities contained elements of purposeful planning and opaqueness. Although Ciborra et al. 
(2000) were not referring to ISRM per se, but rather the management and planning aspects of 
information systems, it is important to realise that the improvisation phenomenon would not be 
ruled out of other managerial disciplines including ISRM.  It can, for instance, be noted that 
some ISRM activities are seen as effective but “irreflexive”, (Forno and Baklarz 1999) a key 
attribute of improvisation. Though Forno and Baklarz (1999) did not necessarily mention 
improvisation, they highlighted the spontaneity and irreflexiveness of ISRM activities. They 
demonstrated various ways information security practitioners would draw upon the action space 
(improvisational) to counter emergent unprecedented threats from hackers who used social 
engineering. Social engineering as used by hackers and the artistic countermeasures by 
information security practitioners for such activities has been documented by scholars who were 
once hackers themselves (Mitnick 2005; Mitnick at. al. 2002). 
 
Cunha (2004) acknowledged this although he was not expressly talking about ISRM. The 
argument extended was that a practitioner’s cognisance of external representations creates 
patterns of insights inside the practitioner. This cognitive space is capable of behavioural novelty 
which can guide information security risk management and information security risk mitigation 
processes.  
 
Though there is less explication about improvisation in ISRM, (Njenga and Brown 2008), 
extending this interdisciplinary research into the contemporary ISRM workplace would be an 
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interesting way of understanding its meaning and its contextual relevance. This interdisciplinary 
approach to ISRM activities may give deeper insights about the goals and intentions of 
information security practitioners who carry out these activities.   
 
4.4 TYPOLOGY OF IMPROVISATION: COGNISANCE OF A WIDER 
MEANING  
 
According to Cunha and Cunha (2001), the approach to improvisation in organisations is 
primarily based on three principles. However, they observe that these principles are more likely 
to change than to be followed rigidly. They include:  
 
a) Principle 1: Plan to remain flexible (incrementalism) 
b) Principle 2: Rely on structure to promote  initiative (functionalism) 
c) Principle 3: Use pressure to boost creativity. (Note: Pressure links functionalism and 
incrementalism) 
 
It should be noted that these three principles have broader implications for organisations as they 
embark on formulating ISRM policies/ structure. Ideal causal conditions for improvisation 
would be: 
a) Lack of organisational discipline. New plans are made as people go along and this stems 
from lack of existing plans and lack of rigour to follow plans (Kamonche et al. 2002). 
b) Deliberately encouraging spontaneous activities that are inconsistent with prior plans 
(Kamonche et al. 2002). 
c) Logic of responsiveness; in the  face of  uncertainty and unpredictability that make prior 
plans irrelevant or incomplete and faced with a context in which it is difficult to refrain 
from taking action (Kamonche et al. 2002). 
d) Turbulence; lots of change in the current environment (Kamonche et al. 2002).  
 
4.4.1  Various forms  
 
Improvisation in its various forms is summarised as follows:  
(a) Individual Improvisation: this is where planned or deliberate individual behaviour creates 
improvisation (Moorman and Miner 1998). As an illustration, an individual’s deliberate 
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behaviour may play an important role in speeding the development of highly iterative and 
experiential new products (Moorman and Miner 1998; Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995).  
 
(b) Collective Improvisation: this is the combined effort of several individuals/organizations 
(Cunha 2004); Research suggests that interactions among people who are improvising frequently 
produces collective improvisation (Cunha 2004; Crossan and Sorrenti 1997). There are 
suggestions that collective improvisation often builds on and incorporates individual 
improvisation (Moorman and Miner 1998). In an improvisational group, for example, one 
member might make a comment, to which a second will respond with an association between the 
comment and another topic, and then a third member might link these issues to a third, inclusive 
topic (Mangham 1986). The group might not have planned what to say in advance, and the 
pattern that arises is not a simple sum of independent improvisational actions but a collective 
system of interaction that creates and enacts the scene simultaneously (Moorman and Miner 
1998). The idea that a system of interaction can produce collective improvisation was first 
suggested by Moorman and Miner (1998). It can also be noted that the behaviour of teams 
sharing a collective mind (Leede et al. 1999) fosters long and strong collective experiences in 
co-operation, both in training situations and in practice. Leede et al. (1999) contends that, to a 
large extent, behaviour in a collective mind is standardised and therefore predictable and that 
this standardisation creates the necessary sound base for collective improvisation, for creative 
and intelligent collective action (Leede et al. 1999). 
 
(c) Process Improvisation: this relates to the “content, character and sequence of previous 
routines”; process improvisations affected the manner in which these products were developed 
Miner et al. (2001). Vera and Crossan (2004) have used the jazz metaphor to  emphasizes that 
good improvisation (in theatre) arises because its main focus, in contrast to
 
the focus of 
organisations, is more on the process of improvising and
 
less on the outcomes of improvisation.  
 
(d) Product Improvisation: this affects the substantive nature of products and outcomes of the 
organization (Cunha 2004; Miner et al. (2001). Another way of viewing product improvisation is 
through composition (music composition, or any sort of a recreation of a process) which is a way 
to turn process improvisation into product improvisation (Belgrad 1998). 
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4.4.2  Improvisation as a Fusion of Functionalism and Incrementalism   
 
 
Hu et al. (2007) has argued for a more coherent socio-organizational framework that explains a 
deviation from a functionalist centralized structure to a socio-cognitive one that explains why 
managers and practitioners behave in certain ways. By extending on Hu’s et al. (2007) socio-
cognitive approach, it would be interesting to consider the “reality” of ISRM activities.  
 
 
It has been discussed at length how functionalist notions of order-seeking, near-to-equilibrium 
social arrangements are inappropriate because these do not take into account notions of 
complexity (Hu et al. 2007). Reed and Harvey (1992) have pointed out that complexity and 
unpredictability in systems defy standard positivist and functionalist canons of description, 
prediction and explanation. On the other hand, incrementalism accounts for complexity and 
takes into cognizance issues such as adaptation, deliberative behavior, intelligent behavior, 
reproduction and evolution (Marion 1999).  
 
A holistic fusion approach would incorporate the functionalist and incremental approaches 
which argues for the principles of ‘dissipative systems’ which are open and capable of 
assimilated change from environments and are increasingly structurally complex (Reed and 
Harvey 1992). The neo-institutional theory stresses organizations as rational entities with 
structures, rules, and procedures designed to perform certain tasks efficiently. The institutional 
theory argues that organizations are socially constructed, in the sense that organizational 
structures are adaptive vehicles ‘‘shaped in reaction to the characteristics and commitments of 
participants as well as to the influences and constraints from the external environment’’ (Scott 
1987)  
 
 
 
4.5 DEVELOPING A SENSITISING DEVICE TO UNDERSTAND 
IMPROVISATION IN ISRM  
 
Improvisation (as a fusion approach) helps reconcile tension between structure (functionalism) 
and reflexivity (incrementalism) since it comprises a rich mixture of centralised structure and 
novel spontaneity (Cunha 2004; Ciborra et al. 2000; Segars and Grover 1999). 
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4.5.1 Device Development  
 
The objective of this research is to explore and conceptualise this fusion of innovation with 
centralised structure, as a vehicle of understanding these contrasting and often opposite 
perspectives and dichotomies. It is believed that with this understanding, there will be important 
implications for management practice.  Table 4 introduces structured functionalist ISRM 
activities as stipulated by ISO IEC 17799. This initial framework (Table 4) will acts as inputs 
for developing a Sensitising Device to be used in the research. ISO IEC 17799 acts as a 
functionalist representation of the ISRM activities stipulated in ISRM frameworks, 
methodologies and standards discussed earlier. The reason ISO IEC 17799 has been singled out 
as functionalist input for the Sensitising Device is that ISO IEC 17799  is deemed to apply, both 
in relevance and practicality, to a large number of organisations (Von Solms and Von Solms 
2005; IT Gov 2000; ISO / IEC 2002). The other reason is that ISO IEC 17799 has been 
suggested as a framework that identifies information security requirements in organisations 
(Furnell et al. 2006). ISO / IEC 17799 (ISO / IEC 2002) lists some of the following activities 
conducted by information security practitioners. (ISO 27005 has not been used as an input for 
the sensitising device since this research predates the publication of the standard). The names 
of some of the activities (Table 4) have been changed in this research to reflect the generic 
nature of the activities. Six of these activities are singled out for conceptualisation in the research 
as follows: 
 
1. Information Security Policy- See section 2.4.2 of this research (Section 3 of  ISO 17799)  
2. Information Security Architecture- See section 2.4.1 of this research (Section 4 of ISO 
17799) 
3. Information Assets Control Section- See section 2.4.1 of this research (5 of ISO 17799) 
4. Information Security Event Monitoring - See section 2.4.1 of this research (Section 9 of 
ISO 17799) 
5. Regulatory Compliance - See section 2.4.2 of this research (Section 12 of ISO 17799) 
6. Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity Management - See section 2.4.2 of this 
research (Section 12 of ISO 17799) 
 
These 6 ISRM activities identified in Section 2.4, have been selected since they are deemed 
easy to trace and observe, and hence for purposes of practicality and feasibility the research 
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focuses only on these. The Table 4 shows a mapping of the ISRM activities selected with ISO 
IEC 17799. 
Table 4. Mapping ISO 17799 Domains to ISRM Activities (Njenga and Brown 2008) 
*No – technical areas were not considered feasible hence not researched 
The purpose of the Sensitising Device incorporating ISO IEC 17799 is to help the researcher 
empirically understand and describe ISRM activities within the contexts of functionalism, 
incrementalism and the fusion of both of these. Functionalism as described in the Sensitising 
Device is drawn from ISRM literature focusing on ISO IEC 17799. Functionalist approaches 
described in the Sensitising Device are frameworks that focus on planning and implementing 
procedures and guidelines as contained in standard codes of practice such as ISO IEC 17799 
(Eloff and Eloff 2003; ISO 17799).  Table 4 maps ISRM functionalist approaches in literature 
(ISO 17799) to be conceptualised against incrementalism. The detail to which functionalism and 
incrementalism is translated as improvised action in the 6 ISRM activities will be the research’s 
concern.  
4.5.2 The Device  
 
To contribute to the development and empirical validation of a comprehensive framework for 
improvisation in ISRM, a conceptual model know as a Sensitising Device, that fuses the 
functionalism and the incrementalism approach towards ISRM was developed. This model 
CORE ISRM  Activities 
ISO/ IEC 17799 Sections 
 Covered 
in 
Research 
ISRM Activities  
(listed in order of research 
analysis) 
   
ISO/IEC 
17799 
Section  Type of Activity (Domain)   
 
 1 Introduction Reference text   n/a  n/a 
n/a 
IDENTIFY 2 Introduction Reference text   n/a  n/a 
n/a 
 3 Information Security Policy  Yes 
3  Information Security 
Policies  
 4  Security Organisation   Yes 
2   Information Security 
Architecture 
 5 Information Asset Classification and Control  Yes 
1 Information Assets Access 
and Data control 
 
ANALYSE 6 Personnel Security  *No  
 7 Physical and Environmental Security   *No 
 
 8 Communications and Operations Management   * No  
RESPOND 9  Access Control  (section 9.7)  Yes 
 4 Information Security Event 
Monitoring 
 10  System Development and Maintenance  * No  
 11 Business Continuity and Management  Yes 
6  Business Continuity and 
Disaster recovery 
 12 Compliance with Legal Requirements   Yes 
5 IT Governance and 
Regulatory Compliance 
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explains the fusion derived from variations between functionalism and incremetalism in ISRM. 
The variations are derived and contrasted through the specification and examination of 
organisational frameworks, standards and policies which are determinants of ISRM activities 
and also incrementalism where socio-contextual and emergent activities that fall outside of these 
frameworks are examined. The fusion framework confirms the contextual determinants of ISRM 
success by exploring improvisation and is illustrated in Figure 8 below.  
 
 
Figure 8. Fusion between Functionalism and Incrementalism in ISRM 
 
Figure 8. summarises what has been discussed and is a fusion of the functionalist and 
incremental approaches. Both of these approaches are summarised as follows: 
 
Structured Functionalist Approaches 
 
The functionalist approach takes the view that organizations will be successful in coping with a 
turbulent environment only when they incorporate formal planning (Salmela et al. 2000).  The 
formal planning could be based on Guidelines (NIST, organisational guidelines), 
Methodologies (CobiT, ITIL) and Standards (ISO IEC 17799). As depicted in Figure 8 
functionalist ISRM activities conducted within an organisation, would be seen to characterise the 
following;  
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1. Activities (e.g. ISRM) are complicated and highly integrated with overall strategy 
(Premkumar & King 1994). 
2. Activities (e.g. ISRM) are formal and comprise multiple analyses which are used to 
derive order and control (Raghunathan & Raghunathan 1991; Bergeron et al. 1991). 
3. Activities (e.g. ISRM) are based on formal representations from many different 
organisational groups (Earl 1988). 
4. The formal methods and criteria are the basis for (e.g. ISRM) decisions (Ein-Dor and 
Segev 1978). 
5. Activities (e.g. ISRM) are periodically reviewed to adapt to changing circumstances 
(Galliers 1987).  
 
Incremental Approaches 
The incremental approaches sees change in a turbulent environment as so rapid that plans are 
obsolete before they can be implemented therefore making the functionalist approach susceptible 
to wasted efforts, misdirected investments, and low morale (Vitale et al. 1986). As depicted in 
Figure 8 incremental ISRM activities conducted within an organisation, would be seen to 
characterise the following; 
 
1. Activities (e.g. ISRM) are simple, informal and loosely integrated with overall strategy 
(Ciborra 1994). 
2. Activities (e.g. ISRM) are based on personal experiences and judgment to derive order 
and control (Vitale et al. 1986). 
3. Activities (e.g. ISRM) are based on an informal network of few key individuals (Vitale et 
al. 1986). 
4. Shared group (collective) understanding of a few key individuals is the basis for (e.g. 
ISRM) decisions (Ciborra 1994). 
5. Activities (e.g. ISRM) are reflexive and are continuously reviewed to adapt to changing 
circumstances (Vitale et al. 1986). 
 
The Fusion (Improvisation)  
 
Figure 8 also depicts a fusion between these two approaches. This fusion is what the researcher 
denotes as improvisation. By its earlier definition, improvisation was seen as purposeful, and 
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simultaneously rational (functionalism) and unpredictable (incrementalism). This means 
improvisation bears the characteristics of both approaches. When practitioners improvise, they 
improvise within the boundaries of frameworks, methodologies and standards, while at the same 
time, following practices specifically adapted for coping with a turbulent contextual environment 
(incrementalism). The researcher therefore sees improvisational activities in ISRM are those 
engaged when searching for satisfactory solutions that deal with threats and opportunities yet 
remain within the organization’s current frameworks and methodologies. 
 
It can be seen that in stable environments, ISRM is seen as unchallenging, and it is agreed that in 
stable environments functionalism can work (Vitale et al. 1986), but no research has validated 
either the incremental or functionalist approach in ISRM to verify this. The subsequent 
Sensitising Device is the more detailed fusion framework that helps serve as a lens into the areas 
to explore the general idea and meaning into improvisation in ISRM. This is shown as Table 5. 
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Table 5. Detailed Fusion Framework between Functionalism and Incrementalism in ISRM  
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ISRM Functional  Approach  
 
 
ISRM Incremental   Approach ISRM Activities ISO 17799 
Sections  
ITIL CobiT 
 
1.  Information 
Asset Access and 
Data Control 
 
5.2 Information 
classification    
 
 
Application Management, Control 
Methods and Techniques  7.2 
Understanding the applications relationship 
to IT services 
DS 11 Manage Data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unknown ISRM Data: 
 
 
 Improvisation in ISRM to be 
conceptualised  
 
 
(Chapter 6 and Chapter 7) 
 
 
 
 
 Minzberg (1979,1994) 
 Minzberg and Quinn (1996)  
Organizations using an 
informal, incremental 
approach will be more 
successful in that 
environment 
 Mitnick (2002) Controlling 
the Human Element of 
Security 
2.  Information 
Security 
Architecture 
 
4.1 Information 
security 
infrastructure 
 
 
 
ICT Infrastructure Management, 
Technical support  5.4  
 
 
PO  2    Define the information 
architecture 
 
3.  Information 
Security Policies
  
3.1  Information 
security policy 
Security Management; Fundamental of 
Information Security; 4.1 Control 
DS  5  Ensure Systems Security 
 
4  Information 
Security Event 
Monitoring  
 
 
 
9.7 Monitoring 
system access and 
use 
 
 
Service Level Management  4.4.7 
Establish monitoring capabilities 
 
 
DS 10   Manage Problems and 
Incidents  
5 IT Governance 
and Regulatory 
Compliance 
 
12.1 Compliance 
with legal 
requirements 
 
12.3 System audit 
considerations 
 
The Technical Support  5.4  
The technical support process  
 
 
PO  8   Ensure compliance with 
external requirements 
 
6. Disaster 
Recovery and 
Business 
Continuity 
11.1 Aspects of 
business continuity 
management 
 
Availability Management  8.3  
 The availability management process 
DS  4  Ensure Continuous 
Service 
 
DS 10   Manage Problems and 
Incidents 
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4.5.3 Synthesis of Approaches and Apparent Contradictions  
 
From the synthesis of the apparently contradictory approaches of functionalism 
(standards/frameworks like CobiT, ITIL, ISO IEC 17799) and incremental approaches, the 
argument posited in this research is that improvisation has become a way of considering these as 
fused elements. Indeed researchers have noted that there is a limitation of scope and 
understanding for people who view ISRM from one of either perspective or approaches. Yates 
and Orlikowski (1992) have successfully pointed out the dichotomies and contradictions in 
perspective in organisational studies. Weick (1998) argues that organizational analysts are 
limited in perspective and often end up tempted to choose between either of the opposing or 
contradicting conceptual dichotomies, “the issue in most organizations is one of proportion and 
simultaneity rather than choice”.  The fusion framework or the ‘Sensitising Device’ offers a lens 
to which the opposing and contradicting dichotomies are seen as fusing into one whole with 
improvisation being the core of this whole.  
 
4.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION   
 
The earlier sections of this chapter dem nstrated improvisation as holistic, incorporating 
elements of functionalism and incrementalism. The knowledge obtained in the chapter has 
contributed to the theoretical understanding of improvisation’s role in ISRM. A common thought 
is that both functionalism and structure are indispensable enablers of ISRM order and control. 
Although the potential of structure and functionalism in organizations is acknowledged, 
evidence increasingly points to the importance of human agency expressing improvised acts. 
The chapter has demonstrated an alternative approach that shows the resourcefulness of human 
agency in terms of inventiveness. The chapter has also given us useful insights that reveal that 
practitioner activities go beyond rules, structure and formalization.  
 
 
 
 
Table 1A: Mapped Framework Against Topology of Improvisation 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
 90 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
 
 
 
The previous chapters have secured our theoretical understanding and have helped us conceive 
information security risk management and the activities therein. What remains is the generation 
of data and the conceptualization of the phenomenon of improvisation in these activities. This 
chapter introduces the methods and the methodology by which data was drawn. The chapter 
explains the data collection methods that were used. The chapter concludes by justifying the case 
for using grounded theory techniques to analyze this data. The philosophy of the research makes 
the case for the research.   
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
5.0 INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter discusses the philosophical assumptions underpinning the research problem 
presented in the first chapter of this thesis.  In the introduction, it was mentioned that little 
research had been undertaken on improvisation in ISRM.  The purpose of this chapter is to 
discuss a formal scientific way of dealing with the gaps identified in literature by introducing a 
sound research methodology. This chapter discusses the research methodology underpinning the 
research and the manner in which the gaps in ISRM identified in the first chapter are explored.   
 
This chapter is concerned with the methodological approach to the problem posed in Chapter 1. 
The chapter details the research strategy, approach to theory and the challenges experienced. The 
qualitative approach to research is introduced as a means of providing richer meaning and 
insight to the research. 
 
Section 5.1 revisits the research questions. This section exemplifies the meaning of 
improvisation by re-visiting the research questions identified in Chapter 1. These questions 
make the qualitative approach to research amenable to finding meaning of improvisation in 
ISRM. Section 5.2 outlines some principles of research and the competing dichotomies 
identified in literature that guide researchers’ approaches towards research. This section explains 
the need to account for these dichotomies and why some of the approaches were singled out for 
this research. Section 5.3 and 5.4 describe both the ontology and epistemology of the research. 
Section 5.5 describes the approach to theory and to research. Section 5.7 discusses the research 
strategy.  The single case study research strategy is presented, the data collection methods 
outlined, and the various research themes/topics for interviews discussed. This section explains 
how the research questions established earlier are met in collaboration with the organisational 
participants. Section 5.7 introduces the single case and explains why this case was selected. This 
section shows how this single case study is well integrated with the wider objectives of this 
research. Section 5.8 explains the data collection techniques used in the single case while section 
5.9 justifies the reason for using grounded theory techniques to analyse the data collected. The 
last section gives a summary of the chapter.  
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5.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
This section deals with the research question that laid a foundation for the research. Finding the 
meaning of improvisation with the aim of improving ISRM activities was seen as the main 
objective. The research considered the deeper meaning underpinning improvisation in ISRM. 
The research question formulated earlier on in Chapter 1 was aimed at directing attention away 
from the functionalist ISRM approach present in larger more complex organisations which have 
comprehensive information security policies in place to focusing on improvisation.  
5.1.1 Objectives and Questions - Revisited 
 
Research Question 
 
How is improvisation manifested in Information Security Risk Management 
(ISRM) activities and how can improvisation in ISRM be conceptualised? 
 
While considering the above question, the following sub-set questions amplify this question and 
deal with understanding ISRM activities outside of functionalism as follows: 
 
 
 What ISRM activities are in an organisation and how are they carried out? 
 How is improvisation manifested in these ISRM activities in the organisation? 
 How can improvisation in ISRM be conceptualised? 
 How is improvisation used as a foundation for Positive ISRM?  
 
Understanding the above questions meant employing research methods that would be deemed 
appropriate. The methods used (described in detail in the sections that follow) were seen by the 
researcher as compatible with the wider objectives of this research. The methods aimed at giving 
the researcher the optimal data required to comprehensively investigate the research questions 
posed. Care was taken by the researcher to select methods that could complement each other and 
methods that were feasible given the constraints of resources. The methods selected aimed at 
capturing lived experiences, deeply held beliefs, opinions and feelings, and world views as 
understood by information security risk practitioners. The researcher was the main meaning 
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maker of inquiry. There was balance between what was explained as having happened out there 
and the practitioner’s interpretation and “reality”. 
 
5.2 DICHOTOMIES OF RESEARCH  
 
This section introduces the various research dichotomies (Lee 1989) and explains why certain 
approaches were singled out and adhered to in this research. The section explains the approaches 
used while assessing these approaches in terms of feasibility to meet research objectives. When 
looking at the research approaches, the researcher realised that there are a number of competing 
dichotomies identified in the literature that guide researchers’ approaches towards research. 
Some of these are seen as dichotomous to each other (Guba and Lincoln 1994; Lee 1989). 
Fitzgerald and Howcroft (1998) have listed these to include: 
 
1) Realist v. Relativist 
2) Interpretivist v. Positivist (V. Critical Realism: Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991)  
3) Subjectivist v. Objectivist  
4) Qualitative v. Quantitative  
5) Exploratory v. Confirmatory 
6) Induction v. Deduction 
7) Relevance v. Rigour 
5.2.1 Not Dichotomous After All 
 
In the recent past researchers have recognised that Information Systems research is 
multimethod. This means it is not one paradigm verses the other, one or the other, but a 
multimethod approach may be used (Mingers 2001). The explanation for this is because 
Information Systems “draws on and provides a nexus for many diverse research fields and 
disciplines” (Mingers 2001). Information Systems also encompasses very different research 
traditions. Mingers (2001) agrees that research needs to be done on the cognitive and cultural 
obstacles that stand in the way of multimethod.  According to Mingers (2001), the real world is 
ontologically stratified and differentiated, consisting of a plurality of structures that generate the 
events that occur. Different paradigms each focus attention on different aspects of the situation, 
and so multimethod research is necessary to deal effectively with the full richness of the real 
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world.   Each of the competing views (paradigm) is defined and the researcher’s stance 
explained in the following sections. 
5.3 ONTOLOGY 
 
“The question about ontology refers to whether an object of cognition 
exists beyond subjective imagination and perception” (Bunge 1977). 
 
Table 6 outlines two competing views: the relativist view and the realist view. 
 
Table 6. Ontological Research Approach 
 
SOFT APPROACH  HARD APPROACH  
ONTOLOGICAL LEVEL 
Relativist  
Belief that multiple realities exist as subjective 
constructions of the mind. Socially-transmitted terms 
direct how reality is perceived and this will vary 
across different languages and cultures. Fitzgerald and 
Howcroft (1998) 
Realist  
Belief that external world consists of pre-existing 
hard, tangible structures which exist independently of 
an individual's cognition. Fitzgerald and Howcroft 
(1998) 
 
From Table 6 above it can be shown that ontology seeks to explain whether the perception of 
social and physical reality exists subjec ively as a construction of the mind or whether the reality 
is objective and exists independently of an individual's cognition. It should be noted that 
research in cognitive science shows that universal immediate knowledge of reality is impossible 
in principle (Maturana and Varela 1980). 
 
Stance 
This research is relativist and fits into a view point that holds onto a subjective reality which is 
perceived as only existing as an aggregate of socially constructed multiple realities. This 
ontological understanding fits with the researcher’s overall aim which is to understand the 
phenomenon of improvisation in ISRM activities through the relative socio-construction of 
meaning that information security practitioners assigned to these activities i.e. the relative 
meaning of improvisation in ISRM in its context. 
 
In this research it can only be said that the “truth” about the reality of improvisation in ISRM is 
relative and waiting to be discovered (Crotty 1998). Truth as conceived by the researcher exists 
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only through understanding the interaction with the realities of the world. This view assumes 
meaning is constructed rather than discovered (Crotty 1998).   
 
The researcher’s soft approach and ontological stance (relativist) was justified by the fact that 
there has been a noticeable shift in IS research from technological to managerial and soft 
organisational issues. This growth of a softer stance to research was evidenced, for example, by 
an increase in the number of IS journals publishing interpretive studies (Walsham 2006). There 
is also evidence of a shift in editorial policy of some main IS journals, notably MISQ, that found 
acceptance of interpretive studies (Mingers 2001).  
 
5.4 EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
“Epistemology is concerned with providing a philosophical grounding 
for deciding what kinds of knowledge are possible and how we can 
ensure that they are both adequate and legitimate” (Crotty 1998). 
 
 
Table 7. outlines competing views, namely the interpretivist, the positivist, the subjectivist and 
the objectivist views which provide various knowledge types. 
 
Table 7. Epistemological Research Approach 
SOFT APPROACH  HARD APPROACH  
EPISTEMOLOGICAL LEVEL 
Interpretivist 
No universal truth. Understand and interpret from 
researcher’s own frame of reference. Uncommitted 
neutrality impossible. Realism of context important. 
Fitzgerald and Howcroft (1998) 
Positivist 
Belief that world conforms to fixed laws of causation. 
Complexity can be tackled by reductionism. Emphasis 
on objectivity, measurement and repeatability. 
Fitzgerald and Howcroft (1998) 
Subjectivist 
Distinction between the researcher and research 
situation is collapsed. Research findings emerge from 
the interaction between researcher and research 
situation, and the values and beliefs of the researcher 
are central mediators. Fitzgerald and Howcroft (1998) 
Objectivist 
Both possible and essential that the researcher remain 
detached from the research situation. Neutral 
observation of reality must take place in the absence of 
any contaminating values or biases on the part of the 
researcher. Fitzgerald and Howcroft (1998) 
 
The core of epistemology deals with the relationship of cognition acquired by the subject to the 
object of cognition (Becker and Niehaves 2007). From Table 7. above, it can be explained that 
the interpretivist researcher focuses more on the subjective propositions that are regarded as 
relevant when striving for knowledge, while the positivist researcher theoretically claim an 
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intersubjective validity for their research results (Becker and Niehaves 2007). According to 
Pozzebon (2003), the terrain in which the interpretive research takes place is continually shifting 
and is characterised by openness rather than stability and closure.  
 
It should be noted that the main area of contention between a positivist and an interpretivist 
perspective lies in the understanding of ‘reality’ (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Walsham, 1993). 
Interpretive research attempts to understand phenomena by exploring the meaning people assign 
to them and the context in which that person acts. An interpretive approach is based on the 
assumption that data is socially constructed and value laden (Byrne and Sahay 2007).  Byrne and 
Sahay (2007) consider data collected in interpretive research as being transformed into 
information and then knowledge through the interpretation and meaning people assign to it, 
which influences knowledge and actions.  
 
Stance 
The epistemological viewpoint held in this research is that of interpretivism.  It is thus seen as a 
researcher’s own interpretation of the ISRM practitioners’ interpretation of the reality of 
information security risk.  It was acknowledged from the onset that an interpretivist stance 
(Klein and Meyers 1999) would help establish successful collection of data and interpretation 
through in-depth interviewing. What led to this research generally being taken and classified as 
interpretive was a primary assumption that the researcher’s knowledge of reality was to be 
gained through social construction such as language, consciousness, shared meanings 
documents, tools and other artifacts (Klein and Meyers 1999).   
 
The construction of knowledge about improvisation was also gained iteratively through the 
researcher’s own interpretations. This meant that this knowledge was to grow incrementally, 
with meaning of language, consciousness, and shared meaning of ISRM activities growing 
successively at each iterative step, allowing the researcher to take advantage of what was being 
learned, and then to proceed to the next higher level (Miyake 1997).  
 
The researcher rejects objective reality, and much of the research work could be taken as 
subjective and tending to construct meaning.  The research was inclined towards the meaning-
oriented methods as opposed to those methods that were positivist measurement-oriented 
methods (Myers 1997b). Thus this is where the researcher became the meaning maker of this 
reality of improvisation in ISRM.  This inherent subjectivity lies at the core of richness of this 
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research. It should be noted that Rubin and Rubin (2005), have viewed the iterative process as 
being very subjective and varying from one researcher to another.  Rubin and Rubin (2005) 
postulated that, “Though the analysis is based on the descriptions presented by the interviewees, 
the interpretations in the final reports are those of the researcher”.  While the positivist holds 
that reality is "out there", waiting to be discovered and that this reality is reflected in universal 
laws that may be discovered by the application of objective, replicable and "scientific" research 
methods, the interpretive position argues that the world is subjective and reality is socially-
constructed and hence relative (Lincoln and Guba, 2000).  
5.4.1 Qualitative and Quantitative Research (Data Types) 
 
“Qualitative Research is any type of research that produces findings not 
arrived at by statistical procedures or other means of quantification. It can 
refer to research about persons’ lives, lived experiences, behaviours, emotions, 
and feelings as well as about organizational functioning, social movements, 
cultural phenomena, and interactions between nations” (Strauss and Corbin 
1998). 
 
“Quantitative approach to research is any type of research that involves 
quantification and measurements (statistical procedures) applied to 
populations, since the populations’ data exists independently from the 
researcher’s opinions and feelings. Being objective implies that other 
individuals should agree with the researcher’s observations and measurements 
applied to populations” (Welman, et al. 2007).  
 
Table 8 outlines two competing methodological approaches namely the qualitative and the 
quantitative. 
Table 8. Methodological Research Approach 
 
Qualitative 
Determining what things exist rather than how many 
there are. Thick description. Less structured and more 
responsive to needs and nature of research situation 
Fitzgerald and Howcroft (1998) 
Quantitative 
Use of mathematical and statistical techniques to 
identify facts and causal relationships. Samples can be 
larger and more representative. Results can be 
generalised to larger populations within known limits 
of error Fitzgerald and Howcroft (1998) 
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From the descriptions on Table 8 above, it can be determined that both positivistic and 
interpretive research can apply qualitative and quantitative methods (Creswell 2003). Qualitative 
research can also either be positivist, be interpretive or use the critical research perspective 
(Mingers 2001). Qualitative approaches emphasize meaning-oriented methods while 
quantitative approaches look at results and outcomes as stemming from causal relationships. The 
quantitative methods use mathematical and statistical data to show these relationships.  
 
Stance 
In this research, qualitative research methods were used to examine the socio-technical 
phenomenon of improvisation in ISRM. Thick descriptive data were used. The qualitative 
approach was used to help the researcher understand improvisation in ISRM as seen from the 
information security practitioners’ perspective. The information security practitioners would 
yield qualitative data about “lived experiences, behaviours, emotions, and feelings as well as 
about organizational functioning”.   
 
In general terms, not all qualitative research is interpretive (Klein and Meyers 1999). Within 
qualitative research methods, the employment of the hermeneutic method is what distinguished 
this qualitative research to one that would be recognized as being interpretive (Klein and Meyers 
1999). The hermeneutical method was considered to fit well with the concerns of attempting to 
achieve coherence over the whole process and finding overall meaning (of improvisation in 
ISRM) (Schultze 2000). 
 
The Hermeneutical Circle: this is the view that ‘understanding the meaning of the whole, is 
done by understanding the meaning of its constituent parts and, also by understand the meaning 
of the verbal parts of a linguistic whole, there must be some prior sense of the meaning of the 
whole’ (Klein and Meyers 1999). The hermeneutical circle is the foundation of all interpretive 
work. How the hermeneutical circle was applied in this case was in the understanding of a 
complex whole of ISRM (functionalism and incrementalism), the preconceptions about meaning 
attributed to of its parts (functionalism and incrementalism) and their interrelationships. The 
process of interpretation in this research moved from a precursor of understanding the parts 
(texts and meaning) to understanding the whole and from a global understanding of the whole 
context back to an improved understanding of each part (Klein and Meyers 1999).  
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Thus the whole process was circular in approach. This circular accumulation of understanding is 
exemplified in Chapter 6 and 7. The interpretation in Chapter 7 was based on both the 
researcher’s and the information security practitioners’ preliminary understanding (and 
interpretation) of the research question/gaps. Interpretation would be concluded by 
understanding the whole which would consist of the shared meaning that emerged based on 
these interactions (Klein and Meyers 1999).  
5.5 APPROACH TO RESEARCH 
 
“The exploratory approach to research is concerned with 
discovering patterns of data “(Fitzgerald and Howcroft 1998). 
 
“Confirmatory research is concerned with theory testing and 
verification” (Fitzgerald and Howcroft 1998). 
 
It should be noted that the approach to research can be either exploratory, explanatory or a 
combination of both. 
 
Table 9 outlines the two approaches to research namely the exploratory approach and the 
confirmatory approach. 
Table 9.  Approach to Research 
SOFT APPROACH HARD APPROACH 
 
APPROACH TO RESEARCH 
Exploratory 
Concerned with discovering patterns in research data, and to explain/understand them. Lays basic descriptive 
foundation. May lead to generation of hypotheses Fitzgerald and Howcroft (1998) 
 
Confirmatory 
Concerned with hypothesis testing and theory verification. Tends to follow positivist, quantitative modes of 
research Fitzgerald and Howcroft (1998) 
 
 
Table 9 above should be viewed as suggesting that exploratory research may incorporate either 
soft, hard or both approaches. The same may be said on confirmatory research.  
 
Stance 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
 101 
 
No Previous research studies have been done of improvisation in ISRM; therefore this research 
was exploratory and was concerned with discovering new patterns of data (improvisation in 
ISRM). A lot of ideas incorporated in the research were exploratory and were drawn from the 
domains that incorporated cognitive philosophy and thinking dominant with social scientists 
well as industry managers. Exploring new ideas meant that the researcher would explain the 
phenomenon under study well and also would a lay a foundation of descriptive ideas for 
understanding improvisation in ISRM activities. Exploration was possible in the research since 
at the heart of qualitative and interpretive research lays the premise of openness.   
 
5.6 APPROACH TO THEORY 
 
“The inductive researcher derives understanding based on the discussion” 
Krueger (1989). 
 
“The deductive researcher derives understanding based on testing or 
confirming a preconceived hypothesis or theory” Krueger (1989). 
 
Table 10 outlines the two approaches to theory: the inductive approach and the deductive 
approach. 
 
Table 10. Research Approach to Theory Development 
SOFT APPROACH HARD APPROACH 
APPROACH TO THEORY  
Induction 
Begins with specific instances which are used to arrive 
at overall generalisations which can be expected on 
the balance of probability. New evidence may cause 
conclusions to be revised. Criticised by many 
philosophers of science, but plays an important role in 
theory/hypothesis conception. Fitzgerald and 
Howcroft (1998) 
Deduction 
Uses general results to ascribe properties to specific 
instances. An argument is valid if it is impossible for 
the conclusions to be false if the premises are true. 
Associated with theory verification/falsification and 
hypothesis testing Fitzgerald and Howcroft (1998) 
 
As Table 10. suggests, the research approach to theory can be either inductive, deductive or 
both.  The inductive research approach usually forms the basis for most qualitative research 
methods and may at times be treated as ‘suspicious’ because subjectivity introduced into 
research makes the findings ‘challenged’ or ‘not measurable’. However, it is this inherent 
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subjectivity that makes an inductive research approach rich and descriptive (Rubin and Rubin 
2005).  
 
Stance 
Because of the existence of a prior theoretical framework and Sensitising Device, whereby 
discussions about the nature of ISRM as incorporating both functionalism and incrementalism 
apply to this research, it was safe to acknowledge that the research was not purely inductive, 
but consisted of both deductive and inductive elements.  The derivation of a Sensitising Device 
aimed at a preliminary “testing” of the fundamentals of ISRM in the organisation was 
determined by existing frameworks; thus the research was deductive. The data analysis (open 
coding) part of this research was seen as independent and not influenced by pre-existing data 
sets, making it inductive.  It was possible to identify some deductive element expressed in the 
form of the Sensitising Device and consequently in the arguments that stemmed from its use in 
the latter stages of the research. Inductive reasoning was not suppressed by the researcher.  
 
5.6.1 Approach to Research at Axiological Level  
 
“Rigour refers to hypothetical-deductive testing with emphasis on 
internal validity” (Fitzgerald and Howcroft 1998). 
 
“Relevance refers to applying research questions to practice with 
emphasis on external validity” (Fitzgerald and Howcroft 1998). 
 
Table 11. outlines the two approaches at the axiological level namely rigour and relevance. 
 
Table 11. Axiological Research Approach 
SOFT APPROACH HARD APPROACH 
AXIOLOGICAL LEVEL 
Relevance 
External validity of actual research question and its 
relevance to practice is emphasised, rather than 
constraining the focus to that researchable by 
‘rigorous’ methods Fitzgerald and Howcroft (1998) 
Rigour 
Research characterised by hypothetico-deductive 
testing according to the positivist paradigm, with 
emphasis on internal validity through tight 
experimental control and quantitative techniques 
Fitzgerald and Howcroft (1998) 
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Rigour has sometimes been mistakenly confused with positivist, quantitative research. It is for 
this reason that much attention has been devoted to rigorous hypothetico-deductive testing 
according to the positivist paradigm; this has been at the expense of relevance. The price that has 
been paid is that the hypotheses being tested have often been trivial, resulting in sterile research 
(Fitzgerald and Howcroft 1998). 
 
Fitzgerald and Howcroft (1998) contend that researchers need to establish relevance and that 
research may be greatly constrained if there is too much emphasis on rigour only. They see a 
focus on rigorous approaches only as one way of failing to ensure the validity of the actual 
question being researched. They propose a need to lay down a critical foundation of meaningful 
and relevant constructs, in other words, “relevance should come first and drive rigour”. 
However, "relevance does not excuse inattention to rigour” (Fitzgerald and Howcroft 1998). 
 
Stance 
This research needed to be rigorous and relevant, particularly in using the methods employed in 
data analysis. Relevance in this research was achieved by asking the following questions when 
examining data: “what is this data saying from the through processes of the information security 
practitioner and the researcher”? “What was the ultimate relevance of the data”? Rigour from 
an interpretive, qualitative perspective was achieved by following the principles and guidelines 
for conducting interpretive qualitative case study research (Darke et al. 1998). Rigour was also 
achieved in the way data was analysed.  
 
It was accepted that conceptualisation and analysis process was greatly dependent on rigour and 
relevance, i.e. the researcher’s “rigour, clarity and creativity of his or her conceptual thinking” 
(Lewis and Ritchie 2003).  This means that the researcher made every attempt to make this 
research both rigorous and relevant, since making sense of the data was the ultimate goal of this 
research.  
 
The next sections look at the research strategy and propose the single case study as the most 
appropriate strategy to achieve the research’s ontological epistemological, methodological and 
axiological objectives.  
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 5.7 RESEARCH STRATEGY: CASE STUDY  
 
Yin (1994) defines a case study as an “empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clearly evident”.  “Case study research involves in-depth study of a few 
people, an organization or an event”.  This definition directed the researcher’s understanding of 
the need to use case studies when the intention was to cover contextual conditions (Yin 1994).   
Yin (1994) identified five components of research strategy that are important for the single case 
study considered in this research. They are listed as follows: 
1) Research questions  (See Section 1.2) 
2) Propositions, if any (Not applicable for this single case) 
3) Unit(s) of analysis (See Section 1.2) 
4) The logic linking the data to the research question ( Section 5.1.1 and Section 6) 
5) The criteria for interpreting the findings (See Chapter 7) (Yin 1994). 
A fundamental difference between case studies and any other alternative method is that the case 
study researcher may have less a priori knowledge of what the variables of interest will be and 
how they will be measured (Benbasat et al. 1987). In this particular instance, the researcher 
developed a Sensitising Device to act as a reference point into understanding improvisation in 
ISRM since knowledge about improvisation in ISRM was still insufficient at this stage. That is 
why this research should not be construed to imply that it is a purely inductive research (as 
discussed previously, Section 5.5).   
5.7.1 General Myths: Debunking and Justifying Case Study Research 
 
Some arguments suggest that case studies are subjective and this makes them only suitable for 
pilot studies. Some have also suggested that one cannot generalise from case study research. In 
other words, they would not be considered fully fledged research schemes.  The conventional 
wisdom has been that case study research cannot be of value in and of themselves; they “need to 
be linked to hypotheses following a known hypothetical deductive model” (Flyvbjerg 2006).  
When such criticism is repeated often enough it may be taken as truth - argumentum ad infinitum 
(Flyvbjerg 2006).  
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This researcher agrees with Flyvbjerg’s (2006) notion that this conventional wisdom about case 
study research is not valid since there are reasons why case study research should merit full 
fledged research recognition. Case studies are multi-perspective (Feagin et al. 1991),  meaning 
that any research that adopts case study strategy considers not just the voice and perspective of 
the actors, but also of the relevant groups of actors and the interaction between them.   The 
following are some of the myths discussed by Flyvbjerg (2006) and how these have been 
debunked. Table 12 below explains these myths. What follows is a brief justification for the use 
of case studies for each myth.  
 
Table 12. Case Study Research  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Each of these issues above will be discussed in turn.  
 
1. Knowledge Comparison 
Myth: General theoretical (context-independent) is more valuable than concrete practical 
(context-dependent) knowledge.   
 
 
Myths Nature Description 
1 Knowledge 
comparison  
General theoretical (context-independent) is 
more valuable than concrete practical (context-
dependent) knowledge.  Flyvbjerg (2006) 
2 Generalisation One cannot generalise on the basis of an 
individual case; The case study cannot 
contribute to scientific development.  
Flyvbjerg (2006) 
3 Research 
Completeness  
The case study is useful only in generating 
hypothesis (first stage of process) while other 
methods are more suitable for hypothesis 
testing and theory building.  Flyvbjerg (2006) 
4 Bias  The case study contains bias towards 
verification; tendency to confirm the 
researcher’s preconceived notions.  Flyvbjerg 
(2006) 
5 Summarisation  It is difficult to summarise and develop a 
general proposition and theories on the basis of 
specific cases Flyvbjerg (2006) 
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Stance 
This research produced context-dependent knowledge about the phenomenon of improvisation in 
information security and risk management in one organisation. It is believed that this knowledge 
is of value to both industry and practice (Flyvbjerg 206). Information security risk practitioners 
should be seen by all as experts in their everyday social, technical and intellectual skills while 
operating on the basis of intimated knowledge of numerous concrete cases in information 
security risk. It is such context-dependent knowledge that the researcher acknowledged as the 
method of understanding ISRM activities. It was the closeness of the case study to the real-life 
situation and its wealth of details that was important and added to these rich insights in two 
respects: the development of a nuanced view of reality and that this case was important in the 
researcher’s own learning processes. 
 
2. Generalisation 
Myth: One cannot generalise on the basis of an individual case; the case study cannot 
contribute to scientific development.   
 
Stance 
The researcher agrees with other researchers who have identified generalisations of case study 
research as being a challenge (Lee and Baskerville (2003). The challenge applies to whether the 
results from this research can be abstracted and applied to other settings. However, the 
researcher also agrees with Walsham (1995) who extended the notion of generalisations from 
interpretive case studies by arguing that generalisations can be viewed as “tendencies” and are 
best “seen as explanations of a particular phenomena derived from empirical interpretive 
research in specific IS settings which may be valuable in the future in other organisations and 
contexts”.  Walsham (1995) also outlines four types of generalisation from interpretive case 
studies that this researcher considered significant. The researcher saw this work as generalisable 
in the following manner: 
a) Development of concepts (Walsham 1995; Lee and Baskerville (2003). (concepts 
generated in this research to theory can be generalised Chapter 6). 
b) Drawing specific implications (Walsham 1995) (specific implications in this research 
can be generalised Chapter 8). 
c) Developing rich insights (Walsham 1995) (insights produced by this research can be 
generalised Chapter 6,7, and 8). 
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d) Generating theory (Walsham 1995) (the framework in use in this research can be 
generalised Chapter 7 and 8). 
 
It should also be observed that Lee and Baskerville (2003) have provided a framework for 
classifying the concept of generalisability particularly for research that falls outside of the 
bounds of sampling-based (statistical) research. According to Lee and Baskerville (2003), 
generalisation in qualitative research should not be “proven statements” but rather to be taken as 
“untested yet well-founded statements”. Yin’s (1994) view on generalisability is that statistical 
generalisability is an inappropriate measure of quality of case studies because case studies 
involve a different form of inference. This researcher concurs and adapts the above listed  points  
in terms of generalising this work. 
 
3. Research Completeness 
Myth: The case study is useful only in generating hypothesis, (first stage of process) while 
other methods are more suitable for hypothesis testing and theory building.   
 
Stance 
According to Lee and Baskerville (2003), this myth is invalidated by the fact that many 
researchers have built theories from case study research. Lee and Baskerville (2003) make 
mention of Eisenhardt’s (1989) work which describes how to build theories in case study 
research. This is demonstrated when Eisenhardt (1989) explicitly subscribes to Yin’s case study 
method and to Glaser and Strauss’ (1967) grounded theory in providing ground for theory 
building in case studies and warranting full recognition. This researcher concurs with these 
arguments.  
 
4. Bias 
Myth: The case study contains bias towards verification; tendency to confirm the researcher’s 
preconceived notions.   
 
Stance 
Although it can be stated that case studies contain a bias towards verification and is understood 
as a tendency to confirm the researcher’s preconceived notions, this researcher explains bias as 
follows:  bias was not to be seen as an inherent characteristic of case study research but as a 
fundamental human characteristic. This is a problem all researchers including this one have had 
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to deal with.   Although the allegation would be that this research allowed more room to be 
subjective and arbitrary, this research presented its own rigour particularly in data analysis which 
minimised bias and subjectivity.  The strength of this research was that the researcher focused on 
real-life situations of ISRM practises and tested against these views directly to improvisational 
theory as these activities unfolded in practise.  
 
5. Summarisation 
Myth: It is difficult to summarise and develop general propositions and theories on the basis 
of specific cases 
 
Stance 
Though this research yielded thick descriptive data, it was not the intension of the researcher to 
summarise greatly, nor was this desirable. This was because “it is simply that the very value of 
the case study, the contextual and interpenetrating nature of forces, is lost when one tries to sum 
up in large and mutually exclusive concepts”. (Peattie 2001). The dense case study is, according 
to Peattie (2001), more useful for the practitioner and more interesting for the social theory than 
either factual “findings” or the high level generalisations of theory.  
 
5.7.2 Single and Multiple Case Study Research  
 
Case study research can be a single case or a multiple case study (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 2003). 
An organization can provide a single or a multiple case study appropriate for building an 
understanding of how practitioners undertake tasks for theorizing based on this understanding 
(Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 2003).  There can also be more than one organization that will provide for 
multiple cases (Yin 2003).   
 
Stance 
The research adopted a single case with multiple embedded units of analysis to investigate the 
phenomenon of improvisation in ISRM. The use of embedded or multiple units of analysis (6), 
was necessary for cross comparison and analysis (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 2003) (See Chapter 6 
and 7). The single case study research is accepted as a valid research strategy within the IS 
research community (Klein and Meyers 1999). 
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5.8 THE SELECTION OF A SINGLE CASE STUDY IN CONTEXT 
 
The researcher identified and selected a single case on the assertion that this case was uniquely 
positioned to generate a full variety of evidence including documents, artefacts, interviews and 
observations.  In general, the single case was considered suitable due to a series of key 
characteristics identified for this particular research. These key characteristics have been 
summarized and shown in Table 13 below.  
 
Table 13.  Reasons for Selecting the Single Case (Adopted from Benbasat et al. 1987) 
 
Key Reason  Covered in this research  
Phenomenon (of improvisation) could be examined in 
its  natural setting in this case  (Benbasat et al.  1987) 
Improvisation and ISRM:   Chapter 4 
 
It  was possible to collect data by multiple means  in 
this case setting (Benbasat et al. 1987) 
Data Collection:  Chapter 5 
 
It was possible to examine one or few entities (person 
or group) in this case ( Benbasat et al. 1987) 
Single Case Study:  Chapter 5 
 
It was possible to study intensively the complexity of 
the units of analysis singled out in this case (Benbasat 
et al. 1987) 
Units of Analysis: Chapter 1,5,6 
 
This case study was  suitable for the exploration and 
classification (Benbasat et al.  1987) 
Approach to Research: Chapter 5 
No experimental controls or manipulation would be 
involved in this case ( Benbasat et al. 1987) 
Approach to Theory: Chapter 5 
The results derived in this case would depend heavily 
on the integrative powers of the researcher( Benbasat 
et al. 1987) 
Data Analysis and Interpretation : Chapter 6 and 7 
It remained possible to change site selection and data 
collection methods if the researcher developed new 
insights about the case ( Benbasat et al. 1987) 
Methodology : Chapter 5 
It was possible to  study the  "why" and "how" 
questions in the case because these deal 
with operational links to be traced over time 
(Benbasat et al. 1987) 
Questions: Chapter 1,5 
The focus is the case was of a contemporary event. 
Benbasat  et al. (1987) 
Objective: Chapter 1,2,5 
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5.8.1  Reason for Selecting the Single Case 
 
Site Selection 
The researcher began the site selection process by considering the nature of improvisation and 
ISRM. There was an initial recognition that both ISRM and improvisation were organization-
level phenomena, hence the need to select a suitable organisation that would richly express such 
phenomena. The characteristics of large multinationals were then examined to determine best fit 
and most likely case. The factors used (Benbasat  et al. 1987) to determine these included: 
 
a) Organisational size 
b) Organisational structure 
c) Public or private ownership (due to accessibility ) 
d) Geographical proximity (due to resource limitation) 
 
In identifying a suitable single case, the researcher located a “most likely” case that could be 
large enough to confirm the phenomenon of improvisation in ISRM and would fit the above 
listed criteria. The researcher focused on local multinationals and singled out 5 large 
multinational companies. Also included in this list was a large government organization. The 
researcher finally settled down on one organisation which has the following characteristics. 
 
Organisational size 
 
The organisation is a large retailer which sells a selected range of food products, clothing and 
house wares in 230 stores in South Africa.  The organisation also has franchised outlets 
throughout Africa as well as the Middle East. The organization has demonstrated high levels of 
business performance as shown by a preliminary review of its key performance indicators 
(KPIs).  The organisation employs approximately 14,000 employees and has an annual revenue 
of approximately $2.1 billion. In terms of its IT infrastructure, the organisation has in the 
immediate past rolled out a modern stock replenishment information system that manages 
approximately 1,100 styles of information. Recently this stock replenishment information system 
could no longer support the organisation’s growth. 
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Organisational structure 
The organization did not want this data (information) to be disclosed in any format, generic or 
otherwise. The Business Continuity manager suggested that the interviews and document 
analysis should suffice. Due to confidentiality, the researcher opted not to try and obtain more 
information about the structure of this organization than was necessary. The structure of this 
organization is not in the public domain. The upside of this was that the organization had put 
structures (units) in place that were identifiable making this case ideal and suitable. That was 
why the researcher was easily able to select the units of analysis in this organization. (For the 
structure of the units of analysis for this organization see Section 5.9.2 – structuring interviews.)  
 
Public or Private ownership (due to accessibility) 
The organization remains a holding limited company with local (South African) franchise stores 
and international franchise stores throughout Africa and Middle East.  
 
Geographical proximity (due to resource limitation) 
The host organization was selecting due to its size, structure, profit base and, most importantly, 
accessibility.  The headquarters of this organization was close to where the researcher lived and 
studied.  
 
5.8.2  ISRM in the Selected Single Case 
 
It was established that the organization frequently conducts information security assessments 
and uses established frameworks for carrying out information security audits. The organization 
has a sound information security architecture, with its network systems, virtual private networks 
(VPN) and firewalls equipped with cutting edge technology.  The organization pioneered a web 
based approach to internal and external transactions in its operations with real-time connection 
and integration to customers, manufactures, distributors and point of sale representatives.  
 
The organization’s Information Security department is responsible for co-coordinating secure 
distribution channels for its retail and financial services in real-time for its critical applications. 
Since the organization was and has been offering financial services, it placed importance in 
working within a strict regulatory environment. Customers using its systems are found to be 
extremely strict about and sensitive to the security of their personal information. The concerns 
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were particularly sound given the publicity of information security incidents present in the 
public domain.  
 
The organization has been conducting ISRM activities such as business continuity assessments, 
disaster recovery exercises, information security policy and procedures review, and information 
security audits. The purpose of these exercises as explained to the researcher was to guarantee 
information security to all its partners, customers and stakeholders, while ensuring the highest 
degree of protection from hostile attacks.  
 
The Information Security and Business Continuity Department was mandated to ensure that 
there was minimal interruption of critical production networks, applications and especially data. 
The primary objective of this department was to ensure applications were run in a secure and 
protected way from attack (external or internal). It was explained that this was to be 
accomplished through comprehensive information security auditing and assessments. 
Fundamental to these assessments was an ISRM approach contextual to the organisation which 
was designed to: 
 probe and validate the organisation’s information security state of applications through 
penetration testing and vulnerability assessments; 
 review the on-going information security practices, policies, and processes.  
 manage information security posture in the context of the information security industry 
best practices, baselined against industry standards. It was during the research that the 
organisation had just rolled out CobiT as an acceptable best practice approach to ISRM.  
In terms of benchmarking itself with the industry best practices, the organization used CobiT (as 
previously mentioned), ISO IEC 17799, Open source security testing methodologies and the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Network Security Testing Guidelines.  
The benchmarking and comparative scoring for its applications was found to be on level-2 
security, meaning consensus best practice was at a high level of due care where most of its 
critical applications connected to the internet..  
 
From this preliminary background of the organization, the researcher was able to maximize the 
utility of information derived from this single case organization to successfully achieve the 
initial aims and objectives stipulated for this research.  The next section explains how the units 
of analysis in the single case were examined and reviewed.  
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5.8.3 Defining Units of Analysis in the Single Case  
 
The organisation followed set procedures as directed by the CobiT, ITIL, ISO IEC 17799 
frameworks and methodologies. It was therefore easy to map out the units of analysis as 
activities defined by these frameworks, since these activities were already implemented in the 
organisation. There was also a clear structure of how these activities were to be implemented and 
performed (based on CobiT, ITIL, ISO IEC 17799). Each of these activities also had a 
leadership that was contactable. The research then simply defined the units of analysis as the 
ISRM activities defined earlier in literature. See Section 2.4.   
 
The units of analysis identified in this organisation were those that would yield distinct themes 
as well as rich and context specific activities that characterised ISRM activities. It was feasible 
to compartmentalise these ISRM activities into themes guided by functionalist frameworks such 
as CobiT, ISO IEC 17799, and ITIL. The researcher identified the core sets of activities, rich in 
distinct themes from an initial framework, the Sensitising Device (See Section 4.5.2) developed 
earlier on. These distinct ISRM activities (themes) were notably evident, based on preliminary 
interviews held with a senior practitioner from the organisation.  
The units of analysis (previously ISRM activities) as deductively understood from the 
Sensitising Device contained a summary of ISRM techniques used by information security risk 
practitioners in those specific themes. The units when viewed and considered in aggregate 
constituted the holistic corporate information security risk management practises of the single 
case study. The ISRM activities and hence the units of analysis are summarised in Table 14 
below.  
Table 14. Units of Analysis 
No. Units of Analysis ISO IEC 17799 ITIL CobiT 
 
1 Information Assets Access and Data 
Control (Section 2.4 of this thesis) 
Section 3 of  ISO 
17799 
Application 
Management, 
Control Methods 
and Techniques 7.2 
Understanding the 
applications 
relationship to IT 
services 
DS 11 Manage Data 
 
2 Information Security Architecture 
(Section 2.4 of this thesis) 
Section 4 of ISO 
17799 
ICT Infrastructure 
Management, 
Technical support 
5.4  
 
PO  2    Define the 
Information 
Architecture 
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The units of analysis (functionalist ISRM activities) were seen as appropriate for generating the 
required information. The Sensitizing Device discussed in Section 4.5.2 therefore served as a 
lens for initially deductively understanding which areas the researcher would investigate and 
which information security risk practitioners the researcher would interview.  
 
 
5.9 DATA COLLECTION IN THE SINGLE CASE STUDY  
 
Initiating rapport, engaging with the selected organization and finally gathering primary data on 
information security proved challenging. This was not considered a unique experience nor did 
this experience discourage the researcher. Kotulic and Clark (2004) conducted a study and found 
a number of reasons for this. An important reason that stands out is that in matters of 
information security, organizations are reluctant to share information about information 
security policies with individuals from outside the company.  In fact, according to Kotulic and 
Clark (2004), “Information security research is one of the most intrusive types of organization 
research” …and “there is undoubtedly a general mistrust of any ‘outsider’ attempting to gain 
data about the actions of the information security practitioner community.”  The next section 
describes how the researcher overcame some of these challenges. 
 
3 Information Security Policies (Section 
2.4 of this thesis) 
Section 5 of ISO 
17799 
Security 
Management; 
Fundamental of 
Information 
Security; 4.1 Control 
DS  5  Ensure 
Systems Security 
 
4 Information Security Event Monitoring 
(Section 2.4 of this thesis)  
Section 9 of ISO 
17799 
Service Level 
Management; 4.4.7 
Establish monitoring 
capabilities 
 
 
DS 10   Manage 
Problems and 
Incidents 
5 IT Governance and Regulatory 
Compliance (Section 2.4 of this thesis) 
Section 12 of ISO 
17799 
The Technical 
Support  5.4  
The technical 
support process 
 
 
PO  8   Ensure 
Compliance with 
External 
Requirements 
 
6 Disaster Recovery and Business 
Continuity  (Section 2.4 of this thesis) 
Section 12 of ISO 
17799 
Availability 
Management  8.3 
The availability 
management process 
DS  4  Ensure 
Continuous Service 
 
DS 10   Manage 
Problems and 
Incidents 
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5.9.1 Data Collection Procedures 
 
Negotiating Entry 
 
Before data collection could begin, the senior information security officer (Information Security 
and Business Continuity Department) was contacted for a meeting. This was done via a series of 
telephone calls and email. The preliminary purpose was to set an appointment and discuss the 
research. The researcher began by spelling out clearly in a letter sent via email what the 
intentions and objectives of the researcher were. The researcher was not explicit on the topic 
concerning improvisation, though. This was important so as not to arouse mistrust or misgivings 
about whether the researcher was in fact in the right place. Once a meeting was scheduled, the 
researcher then proceeded to have a direct face-to-face conversation with the information 
security practitioner. The information security practitioner’s seniority and tenure made it 
possible to easily arrange meetings with other section heads. This would benefit the theoretical 
sampling approach used later on when conducting and obtaining primary data from other 
practitioners (see Appendix 10).  
 
For purposes of structuring the interview processes, it was important that units of analysis be 
identified from the onset. Once this was d ne, it would be easy to explain the purposes and 
objectives within each distinct unit being researched and the source of primary data (see 
Appendix 1). It would also enable the appropriate sets of questions to be placed for each unit so 
as to yield rich distinct themes for each unit. It was important to establish the units and themes 
early on since this approach would help establish a balance of structure that would enable the 
selected organisation to make certain distinct resources available as early as possible. There was 
a situation where representatives represented more than one unit of analysis as their duties 
tended to overlap. This however was noted early on and interviews were structured to 
accommodate more than one unit of analysis.  
 
At times planning, arranging and finally obtaining the required level of participation proved very 
difficult as most of the information security practitioners were very busy people who were 
generally committed to their work and had very little time.  This did not discourage the 
researcher although it was evident that this would affect the research outcome in general.  The 
units of analysis as identified from the onset (see section 4.5.2) formed the deductive focus areas 
of information security risk concerns particularly with regard to the use of technology and, more 
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specifically, to the knowledge hot spots for information security and controls. Anecdotal 
evidence suggested that these units of analysis (themes) had been the focus areas by 
management on ISRM to meet baseline standards required by the board.  
 
Data Collection in the Units 
The primary data collection methods used included in-depth interviews, review of 
documentation (and artefacts) and observation. The richness of the choice of this methodology 
was vindicated by the richness of data obtained. The following techniques are explained in detail:  
 
1) In-depth interviews 
a. High level questionnaire (sent first to determine interview questions Appendix 8) 
2) Review of  artefacts and documentation  
3) Observation  
 
 
5.9.2 In-depth Interviews  
 
Before the interview process could begin, the researcher designed and sent a high level 
questionnaire (Appendix 8) to only one person. The purpose was to elicit information that would 
enable the structuring of the interview schedule in Appendix 1.   
The interview guide as reflected in Appendix 1. was developed as follows; 
 
1. The researcher divided the main ISRM activities suggested by literature review into units. 
The researcher inde tified 6 units in all. 
2. The researcher then looked at the open questionnaire sent to one information security 
practitioner for the host organization and looked at how some of the questioners were 
answered. This gave an over view of how the guide was to be developed. 
3. The researcher then looked at ISO/IEC 17799 which is explicitly about control issues with 
respect to the above units.  
4. Control issues from ISO/IEC 17799 were re-worded to serves as impetus for the interview 
guide. 
 
The primary data was gathered in two phases. The first phase consisted of a series of 11 in-depth 
interviews. The in-depth interviews were open-ended and discovery oriented.  The interviewees 
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were senior information security practitioners including one who sat on the board. The list was 
drawn up from contacts provided by the senior information security practitioner (Information 
Security and Business Continuity Department) earlier on. The researcher constantly liaised with 
the senior practitioner in order to plan subsequent meetings with other heads. The sampling 
strategy used was theoretical sampling where participants were selected to maximize the 
opportunities for augmenting the pool of relevant data. During the actual interviews, a tape 
recorder was used to collect primary data. Permission to use the recorder was sought before any 
interview commenced.  
 
The interviewees were encouraged to talk in an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence and 
were encouraged to reflect on any aspect of improvisation they had themselves encountered or 
initiated as potential contribution to change in risk mitigation or enhancing information security 
posture of the host organisation. The interviewees were requested to focus on the strong 
potential for improvisation, originality, creativity and of fostering new ways of doing things 
outside of their normal structures. The whole process was easygoing since the researcher 
expressed himself in such a manner as to show interest in what was being talked about. 
However, there were times that the whole discussion had to be re-directed back to the main topic 
if the interviewee turned to “other interesting topics”. The researcher realised that the best way 
to re-direct the discussion was to ask a direct question which would “scaffold” the thinking and 
discussion process, and that the researcher still maintained control of the process. The objective 
of the interview process was to understand the different sets of practitioner activities and 
relationships that create a different form of risk management process.  
 
All interviews were tape recorded. After each interview, the information was transcribed 
verbatim in writing. In addition, notes were taken as the interviews progressed. It is from the 
transcribed responses from the interviewees that the research formed the contextual case for the 
phenomenon of improvisation being investigated.  The interviews were conducted for 60 to 90 
minutes per session. This generated close to 700 transcript minutes for data analysis. Phase two 
consisted of 3 additional interviews that enabled the researcher to explore some of the mentioned 
issues in phase one in more detail. These interviews also lasted up to 60 minutes.  The interviews 
were based on open-ended questions and the researcher gave the respondents room for open 
answers. The interviewees were, as a matter of encouragement, given room for reflexivity in 
answering questions. The discourse of the interview was perceived by the researcher to be “an 
act of knowledge making its own rules”; the researcher saw the interviewees as “social actors” 
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who were interacting with the interviewer while at the same time being involved in discursive 
practise. The profile of respondents interviewed and the positions they occupy are given in 
Table 15 below.  
Table 15. Profile of Respondents within the Units of Analysis 
 
 
CORE ISRM  ACTIVITIES 
ISO 17799 Sections/ CobiT/ ITIL 
Covered 
in 
Research  
 
Activities 
analysed  and 
labelled as 
units in this 
research Interviewee and Position 
   Section  Type of Activity    
IDENTIFY  
 
3 Security policy Yes Information 
Security 
Policy 
Group Information 
Security Officer  
 
 
4  Security organisation  Yes IT 
Governance 
and 
Regulatory 
Compliance  
 
IT Executive  
IT Security team 
 
 
5 Information Asset 
Classification and Control 
Yes Information 
Assets and 
Control 
IT Executive  
IT Security team 
ANALYSE 
  
 6 Personnel Security   No research on this section  
 
7 Physical and Environmental 
Security  
Yes Security of 
Information 
Architecture  
Head of Architecture 
Forum  
Enterprise Middle ware 
Team  
IT Executive   
Business Continuity 
Manager   
 
8 Communications and 
Operations Management  
  No research on this section 
RESPOND/CONTROL 
9  Access Control  Yes 
 
 
 
 
Event 
Monitoring  
Manager of Microsoft 
Platform, Operations   
Group Enterprise 
Architect  
 
10  System Development and 
Maintenance 
   No research on this section 
 
11 Business Continuity and 
Management 
Yes Disaster 
Recovery/ 
Continuity 
Business Continuity 
Manager  
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Initiating Rapport during the Interview 
 
Rapport was a necessary part of the in-depth interview process since, by initiating this strategy, it 
was easy to notice a shift into informal discussions and social communication and back again into 
more formal aspects.  Rapport enabled the researcher to get acquainted with the information security 
practitioners early on and “break-the-ice”. Although they maintained their distance (which was 
picked up easily by the researcher--they seem to hold and hoard critical information they valued), the 
researcher developed an understanding about each of the interviewees.  
 
Meaning Co-construction during the In-depth Interview  
The researcher perceived the interviewees as co-constructors of meaning even though at times 
the interviewees did not necessarily indicate their knowledge of this.  The researcher would 
often interject with words like ‘hmmm” or expressions indicating that the interviewee continue 
the narration after a pause. Sometimes subtle encouragement was necessary especially when the 
interviewee was not sure if what they were saying was relevant.  
 
Managing Interview Relationships 
The researcher conscientiously wanted an environment which would encourage free and natural 
conversation. The researcher had the privilege of controlling the direction and flow of 
discussion. The good thing about this was that at an earlier stage through emails and various 
correspondences, the researcher alerted the interviewee of the interview process. This sort of 
introduction gave impetus for such control especially when seen in the light of what took place 
in the actual discussions.  
 
5.9.3 Review of Artefacts and Documentation 
 
In order for the researcher to have a preliminary understanding of the selected case for study, a 
reasonable time was spent reviewing documents that gave information about the host 
organisation. The key approach to document analysis was content analysis. In this approach, the 
researcher looked at what was being done in the organisation and what was emerging in these 
documents.  In using content analysis, the researcher focused on the actual content of the 
documents so as to determine the presence of certain words, concepts and phrases. This was 
done in order to quantify these concepts or phrases in an objective manner.  
The researcher was not analysing whole documents but looking at chunks of data in these 
documents, i.e. looking at lines and phrases at a time. Only those phrases that were relevant to 
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the units being analysed were coded. A detailed discussion of the document review and the 
analysis process is listed in Chapter 7 STEP 3.  
5.9.4 Observation  
 
Observation of ISRM activities was very limited. The researcher ensured observations were 
conducted in the context of the experiences of the information security risk practitioners. 
Observations were intended to capture the world of the information security practitioners 
without prescribing a structure in which the information security practitioners must reflect in this 
world in her data-yielding actions; thus they were free and open.  The organisation organised 
disaster recovery exercises in two locations. The researcher was invited to participate in the one 
that was 18 km from the organisation’s headquarters. The researcher observed the activities that 
were carried out in the disaster recovery exercise.  In the disaster recovery exercise, the 
researcher did not become part of “the furniture” but went to the scene to explore issues that 
would reveal more about the phenomenon of improvisation. The researcher had in mind a way 
that he would collect data; an observation protocol/ schedule was designed prior to going to the 
site and the researcher filled in the schedule what was observed. Table 16 below is a template 
for the on site observation. The full recording of the observation is detailed in Section 7.7 Table 
39 and Appendix 3.  
 
Table 16. Template for Observation: Disaster Management Exercise 
 
Location : Name and Description of Location    
 
Access to this site is restricted and everyone is issued a temporary access ID.  
Start  Time: 
9: 00 am  
Description of Activity   Observation Notes  
 
 
Description of Activity   
End Time:  
 
9:30 am  
 
Description of Activity   Observation Notes  
 
Description of Activity   
Description of Activity   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Key notes  
 
 
DISCUSSION  
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The researcher also developed some field notes which complemented observation with data that 
shed light of the various parts of the inquiry. The advantage of this process was that the whole 
exercise was able to assist the researcher mentally organise and fit in specific pieces of 
information that would not have been obvious through interview only.  
5.10 USING SELECTED GROUNDED THEORY TECHNIQUES AS A 
METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS 
 
5.10.1  The Grounded Theory Method 
 
Grounded Theory Method (GTM) is a “systematic qualitative research methodology in the 
social sciences emphasizing generation of theory from data in the process of conducting 
research”. (Allan 2003). GTM works in a reverse approach from traditional research and at first 
may appear to be in contradiction of the scientific method (Allan 2003).  
 
GTM works by firstly collecting data through a variety of methods then marking the data with a 
series of codes which are extracted from text. The codes are grouped into similar concepts in 
order to make them more workable. From these concepts, categories are formed, which are the 
basis for the creation of a theory. This contradicts the traditional model of research, where the 
researcher chooses a theoretical framework, and only then applies this model to the studied 
phenomenon (Allan 2003). 
 
In this research, the Grounded Theory Method (GTM), (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Glaser 1978; 
Strauss 1987; Strauss and Corbin 1990; Glaser 1992) has been used as a form of content 
analysis to find and conceptualise underlying issues amongst a myriad of confusing data. Glaser 
(1992) established this technique as a qualitative way of inductively deriving theory.  This 
technique was proved attractive due to its systematic procedures for inductive reasoning and 
conceptualisation particularly at case study level. As established earlier, many cases are 
contextual and therefore would need a deeper understanding (Orlikowski 1993).  
 
Grounded Theory Method has been noted as a useful interpretive method for theory generation 
(Bryant 2002; Strauss and Corbin 1998). The researcher’s choice of this method was to generate 
a descriptive and exploratory theory of improvisation in information security risk management, 
rooted in the experiences of specific information security practitioners. Grounded theory has 
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been used successfully in both organizational and information systems research in the past 
(Orlikowski 1993; Trauth and Jessup 2000; Urquhart 1997). 
The basic elements of Grounded Theory Method include generating concepts and categories, the 
concepts being the most basic units of analysis. Since the whole purpose of the research was 
inherently conceptualisation, it was important for the researcher to derive concepts from primary 
data. The development of concepts stemming from the inductive nature of grounded theory 
techniques encourages researchers to steer thinking out of the confines of literature (deductions) 
and avoid standard ways of thinking about the data (Strauss and Corbin 1990).  
"All is Data" Glaser (2001) 
 
One essential dictum raised by Glaser (2001) which is a pillar on which the units of analysis in 
section 5.7.2 stand is the idea that ‘all is data’. The researcher noted that the collection of data 
was primarily for conceptualisation of what was meant to be in the researcher’s eyes, that is, 
theory. The theory emerging from the data would then be compared with the Sensitising Device 
formulated earlier (Section 4.5.2).  
 
Glaser (1992) proposes a way in which concepts and categories should be seen to emerge 
naturally.  While it may seem that Glaser (1992) has validity in this proposition, the history of 
how this data has been treated by researchers; Strauss (1987), Strauss and Corbin (1990), does 
point out that many have used this method as a ‘rule of the thumb’ rather than static rules.  As a 
note to this work, the researcher has been flexible in modifying the approach in a way that lets 
the data ‘speak for itself’, and in a sense establish the concepts as actual derivatives of the 
qualitative data being analyzed. This method was suitable for the inductive element of research. 
5.10.2 Using Open Coding as a Grounded Theory Technique  
 
A number of ways were considered in analysing primary data. The researcher finally settled on 
the use of open coding, grounded theory techniques. The choice of the technique gave the 
researcher comfort in the possible richness and insights the data streams would yield. The value 
of these techniques was considered for two primary reasons: (i) The approach would draw on 
deeper features of case study research which would be undiluted from preconceived ideas of 
other researchers, through searching for new concepts and ideas (Glaser and Strauss 1967); (ii) 
New concepts would emerge that would aggregate into categories that would be used to establish 
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theory.   Strauss (1987) talked of open coding forcing the researcher to break apart and fracture 
the data analytically.  
 
5.10.3 Applying Open Coding  
 
This was what was done initially and is explained in detail in Chapter 6. This process is 
described in Table 17 below. Table 17 shows the structured way followed by the researcher in 
the data analysis phase.  
Table 17. Process of Data Analysis using Grounded Theory, Open Coding  
RESEARCH PROCESS  
 
Process 1 
Analyse data relating to unit s of 
analysis and to conceptualise 
improvisation 
Use open coding  
 
Develop concepts and categories 
relating to improvisation in ISRM 
activities 
Process 2 
Theoretical Sampling Literal and theoretical replication across 
cases (select interviewees for data until 
saturation) 
Confirms, extends and sharpens 
theoretical framework by 
analysing the rest of the units of 
analysis 
Process 3 
Analyse data relating to the 
subsequent other units of 
analysis to conceptualise 
improvisation 
Use open coding  
  
Develop concepts and categories 
relating to improvisation in ISRM 
activities 
Process 4 
Reaching closure Theoretical saturation when possible  Ends process when marginal 
improvement becomes small  
 
Table 17 shows that the first process was to determine codes using open coding as grounded 
theory technique of analyzing data. The coding was done until theoretical saturation. In a sense 
the whole process was to start inductively. Sense making became integral to the coding process, 
in such a way that the sense making process (contextualising data) blended inductive and 
deductive thinking in ways that produced meaning and relevance. The researcher spent less time 
worrying about the ‘correctness’ of data Glaser (2001) and more on the relevance of what was 
being coded. This meant placing greater emphasis on concept generation that would be more 
fitting to the phenomenon of improvisation in ISRM activities.  This whole process was iterative 
and is depicted in the Figure 9. 
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Data Analysis  
 
Theory Development 
 
 
 
Theory 
Saturation?  
Yes 
Data Collection  
 
 
 
 
  No  
Closure 
Theoretical 
Sampling (1)   
 
 
Figure 9. The Interrelated Processes of Data Analysis, 
to Building Theory (Pandit 1996) 
This coding process went on until the researcher was sure about the categories emerging i.e. 
saturation. This approach is not without criticism as was acknowledged in earlier studies. Glaser 
(1992) has been critical of this method. He notes his concern with the approach which leads to 
‘forced conceptualisation’ of qualitative data (exemplified in Strauss 1987; Strauss and Corbin 
1990).  The framework in Figure 9 guided data analysis for each unit of analysis and involved 
generating concepts through the process of open coding and breaking down data, 
conceptualising this data and putting it back into new ways. 
5.10.4 Iterative Theorising and Constant Comparison  
 
Data should be analyzed and inferences drawn from the empirical data itself and not inferences, 
prejudices or association of ideas directly from the researcher (Glaser 1992; Strauss and Corbin 
1998). Though this proved difficult, the researcher was guided by the constant comparison 
between emergent theory (codes and categories derived) and the new data. The constant 
comparison helped the researcher confirm the data and hence theoretical constructs up to a level 
of theoretical saturation, which would mean that new data would add significantly to what was 
already known. Through constant comparative analysis, the researcher took time searching for 
relationships between the concepts derived, and the phenomenon of improvisation in ISRM. The 
researcher adopted a middle order approach (Dey 1993) where some broad distinctions were 
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initially drawn based on common sense categories. Analysis proceeded towards sub-
categorization and the comparison between the middle order categories. In order not to lose 
focus and also to maintain relevance, constant comparative analysis was applied not only from a 
code-to-code, theme-to-theme and concept-to-concept but also by looking holistically at what 
the literature said. So, in a way, the comparison was done holistically and iteratively. This 
approach is critical to any interpretive research applying grounded theory techniques to analyze 
and interpret data (Schön 1983). This means the whole process reflected an inductive-deductive 
research cycle that is required in the learning process.  The iteratively theorized approach used to 
conceptualize improvisation through constant comparison not just for sections but for chapters is 
shown in Figure 10 next page.  
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Chapter 
2, 3, 4 
Chapter 
5.4 
Chapter 
6.2 
Determination of Suitable Context for 
Investigating Improvisation In ISRM 
Create a Phenomenological Database for 
Data Collection 
Open Coding for Relevant Codes, Categories 
Properties and Dimensions 
Chapter 
6.2 – 6.7 
Refine Core Categories  
 
Write Theoretical                                  Define Relationships 
Memos                                                       and Properties 
                                                                    
   
 
Generation of New Insights 
for ISRM  
 
 Reflect on Researcher’s 
Own Pre-Understanding 
 
Secondary Data 
Literature Review 
 
Formal Theory Construction through 
Researcher’s Own Interpretation and Finding  
Conclusion 
Chapter 
8.1 
Chapter 
7.9 
Acknowledge Influence of Literature Sources 
for Improvisation and ISRM 
Figure 10.  Iterative Theorising and Constant Comparison. 
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5.10.5 Researcher’s Role and Ethical Consideration 
 
The research for all purposes abided by and followed on the proposals from the ethics 
committee which has developed quality control criteria and procedures based on traditional 
forms of qualitative research. Based on these procedures, this research emphasises consent 
and confidentiality. It is for this reason that the researcher made explicit to the selected host 
organisation that there would be a mutual understanding that the research contents would be 
confidential while safeguarding the interests of the participants of research. The other ethical 
consideration for this research was the intended value to the research participants.  
 
With the aim of providing value, the researcher strove to find meaning in the phenomenon of 
improvisation in ISRM by attempting to see the bigger picture. “Raw” empirical information 
was turned into qualitative descriptions in order to give a meaningful description of 
improvisation as it was contextually applied. The researcher made attempts to present “thick 
descriptions” by providing ample empirical evidence from various data sources and by using 
a systematised approach.  
 
From an ethical perspective, the researcher was the main instrument of the research and made 
meaning of data from the engagement with the information security risk practitioners. 
Meaning was also derived from what was consequently interpreted of the data. This approach 
was consistent with other studies (Henning 2002; Henning 2004). Every attempt was made to 
ensure that the meaning assigned to data and the interpretations thereof were linked and 
drawn from the data collected and from the theory that explicated the phenomenon of 
improvisation in ISRM (Sensitising Device).  The understanding that the knowledge and 
skills base of participants would grow in line with the stated objectives provided the ethical 
value of this research to the selected host organisation.  
 
5.11 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
The methodology chapter adds value to this research by explaining the research philosophy 
and approach to research. This chapter revisits the research problem and focuses on shaping 
the problem into questions for which appropriate methods of inquiry were used.  Insight is 
also added in this chapter regarding the methods, and nature of data collection, and finally 
how the data are analyzed. By introducing the use of grounded theory techniques to analyze 
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data, this chapter has demonstrated in detail how this is achieved in as far as helping to meet 
the underlying research objectives stipulated in the first chapter of this thesis. The chapter 
deliberates the research strategy, debates and justifies the use of grounded theory techniques 
applied in the data analysis section. The research methodology and research methods of 
inquiry introduced in this chapter exemplify: 
 
1) better understanding of raw data, 
2) rich data that provides for reflexivity in interpretation. 
 
The next chapter is a detailed discussion of the procedure of data analysis as applied using 
grounded theory techniques. This chapter analyses data from distinct units and themes.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
 
 
This chapter attempts to increase the natural knowledge of what is already know in ISRM and 
improvisation by grounding this understanding with contemporary present day data, 
specifically focusing on primary data analysis. The chapter takes us through the steps of 
analyzing and interpreting this contemporary data. This permits an interpretation of the 
practitioner’s own understanding of improvisation in ISRM into new ways that largely 
harmonizes with what is already known. The chapter sectionalizes the analysis into units of 
various themes and draws out new knowledge.  
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CHAPTER SIX: DATA ANALYSIS – OPEN CODING 
6.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
Formal data analysis as explained in this chapter started as soon as data was collected. What 
followed was the coding of data. The coding happened iteratively with analysis. This chapter 
gives a detailed discussion of how the collected data was coded and analyzed and is a step 
closer towards a full conceptualization of improvisation in ISRM activities. The purpose of 
this chapter is to make it possible to develop a deeper understanding and meaning of 
improvisation as analyzed from the various units of analysis. The data analysis chapter 
demonstrates scientific rigor as shown by the approach and techniques used in data analysis. 
This chapter helps establish understanding of raw data using tested and sound data analysis 
techniques.   
 
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section explains how open coding as a 
grounded theory technique was used to analyse data. This section explains the steps that were 
carried out in open coding. The second section describes how open coding was applied to all 
ISRM units of analysis.  The third section is a collective summary of findings while the 
fourth section concludes the chapter. 
6.1 EXAMINATION OF UNITS OF ANALYSIS BY APPLYING OPEN 
CODING TECHNIQUES 
 
While adhering to the grounded theory techniques for analysing the data, (Strauss and Corbin 
1998), the essential guide posts for the data-sets examined in this chapter are illustrated by 
the steps listed in Table 18. What follows is a detailed explanation for each step. 
Table 18. Open Coding of Improvisational Date Incidents 
STEP 1  
 
Data Incidents 
( Transcribed 
Interviews)   
 
STEP 2 
 
 
Context of Data 
Incident 
 
STEP 3  
 
Researcher’s 
memos  
Determine 
Codes 
 
 in vivo and 
other 
generated  as 
underlined) 
 
STEP 4  
 
Level 
STEP 5  
 
Concepts 
generated 
 
 
STEP 6  
 
Categories 
(See Section  
4.4.1) 
 
 
 
 
Step 1 Data Step 2 Data Step 3 Data Step 4 Data 
 
Step 5 Data 
 
Step 6 Data 
(For a full list of steps and work done, see Appendix 2 – 7). 
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 6.1.1  STEP 1: Extracting Data Incident 
 
As soon as the researcher had finished the interview process and transcribed the recordings, 
the researcher started “engaging the data”. The researcher started by looking for elements of 
improvisation. Data was fractured or “compartmentalised” into cells (to be referred to as 
data-sets) for analysis and traces of improvisation. The compartmentalisation process 
involved breaking down data. The process of breaking down and analysing the data and 
assigning labels is described as content analysis by researchers (Glaser and Strauss 1967). 
These data-sets are listed in Appendix 10. A documented shortcoming to this approach was 
that major themes would be “lost” in contextual detail or lead to “over-conceptualisation’ 
(Glaser 1992).  In order to overcome this suggested shortcoming, the researcher tried as much 
as possible to retain the original meaning inherent in the data-sets. Data-sets were compared 
with other data-sets (constant comparative analysis) so that the meaning of what was said 
would not be lost. The other reason for the compartmentalisation was to enable triangulation 
of data and finally classification of data into distinct themes relating to the identified ISRM 
units of analysis. That was the reason for Appendix 10. 
 
Traces of improvisation (elements of fusion between incrementalism and functionalism) were 
noted in researcher’s memos.  The units as defined by literature review (See Section 5.8.3, 
Table 12) were (6) six in total, meaning these data-sets would in the end be categorised into 
6 parts with each part representing a distinct unit of analysis. This was not difficult since the 
persons being interviewed represented distinct units of analysis and so what was said would 
generally fit into the data-set for that particular unit. However there were times when a 
practitioner would mention activities relating to other units and this data was moved to its 
respective data-set. The final result of the 6 part categorisation was the generation of 
Appendix 2 to Appendix 7.   Data incidents that pertained to improvisation were then 
extracted from these high level data-sets.  
6.1.2 STEP 2: Determining Context of Data Incident 
 
It was easy to see that the compartmentalised data in the data- sets (Appendix 10) would not 
make sense by simply glancing at the data. Through conversation analysis (Denzin et al. 
2003) the researcher provided the context for selected data in the data-sets for incidents that 
reasonably suggested improvisational elements. In order to give relevance and context for 
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data incidents, the researcher followed procedures suggested by Glaser (1978), when 
examining data and providing contexts. These procedures involve asking a series of questions 
relating to the data incidents in the data-sets. The following questions as suggested by Glaser 
(1978), were re-written to suit the research purpose and are listed as follows; 
 
 What aspect of both incrementalism and functionalism does this data imply? 
 What improvisational concept does this explanation suggest/indicate? 
 What is actually happening in the data incident? 
 
Once these questions were addressed the researcher wrote memos relating to the context the 
data incidents happened. These memos are also shown in Appendix 2 to Appendix 7, STEP 
2.  
6.1.3 STEP 3: Deriving Open Codes from Researcher’s Memos  
 
The process of writing memos that would guide open coding (grounded theory technique) in 
STEP 3 involved several sub-steps. The first step was to examine in-vivo codes. Note: In-vivo 
codes are derived from the language and terminology used by participants (interviewees) in 
the study (Rodon and Pastor 2007). It is from this direct language that scientific constructs 
are derived.  Strauss (1987) refers to in-vivo codes as being taken from or derived directly 
from the language used by the actors (participants or interviewees) themselves. In-vivo codes 
have ‘analytic usefulness’ as they are often used precisely by the participants, and they often 
have very vivid imagery (Strauss 1987). Once this preliminary examination concluded, the 
researcher then wrote additional memos. These memos proceeded from data-sets (STEP 2) 
that were searched for improvisation elements and can be illustrated as follows:  
[Data set] 
The data-set containing the data incident “…so we quickly had to make [create] 
a few more categories…so” had the following memo “attached” to the incident; 
 
[Memo] 
“Implies quick reaction in terms of profiling users and determining data security 
and classification levels based on information requirements” (See Table 14).  
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
 134 
 
The researcher then underlined words from these memos that related to specific activities. 
These underlined words are the initial codes. The researcher also wrote memos about the 
nature of that activity by coding deductively from literature the nature of activity. For 
instance, the classification for the above data incident was given “Control and Classification 
of Information Assets”.  These classifications were useful in structuring the narratives that 
describe improvisation in Section 6.2 onwards.  
 
The researcher treated these memos as heuristic tools rather than as objective representations 
of facts. The researcher used these memos as flags/signposts to point to the phenomenon of 
improvisation in the data.  Memos helped the researcher gain insights into the kind of data 
that was needed for further analysis, and the data that was required to be viewed from 
multiple angles. This facilitated useful discoveries.  
6.1.4 STEP 4: Determining Level  
 
The inductive aspect of analysing data was made possible by extracting and understanding 
data that reflected aptitude for a fusion of structure and creative thinking simultaneously at 
three organisational levels. Deductively, the ISRM activities from the data-sets were to be 
considered from three levels: Strategic, Tactical and Operational. Data-sets that seem to 
suggest that an improvised activity was carried out at operational level were coded as 
“operational”. Three level codes i.e. strategic, tactical and operational were defined for each 
selected data-set identified and coded as an improvisational activity.  
6.1.5 STEP 5: Creation of Codes and High Level Concepts Deductively 
and Inductively  
 
Deriving codes (using both deductive and inductive approaches) was a lengthy and time 
consuming process.  Although there were many codes that could have been derived and could 
have been relevant, for purposes of meeting the objectives of this research, the researcher 
restricted open coding to only those instances where there were answers to questions asked in 
STEP 2. Through a combination of deductive and inductive reasoning coding for 
improvisation was possible. STEP 5 was conducted as follows; 
 
1) Data-sets were coded and examined in-depth. Data-sets found to fit the phenomenon 
of improvisation in ISRM were carefully selected and filtered out for in-depth 
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examination i.e. moved from Appendix 10 and to the generation of Appendix 2 
(memo writing). Deductively identifying the codes was assisted by the use of the 
Sensitising Device. The researcher first developed lower level practitioner language 
codes or ‘in-vivo coding’ iteratively from STEP 2 (mentioned previously).  
 
2) Careful analysis was done and in-vivo codes from data-sets generated. These codes 
provided reasonable first level understanding as to how information security risk 
practitioners engaged in their daily activities. Finally the researcher developed finer 
and more detailed higher level (specific) codes of the data-sets that were derived 
from multiple readings iteratively. 
 
3) To illustrate how data-sets were examined and coded for improvisation, the data-set 
containing the data incident “…so we quickly had to make [create] a few more 
categories…so” was coded for Quick–reaction. (Codes identified in this research are 
distinguished as being both bold and underlined.  
 
Note: The above open code demonstrates one (1) conceptual instance of 
improvisation within this data-set. Conceptual Density was determined to represent 
the total number of conceptual instances in a data-set relating to a distinct unit of 
analysis and is represented as a numeric figure at the end of Chapter 6 and 7.This 
is not to be confused with quantitative research methods. 
 
4) The comprehensiveness of the data-sets provided reasonable generality of 
improvisation in ISRM. (The generality was later to be used for theory development 
in Chapter 7). 
 
Once the coding process was done, certain theoretical ideas began to emerge which 
appeared central to the study of improvisation in ISRM. The purpose of coding was to 
help the researcher conceptualise and make sense of each coded data element.  The 
researcher also embarked on looking for patterns and relationships between the collected 
codes and also across other collections and data-sets. This would help in making 
insightful discoveries about improvisation in ISRM. 
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6.1.6 STEP 6: Generating Types of Improvisation    
 
Section 4.4.1 identified the typology of improvisation as being either Collective, Individual, 
Product or Process. Data-sets were examined holistically to determine the type of 
improvisation occurring. This was coded as being one of the above.  
 
It should be noted that the improvisational codes generated were neither inherently objectivist 
nor heuristic, meaning the terms coined only related to how the researcher chose to describe 
the conceptualisation and the use of the codes being generated. The researcher understood 
that the codes were representations of the phenomenon of improvisation, though there was no 
assurance that this kind of improvisation as conceptualised was the type mentioned in other 
instances.  
 
The following sections are a unit by unit analysis of data and the generation of in-vivo codes, 
and categories. Although the following sections list the STEPS described above, these 
sections take the form of narratives for easy readability.  
6.2 UNIT BY UNITS DATA ANALYSIS  
 
The following sections describe a unit by unit analysis following all the above steps.  
6.2.1 Analysis - Information Assets Access and Data Control 
 
 
Section 2.4.1 of this research dealt with issues regarding this unit of analysis. The following 
section conceptualizes improvisation within activities relating to information assets access 
and data control. Conceptualizing improvisation in this unit followed the 6 steps listed in the 
previous section. This is demonstrated by Table 19 as follows; 
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 C119-Appendix 10 
STEP 1  
 
Data Incidents 
( Transcribed Interviews)   
 
STEP 2 
 
Context of Data Incident 
(Researcher’s Memo) 
STEP 3  
 
Researcher’s memos  
Determine Codes 
 
 in vivo and other 
generated  as underlined) 
 
STEP 4  
 
Level 
STEP 5  
 
Concepts 
generated 
(inductively) 
 
 
STEP 6  
 
Types of 
Improvisation 
(See Section  
4.4.1) 
 
 
 
 
“…so we quickly had to make 
[create]  a few more categories…so 
it doesn’t  just get as simple as you 
just having internet access ..and 
you don’t get this.. [but rather] you 
having internet access and  you 
belong to marketing…and you 
belong to IT…” 1 
 
 
Profiling users based on user activities was 
found to be critical. However, it was the 
nature of the profiling as observed that was 
to be found interesting. Multiple users had 
multiple requirements. The creation of extra 
categories outside of the normal categories 
was improvised as it had never been done 
before. i.e. new ways of defining categories 
that allowed for innovative information 
access. 
Control and Classification of 
Information Assets 
1. Implies  quick reaction  in 
terms of profiling users and 
determining data security and 
classification levels based on 
information  requirements 
Operational 
Activity 
 
Quick reaction 
to data access 
security levels 
(Process) 
Improvisation 
“…and we did and worked on 
exactly what they said.. and of 
course within the first few days.. of 
putting access controls in [the 
system]…we got hundreds and 
hundreds of calls…saying they 
couldn’t get through.. they said that 
they wanted to go to selling sites.. 
whatever…and they couldn’t go to 
see what was on hundreds of other 
sites…” 2 
The IT team improvised (employed 
automatic thinking towards) new control 
frameworks that guided the abuse of 
internet by users and helped place 
appropriate security controls to users.  
Accountability of information 
assets through access control 
1. Implies  being resourceful and 
providing reflexivity by 
placing data security controls 
Operational 
Activity 
Being 
resourceful in 
placing data 
access security 
controls  
 
 
 
 
 
(Process) 
Improvisation 
Table 19 Open Coding for Information Assets and Data Control (Extract of Appendix 2) 
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The following were the data classification as described in STEP 3 (2
nd
 paragraph) and are 
derivatives of interview transcripts for this unit of analysis (see Appendix 2). These 
classifications are listed as follows: 
 
1. Control and Classification of Information Assets  
2. Accountability of Information Assets through Access Control 
3. Authorization Process of Information  Facilities 
4. Data Warehouse Management and Information  
5. Authorization Process for Program Source Library  
 
Each of the above classification is explained in turn. 
 
1. Control and Classification of Information Assets 
 
The ISO IEC 17799 Section 5 prescribes how information security practitioners should 
treat information assets. Section 5.2 prescribes acceptable ways for information control 
and classification while Section 5.1.1 identifies how practitioners should compile an 
inventory of all information assets depending on their value to the organisation. The 
CobiT objectives Section DS5.9 gives a mechanism for centralised control and 
identification with proper procedures for access rights management. ITIL Section 4.2 
(Security Management) describes the best way to implement information security 
management measures. Asked how the organisation carried out activities relating to the 
control and classification of information assets, one information security practitioner 
responded this way: 
 
“All requests for access are done via control application which is 
authorised by the relevant executive, with final authorization given by the IT 
Risk and Continuity manager.”3   
 
It was during the interview process that the information security practitioners revealed 
that they actually followed procedures set by ITIL, CobiT and ISO IEC 17799. Some of 
these procedures determined control levels for sensitive information. In terms of 
controlling access to sensitive information, when questioned about whether there was 
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delegation of security responsibilities between asset owners, the same practitioner noted 
that this was indeed the case: 
 
“Delegation, yes in terms of recommendation levels of access.”4 
 
What this practitioner was saying was that they delegated responsibilities to designated 
persons to determine various access levels to sensitive information. There was no form of 
improvisation noted in terms of the delegation process.  
 
Data incident  
 
There were times when the practitioners would be forced to address information security 
control and access issues. In fact for one particular instance, it was noted that access to 
sensitive information was granted spontaneously:  
 
“…so we quickly had to make [create] a few more categories…so it doesn’t just 
get as simple as you just having internet access and you didn’t get this...”  5 
 
 
This act of spontaneity in determining access levels was a demonstration of the need to 
quickly address information access needs and called for quick reaction
IMPROV-1
. This was 
coded as such. It should be noted that at the heart of this improvisation was the ability for 
the practitioner to react quickly and ingeniously to overcome emergent constraints. The 
creation of these new categories to the end-users was interpreted as the constraint that 
was addressed by this quick thinking i.e. improvised. The nature of this reaction was 
collective since this involved more than one person. This act was interpreted to suit the 
occurrence of collective improvisation
IMPROV-1
 and was seen to occur more at tactical 
level since these were tactical decisions that would affect access levels in the short to 
medium term.  
2. Accountability of Information Assets and Access Control 
 
Another ISRM activity examined was that of accounting for access control. The need to 
account for control meant the need to not only control the granting of access to 
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employees but to also account for whom and why certain persons were or were not being 
given access. The information security practitioners appreciated that there were different 
approaches to providing accountability and access to information assets as prescribed by 
ISO IEC 17799 Section 5.2.1.  Section 5.2.1 prescribes the manner in which the 
information assets classification system restricts access to information when deemed 
necessary. The CobiT objectives Section DS5 provides a mechanism for data 
classification, with the key areas being data sensitivity and the disposition and sharing of 
data. CobiT objectives Section DS5.3 suggests procedures for security of online access 
to data by providing measures for access security control. ITIL Section 4.2.2 (Security 
Management) also gives guidelines on the implementation of security management 
measures, while ITIL Section 4.2.4 suggests requirements for access control.  
 
It was understood that the organisation was following the above recommendations 
(frameworks and standards) as explained by one respondent. When asked about how the 
organisation ensured accountability and confidentiality of information so that the 
information would not accidentally be passed on to any unauthorised person in or out of 
the organisation, it was explained that there were certain procedures in place: 
 
“We do this by developing access hierarchies and permissions.”6 
 
No form of improvisation was coded for the development of access hierarchies and 
permissions since the development was structured and determined by set procedures.  
 
Data incident  
 
An example of a data incident where practitioners acted on the spur-of-the-moment could 
be illustrated when practitioners skilfully remedied situations. They achieved this by 
providing pragmatic solution when faced with challenges. This is illustrated by the 
following data incident: 
 
“…and we did and worked on exactly what they [Management] said, and of 
course within the first few days of putting access controls in [the system], we 
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got hundreds and hundreds of calls saying they [end-users] couldn’t get 
through…7 
 
“Roles [end users roles] were then specifically split into two areas, technical 
response and the process, procedures and people element”8 
 
The context for this data incident as explained by the respondent was that the 
practitioners were faced with a situation where they had granted end users incorrect 
profiles and access permission to systems. The granting of access was based on what the 
frameworks had made provisions for. What was not anticipated was that the end user 
profiles had changed, forcing the review of end user access rights. This turned out to be a 
wrong decision and many end users had difficulty accessing certain files in the systems 
leading to frantic calls. The frameworks used to assign profiles were generic, making it 
difficult for practitioners to anticipate these emergent problems. To facilitate continuity 
of work, the practitioners contextually determined those people requiring technical access 
(system administrators) and those requiring process/procedural based access (end users). 
They then determined procedural based access by assigning new group profiles. 
 
This data incident suggests that the information security practitioners exhibited a degree 
of resourcefulness (being resourceful
IMPROV-2
) and this act was coded as such. The 
practitioner responsible for splitting access roles into technical and process understood 
the contextual needs at the time and also addressed emergent needs that the functionalist 
frameworks had no provision for at the time. These were process based operational 
activities, and were therefore interpreted to mean an occurrence of process 
improvisation
IMPROV-2
.  
 
3. Authorization Process of Information Facilities 
 
Another ISRM activity identified from the interview discussions was that of the need for 
information security practitioners to conduct the authorisation processes for use of 
facilities carrying sensitive information. ISO IEC 17799 Section 4.1.4 takes cognisance 
of the authorisation process for information processing facilities. CobiT objectives 
Section DS5.6 suggests ways of determining user control, by creating designated user 
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accounts (or group accounts) through a structures mechanism to oversee these accounts.   
The CobiT objectives Section DS11.16 also gives a controlled way of issuing security 
provisions for output reports while ITIL Section 4.1 (Security Management) explains 
information security management measures for information control.  
 
Data Incident 
 
An interesting way in which the information security practitioners adopted these 
provisions (frameworks) was that they knew they had the freedom to interpret what 
control mechanisms to put in place. At times their interpretations were consultative as 
explained by the following data incident: 
 
“…we have established that we don’t have to give them that [administration 
group] kind of access, but then we [deliberated] about restricting 
internet…9 
 
This sort of incident demonstrated that the consultations and deliberations constituted 
some level of deliberation (being deliberative
IMPROV-3) 
from the consultative group. The 
context of the deliberation was to ensure that “determining user control” was appropriate 
to the situation/need. Determining this need was achieved at group level and entailed 
imaginative thinking in order to comply with information security provisions. As a 
process based activity (operational level), this ISRM activity also demonstrated collective 
improvisation
IMPROV-3
 that was strengthened through practitioners’ skills and experience.  
 
4. Data Warehouse Management and Information  
 
ISO IEC 17799 Section 5.1.1 suggests the need for management to compile an inventory 
of assets as an important aspect of risk management. The ISO IEC 17799 Section 5.2.2 
guides the management in setting procedures for labelling these assets, after the 
compilation process. The CobiT objectives Section DS5.8 suggests a manner for 
information assets classification, and suggests mechanisms that provide for data 
sensitivity and the sharing of data. ITIL Section 4.2 (Security Management) gives 
direction on how to implement these measures.  The importance of the above identified 
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ISRM activity ensures that sensitive information (assets) was appropriately labelled and 
handled as such.  
 
Data incident 
 
From the interview it was revealed that the information security practitioners were 
carrying out this activity as the procedures stipulated. One practitioner highlighted how 
this was carried out:  
 
“… [This is carried out] in terms of safety of information, manipulating 
information, metadata around information and stuff like that…” 10 
 
It was indeed interesting that the information security practitioner mentioned the word 
“manipulating”. The context of why the word manipulation was mentioned was the idea 
that when looking at safety of information (data), if data is threatened in any way, it is 
not that its integrity is threatened or the information is invalid in anyway.  It is just that 
whoever has access to this information (data) may use it in an illegal/illegitimate way. 
What can be shown is that practitioners had devised and manipulated the system (and 
information) holding the data in creative ways to protect the information and 
hinder/minimise illegal access. This data incident revealed that the skilled information 
security practitioners considered the safety of information to the level they through to 
manipulate
IMPROV-4
 the data base was an ideal way of risk minimization. This act suited 
the contextual need at the time and was coded. Since this act was at a higher level 
(strategic activity), and the manipulation involved more than one information security 
practitioner at the time, it was interpreted to demonstrate collective improvisation
IMPROV-
4
.  
 
5. Authorization Process for Program Source Library 
 
The ISO IEC 17799 Section 10.4.3 issues strict guidelines on access control to program 
source libraries. This reduces the risk of potential corruption to associated and main 
source programs that control data in the databases. The CobiT objectives Section DS8.4 
suggest a way of monitoring clearance of source information in a timely manner and of 
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investigating outstanding incidents that affect source information/libraries. Similarly 
CobiT objectives SectionDS5.4 gives procedures for user account management, and 
shows access privileges and the necessary security procedures to be followed when third 
parties access source information/libraries. ITIL Section5.4.3 (Service Support) gives 
direction on general incident management and a structure for investigation and diagnosis 
of general incidents which includes source library incidents.  By interpreting the above 
frameworks, it seems that these frameworks give little room for flexibility in terms of 
access and authorisation towards source programs, source codes, and source libraries.  
 
Data incident 
 
In the interview, it was established that the information security practitioners understood 
the procedures relating to accessing source programs well.  However, in their capacity to 
understand what was contextually happening, they set procedures that would override 
underlying restrictions. This was done provided that the overriding actions would not 
jeopardize system security. This was explained by one interviewee as follows: 
 
“…Because, we had to do it…in those groups… what happens in the access 
aspect is that they actually modified the database…and [name withheld] 
actually approved this…” 11 
 
The context of the data incident was that, in this organisation, user access management 
transcended departmental boundaries, meaning the Human Resource Department was 
involved (in assigning job descriptions), the IT Department (in assigning group profiles) 
and the Information Security Officer (in assigning policy). What happened was that 
certain employees’ job designations from Human Resource were inappropriate for the 
assigned group profiles given by IT and hence could not access certain information. It 
was at the moment of this realisation, that the practitioner on the spur-of-the-moment 
(“we had to do it”) modified the database to accommodate this need. This data incident 
allowed the practitioners to be quick in thinking and was coded as quick-
wittedness
IMPROV-5
. The database modification was authorized at operational level and 
process improvisation
IMPROV-5
 was coded in this instance.   
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Summary of the First Unit of Analysis 
 
Table 20 summaries the total number of conceptual instance in the previous narrative 
for this unit as follows: 
Table 20. Conceptual density of Improvisation when examining Information Assets and 
Data Control 
As shown in the previous section, the analysis of the first unit of analysis has been 
illustrated by a descriptive narrative that explicates improvisation in the way information 
security practitioners control the access to information as value assets. The next section 
examines how the researcher expounded on this narrative for the five (5) remaining units 
analysis using this preliminary knowledge and understanding and a similar approach. 
This narrative approach was useful in helping this researcher think critically and 
systematically about coding data and deriving improvisation concepts. This knowledge 
was then appropriated to the rest of the units of analysis in complex ways and through 
constant comparative analysis and the validation and re-questioning of data. 
6.2.2 Analysis – Information Security Architecture 
 
Information Architecture (IA) refers to the organisation labelling and structuring 
information and systems that hold the information, the design of these and their 
navigation in order to allow users to realise their information needs. Section 2.4.2 of this 
research dealt with issues regarding this unit of analysis. The following section 
conceptualizes improvisation within activities that relate to information security 
architecture. Conceptualizing improvisation in this unit followed the 6 steps listed in 
Section 6.1. This is demonstrated by Table 21 as follows:  
Units of 
Analysis 
 
Activities 
related to; 
Core 
Categories 
Concepts generated within the types of improvisation  
 
Concept
ual 
Density 
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Assets 
control 
Strategic  Manipulating
IMPROV-4 
 
   
1 
Tactical  
Quick reaction
IMPROV-1
 
 
 
  
1 
Operational  
Being 
deliberative
IMPROV-3
, 
 
Being resourceful
IMPROV-2
, 
Being Quick-witted
IMPROV-5
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STEP 1  
 
Data Incidents 
( Transcribed Interviews)   
 
STEP 2 
 
Context of Data Incident 
(Researcher’s Memo) 
STEP 3  
 
Researcher’s memos  
Determine Codes 
 
 in vivo and other 
generated  as underlined) 
 
STEP 4  
 
Level 
STEP 5  
 
Concepts 
generated 
(inductively) 
 
 
STEP 6  
 
Types of 
Improvisation 
(See Section  
4.4.1) 
 
 
 
 
and whether there is compliance, 
you know considering security you 
know whether there are best 
solutions to match the technology 
platform… stuff like that 12 
 
 
 
 
 
The current architecture and  technology 
platform (a fusion of many platforms) could 
not be matched with proposed policy 
compliance models so the nature of 
compliance had to be innovative  based on 
the technology architecture, resulting in the 
process of compliance being improvised 
Compliance Efforts and Information 
Architecture Specification 
1. Implies being rational adaptive in 
ensuring compliant information 
architecture. 
Tactical 
Activities 
Being rational 
adaptive in 
determining 
compliant 
architecture 
 
 
 
(Process) 
Improvisation 
[The] middleware team...gives a 
human aspect to the way we design 
things...such that the whole way we 
design things is very middleware 
driven.. we’ve got a 
rich...middleware architecture 
13
 
 
 
 
The middleware team was socially driven 
with the social conditions permitting the 
middleware team to explore and discover 
new  technical designs  that interfaced 
between people, business processes and 
technology. Their discoveries were shaped 
by time and resources. 
Security Design requirements and 
Specifications 
1. Implies lateral thinking by the 
middleware team charged with 
designing  the security requirements of 
middleware architecture   
Tactical 
Activities 
Lateral 
thinking in 
designing 
middleware 
architecture 
 
 
 
 
 
(Process) 
Improvisation 
Table 21 Open Coding for Information Security Architecture (Extract of Appendix 3) 
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The following are the data classifications as described in STEP 3 (2
nd
 paragraph) and are 
derivatives of interviews transcripts for this unit of analysis (see Appendix 3). These 
classifications are listed as follows: 
 
1. Compliance Efforts and Information Architecture Specification 
2. Information Security Design requirements and Specifications 
3. Information Architecture Requirements on Risk 
4. Information Architecture Forum for Information Security 
5. Information Architecture Design  and Acceptance 
6. Operational Procedures and Responsibilities 
 
Each of the above classification is explained in turn. 
 
1. Compliance Efforts and Information Architecture Specification 
 
Procedures that stipulate the way this ISRM activity is to be carried out are explained as 
follows. In terms of compliance requirements for information architecture specifications, the 
ISO IEC 17799 Section 12.1.1 explains the management obligation to design, operate and 
use information systems in ways that meet and address requirements stipulated by statutes, 
regulatory and contractual frameworks. The CobiT objectives Section AI5.13 suggests a 
manner for evaluation and meeting user requirements through post-implementation review to 
assess whether user needs are being met. ITIL Section3.5.4 (ICT Infrastructure 
Management) gives direction on system deployment and acceptance testing. Most of these 
procedures are incorporated in the overall information architecture specifications.  
 
Data incident 
 
The information security practitioners carried out this particular ISRM activity through a 
series of co-ordinated efforts based on their inherent skills and experience. Experience was a 
necessary aspect of managing ISRM activities as shown by the following data incident.  
 
“We use our own experiences and [sometimes] solicit the expertise of outside 
agencies such as Gartner, etc.”14 
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The interview revealed that a great deal of emphasis was placed in the information security 
practitioners experience towards understanding how to design an information architecture 
that met compliance requirements. The following is a data incident recorded that illustrates 
the contextual need: 
 
“…there has been a lot of good stuff that these guys for instances like [name 
withheld], in Enterprise Risk [Architecture] have done…they have complied 
with every possible standard/ framework…” 15 
 
The context of this data incident is that the organisation’s Enterprise Risk Architecture 
Program (ERAP) as designed by [name withheld] provided a critical component of the 
information security program. To this end, the ERAP’s objective was to identify and evaluate 
threats to the organisation’s risks and mitigation controls. At lot of good work was done but it 
was how this was done that proved exceptional. The good work mentioned here was a 
demonstrated ability to comply with frameworks and other requirements and to meet ERAP’s 
objectives at the background of emergent contextual factors. The practitioners designed the 
ERAP to determine critical systems. Not all systems were to be protected equally due to 
limited resources. Under ERAP, systems classified as critical would be assigned significant 
protection. The skills and experience to determine critical systems under ERAP epitomised 
exceptionality
IMPROV-1
 and was coded as such. The experience and exceptionality 
demonstrated process improvisation
IMPROV-1 
in the way compliance requirements for ERAP at 
strategic level were met by the practitioners.  
 
Data incident 
 
Another data incident relating to enterprise architecture compliance noted by the researcher 
involved situations where compliance requirements were “silent”, i.e. did not fully address 
the contextual organisational requirements of the organisation at the time. These situations 
forced solutions. The following data incident illustrates this: 
 
“…and without preparation, [we needed] getting to know whether there is 
compliance, considering, information security you know whether there are best 
solutions to match the technology platform… stuff like that…” 16 
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The context of this incident was that the organisation was in possession of a new technology 
platform with features not addressed by frameworks, making compliance requirements 
contextual to the new technology and the risk involved. When faced with the challenge of 
identifying best solutions at the time, the information security practitioners demonstrated an 
ability to match compliance needs for this new platform while piecing together an elaborate 
secure information architecture. An important part about this data incident was that the 
practitioners acknowledged that compliance considerations were done without preparation 
and therefore on the spur-of the-moment. This on the spur-of-the-moment extemporaneous 
act was made possible when practitioners drew on past experience. This was interpreted to be 
rational adaptive
IMPROV-2
. This rational adaptive mode exemplified process improvisation 
IMPROV-2
 at strategic level.  
 
2. Information Security Design Requirements and Specifications 
 
The ISO IEC 17799 Section 10.1.1 explains the need for organisations to issue statements of 
requirements specifications for new systems, or on the enhancements of existing systems 
which specify the architecture requirements for controls. Section 10.1.1 further notes that 
such architecture specifications should consider automated controls to be incorporated in the 
system, and the need for supporting manual controls. Part of the design requirements and 
specifications revealed in the research were the set password requirements for users and 
system accounts.  
 
Data incident 
 
When asked what the security design requirements for system passwords were, it was 
explained that the: 
 
“User sign-ones’ are unique to each user and passwords are required to 
alpha/special character/numeric format and a 30 day expiry lifespan.”17 
 
The context of this data incident was that the organisation had put in place user sign-ons and 
authentication or the verifying of identity of the users (employees) through the use of 
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passwords. The policy was instituted to create a system that would give passwords a 30 day 
expiry lifespan. This meant employees had to change passwords after a 30 day period. The 
information security practitioners explained that the password design requirements and 
specification for passwords was to be designed in context with the enterprise architecture. 
The design was therefore to be considered primarily from two perspectives: an enterprise 
wide perspective and a technical perspective. These two issues influenced how password 
design specifications would be met. This simply meant the designs would accommodate 
complex passwords for technical users while maintaining simplicity for ordinary users yet 
rejecting simple, easy to crack passwords. The information security practitioners developed a 
lateral thinking
IMPROV-3
 approach in the way a system for passwords within the enterprise 
architecture was to be designed. One interviewee puts it this:  
 
“… [The] middleware team gives a human aspect to the ay we design 
things...such that the whole way we design things is very middleware driven… 
we’ve got a rich...middleware architecture…” 18 
 
The lateral thinking at operational level that enabled the generation of secure designs 
(including passwords) was interpreted to be process improvisation
IMPROV-3
.  
 
3. Information Architecture Requirements on Risk 
 
In terms of information architecture requirements on risk, ISO IEC 17799 Section10.1.1 
explains that the information security requirements and controls should reflect the corporate 
value of the information assets involved, and the potential business damage which might 
result from a failure or absence of information security. The CobiT objectives SectionAI5.10 
determines through information security testing and accreditation, the need to understand the 
information security levels and the residual risk in the system. ITIL Section3.5.2 (Service 
Support) shows the proper way to install systems in a working environment.  
 
Data Incident 
 
From one specific data incident, when asked if the organisation’s network and computer 
systems were risk monitored for network intrusions as a risk element the response was: 
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“Yes…”19 
 
Asked what the organisation considered as confidential information and how was protected 
from information security risk, the respondent recalled that the risk would be realised when 
information deemed confidential was accessible to the wrong persons and impacted wrongly 
on the brand: 
 
“Any information that would, if made accessible to the wrongs persons, and 
negatively impact the brand, is regarded as confidential.”20 
 
ISO IEC 17799 Section 10.1.1 points out that while the framework for analysing 
information security risk requirements and identifying controls to fulfil them is through  risk 
assessment, the controls implemented at the design stages are significantly cheaper to 
implement and maintain than those included during or after implementation. This ISRM 
activity was explained by one information security practitioner when asked about the security 
of computers with regard to internet connections:  
 
“We ensure at the beginning, that the level of security on these computers/servers 
would offer the company the necessary protection.”21 
 
The context of this data incident was that the organisation’s mission critical applications 
required certain measures for security and access controls. Users and processes were to be 
allowed access based on the principle of least privileges (need to know basis). What was 
important was that the information security practitioners extemporaneously implemented 
controls over configurations of systems to disallow potential malicious use. By analysing the 
above data incidents, the researcher established that the information security practitioners 
identified system requirements for risk while at the same time contextualizing ways to 
address information protection. This illustrated that the information security practitioners 
were rational adaptive
IMPROV-4
 at tactical level. The information security practitioners jointly 
acted within a range of options for information architecture requirements that determined best 
fit and was seen as collective improvisation
 IMPROV-4
. 
 
4. Information Architecture Forum for Information Security 
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The ISO IEC 17799 Section 10.1.1 explains that while information security should be a 
responsibility shared by all, it proposes the formation of a management forum. Part of the 
proposition advanced by Section 10.1.1 helps ensure that within the organisation; there is clear 
direction and visible management support for information security initiatives. The CobiT 
objectives Section AI5.14 suggests that responsibility for ensuring security through the roll 
out of any new system rests on the management and stipulates benefits realisation through a 
post-implementation review. ITIL Section4.2 (Service Support), Release Management, gives 
direction on how to implement a new system in a working environment.  Ideally, the forum 
should promote information security within the organization through appropriate commitment 
and adequate resourcing, while undertaking the following: 
 
 Reviewing and approving information security policy and overall responsibilities; 
 Monitoring significant changes in the exposure of information assets to major threats; 
 Reviewing and monitoring information security incidents; 
 Approving major initiatives to enhance information security. 
 
When one particular information security practitioner was asked who co-ordinated the 
implementation of security controls, the response suggested that the organisation was 
following procedures stipulated by the mentioned frameworks:  
 
“The technical component resides within the technology enablement group / forum 
as they respond to the policies and procedures provided by the IT Risk and 
Continuity management.”22 
 
No improvisation was coded for this data incident.  
 
Data incident 
 
In one other data incident, one interviewee identified the importance of forums. These forums 
were to give a clear direction to management on best ways to review and monitor information 
security incidents and any other information security initiative:  
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“…We have got the Architecture forum, which sits under [name withheld]… and 
uum, we also have [another forum], which I’m more involved in, in making sure 
that there is compliance architecture…23 
 
The context of the data incident was that these forums allowed for unplanned outcomes and 
were seen as contextually relevant. The outcomes of the forums and workshops ultimately 
shaped risk perceptions and compliance requirements. The forums and workshops at tactical 
level were interpreted by the researcher to influence the processes for information security 
architecture and design. These were coded as collective improvisation
IMPROV-5
 since the 
outcomes of the perceptions within the forums occurring overtime were meant to be 
deliberative
IMPROV-5
 and to eventually fit within the corporate risk profile.  
 
5. Information Architecture Design and Acceptance 
 
The ISO IEC 17799 Section 8.2.2 advances the idea that the acceptance criteria for new 
information systems with upgrades and new versions being established and suitable tests of the 
system carried out prior to acceptance. The CobiT objectives Section AI 5.13 also suggests the 
need for an evaluation of systems to test acceptance of user requirements. ITIL Section 9.6.3 
(Service Support), Release Management, gives direction on release acceptance procedure and 
working environment. The criteria for accepting new systems was established by a 
management framework which controlled the organisation’s systems acceptance and 
implementation criteria. The management review of the criteria was explained to have been 
done in the year preceding the research:  
 
“This was undertaken last year with the inclusion of Information Security 
into Business Intelligence competency.” 24  
 
 
Data incident 
 
Data incidents for this ISRM activity revealed that the way the information architecture was 
designed and tested for acceptance was both innovative and novel. While there was a general 
acknowledgement by information security practitioners that part of their organisational 
systems were not designed with security in mind, nevertheless, the practitioners designed 
                                            
23
 C60-Appendix 10 
24
 Q19-Appendix 8 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
 154 
 
suitable novel acceptance criteria which was supported by innovative procedures as fusion of 
the technical and the socio-cognitive. Indeed the acceptance criteria for the security and use 
of systems seemed to be “made up as they went along” or “as were being defined”: 
 
 “…to ensure that they comply with whatever policy and standards that they have 
devised or as was being defined by the board…” 25 
 
The context of this data incident was that the organisation had identified board members who 
were experienced and understood not only the business goals of the organisation but also had 
a measure of technical knowledge to understand information security issues. It is this 
proficiency by representatives of the board that enabled compliance in novel ways. The 
improvisational aspect of this novel
IMPROV-6
 approach was that the board recognised this 
specialised knowledge area and included provision for delegation to skilled information 
security practitioners who would design the compliance criteria and report this to the board 
only when a need arose. There had not yet been provision for this in the organisation’s policy. 
This was interpreted as collective improvisation
 IMPROV-6
. 
 
6. Operational Procedures and Responsibilities 
 
The ISO IEC 17799 Section 8.1.2 requires the need to control changes to information 
processing facilities and systems through the provision of technical specifications. It follows 
that inadequate control of changes is a common cause of system or information security 
failures. Section 8.1.2 advances the need for formal management responsibilities and 
procedures to be put in place to ensure satisfactory control of all operational procedures. The 
CobiT objective Section DS51.3 suggests procedures for checking performance through 
governing relationships and communication. ITIL Section 4.7 (Service Delivery) Service 
Level Management gives direction on Key Performance Indicators (KPI’s) and metrics for 
SLM efficiency and effectiveness.  
 
Within the context of above frameworks, the researcher raised the question of how often the 
organisation monitored (a) dormant accounts; (b) antivirus updates; (c) shared files; (d) 
account lock out; (e) the use of regular passwords. The response was that this was done 
regularly: 
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“This monitoring is done on a regular basis by our Active Directory 
administrators.”26  
 
The importance of the regular monitoring of operational procedures and having someone 
responsible was an important ISRM activity, and the organisation seemed to place great 
importance on this.  The ISO IEC 17799 Section 8.1.2 stresses the need to be constantly 
vigilant of changes and incidents and that wherever practicable, operational and application 
change control procedures should be integrated. These procedures and specifications include:  
 
 Specifications for the identification and recording of significant changes; 
 Specifications for the assessment of the potential impact of such changes; 
 
Data incident 
 
The review of data incidents highlighted that there was vigilance in monitoring changes to 
applications and that there were adequate procedures and specifications that covered these 
ISRM activities. The following data incident illustrates this:  
 
“…we developed requirements specifications for reviewing the [operational] 
process. We had systems requirement specifications, integration specifications in 
terms of how the system sends information to another system…or the middleware 
stuff…”27 
 
The context of this data incident was that the organisation had created access rules and 
specification, by virtue of the estimated magnitude of risk that could potentially arise within 
each of the organisation’s critical processes. The challenge here was for practitioners to 
determine at operational level who was to enforce the requirement specifications, while at the 
same time not burdening other practitioners who ultimately had no liability at stake for some 
of the processes. This was not easy and there were signs and elements of 
resourcefulness
IMPROV-7
 on the part of those deciding who among the practitioners would be 
responsible for determining the requirement specifications. Determining this was interpreted 
as process improvisation.
IMRPOV-7
.  
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Summary of the Second Unit of Analysis 
 
 
A key differential with this unit of analysis is that there is a reasonable level of collective 
improvisation at strategic level and tactical levels. It is evident that process improvisation is 
conceptually dense at the operational end, the reason being the key role that information 
security practitioners play between balancing short term to immediate solutions. Table 22 
summarises the total number of conceptual instances in the previous narrative for this unit as 
follows: 
Table 22. Conceptual density of Improvisation when examining Control over Information 
Architecture Security 
 
6.2.3 Analysis - Information Security Policies  
 
Section 2.4.2 of this research dealt with issues regarding this unit of analysis. The following 
section conceptualizes improvisation within activities that relate to implementing information 
security policies. Conceptualizing improvisation in this unit followed the 6 steps listed in 
Section 6.1. This is demonstrated by Table 23 as follows; 
Units of 
Analysis 
 
Activities 
related to; 
Core 
Categories 
Concepts generated within the types of improvisation  
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Information 
Security 
Architecture 
Strategic  Novel
IMPROV-6
,    Exceptionality
IMPROV-1
,    2 
Tactical  Rational adaptive
IMPROV-4
 
Deliberative
IMPROV-5
 
 
 
  2 
Operational     
Rational 
adaptive
IMPROV-2
,  
Lateral thinking
IMPROV-3
, 
Being resourceful
IMPROV-7
  
 3 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
 157 
 
 
 
                                            
28
 C99-Appendix 10 
29
 C79-Appendix 10 
STEP 1  
 
Data Incidents 
( Transcribed Interviews)   
 
STEP 2 
 
Context of Data Incident 
(Researcher’s Memo) 
STEP 3  
 
Researcher’s memos  
Determine Codes 
 
 in vivo and other 
generated  as underlined) 
 
STEP 4  
 
Level 
STEP 5  
 
Concepts 
generated 
(inductively) 
 
 
STEP 6  
 
Types of 
Improvisation 
(See Section  
4.4.1) 
 
 
 
 
what they did was… they took the 
notebooks…they gave those new 
notebooks to people…and they gave 
the old notebooks that people had 
that were still on working 
conditions to other people 
28
 
 
 
Policy dictated that the old laptops be 
replaced by new ones. The old could not be 
used as their warranty had lapsed and it 
could be expensive to maintain. A way was 
devised and the practitioners improvised by 
rotating the old with new to control costs. 
This had never been done before. 
Information Security Policy Co-ordination 
1. Implies being ingenious in situations 
resulting from limited resources 
 
Tactical 
Activity 
Being ingenious 
on  Information 
Security Policy 
 
 
 
 
(Collective) 
improvisation  
and most of them.. they can’t even 
document all that stuff 
29
 
 
 
 
 
The lack of documentation for some of the 
critical activities done, provided clear 
motivation for some activities to be 
improvised as there were no explicit 
guidelines to follow upon. 
Accountability and Reporting of Information 
incidents 
1. Implies unexpected incidents where 
practitioners lack of documentation 
have to be imaginative in their 
contextual activities  providing  grounds 
for improvisation. 
Tactical 
Activity 
Being 
imaginative with 
policies when 
none  
 
 
 
 
(Process) 
improvisation 
Table 23 Open Coding for Information Security Policies (Extract of Appendix 4)  
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The following were the data classification as described in STEP 3 (2
nd
 paragraph) and are 
derived from interview transcripts for this unit of analysis (see Appendix 4). These 
classifications are listed as follows: 
 
1. Information Security Policy Co-ordination 
2. Accountability and Reporting of Information Incidents 
3. Co-operation and Training on Information Security Policy 
4. Policy on Access and Control of Information Users 
5. Control of internal Processes and Change Management  
 
Each of the above classification is explained in turn. 
 
1. Information Security Policy Co-ordination 
 
In light of the requirements that companies should implement appropriate controls and co-ordinate 
implementation across critical business processes, the ISO IEC 17799 Section 4.1.2 requires that a 
cross-functional forum of management representatives from relevant parts of the organization co-
ordinate the implementation of information security controls. The CobiT objectives Section AI6.1 
stipulates the policies and procedures guide management in terms of changes in control of 
information with regard to system and control changes, categories, responsibilities, priorities status 
and urgencies. ITIL Section 4.2 (Service Support) suggests policies for change management by 
highlighting the basic concepts of change management. 
 
Data Incident 
 
Analysis of the data incident revealed that the ISRM activity regarding information policy co-
ordination was also present in the organisation. One information security practitioner was asked about 
how the organisation ensures that the co-ordination of security controls are representative of the 
organisation’s needs as well as the needs of the employees. It follows that holistic needs were 
considered: 
 
“The intent of our policies is to offer our organisation the necessary protection, 
but also to provide the assurance of the protection of the integrity of the 
individuals who use the system.”30  
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“Our organisations security roles and responsibilities are documented in the [name 
withheld] Corporate Information Security Policy.”31 
 
In terms of co-ordinating these efforts, ISO IEC 17799 Section 4.1.2 proposes that a forum be 
constituted to:  
 agree on specific roles and responsibilities for information security across the organization; 
 agree on specific methodologies and processes for information security, e.g. risk 
assessment, information security classification system. 
 
Data incident 
Analysing a section of a data incident revealed that the organisation’s board had made 
recommendations for sweeping changes regarding co-ordination of Information Security 
policies. While previously this responsibility was left to one practitioner with a familiarity on 
procedures stipulated by CobiT control methodology, the Board’s new strategy was to 
incorporate an efficient team that would include participation by users. This was to be achieved 
through a change in the existing mind-set of all users. There was initial resistance as expressed 
by one interviewee: 
 
“…so that was the real challenge in terms of getting...their minds [my mind] to 
change…nobody wants to be [held responsible]…”32 
 
The resistance and the changing of mind-set regarding the functionalist policies were not 
isolated. Indeed one information security practitioner expressed the concern as stipulated by 
ISO IEC 17799 Section 4.1.2 in a subtle way but understood by the researcher, regarding 
agreeing on specific methodologies. When asked if the practitioner felt liberated or constrained 
by security policy and methodologies, the response was:  
 
“I feel that the policy provides both a liberating and constraining feeling insofar as  
you are aware of the parameters within which you have to work.”33 
 
This sort of both liberating and constraining feeling seemed to have influenced that approach 
and attitude towards Information Security policy. The feeling also influenced how the outside 
opinion including benchmarks and best practice was to be perceived, appreciated and rolled out 
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internally to the organisation. When one information security practitioner was asked whether 
there were times when there was conflict of opinion between the organisations’ internal experts 
and external experts in relation to information security policy, it was revealed that: 
 
“I would not regard it as conflict, rather a variance of views in terms of company 
needs and external stringent adherence to best practices.”34  
 
It was interpreted that this sort of “variance of views” was fertile grounds for improvisation to 
occur particularly in information security policy formulation and roll-out. One data incident 
which demonstrated “variance of views” between information security policy and its co-
ordination, showed this to be true. One particular information security practitioner narrated 
how it was policy for old laptops (notebooks) to be discarded, once the warranty had expired, 
since it would be expensive to maintain these.  But because of limited resources, the board 
recommended the continued use of old laptops. The continued use of old laptops meant 
increased costs and risk to the company because of warranty issues (expired warranties). Policy 
was tactically and creatively overridden collectively to ensure that work continued and at the 
same times risks were kept in check. This is illustrated by one interviewee as follows:  
 
“…what [the practitioners] did was… they took the notebooks…they gave those new 
notebooks to people…and they again gave back the old notebooks that people 
previously had that were still on working conditions to other people…” 35 
 
The above data incident illustrates product improvisation
IMPROV-1
. This can be explained as 
follows. The context of the data incident was that the policy in place meant that out-of-
warranty notebooks should not be used.  This meant the available notebook “products” were 
insufficient to meet the work objectives of the organisation at the time. At operational level, an 
innovative way was found whereby old out-of-warranty notebooks that were partially damaged 
but were still functioning were revived and given to those people without notebooks 
(circumventing policy). The manner in which these notebooks were revived was coded as 
being ingenious
 IMPROV-1
. This data incident was interpreted by the researcher to be an 
extemporaneous way of coping with an unplanned for situation as it was arising. 
 
2. Accountability and Reporting of Information Incidents 
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The ISO IEC 17799 Section 6.3.1 proposes the need to establish formal processes to 
document information security incidents procedures and of the reporting of these through 
appropriate management channels as quickly as possible. This section proposes the 
establishment of a formal incident response procedure, together with an incident response 
which sets out action to be taken on receipt of an incident report. The CobiT objectives 
Section DS3.3 suggests the ideal ways for monitoring and for the reporting of information 
security incidents, while ITIL Section 8.5.1 (Service Delivery) states that, in terms of 
information systems availability management, there should be structured ways of determining 
availability requirements.  
 
The need for continuous reporting of information security incidents was consider critical since 
it was good practise to report information security incidents by following procedures of 
reporting of these incidents through appropriate management channels. It was revealed that the 
organisation had put in place measures to educate and make users aware of the documenting 
and reporting requirements of information security issues in general and of information 
security incidents in particular.  
 
Data incident 
When asked what sorts of measures were taken by the organisation to encourage a multi-
disciplinary approach to information security reporting of incidents, it was revealed that:   
 
“By regular communications with the broader [name withheld] community we 
have heightened the need for corporate response to security.”36 
 
However, analysis of data incidents suggested that this was not always the case. For instance, it 
was common for some users to encounter information security incidents while failing to 
report/document these. The lack of documenting incidents or even the manner of resolving 
these incidents was highlighted in the interview as follows:  
 
“…and most of them… they can’t even document all that stuff …” 37 
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In light of the fact that some employees were not aware of these documentation procedures, it 
became challenging for information security practitioners to monitor incidents. The following 
data incidents reveal the challenge faced: 
 
“There were certain inconsistencies highlighted from the last [audit] review 
and these were addressed and remedied.”38 
 
 
The context of the above data incident was that the organisation did not put in place proper 
procedure to monitor and report system activity. That was why the audit revealed 
“inconsistencies”. However, it was the addressing and remedying of these inconsistencies at 
tactical level that was coded as process improvisation
IMPROV-2
. This is explained as follows. In 
the light of the inconsistencies brought to light by third party audits, the practitioners had to be 
imaginative
IMPROV-2 
to remedy the situation. What was done was that they used a combination 
of automated and manual tools to monitor system activity. They automated the process of 
determining systems logs (running continually in the background) while spontaneously 
manually auditing specific user activity when a contextual need arose.  As suggested by the 
information security practitioners, they had a way of “remedying’ the situation.  
 
3. Co-operation and Training on Informati n Security Policy 
 
The ISO IEC 17799 Section 6.2.1 proposes that all employees of the organization should 
receive appropriate training and regular updates in organizational policies and procedures. The 
CobiT objectives Section DS7.1 proposes a mechanism for identification of training needs, 
through a training curriculum for each group of employees. ITIL Section 6.8 (Service Support) 
establishes procedures for dealing with problems through proactive problem management. This 
includes information security requirements, legal responsibilities and business controls as well 
as training in the correct use of information processing facilities.   
 
Data incident 
One information security practitioner was asked who (between employees and third parties), 
played a greater role in helping define the organisation’s information security needs and 
policy? It was revealed that the role was spilt:  
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“There is an equal level of contribution in balancing the needs of the company 
and those advised by third parties.”39 
 
Part of ISO IEC 17799 Section 6.2.1 aims at ensuring users are aware of information security 
threats and concerns, and are equipped to support organizational information security policy in the 
course of their normal work.  From parts of the interview with one information security 
practitioner, it was established that information security training and education on policies, 
tools, methodologies and control frameworks was initially the sole prerogative of the IT Risk 
and Continuity Manager. 
 
At strategic level, the IT Risk and Continuity Manager expressed a level of challenge in getting 
users to a level where they could understand information security guidelines as stipulated by 
CobiT. The organization had already implemented CobiT but its reception was poor. That is 
why the IT Risk and Continuity Manager had to be creative and employ lateral 
thinking
IMPROV-3
 to get the users accustomed to and familiar with CobiT requirements. This 
improvisational element was coded as such.  The researcher interpreted the lateral thinking of 
the IT Risk and Continuity Manager as individual improvisation
IMPROV-3
. Once the users began 
to understand the intrinsic befits of CobiT, then they began to appreciate his efforts. The whole 
mindset and attitude towards these frameworks changed because of this individual. This is 
revealed by what this practitioner said in the interview:  
 
“…it was perfect…when they actually saw the CobiT…exception results…they 
actually came to like it… because we are here to [show them]…”40 
 
Making CobiT clear to users and explaining its importance with regard to the organization’s 
information security posture seemed to be borne by the IT Risk and Continuity Manager, 
though it seems this role was handled well.  
 
4. Policy on Access and Control of Information Users 
 
The ISO IEC 17799 Section 9.6.1 gives guidelines to users of applications who should be 
provided access to information and application systems in accordance with defined access 
control policies. The CobiT objectives Section DS5.2 suggests a manner for identification, 
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authentication and access requirements for users by establishing procedures for logical access 
to and use of resources, and restriction to authorised personnel.  ITIL Section 4.2.4 (Security 
Management) gives direction to the information security management measures to be taken on 
access controls.  
 
Data incident 
 
The researcher asked one information security practitioner the criteria the organisation used to 
assign the responsibilities for implementing information security policy. It was established that 
experience and extensive knowledge played a big role.  
 
“Relevant experience in an IT environment. Clear understanding of Information 
Security Extensive knowledge of IT strategies, best practise processes and 
standards. Thorough working knowledge of analysis and design methodology 
and modelling techniques.”41 
 
When also asked what the organisation’s security roles and responsibilities were based on, the 
information security practitioner responded by stating that: 
 
“Our roles and responsibilities are based on providing the preservation of 
confidentiality, integrity and availability. Confidentiality – ensuring that 
accessibility is only for those authorised.  Integrity – safeguarding of accuracy 
and completeness of information. Availability – ensuring authorized users have 
access to information.”42  
 
The above data incidents corroborate the literature review finding that describes the tenets of 
information security (explained in Section  2.1, literature review). These were the same tenets 
that guided this organisation. The tenets as analysed from the data incidents seemed to guide 
the organisation towards putting controls in place that supported access restriction requirements 
such as: 
 users being providing with  menus to control access to application system functions; 
 restricting users’ knowledge of information or application system functions which they 
are not authorized to access; and 
 controlling the access rights of users, e.g. read, write, delete and execute; 
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How this was done and communicated to the users was through the organisation’s intranet as 
explained by one information security practitioner.  
 
“We use our Intranet,[name withheld]. Information days, regular e-mails are 
posted as reminders of the policy”.43  
 
In the interview process it was revealed that sometimes policies and guidelines on control of 
users were indeed accommodated and innovatively crafted and process improvised
 IMPROV-4
 to 
reflect user requirements. This sometimes called for practitioners to being quick-witted
IMPROV-
4
 in terms of making provisions for policy amendments. One practitioner states as follows:  
 
“…Well most of the times we try and keep us much access control as we can but 
most of the times that we do, people don’t want to follow the right procedures… I 
mean they are willing to [jump levels] and would do whatever they need to do to 
get their stuff across…” 44 
 
 
The context of process improvisation for the above data incident was that the employees 
seemed to disregard set policies and procedures.  
 
“Adherence to the e-mail usage policy seems to be disregarded by many users.”45 
 
The information security practitioners had challenges enforcing policy and would often be 
faced with the softer “people” issues. The need to be quick witted in dealing and interacting 
with users was interpreted by this researcher as comprising elements of improvisation that were 
used to re-create new patterns of approach and this was only possible because the information 
security practitioners displayed skills and experience when dealing with the users:
 
 
“We ensure that our knowledge is kept current by the subscription to the relevant 
professional bodies and the attendance of conferences and seminars.”46 
 
When asked what assurances the organisation had with regard to ensuring users were capable 
of applying information security policy and procedures and thus minimising security risks, the 
information security practitioner suggested the need to keep security awareness an on-going 
practice.  
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“Whilst there are no absolute assurances, we believe that adherence to the 
Security policies would lend itself to that assurance.”47 
 
5. Control of Internal Processes and Change Management  
 
In terms of areas of risk to data and information, particularly when accessed by users and 
support staff, the ISO IEC 17799 Section 10.2.2 identifies risk by highlighting ways that data 
and information that have been correctly entered can be corrupted by processing errors or 
through deliberate acts by users/support staff. The section proposes validation checks which 
should be incorporated into systems to detect such corruption. The section suggests looking at 
the design of applications and ensuring that restrictions are implemented to minimize these 
processing risks and failures that lead to a loss of integrity. The CobiT objectives Section 
AI6.3 stipulates the need to control changes in the information systems environment while 
considering proper change management procedures that guide software control and 
distribution, integrated configuration management, changes recorded and tracked. ITIL 
Section 7.9 (Service Support) guides the proper procedure for configuration management 
particularly with regards to relationships of information systems to other processes.  
 
Data incident 
 
When analyzing a specific data incident, it was revealed that in matters of prioritizing for 
information security, this often called for adjustments in the way the applications and controls 
were used. One practitio er had this to say:  
 
“…and obviously now when we reflect on it…[policy] it has not been too bad on 
business, but now when we hit certain areas, is that we have to make some kind of 
adjustments… because there are so many applications out there…and the thing is 
that, to be working…these needs to run on the administration rights of the 
machine…” 48 
 
The data incident suggested the need to intertwine information security policies with contextual 
and pragmatic requirements. The information security practitioners made attempts to draw 
upon their past experiences and practices in understanding policy requirements and making 
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necessary changes to accommodate business process changes. Through this incident, the 
researcher was able to interpret a degree of thorough intuitive and technical understanding on 
the part of the information security practitioners in making improvised adjustments. This 
collective understanding was interpreted to mean a form of collective improvisation that called 
for rational adaptive
IMPROV-5
 thinking.  
 
Creativity and intuitiveness was also coded in the following data incident: 
 
“……so we actually made provisions, that we could do it..[amend policy] when 
we looked at the group policy…on administration rights issues…” 49 
 
The context of this data incident was that, although the intent of policies for administrative 
rights issues was to give administrators of systems full access rights to systems, the 
practitioners’ spur-of-the-moment actions were inventiveIMPROV-6 and made provision for 
system access by certain users based on unique user identification.  The users used this unique 
identification to gain full access to systems. At tactical level, the need for this was justified.  
The above data incident was interpreted to reflect process improvisation
IMPROV-6
.  
 
Yet, another data incident that seemed to corroborate this incident and which suggested that the 
information security practitioners were pragmatic when it came to dealing with policies was 
when information security methods, policies and procedures were seen as not being practical. 
When one security practitioner was asked to recollect on those incidents, it is by hindsight that 
the following revelation was brought to bear: 
 
“Due to certain design of our systems it becomes impractical to fully apply all our 
security [guidelines] particularly with regard to access to data. As a result hereof 
full application of the policies are not always fully supported.”50  
 
The researcher interpreted the above incident to mean that there were elements of process 
improvisation
IMPROV-7
. This means that at operational level, while the practitioners’ 
respected frameworks/guidelines, between themselves they left provisions where they 
could act freely outside of these guidelines and frameworks. This was coded as being 
creative
IMPROV-7
 and was seen as a pragmatic way of “dealing with the issues as they 
arose”.  This creativity is also exemplified in the following data incident.  
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“…we could give those users…whatever…administration rights on the machine 
centrally… but [only] if we could manage those users who got admin rights on 
the machine …” 51 
 
 
Summary the Third Unit of Analysis 
 
Table 24 summaries the total number of conceptual instance in the previous narrative for this 
unit as follows: 
Table 24. Conceptual density of Improvisation when examining Control over Information 
Security Policy 
 
6.2.4 Analysis – Information Security Event Monitoring 
 
Section 2.4.1 of this research dealt with issues regarding this unit of analysis. The following 
section conceptualizes improvisation within activities that relate to Information Security Event 
Monitoring. Conceptualizing improvisation in this unit followed the 6 steps listed in Section 
6.1. This is demonstrated by Table 25 as follows; 
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Table 25 Open Coding for Information Security Event Monitoring (Extract of Appendix 5) 
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Data Incidents 
( Transcribed Interviews)   
 
STEP 2 
 
Context of Data Incident 
(Researcher’s Memo) 
STEP 3  
 
Researcher’s memos  
Determine Codes 
 
 in vivo and other 
generated  as underlined) 
 
STEP 4  
 
Level 
STEP 5  
 
Concepts 
generated 
(inductively) 
 
 
STEP 6  
 
Types of 
Improvisation 
(See Section  
4.4.1) 
 
 
 
 
Which increases the admin side 
which increases everything else, but 
in the long run it is probably [felt] 
it is the right thing to do 
52
 
 
well… what you see… well what 
happens is that it is all about saving 
money 
53
 
The downside of  implementing 
innovative measures and controls 
for information security was the 
increased costs which the 
practitioners were not comfortable 
with, though deemed necessary.  
Monitoring Equipment Placement and 
Protection 
1. Implies even though there are security 
control implementation challenges for 
ensuring robust security posture, the 
practitioners have to be practical about it  
 
Operational 
Activity 
Being practical 
on Security 
controls 
Implementation  
 
 
 
 
(Process) 
improvisation 
so there are those little things…that 
we do just to help us and to help the 
business.. coz it’s those quick little 
things that…we need to do better 54 
 
 
 
Through continuous internal control 
assessments, the practitioners 
appreciated that they were not 
operating optimally and would 
continually open up to new ways of 
improving controls, discovering 
novel purpose and accomplishing 
desired objectives.  
Monitoring Security incidents and 
requirements 
1. Implies being  reflexive and quick-
witted in dealing with internal controls  
 
Operational 
Activity 
Being quick-
witted in 
Internal control  
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The following were the data classifications as described in STEP 3 (2
nd
 paragraph) and are 
derived from interview transcripts for this unit of analysis (see Appendix 5). These 
classifications are listed as follows: 
 
1. Monitoring Information Security Incidents and Requirements 
2. Monitoring Application Usage 
3. Monitoring Processes and Application Integration 
4. Monitoring Application Classification Guidelines 
5. Monitoring and Assessing Application Risk 
6. Exceptional Reporting 
7. Monitoring Operational Procedures and Responsibilities 
8. Monitoring Equipment Placement and Protection 
 
Each of the above classification is explained in turn. 
 
1. Monitoring Information Security Incidents and Requirements 
 
The ISO IEC 17799 Section 9.7 specifically issues guidelines for monitoring systems in order 
to detect deviation from access control policy and also to record events that provide evidence 
of information security incidents/breaches and/or abuse. The CobiT objectives Section M1.1 
suggests a mechanism for collecting monitoring data benchmarks, proprietary nature and 
integrity of data by looking at relevant performance indicators. ITIL Section 6.2 (Service 
Delivery) gives direction on the proper way of handling capacity, through capacity 
management and demand management while Section 6.8 suggests ways of proactive problem 
solving and notes the importance of system monitoring in order to allow the effectiveness of 
controls adopted to be checked.  
 
Data Incident  
 
In order to understand how incident reporting took place, the researcher asked one practitioner 
the procedures involved in ensuring users reported observed information security weaknesses. 
It was mentioned that: 
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“Whilst no formal [procedure] is in place we depend on the various competencies 
within the organisation report potential breaches.”55    
 
The above data incident demonstrated a degree of flexibility and informality in carrying out 
reporting activities. Data analysis however revealed that the organisation had at least a working 
mechanism (competencies) for the capturing and reporting of security incidents. When one 
practitioner was asked whether there were policies for reporting incidents, and whether there 
were procedures to follow as laid down by the organisation when reporting incidents, it was 
reported  that:  
 
“Yes, incidents are generally reported to IT Risk management or via our External 
Service Provider through their network monitoring mechanism.”56  
 
It was also reported that there were mechanisms in place to ensure that most of the critical 
information security incidents were captured and reported. This was explained by one 
information security practitioner as follows: 
 
“There is a formal meeting held monthly, however if serious breaches are detected 
emergency meetings are convened. There are also automated alerts prompting us of 
potential threats, specifically external threats.”57 
 
The information security practitioner also mentioned that the reporting of the incidents was 
happening as it occurred: 
  
“[incidents] are reported as they occur or detected by our external service providers 
who monitor our network activity. We have a monthly meeting to analyse incidents 
received.”58 
 
What was interesting to the researcher was the way the information security practitioners 
carried out checks to confirm incidents. From the interviews held, it was also mentioned by one 
interviewee that the monitoring process was carried out based on set standards and if there 
were deviations, then these would be reported. 
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“…[We carried out] particular checks around [form ] abuse…which forms part of 
our information security requirements to ensure confidentiality and integrity 
basically at more or less operational level…” 59 
 
The way this monitoring process was done at operational level revealed that the practitioners 
were practical
IMPROV-1
 in the approach. This was coded as such. The context of this can be 
explained as follows: in order to be responsive to monitoring system access and use, and at the 
same time being efficient with the use of resources, the organization carried out periodic  and at 
times spontaneous log files reviews in a practical manner. The log review exemplified the 
information security tenets of confidentiality, integrity and availability.  It was established that 
the practitioners did not have any specific rigid method for following the tenets yet they were 
practical and managed successfully to monitor reports and comply with information security 
policies. The researcher interpreted this to mean that collective improvisation
IMPROV-1
 was 
manifest. The reason for the success was because the information security practitioners and 
their peers were able to collectively extemporize the requirements (without prior preparation) 
while considering the tenets of information security. This data instance was coded as such.  
Extemporization and contriving the information security requirements as they were arising was 
established to be necessary. 
 
Data Incident  
 
In another data incident, it was noted that at times users did not follow procedures, as 
demonstrated by the following data incident:  
 
“…everyday, I mean, it would actually be too easy if [users] followed 
procedure…”60 
 
The context of this data incident was that the organisation had informally established four areas 
for monitoring: monitoring authorisation access, monitoring privileged operations, monitoring 
unauthorised attempts and monitoring system alerts. In this context, users were not following 
procedure when it came to accessing systems. They would log into systems using other users’ 
passwords, or having concurrent log-ins and therefore invalidating the monitoring process.  
This made monitoring authorisation access difficult on the part of the practitioners. It was as a 
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result of this that at tactical level the practitioners had to be inventive
IMPROV-2
 in formulating 
procedures and methods for checking and monitoring the users and the systems. The 
practitioners were faced with security alternatives/options which would be devised to ensure 
they kept tabs on who was doing what. It was how the practitioners managed those users that 
the researcher coded as process improvisation.
IMPROV-2. 
The improvisation occurred when the 
practitioners minimised the incidents caused by users who were not following procedure.   
 
Data incident  
 
It terms of monitoring the other areas, namely monitoring privileged operations, monitoring 
unauthorised attempts and monitoring system alerts, that the practitioners were asked how they 
managed to do this. One practitioner responded as follows:  
 
“By the application of pragmatic access policies, use of firewalls, message 
filtering, etc.”61  
 
There was a general feeling that the monitoring process was not optimally conducted. This was 
exemplified by the following statement:  
 
“…so there are those little things…that we do just to help us and to help the 
business…because it is those little things that…we need to do better…” 62 
 
 
The context of this data incident was that reviewing logs required a considerable amount of 
time and resources. As explained earlier, the monitoring process was semi-automated and 
spontaneous. This meant that it was not optimal and the practitioners felt they needed to do 
things (monitoring) slightly better than they had been doing previously.  
 
The researcher interpreted the words “those little things” as those makeshift activities that were 
contrived to make it possible for the monitoring process to function well. At operational level, 
those informal makeshift activities that were outside the radar of formality were conveniently 
done to improve on processes. Those kinds of activities were necessary to achieve their 
intended objectives, and were coded as being novel
IMPROV-3
 in approach. Those “little things” 
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exemplified thinking outside the box. This is what the researcher interpreted to constitute 
process improvisation
IMPROV-3
.  
  
 
2. Monitoring Application Usage 
 
The ISO IEC 17799 Section 9.7.2 defines the proper procedures and areas of risk when 
monitoring system/application use. The section calls for establishing procedures for monitoring 
use of information processing facilities. Such procedures, the section states are necessary to 
ensure that users are only performing activities that have been explicitly authorized. The 
CobiT objectives Section DS3.8 talks of resource availability, and talks of procedures for 
monitoring application use through looking at availability requirements, fault tolerance, 
prioritisation and resource allocation, while CobiT Section M 1.2 considers the assessing 
performance targets on a continuing basis.  ITIL Section 8.3 (Service Delivery), points to the 
proper manner of monitoring application use by considering the availability management 
process. The level of monitoring required for individual facilities should be determined by a 
risk assessment. Areas that are considered by this section include: 
 authorized access 
 all privileged operations, e.g. use of supervisor account; 
 
Data incident 
 
When interviewed, one of the information security practitioners suggested that they were 
flexible in the manner in which they used monitoring tools to monitor user activity particularly 
when monitoring different user profiles. Within the organisational setting, it was noted that 
users had different application needs. The difference in user needs required that users be 
granted different log-in profiles and privileges. This is exemplified by the following comment: 
 
“…[In this organisation]… it’s the way…the [monitoring] applications…and the 
people that use them [that]  are a bit…different… so…[our] users are quite 
different from [say other’s] users…because they’ve got different applications 
running on the servers…and they’ve got probably different ways of logging in…” 
63
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It can be inferred from the above data incident that the organization required many different 
tools and techniques to monitor profiles and different applications. The context was that the 
practitioners at tactical level were using several packages (tools) that brought these disparate 
applications and types of information into one convergence. How they did this was very 
contextual to the applications in use, the profiles of the users, and the monitoring tools, such 
that the approach would have not been replicated elsewhere. It was this approach that the 
researcher coded as being original
IMPROV-4
. The context of using different monitoring 
applications provided for process improvisation 
IMPROV-4
. 
 
3. Monitoring Processes and Application Integration 
 
ISO IEC 17799 Section 9.7.2.2 is more specific on the monitoring process particularly when 
looking at application integration and the exposure to risk.  It states that when considering risk, 
the results of the monitoring process need to be reviewed regularly. The CobiT objectives 
Section M1.1 stipulates procedures for monitoring data benchmarks and the proprietary nature 
and integrity of data. CobiT Section DS5.2 also suggests a manner for forecasting the 
workload of applications through capacity planning and trend analysis. ITIL Section 4.2 
(Service Delivery) has established mechanisms for capacity management, analysis, and the 
production of the capacity plan.  The organisation was following ISO IEC 17799 Section 
9.7.2.2 recommendations and monitoring applications exposure to risk incidents as shown: 
 
“Incidents are prioritised and “red flagged”. The “red flag” incidents become part 
of the audit report with the required management response.”64 
 
 
It should be noted that the frequency of the review depended on the risks involved. The following 
are some of the risk factors that the section proposes to be considered: 
 the criticality of the application and integration processes; 
 the extent of system interconnection and integration (particularly public networks). 
 the value, sensitivity or criticality of the information involved; 
 the past experience of system infiltration and misuse; 
 
Data incident 
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The practitioners acknowledged that the difference and uniqueness between theirs and any 
other organization’s monitoring process and how the monitoring was integrated or ‘put 
together’. The following data incident shows this pragmatic consideration:  
 
“…what they are trying to do, holistically in the [monitoring] process …it is all 
based on the criticality of the business processes, what’s important and what’s 
not…” 65 
 
The context of the above data incident was that the practitioners had their own pragmatic and 
unique ways of creating monitoring solutions. Why this was necessary, as explained, was that 
previously the organization had deployed monitoring systems but then there was no one to look 
at the data logs. At strategic level, the organization realized that they were wasting a lot of 
money. To address this issue they designed a “holistic monitoring process” that would allow 
for regular or periodic review based on mission critical systems. The organization also assigned 
designated people to various monitoring processes, and determined how often this was to be 
done. This holistic solution was coded as being resourceful
IMPROV-5
 and was seen as a form of 
process improvisation
IMPROV-5 
that addressed what was important and what was not.  
 
Data incident 
 
One other data incident that seemed to corroborate the need for a holistic monitoring solution 
was exemplified by the following statement from one practitioner: 
 
“…and we configured those [monitoring] things together and we come up with ‘IBAS’ 
which stands for integrated business architecture solutions…” 66 
 
The context of this data incident is that the practitioners realized they needed to deploy an 
elaborate system that would gather data from various sources within departments and user 
profiles into convergence. From this converged silo, the monitoring system would generate 
reports to make the data useable and understandable. At strategic level, the result of this was (a 
product) they called the “integrated business architecture solutions”. The researcher coded this 
way of using technology as being ingenious
IMPROV-6 
as demonstrated by the manner in which 
the practitioners handled the monitoring process holistically. The novel action and thought 
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together, combined with the element of deciding what was and was not important enabled the 
creation of a product “integrated business architecture solutions” and was a form of product 
improvisation
IMPROV-6
. 
 
 
4. Monitoring Application Classification Guidelines 
 
The ISO IEC 17799 Section 9.7.2.2 points to the need for a comprehensive way of monitoring 
application classification. Applications are classified to indicate the need, priorities and degree of 
protection. The information held in these applications has varying degrees of sensitivity and 
criticality. The CobiT objectives Section DS9.7 equally has established procedures for 
configuration management, critical components identified, classified and managed, while 
CobiT Section M1.3 assesses the need to monitor satisfaction levels of customers while 
highlighting the shortfalls.   ITIL Section 7.11.1 (Service Support) gives procedures for the 
level of control while Section 4.4.8 considers monitoring the applications for the purpose of 
understanding customer satisfaction and base classification guidelines for items that may require 
an additional level of protection or special handling.  
 
Data incident 
 
An information classification system should be used to define an appropriate set of protection 
levels and communicate the need for special handling measures. From the review of one data 
incident, it was confirmed that one practitioner was mandated to create an information 
classification system that would highlight the mission critical, tier 1 systems. This is evidenced by 
the following data incident: 
 
“…I put a huge enterprise around that…I picked all the main applications and 
[classified] them on a spreadsheet…” 67 
 
The context of this data incident was that this particular individual creatively designed a 
classification system that was colour coded to highlight the main applications (mission critical, 
tier 1 systems) that would be singled out for intense monitoring. The reason given for the need 
for this classification was that should the main tier 1 systems be exposed to incidents, then 
these had the potential to cause serious disruptions that would have a long term effect on 
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operations. There was therefore a need to classify these systems.  By analysing one specific 
data incident, it was discovered that the practitioners had their own creative
IMPROV-7
 way of 
designing a classification system. By using colour codes for each system, with the stronger red 
colour for mission critical, tier 1 systems and the less important systems with blue colour,   
the individual improvised ways to determine appropriate levels for monitoring the 
organisation’s applications at tactical level. The researcher interpreted this to imply individual 
improvisation
IMPROV-7
.  
 
5. Monitoring and Assessing Application Risk 
 
The ISO IEC 17799 Section 10.5.2 proposes the continuous reviewing and monitoring of 
applications in terms of any changes to these applications. The CobiT objectives Section M1.4 
suggests proper ways of management reporting for risk mitigation. ITIL Section 4.5.1 (Service 
Delivery) highlights the need to define service level management which incorporates 
monitoring and reporting. Section 4.4.9 of ITIL recommends the need to define reporting and 
review procedures. ISO IEC 17799 Section 10.5.2 provides guidelines for detailed technical 
reviews for periodic assessments to check on changes to applications and operating systems 
and covers some of the following: 
 review of application control and integrity procedures to ensure that they have not been 
compromised by the operating system changes 
 ensuring that notification of operating system changes is provided in time to allow 
appropriate reviews to take place before implementation; 
 ensuring that appropriate changes are made to the business continuity plans 
In order to understand how this ISRM activity was taking place, the researcher asked how the 
organisation determined and quantified information security risk relative to use and how risk 
was monitored. The information security practitioner to whom the question was directed stated 
that some of these efforts were rather technical and complex. The need to quantify information 
security was done procedurally by determining mission critical systems:  
 
“Risk quantification is determined by the criticality of data on specific 
servers.”68 
 
Data Incident 
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During the interview it was noticed that the risk assessment activity followed suggested 
guidelines that gave opportunity for those assessments to be contextualized. One security 
practitioner noted how they were assessing risk in out of warranty machines: 
 
“…and also they must, like as you say, assess the risk. If the machine is out of 
warranty and it is a tier one application (critical application), and it is going to be 
down for some time…” 69 
 
The context of this data incident was that the organisation had determined a criticality rating 
for the systems and application (machines) held.  The criticality rating, i.e. determining tier 1 
mission critical systems, was a useful metric since the organisation did not want to dedicate all 
its resources to just monitoring. An innovative and thoughtful way whereby the organisation 
made decisions on how to allocate time and money for monitoring and assessing risk was to 
balance controls with practitioner productivity. While ensuring they remained compliant with 
regulations, they designed at operational level, a spontaneous approach that could prioritise and 
allocate monitoring resources to critical applications when and where necessary. This approach 
was coded by the researcher to imply lateral thinking
IMPROV-8 
and was interpreted as process 
improvisation
IMPROV-8 
since the need to assess risk against a critical tier one application was 
extemporaneous and would occur on a more improvised fashion than controlled fashion.  
 
Data Incident 
 
This capability of understanding criticality of application was also demonstrated by analysing 
another data incident. The researcher asked one information security practitioner how they 
ensured they continued to learn and gain the necessary skills and capabilities in order to 
continue addressing information security risks adequately. It was explained that this was an 
operational activity that called for prioritising incidents, and of the reporting of these. The 
reports would then be studied in order to obtain a deeper understanding.  The confidence 
placed by the information security practitioners in the assessment process was strengthened by 
the fact that the practitioners were equipped with sufficient knowledge, experience and right 
attitude towards the risk assessment processes.  
 
“…I mean, our actions [are] based on the criticality of the 
application…obviously… experience plays a lot, if the heat comes from the 
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executives and that kind of thing ... we know which applications are critical and 
which [ones] are not…” 70 
 
The context of this data incident was that the information security practitioners were tasked to 
develop defensive (and at times offensive) strategies to protect and defend the organisation’s 
information and information systems asset/applications. In order to do, this they had to 
demonstrate at strategic level that they had sufficient experience and understanding of the 
systems/applications, the risks, the criticality of applications and how these systems are 
sensitive to compromise. That is why one practitioners stated, “our actions [are] based on the 
criticality of the application”. The researcher coded this incident as an expression of being 
practical
IMPROV-9
 based on experience and understanding. The researcher interpreted the 
contextual determination of the ‘right risk’ appetite based on understanding and experience as 
reflecting some degree of process improvisation
IMPROV-9
.  
 
6. Exceptional Reporting  
 
The ISO IEC 17799 Section 12.2.2 proposes a guideline for technical compliance checking 
and for the generation of reports for interpretation by specialists. The need for regular checking 
and reporting of information systems is of importance particularly in ensuring compliance with 
information security standards. The CobiT objectives Section M2.4 suggests a manner for 
internal control level reporting where exception reporting and guidelines for reporting needs 
analysis is given. ITIL Section 4.4.5 (ICT Infrastructure Management) suggests proper ways 
of managing and controlling all aspects of ICT operational security.  
 
The researcher needed to know how the exceptional reports were being generated. One 
information security practitioner was asked how the organisation assured itself that the 
reporting procedures for security incidents were correctly followed and the exceptional reports 
correctly captured. The practitioner explained to the researcher the procedure for reporting as 
follows: 
 
“Formal reports have to be forwarded to the IT leadership team and a Risk Matrix 
is maintained and included in the Monthly Board report.”71  
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When the same practitioner was asked how the organisation ensured that it had studied and 
learnt from the exceptional reports, it was noted that the organisation regularly studied the 
reports: 
 
“By regular security review [of report]…”72 
 
Data Incident 
 
The analysis of the data incidents revealed that the process of exceptional reporting was 
manually performed at operational level, and that the reports highlighted instances when 
hardware and software controls were not correctly been implemented. Exceptional reporting 
was shown to be taking place as suggested by the following data incident:  
 
“…so [name withheld] run certain exception reports and actually reported the 
behavior…” 73  
 
The context of this exceptional reporting within the organization was that the organisation had 
set up a mechanism for all users to be responsible for recognizing unusual or suspicious 
activity in systems, e.g. reporting on slow networks, bouncing e-mails with error messages etc. 
From the data incident above, it shows that one practitioner was dedicated to responding to 
incidents. At tactical level, this was the practitioner who was notified of any incidents that 
occurred (by reviewing reports) and who fostered pragmatic, creative solutions. It was this 
pragmatic, creative way of handling the responses that was most interesting to the researcher. 
The solutions provided from the interpretation of these reports by the information security 
practitioners often involved the need to be rational adaptive
IMPROV-10
. Using skills and 
experience of understanding the risks involved, the interpretations and the solutions thereof 
would be interpreted by the researcher to constitute grounds for individual 
improvisation
IMPROV-10
 to occur.  
 
 
7. Monitoring Operational Procedures and Responsibilities 
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The ISO IEC 17799 Section 8.1 highlights the need for responsibilities and procedures 
concerning the management and operation of all information processing facilities. The CobiT 
objectives Section M 2.4 suggests the need for monitoring operational information security and 
internal control assurance through self assessments, independent audits, and identifying 
vulnerabilities and information security problems.  ITIL Section 4.2 (Security Management) 
gives direction on how to implement these measures. Development of appropriate operating 
instructions and incident response procedures are needed to monitor operations and check for 
incidents. ISO IEC 17799 Section 8.1.3 pays specific attention to incident management 
responsibilities and procedures. It emphasises the need for procedures to be established to 
ensure quick, effective and orderly response to information security incidents. ISO IEC 17799 
Section 8.1.3 places emphasis on the following controls over information security incidents:  
 information system failures and loss of service; 
 errors resulting from incomplete or inaccurate business data; 
 
In order to obtain a deeper conceptualisation of how monitoring operational procedures were 
carried out, it was necessary for the researcher to ask how the organisation monitored its 
security incidents. It was explained by one information security practitioner as follows: 
 
“This is done by means of both internal and external monitoring of both data 
access and network activity. Internet usage is also very closely monitored and 
measured.”74 
 
Data incident 
 
Data analysis revealed that the monitoring activities were operational level activities that were 
meant to safeguard the loss of service deemed critical to the organization.  All necessary 
measures were taken to ensure that there were minimal disruptions. This was particularly true 
in the ‘mobile environment’ where users and practitioners used mobile enhanced technologies 
like laptops (notebooks) to help the function. This is exemplified by statements from the 
following interviewee:  
  
“…I mean, if a person has got a broken notebook, then they can’t work…you see? So 
I mean they had to do something, and we’ve been trying to give them little injections 
with these notebooks to keep them going…” 75 
                                            
74
 Q47-Appendix 8 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
 183 
 
 
The context of this data incident was that the practitioners were battling with continuity of 
work and processes while being faced with limited resources.  At operational level, the aspect 
of “doing something” constituted a reflexive manner of handling contingencies as they arose 
and acting on the spur-of–the-moment. The “little injections” was an expression coded as 
being ingenuous
IMPROV-11
, and was seen as an important trait that assisted the practitioner to 
contextualize contingencies as they arose.  The way “they had to do something” was coded as 
an example of collective improvisation
IMPROV-11 
to ensure continuity of services.  
 
8. Monitoring Equipment Placement and Protection 
 
The ISO IEC 17799 Section 7.2.1 highlights the need to monitor and protect equipment from 
risks and environmental threats and also from the risk of opportunities for unauthorized access. 
The CobiT objectives Section M2.1 gives provision for the monitoring of internal controls, 
and suggests procedures for comparisons, reconciliations, deviation analysis, corrective action 
reporting and communication.  ITIL Section 4.6.2 (ICT Infrastructure Management), suggest 
the tools to be used i.e. scheduling tools for workload and resilience testing.  ISO IEC 17799 
Section 7.2.1 suggests some of the following controls measures:  
 Equipment should be sited to minimize unnecessary access into work areas. 
 Information processing and storage facilities handling sensitive data should be 
positioned to reduce the risk of overlooking during their use. 
 Items requiring special protection should be isolated to reduce the general level of 
protection required. 
 Controls should be adopted to minimize the risk of potential threats including theft, fire, 
etc.  
 
The ISO IEC 17799 Section 7.2.1 as implemented by the organization under study seems to 
have been constrained by resource limitations.  
 
Data incident 
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The problem expressed by one interviewee about security and equipment protections was the 
costs involved vis-à-vis the inherent risk to the equipment. No solution was previously found 
which enabled the quantification of the risk against the value and cost of its protection. This 
was done in an ad hoc fashion as the equipment kept coming. Evident from the interview was 
the apprehension about costs and budgets for this. This is demonstrated as follows:  
 
“…Which increases the admin side which increases everything else, but in the long 
run it is probably [felt] it is the right thing to do…” 76 
 
The context of this data incident was that practitioners were conscious of the cost element vis-
à-vis information risk and productivity. At tactical level, it was the balancing of these needs at 
operational level that the information security practitioners were interpreted to have been 
rational adaptive
IMPROV-12 
about equipment protection. Equipment protection was pragmatic 
and based on costs, productivity, risk and criticality of operations. The approach towards 
equipment protection as analyzed from the data incidents was interpreted as a form of process 
improvisation
IMPROV-12
. This interpretation was based on the understanding that equipment 
protection was based on budget constraints. The fact that financial resources were a 
consideration to this pragmatism was expressed as follows:  
 
“…well… what you see…what happens is that it is all about saving money…” 77 
 
Data incident 
 
Financial constraints were singled out as significantly influencing the approach towards 
compliance efforts. At tactical level, the practitioners adopted informal ways to comply with 
the frameworks as revealed by the following statement from one interview:  
 
“… I mean some of them…these people have got…notebooks that have got a mouse 
[attached to] it and they’ve got a keyboard [attached to] it…and they’ve got this 
[whole thing] attached to a monitor…because they don’t have a PC…”  78 
 
An interesting insight revealed by the above data incident signifies the unique way the 
practitioners and users dealt with the challenging circumstances. The practitioners found use 
for discarded notebooks even though these were not working because of missing components.  
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“…because the monitor (computer screen) is not working…the mouse isn’t 
working...and the keyboard isn’t working…” 79 
 
The information security practitioners became creative
IMPROV-13
 by suggesting 
extemporaneously that the laptops and PCs be modified in new ways i.e. using working parts of 
each (integrating the two products).  The researcher interpreted this data incident to be an 
expression of product improvisation
IMPROV-13.
 
 
Summary of the Fourth Unit of Analysis 
 
Table 26 summaries the total number of conceptual instance in the previous narrative for this 
unit as follows: 
Table 26. Conceptual density of Improvisation when examining Event Monitoring 
 
6.2.5 Analysis – IT Governance and Regulatory Compliance  
 
Section 2.4.2 of this research dealt with issues regarding this unit of analysis. The following 
section conceptualizes improvisation within activities that relate to IT Governance and 
Regulatory Compliance. Conceptualizing improvisation in this unit followed the 6 steps listed 
in Section 6.1. This is demonstrated by Table 27 as follows: 
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yes and when I developed that 
spreadsheet and showed it to the 
management…it was [an eye 
opener]…I was like jeez… I mean 
it was like we were focusing on 
applications [that were not 
critical] 
80
 
 
so they actually have to adjust…I 
mean the big guys.. the 
executives… 
committee,…whatever…so we gave 
them all the facts and figures…all 
the notebook stuff 
81
 
This was an instance when planning 
and action was occurring together in a 
synthesized ‘real-time’ strategy. The 
management liked the innovative 
ideas of the practitioner planner  
Technical Compliance Checking 
1. Implies  inventiveness in 
planning and checking 
measurement tools to achieve 
compliant technology  
 
Tactical 
Activity 
Being inventive in 
developing 
measurement tools 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Individual) 
improvisation 
yes but …like I said…had we not 
adopted CobiT at the board level, 
we would have made it far more 
difficult [to implement], but … and 
the challenge being the audit 
report 
82
 
 
 
Prior to this, CobiT was the accepted 
and understood framework at board 
level, so an innovative way was 
proposed to use the same tool in IT 
security governance, which was done 
with minimal implementation 
challenges 
Compliance and System Audit Control 
1. Implies being inspired to adopt 
CobiT tool and fit this with  
processes that ensures 
information compliance and 
monitoring international 
standards  
 
Strategic 
Activity 
Being inspired to 
ensure best 
compliance 
methods 
 
 
 
 
 
(Product) 
improvisation 
Table 27. Open Coding for IT Governance and Regulatory Compliance (Extract of Appendix 6)   
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The following were the data classifications as described in STEP 3 (2
nd
 paragraph) and are 
derived from interview transcripts for this unit of analysis (see Appendix 6). These 
classifications are listed as follows: 
 
1. Technical Compliance Checking 
2. Compliance and System Audit Control 
3. Information Security Reviews 
4. Compliance with Information Protection Legislation and IT Governance 
5. Information Security Reviews of IT Application  Systems 
6. Review of Risk  
 
Each of the above classification is explained in turn. 
 
1. Technical Compliance Checking 
 
The ISO IEC 17799 Section 12.2.2 proposes a guideline for technical compliance checking to 
be carried out by specialists and authorised persons. The guidelines emphasises that technical 
compliance checks should only be carried out by, or under the supervision of, competent, 
authorized persons. The CobiT objectives Section M.2 suggests procedures for technical 
compliance to take into account operational security and internal control assurance. ITIL 
Section 4.2 (ICT Infrastructure Management) has provision for technical compliance which 
procedures for technical support and the processes that require technical support. The risk 
involved here is that non-specialists would either perform incorrect checks/procedures or focus the 
checks in the wrong areas.  
 
Data incident 
 
The interview revealed that at times at tactical level, the compliance checks were performed on 
non-critical applications as explained by one practitioner: 
 
“…yes and when I developed that spreadsheet and showed it to the management, it 
was [an eye opener], I mean it was like we were focusing on applications [that 
were not critical]…” 83 
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The context of this data incident was that practitioners were not balancing productivity with 
risk and were focusing resources on non-tier 1 mission critical systems. What seemed to have 
happened was that, by focusing on non critical applications, the practitioners were affording 
themselves little time to focus on the more critical items. One practitioner realized this and 
took it upon himself to devise a procedure that would remedy this. This practitioner designed a 
procedure whereby practitioners would now dedicate resources to critical applications. This act 
was coded as being novel
IMPROV-1. 
It was the individual intervention and reasoning that enabled 
compliance. This was coded as individual improvisation
IMPROV-1
 and is corroborated by the 
following data incident. 
 
“…so they actually had to adjust. I mean, the executive committee, we gave them all the 
facts and figures…”84 
 
2. Compliance and System Audit Control 
 
The ISO IEC 17799 Section 12.2 points out the need for having appropriate audit tools to 
review information security policy and technical compliance. This section proposes that audits 
be performed against the appropriate information security policies and the technical platforms and 
information systems. The CobiT objectives Section M3.2 suggests having compliance 
requirements and systems audits done by an independent party. Section M3.1 gives guidelines 
for independent information security and internal control review by an accredited party.  ISO 
IEC 17799 Section 12.3.1 points to the audit requirements and activities involving checks on 
operational systems. It suggests that these activities be carefully planned and agreed upon to 
minimize the risk of disruptions to business processes. It proposes the following to be observed in 
the audits: 
 
 Audit requirements should be agreed upon with appropriate management. 
 The scope of the checks should be agreed upon and controlled. 
 The checks should be limited to read-only access to software and data 
 
 
Data incident 
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In the interview, it was established that the information security practitioners had established a 
vision for adopting CobiT as a guiding control framework to assist in checking compliance 
requirements. At strategic level, the framework was familiar to the board and therefore rolling 
it down to operational level proved a small challenge and this helped avoid implementation 
problems. The idea of using CobiT was earlier inspired
IMPROV-2 
by one practitioner and the 
decision to use this particular framework extensively across other operations was taken 
positively. As a strategic activity, CobiT would be implemented on a module by module basis 
where relevant. This was a form of product improvisation 
IMPROV-2
 and is illustrated by the 
comments of one practitioner:  
 
“…yes but …like I said…had we not adopted CobiT at the board level, we would 
have made it far more difficult [to implement], but … and the challenge being the 
audit report…” 85 
 
The implementation of CobiT was also revealed to have been an individual initiative by one 
particular practitioner. This particular practitioner was already aware of the strengths of this 
framework and wanted it rolled out extensively. The practitioner strategically devised a way of 
doing this without encountering great opposition. The way this was carried out demonstrated 
some level of rational adaptation
IMPROV-3
 expressed as individual improvisation.
IMPROV-3
.  
Rational adaptation was interpreted to have been achieved from the onset, when the board 
adopted CobiT, and the practitioners were left to find relevant explanations for the rest of the 
user community for the reason CobiT was suitable, how it would be used and its effects. This 
argument is collaborated by the following data incident: 
 
“…so in line with that approach, it was a good idea that the strategy that I was 
formulating made it so much easier to adopt [CobiT]…” 86 
 
 
3. Information Security Reviews/Forums 
 
The CobiT objectives Section M3.3 suggests a manner for independent reviews and assurance 
of effectiveness of IT services through conducting routine independent checks of effectiveness. 
ISO IEC 17799 Section 12.2.1 points to the need for having regular reviews which ensures the 
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organisation’s compliance with information security policies and standards. The section 
proposes that the reviews should include: 
 information systems; 
 systems providers; 
 owners of information and information assets; 
 users of  information systems; and 
 management 
 
ISO IEC Section 12.2.1 places the owners of information systems as carrying the 
responsibility for supporting regular reviews of the compliance of their systems with the 
appropriate information security policies, standards and any other information security 
requirements. In the interview process, it was established that there were forums mandated by 
management to ensure and review systems, users and even the methodologies being used. One 
such forum was the architecture forum (mentioned earlier) mandated to do such task as 
explained as follows:  
 
“…so you’ve got a methodology, so basically all of the things that come out go 
through the architectural forum for scrutiny…” 87 
 
Data incident 
 
In order to obtain a deeper understanding of how the forums were operating, the researcher 
asked one practitioner how these forums assisted in promoting information security. It was 
explained that the forums would be used to set information security awareness through the use 
of “balanced scorecards”.  
 
“We ensure that we place security awareness on our balanced scorecard.”88 
 
The researcher interpreted the above data incident to imply that the design and construction of 
balanced scorecards would involve some degree of contextual creativeness. At strategic level, 
the forum would engage creatively 
IMPROV-4
 in the way it designed the scorecards to meet the 
set information security requirements which required understanding the security posture of the 
integrated performance measures (scorecards) and describing the performance measures 
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currently in use (contextually). The sitting together and deliberating on these measures was 
constituted to also imply a degree of collective improvisation .
IMPROV-4
  
 
4. Compliance with Information Protection Legislation and IT Governance 
 
ISO IEC 17799 Section 12.1.1 suggests that the way an organisation should carry out 
compliance requirements with regard to information security policies and standards. It 
mentions this important need in order to help organisations avoid breaches of any criminal or 
civil law, statutory, regulatory or contractual obligations and of any information security 
requirements. The CobiT objectives Section M 3.5 suggests an independent assurance of 
compliance with laws and regulatory requirements and contractual commitments through 
routine independent compliance checks. ITIL Section 4.2 (Security Management) gives 
procedures for the need to have audits and evaluate information security reviews of IT systems. 
It should be noted that the design, operation, use and management of information systems may 
be subject to statutory, regulatory and contractual information security requirements. ISO IEC 
Section 12.1.1 informs on specific controls and individual responsibilities to meet these 
requirements and mentions the need for organisations to document all relevant statutory, 
regulatory and contractual requirements for each information system.  
 
Data incident 
 
During the interview, it was noted that practitioners considered themselves to be well above 
average in terms of meeting compliance requirements. One practitioner stated:  
 
“…in terms of how we…have been meeting certain compliance requirements in terms of 
ECT Act…” 89 
 
The general feeling was that the practitioners were conscious of the need to comply with other 
relevant statutory ACTs as explained by one practitioner:  
 
“…or any other critical ACT in line  with  all the information reporting and all this … do 
we  all  play…” 90 
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What was interesting was that although at strategic level the practitioners were aware of the 
compliance needs and requirements, they were not sure how these would apply in their 
contextual circumstances. So far, no situation had arisen yet to warrant the need to “test the 
Act” i.e. no one had as yet been prosecuted in order to test and see how the Act was  
understood and interpreted. Indeed this issue was highlighted by one practitioner as follows:   
 
“…Yes, a lot of Acts have been…introduced… but…I don’t think they have been tested 
yet….so we want to comply to the bare minimum…” 91 
 
This was interpreted by the researcher to mean that the practitioners were resourceful
 IMPROV-5
 
in meeting regulatory requirements at the time. It was also interpreted that the decision to 
“comply to the bare minimum” was not arrived at single-handedly but was a collective effort of 
establishing a mechanism to comply to the bare minimum. As a form of strategic activity, the 
researcher interpreted the data incident to imply that the practitioners exhibited collective 
improvisation
IMPROV-5
.  
 
Data incident 
 
In a similar data incident, the practitioners knew of their responsibilities towards meeting 
compliance requirements: 
 
“…but I still have a role to play in terms of compliance…” 92 
 
The context of this data incident was that the practitioner was aware of the need for the 
organisation to remain in compliance with regulatory, statutory and contractual security 
requirements. It was, however, the mechanism to verify such compliance (at tactical level) that 
was interesting to the researcher. The practitioners had stated that they “wanted to comply to 
the bare minimum”. In a sense they seemed to be getting byIMPROV-6 so long as no major non- 
compliance incidents were being highlighted in audits. This was coded as so. 
 
One way of getting by was to look at some of the suggestions in the frameworks, 
methodologies and ACTs and to see how these would fit into the current organisational 
practices and activities. The manner in which this was done by practitioners required a deep 
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understanding of these requirements and contextually fitting these requirements into the 
organisation. This was coded as collective improvisation 
IMPROV-6
  
 
Data incident 
 
In yet another data incident, the practitioner’s impression of the CobiT framework and his 
interpretation thereof was as follows:  
 
“…if you look at the CobiT core systems there are certain modules that relate to core 
requirements…” 93 
 
“…Do you know CobiT processes? the 34 processes [in CobiT]? Once you adopt CobiT, 
there are certain levels of every process that you have to accept. There is high, low and 
medium…” 94 
 
The context of this data incident was that the organisation had implemented CobiT at 
operational level. CobiT framework made provisions and guidelines that the organisation 
would follow to meet compliance requirements of its operations. At operational level, the 
practitioners had suggested that they were looking at and interpreting these requirements in 
CobiT selectively, although as it is suggest in the data incident, they were well aware of what 
CobiT stipulated. This was coded as managing
IMPROV-7
 compliance requirements. The 
practitioners had a creative way of managing their understanding of the business process 
security risks, the criticality of these processes, and the need to use specific guidelines to meet 
compliance requirements. It was the contextualisation of the risk based on the provisions of 
CobiT that the researcher interpreted to imply that the practitioners were process 
improvising
IMPROV-7.  
 
Data incident 
In another data incident, one practitioner explained the implementation of the CobiT 
framework was a process that involved the understanding of contexts of the critically of the 
processes. At strategic level, the processes would be rated high, medium, or low depending on 
the contextual level of risk. This understanding was coded as lateral thinking
IMPROV-8
 and was 
interpreted to have occurred when the practitioners viewed the CobiT and other compliance 
frameworks as tools not to be applied rigidly but to  apply flexibility to the changing of these 
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tools to fit contextual needs. This form of product improvisation
IMPROV-8
 was explained as 
follows: 
 
“…I think frameworks can be deceiving… we actually incorporate 3 frameworks…we 
incorporate the overall framework, to govern the enterprise architecture solution 
distribution which is basically the Zachman  Framework…” 95 
 
“…but if you look in the Zachman’s framework and you go right down to….the system’s 
design.. basically those  three  of the Zachman’s Framework.. then there is the  CobiT 
and ITIL… are the ones that come into play in governing mostly  the IT… 
processes…uum.. so we have an over-encapsulating…methodology…which is the 
Zachman’s Framework …”96 
 
 
The “Zachman’s framework” (product) was the new tool to be used as an element of tinkering 
with CobiT. In this regard, CobiT was modified to reflect a new compliance/governance 
framework. This new product established a new way of compliance approach and was 
therefore coded as an improvisation.  
 
Data incident 
 
From the discussions held, what would not be overlooked was the important role that planning, 
implementation and compliance of CobiT played. The planning, implementation and 
compliance efforts manifested as practitioners’ actions. The fused framework (Zachman 
Framework) made the process of managing framework implementation easier because of this 
contextualization and understanding. At operational level, it was important to understand that 
the positive appeal of the implementation process, where actions were conceived as events 
unfolded, served as impetus for future planning. The knowledge achieved was seen as an 
ingenuous
IMPROV-9
 way of implementing the framework creatively; similarly, the fused 
framework that was contextually applied was interpreted as an expression of product 
improvisation.
IMPROV-9.  
 
“…In the Zachman framework, a fusion of ITIL, CobiT, the same principles are applied 
because there has to be an understanding of the business process for all the different 
areas…” 97 
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5. Information Security Reviews of IT Application Systems 
 
In terms of actual reviews of IT applications, ISO IEC 17799 Section 3.1.2 points to the need 
for maintaining a review policy document that ensures reviews are carried out in accordance 
with defined processes. The CobiT objectives Section DS5.5 suggests procedures for 
information security surveillance and the need for IT security administration and information 
security violation reports. ITIL Section 4.2 (Security Management) gives procedures on the 
information security management measures to be implemented.  
 
ISO IEC Section 3.1.2 proposes that the review process takes place in response to any changes 
affecting the basis of the original risk assessment, e.g. significant information security incidents, 
new vulnerabilities or changes to the organizational or technical infrastructure. The section 
proposes a schedule of review which considers:  
 the policy’s effectiveness, demonstrated by the nature, number and impact of recorded 
information security incidents; 
 impact of controls on business efficiency; 
 
During the interview process, it was revealed that by using frameworks for security controls, 
review not only made work easier for the practitioners but also motivated them and helped 
them improve in certain operational areas. The following data incident highlights this; 
 
“…so it sort of made my job so much more easier, but now when I talk to them 
around these security  components, you know immediately the guys want to go 
for higher…targets, higher maturity levels of (say 4)…” 98 
 
The researcher interpreted the above data incident to imply that a degree of creativity
IMPROV-10
 
and extemporisation occurred when the practitioners’ used the framework to simplify work 
load and also motivate fellow colleagues about the benefits vis-à-vis immediate job demands. 
This was achieved through the processes of dialogue and communication and was coded as 
process improvisation
 IMPROV-10
.  
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Data incident 
 
It was also noted in the interview that at tactical level, when the practitioners had properly 
managed
IMPROV-11
 the implementation of CobiT maturity requirements, then the review process 
that followed provided a high degree of motivation. The researcher interpreted this to mean that 
the practitioners had realised set goals. This was possible since CobiT had been rolled out 
jointly with the help of users and practitioners. At tactical level, it was how the practitioner 
dealt with the users during the rolling out process that was seen and coded as collective 
improvisation
IMPROV-11
 and this improvisational approach gave impetus to users to achieve even 
higher levels of optimal information security requirements. This was demonstrated by the 
following data incident: 
 
“…yes it was a dream come true, the information security [maturity] levels of 
CobiT are brilliant. When you give a presentation and you say look here, if you 
have managed 3/4 of the requirements, maturity level number 4’s [you are fine] 
… 99 
 
Collective improvisation was demonstrated by how the implementation of the CobiT maturity 
requirements was redesigned to suit a particular approach which contextually fitted 
practitioners and users, one which was “manageable and practicable”100. This approach 
simultaneously helped realise set goals (“dream come true”).  
 
“…you certainly felt that you would attempt higher say 3 or 4… So it is 
manageable and practicable…” 101 
 
6. Review of Information Security Risk  
 
ISO IEC Section 7.1 proposes that the review process for risk by establishing secure areas of 
operations. The CobiT objectives Section DS4.6 suggests a manner for testing the IT 
continuity plan through regular testing of risk and implementing an action plan. ITIL Section 
7.3.4 (Service Delivery), IT Service Continuity Management, proposes an approach to 
minimise risk by operational management.  
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It was established that the organisation had its own concerns about information security risk 
that stemmed from external threats.  One practitioner noted: 
 
“Most organisations are faced with constant hacking and intrusion attempts.”102 
 
When one practitioner was questioned on how this particular organisation went about creating 
awareness of information security risk, the practitioner noted that there were formal procedures 
in place:  
 
“A formal notification was done a year ago, “Security Awareness Week”. This 
was done in the form of an internal competition with staff having to answer 
certain aspects of the policy.”103 
 
From further analysis of other data incidents, the researcher realized that there were established 
beliefs that the frameworks being used needed to be contextualized to this organization and not 
any other. Meaning that even though there were similarities in the risk exposure, how risk was 
handled and reinterpreted would be different and contextual as shown by the following data 
incident: 
  
“…Maybe our risk profile has got to be entirely different…from the CobiT 
one…maybe we have to re-look our risk profile too…right? maybe that area that 
CobiT say’s is high…maybe low 104 
 
The researcher interpreted this to mean that it was inevitable that there should have been a 
contextualisation of the CobiT implementation process. This re-thinking was coded as rational 
adaptive
IMPROV-12
. Contextualisation was seen as a response to the changing organisational 
requirements and called for the re-thinking of CobiT. This rethinking of CobiT differently to 
suit the immediate needs was what was seen as product improvisation
IMPROV-12
 
 
“…and the irony is, and I’ve got to give them credit for it…they’ve (IT users) been 
doing a lot of work, but they’ve probably been focusing on the wrong way…” 105  
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This meant that there was a difference between what this practitioner was interpreting certain 
CobiT procedures to mean and what the other IT users interpreted the same CobiT procedures 
to mean. In this case it was felt that the users were interpreting CobiT wrongly and were 
focusing on the wrong aspects.  
Summary of the Fifth Unit of Analysis 
 
Table 28 summaries the total number of conceptual instance in the previous narrative for this 
unit as follows; 
Table 28. Conceptual density of Improvisation when examining IT Governance and Regulatory 
Compliance 
6.2.6 Analysis – Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity 
 
 
Section 2.4.2 of this research dealt with issues regarding this unit of analysis. The following 
section conceptualizes improvisation within activities that relate to Disaster Recovery and 
Business Continuity. Conceptualizing improvisation in this unit followed the 6 steps listed in 
Section 6.1. This is demonstrated by Table 29 as follows; 
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Strategic  Being 
inspired
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IMPROV-3  
 
Creative-
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Resourceful
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  Lateral 
thinking
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6 
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Managing 
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Being novel
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Table 29. Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity (Extract of Appendix 7)   
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STEP 6  
 
Types of 
Improvisation 
(See Section  
4.4.1) 
 
 
 
 
to give to the people …that they 
gave…and got the ones that [were] 
broken…they had to think quick...and 
make that kind of a judgment… 106 
 
 
Practitioners were initially not 
thought of as being rational when 
they re-issued old laptops to ensure 
processes continued to run; no one 
could predict that their quick 
judgment would  later prove useful  
Business Continuity management Process 
 
1. Implies being quick-witted in  
unpredictable,  unexpected 
circumstances in information decision 
making  
 
Strategic 
Activity 
 
Being quick-
witted in decision 
making 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Collective) 
improvisation 
and it all boils down to budgeting.... 
now they didn’t budgets for it … so 
they had to justify why…they had to 
do it… so that was the main kind of 
thing 
107
 
 
The efficient operation of Processes 
were hampered when laptops broke, 
creating need for extra resources. 
With limited resources, an innovative 
budget (justification) was generated 
Business Continuity Planning Framework 
 
1. Implies being resourceful in ensuring 
business continuity  and limited budgets 
over runs   
Operational 
Activity 
Being resourceful 
and ensuring 
business 
continuity  
 
 
 
 
(Process) 
improvisation 
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The following were the data classifications as described in STEP 3 (2
nd
 paragraph) and are 
derivatives of interview transcripts for this unit of analysis (see Appendix 7). These 
classifications are listed as follows: 
 
1. Business Continuity Planning Framework 
2. Continuity on Critical Operations 
3. Decision Making Procedures and Communication Arrangements 
4. Disaster Scenarios and Critical Operations 
5. Recovery Time Monitoring and Objectives 
 
Each of the above classification is explained in turn. 
 
1. Business Continuity Planning Framework 
 
ISO IEC 17799 Section 11.1.1 considers the need for putting in place a managed process for 
developing and maintaining business continuity throughout the organization. The CobiT 
objectives Section DS4.2 proposes the need to establish an IT continuity plan, a strategy and 
philosophy which aligns with the overall business continuity plan. ITIL Section 7.3 (Service 
Delivery), the IT Service Continuity Management, postulates the need for a risk-based 
approach in the continuity of IT processes and services.  ISO IEC 17799 Section 11.1.1 
proposes the following key elements of business continuity management: 
 
Data incident 
 
Data analysis revealed that the organisation had put in place a process for maintaining 
business continuity. The challenge to the process was that there was always an unanticipated 
event that resulted to making practitioners think extemporaneously and quickly. This thinking 
is illustrated in the following incident where for the sake of continuity the practitioners made 
collective judgment and was forced to issue old out of warranty lap-tops: 
 
“…they had to think quick...and make that kind of a judgment…” 108   
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The context of this data incident was that information security practitioners are constantly 
faced with emergent situations (fluctuations between normal and abnormal operating business 
conditions) that require judgement. It is from experience and skill that the types of judgement 
expressed by these practitioners display distinct emergent properties such as being quick-
witted. This sort of data incident demonstrated quick-wittedness
IMPROV-1
 and was interpreted 
by the researcher to imply collective improvisation.
IMPROV-1
.  
 
Data incident 
 
During the interview it was realised that at operational level, a model suitable for 
managing
IMPROV-2
 contingencies was created. This model (scenario planning model) 
categorised data, listed items of criticality and mapped these items to potential events that 
would cause interruptions. This was achieved by use of creative scenario analysis. The 
flexibility of scenario analysis created cognitive knowledge that would potentially be ideal 
for feedback, leaving practitioners open to determine innovative solutions. It was observed 
that one particular practitioner (in consultation with other practitioners) used the 
classification/categorisation model that focused on processes from a business recovery point 
of view innovatively. This is evidenced by the following data incident:  
 
“…yes and [we] categorised those items… we specifically focused on [those 
items], particularly from a disaster recovery and also business continuity…” 109 
 
The context of this data incident was that scenario planning was essential to determining 
business continuity and business recovery measures. The scenario plans however did not 
restrict the approach to creative solutions, and the practitioners were free to consciously 
expand their thinking to manage these activities. That was why the researcher coded 
managing as collective improvisation
IMPROV-2
, collective because scenario planning and 
solutions were jointly determined.  
 
Data incident 
 
Devising plans and making decisions/judgments as situations arise (on the spur-of-the-
moment) was exemplified at operational level, when activities required that new budgets be 
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formulated. On the part of the practitioners, they had to be resourceful
IMPROV-3
 in finding 
new ways of ensuring continuity.  
 
“…now they didn’t budget for it, so they had to justify why, they had to do it 
so that was the main kind of thing 
110
  
 
 
The data incident notes that it was in hindsight that they were asked what they did and why 
they did so. “…they had to justify why they had to do it”. This was interpreted by the 
researcher to be a situation whereby the practitioners had to justify an act of rapid inference 
to a situation that was affecting business processes forcing them to process improvise.
IMPROV-3
 
and become resourceful. It was coded as such.  
 
2. Continuity on Critical Operations 
 
ISO IEC 17799 Section 7.2 talks of the general information security of equipment/systems 
and the risks associated with these that impact on business continuity.   The CobiT objectives 
Section DS4.10 suggests the need for a framework that establishes critical IT resources 
which should be identified. Once identified, there should be a framework for user 
departmental alternative processing backup procedure in case of failure of these critical 
systems, through a continuity methodology. This is postulated in CobiT Section DS4. ITIL 
Section 7.3 (Service Delivery), the IT Service Continuity Management, postulates the need 
for a risk-based approach in the continuity of IT processes and services.   ISO IEC 17799 
Section 7.2.1 examines equipment security and proposes guidelines that mitigate or prevent 
loss, damage or compromise of assets and interruption to business activities. This section 
proposes the need for equipment to be physically protected from information security threats and 
environmental hazards. The need for protection of equipment (including that used off-site) is 
necessary to reduce the risk of unauthorized access to data and to protect against loss or damage.  
 
Data incident 
 
Discussions were made with practitioners to understand the business continuity measure 
taken by the organisation. One practitioner was of the opinion that the suggestions given by 
guidelines were important, but when there were gaps in these guidelines, they were left with 
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little option but to draw on their experience and any other cognitive or physical resource 
available. In their words, “they did what they had to do” This was explained by one 
practitioner as follows:  
 
“…I think our main thing here is to keep [going]… I mean we have a lot of 
good uses in policies when it comes to keeping the system going,  certain time 
we do what we have to do to keep the [systems] going…and sometimes we 
don’t…know if it is  the right thing to do…” 111 
 
The context of the data incident was that during emergencies, there were no clear guidelines 
to follow hence “sometimes we don’t…know if it is the right thing to do”. While following 
procedure would mean following what was set, improvisation would mean looking at 
procedure but re-creating new routines. In this case the practitioner showed that they acted 
outside of formal procedures. This was coded as being rational adaptive
IMPROV-4
. At tactical 
level, this sort of “doing whatever it takes” at the time constitutes process 
improvisation
IMPROV-4
. Earlier discussions of improvisation in Chapter 2 revealed the salient 
differences between improvisation and following structure and procedure.  
 
3. Decision Making Procedures and Communication Arrangements 
 
The ISO IEC 17799 Section 11.1.1, part b) requires making on-the-spot decisions and 
understanding the impact interruptions to business processes are likely to have on the business 
including making quick decisions that provide solutions to handle smaller incidents, as well as 
serious incidents that could threaten the viability of the organization. The CobiT objectives 
Section DS4.13 suggests the need to have “wrap-up” procedures which entail assessing 
adequacy of plans and planning updates. CobiT Section DS4.11 takes cognisance of the need 
for decision making on back-up site and hardware, while identifying contracts for service 
provision. ITIL Section 7.3.4 (Service Delivery), IT Service Continuity Management, 
stipulates procedures for operational management in continuity of operations.  
 
Data incident 
 
There was an instance where the speed of a system was noted as an issue.  
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“…Well… it is kind of working at the moment, it is just that it is a bit slow, at 
the moment… [we shouldn’t do anything]…” 112 
 
The context of this data incident was that slow systems were affecting output and 
productivity. This means at operational level, on-the-spot decisions were to be made about 
systems and productivity. The researcher was more interested in the intervention mechanism 
(on-the-spot decision) that illustrated how the slow systems were addressed. It was observed 
that the practitioners were less concerned since “it is kind of working at the moment “. This 
data incident was coded as getting by
IMPROV-5
.  It should be noted that at the heart of 
improvisation is expressive individuality. This knowledge grows through interaction with 
systems. The functioning of the systems provokes responses. The responses could be active 
or passive but they remain responses. It was interpreted that the practitioners responded to the 
slow systems (passively but) in a way that balanced productivity with resource issues and 
risk. At expressive individual level this balancing was coded as individual 
improvisation
IMPROV-5
.  
 
Data incident 
 
One data incident revealed how information security practitioners were open about certain 
decisions they had made. At tactical level, they were open to the idea that 
judgments/decisions made at the time could be wrong. This is evidenced as follows:  
 
“…maybe we should actually do this in a different way… 113 
 
The context of this data incident was that the practitioners were contextually aware of the 
ripple effect of their decisions. It is this awareness and re-thinking that was coded as rational 
adaptiveIMPROV-6. Being rational adaptive was influenced by the practitioners’ internalised 
unconscious understanding of the processes around them. “We” being the most critical 
component of the aspect. This incident was coded as collective improvisation
IMPROV-6
.  
 
Data incident  
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It was revealed that during crisis events, the practitioners’ ability to react correctly was 
influenced by time and resource pressures. This is evidenced as follows:   
 
“…so those kinds of things are hard to [do], because…they are under a lot of 
pressure at the time…” 114 
 
The context of this data incident is that practitioners must be responsive to emergent 
situations irrespective of any internal or external pressures faced at the time. It should be 
noted that at operational level, the decisions being made under pressures like these are 
recognised as highly cognitive and reflexive, often drawing on past experiences in order to do 
certain “things that are hard”. The act of doing these under pressure was coded as 
exceptionality
IMPROV-7
. This exceptionality would affect business processes and would be 
based on contextual understanding of contingencies. This was coded as process 
improvisation
IMPROV-7.
 
 
Data incident 
 
ISO IEC 17799 Section 11.1.1, part (a) proposes the understanding of risks the organization 
is facing in terms of their likelihood and impact, including an identification and prioritization 
mechanism on which future plans are based. This understanding to which planning is based is 
draws heavily on past experience, as explained in the following comment: 
 
“…I mean…a lot of it is in based on experience, and just knowing what is 
important and what’s not, we sit…and we put together our plan…for next year 
…” 115 
 
This understanding and planning process at strategic level was interpreted as lateral 
thinking
IMPROV-8
 in risk management and planning for continuity.  The data incident was 
coded for collective improvisation
IMPROV-8
 since the practitioners were seen as 
jointly/collectively “putting together plans”.  
 
4. Disaster Scenarios and Critical Operations 
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ISO IEC 17799 Section 11.1.4 provides guidelines for a clear framework to deal with 
emergencies and to develop emergency procedures, manual fallback plans and resumption 
plans which should be within the responsibility of the owners of the appropriate business 
resources or processes involved. The section calls for fallback arrangements for alternative 
technical services, such as information processing and communications facilities.  
 
Data incident 
 
The interviews revealed that sometimes without fallback plans, decisions were arrived at on 
an ad hoc basis. During discussions, it was mentioned that the process of supporting 
continuity was subject to making quick decisions based on the event and criticality of 
operation. If critical systems went down on a weekend, remediation would be of utmost 
importance. Conversely if these were non-critical, this would justify delay till the next 
working week. This scenario was exemplified and explained by one practitioner as follows:  
 
“…if we get a call on a Saturday…for something that is down,  [we] don’t 
worry, we will look at it on a Monday...since it is not a high level one...but if 
you get a call for something that you know is high level you will come in…” 116 
 
In reality systems do go down from unanticipated causes and it is the decisions that follow 
that would normally be of interest. At operational level, decisions made quickly to discern if 
systems require immediate attention or not are necessary. In this instance, the practitioners 
demonstrated quick judgement and this was coded as being quick witted
IMPROV-9
 and was 
seen as a form of individual improvisation
IMPROV-9
. The need for quick thinking is justified 
with emergent systems, crisis situation and contingencies which force systems to go down. 
The idea that systems do go down is a reality well understood by practitioners:  
 
“…correct…something will always happen…” 117 
 
5. Recovery Time Monitoring and Objectives 
 
It should be noted that the ISO IEC 17799 Section 11.1 considers aspects of business 
continuity management by proposing monitoring and planning for recovery time.  The 
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section recommends the use of tools for monitoring business continuity and business recovery 
(recovery time) creating options and opportunities. The CobiT objectives Section DS4.5 
suggests a manner for monitoring and testing the IT and maintaining the IT continuity plan 
through change control to reflect changes in business requirements. ITIL Section 5.7 (The 
Business Perspective) proposes understanding the business viewpoint and making business 
recovery efforts and business continuity based on the business viewpoint.  ISO IEC 17799 
Section 11.1.5 proposes guidelines for creating business continuity plans and for the provision 
of a variety of techniques that are aimed at providing assurance that the plan(s) will operate in 
real life. These plans are continuously tested and monitored.  
 
Data incident 
 
During the interview, it was revealed that continuous monitoring for usage and also for 
business continuity was routinely done. One practitioner mentioned the following with 
regards to the use of monitoring tools:  
 
 “…they have monitoring tools monitoring the network, we have the 
monitoring tools monitoring Microsoft users, so we actually have two…we 
have the small…one and then we have the big one, called the Microsoft 
operations Manager (MsOM)…” 118  
 
It should be noted that at operational level, using two (2) software technologies and 
applications for purposes of monitoring provided opportunities for spontaneity and flexibility. 
This sort of understanding is stated by the following comment: 
 
“…The small one, we find is quite nice, and flexible, because it is quick and 
easy and it can monitor. Say you need something immediately, it can do it for 
you immediately, and then we can move it on to the other one, as an 
additional kind of monitoring, .in a different kind of way…” 119 
 
In this instance, and at operational level, the data incident was coded as being innovative
-10. 
This can be explained as follows. The organizational capacity to procure the two (2) 
tools/technologies and the individual practitioner’s capacity to understand and utilise these 
tools was seen as innovative. This argument can be justified by the following comment by 
one practitioner: 
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“…well, we’ve always had both, it has always been the kind of thing that it’s 
just easier, we actually use one to monitor, [and the other to] seek and give us 
a better clearer indication of the things that are up or down …”120 
 
The statement needs to be understood in the context of process improvisation
IMPROV-10
 
whereby these practitioners applied two (2) tools and demonstrated the ability to be reflexive 
and innovative. 
 
Summary of the Sixth Unit of Analysis 
 
Table 30 summarises the total number of conceptual instance in the previous narrative for 
this unit as follows: 
 
Table 30. Conceptual density of Improvisation when examining Disaster Recovery and 
Business Continuity 
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Activities 
related to; 
Core 
Categories 
Concepts generated within the types of improvisation  
 
Conce
ptual 
Densit
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C
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a
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Business 
Recovery 
and Business 
Continuity  
Strategic  Being quick-witted
IMPROV-1
  
Lateral thinking
IMPROV-8
,   
   2 
Tactical  Rational adaptive
IMPROV-6
  Rational 
adaptive
IMPROV-4
 
 2 
Operational  Managing
IMPROV-2
 
 
Being quick-
witted
IMPROV-9
 
Getting by
IMPROV-5  
 
Being 
resourceful
IMPROV-3   
  
Exceptionality
IMPRO
V-7
  
Being 
innovative
IMPROV-10
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6.3  COLLECTIVE SUMMARY OF ALL UNITS OF ANALYSIS  
 
This section provides a summary of units of analysis and the data-sets examined in each unit. 
In total, a series of 54 concepts (high level concepts) were generated that were interpreted to 
be improvisational (See Table 31) actions in ISRM. These concepts have been illustrated in 
narrative form in the previous sections of this chapter.  Although some of these concepts look 
similar (share the same name attribute), these concepts were to be taken as being distinct and 
contextually different. This for instance means that a concept such as rational adaption 
appeared twice within the same unit of analysis. This was taken to mean that rational 
adaption could have occurred at, for example, an individual level (individual improvisation) 
or at collective level (process improvisation). An important point about improvisation here is 
that it is engaged by both individuals and collective groups. If the improvisation was coded as 
being at the individual level, this simply meant that key information security practitioners 
were at an individual level altering their roles to meet the heightened demands of the 
emergency. The converse would apply to collective improvisation although both were coded 
as rational adaption. Table 31. (next page) provides a summary of the conceptual instances 
(concepts) of improvisation. Table 31. shows, for instance, that there were more conceptual 
instances of concepts relating to process improvisation at Event Monitoring activities. Also 
process improvisation in general had the greatest number of conceptual instances (23 in 
total). This simply meant that conceptual density (number of conceptual instances) of 
process improvisation as opposed to any other type of improvisation was the greatest in the 
Event Monitoring activity. The researcher interpreted this kind of finding to mean that 
information security practitioners were short-circuiting or bypassing established procedures, 
frameworks and standards by process improvising Event Monitoring techniques as opposed 
to any other activity.  Table 31. also shows that collective improvisation had the second 
highest number of conceptual instances (19 in total), thus interpreted to have had a lower 
conceptual density as opposed to process improvisation. The researcher interpreted these 
findings to mean that information security practitioners were collectively taking 
responsibility as teams for tasks over which they ordinarily had no immediate authority to 
perform and were bypassing  broader norms, using makeshift tools or technology to flexibly 
perform their roles. The researcher wanted to confirm these by findings by also conducting an 
internal document analysis to find out why they were doing what they were doing. Discussion 
and interpretation of Table 31 was done once document analysis was also finalised. These 
discussions are in Section 7.8 (using Table 45 which is the same table in a  different format). 
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Table 31. Summary of Conceptual density of Improvisation 
Units of Analysis 
 
Activities related 
to: 
Level  
Sub Categories 
Conceptual 
Density 
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P
r
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d
u
c
t 
Im
p
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v
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a
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n
 
 
1  
Information Assets 
Access and Data 
Control 
Strategic  ManipulatingIMPROV-4    1 
Tactical  Quick reactionIMPROV-1  
 
  1 
Operational  Being 
deliberativeIMPROV-3, 
 Being resourcefulIMPROV-2, 
Being quick-wittedIMPROV-5 
 
 3 
2 
Information 
Security 
Architecture 
Strategic  NovelIMPROV-6,    ExceptionalityIMPROV-1,    2 
Tactical  Rational 
adaptiveIMPROV-4 
DeliberativeIMPROV-5 
 
 
  2 
Operational    Rational 
adaptiveIMPROV-2,  
Lateral thinkingIMPROV-3, 
Being resourcefulIMPROV-7  
 3 
3 
Information 
Security Policies 
Strategic  Rational 
adaptiveIMPROV-5 
Lateral  
thinkingIMPROV-3   
 
  2 
Tactical    Being imaginativeIMPROV-2 
Being  
inventive IMPROV-6 
Being 
ingeniousIMPROV-1   
3 
Operational    Being quick-wittedIMPROV-4   
Being creativeIMPROV-7 
 2 
4 
Information 
Security Event 
Monitoring 
Strategic    Being resourcefulIMPROV-5 
Being practicalIMPROV-9 
Being 
ingenious 
IMPROV-6 
3 
Tactical   Being creativeIMPROV-7 
Rational 
adaptiveIMPROV-10 
Being inventiveIMPROV-2 
Being originalIMPROV-4 
Rational adaptiveIMPROV-12 
Being creativeIMPROV-13 
 6 
Operational  Being practicalIMPROV-1   
Being ingenuousIMPROV-
11 
 
 Being novelIMPROV-3 
Lateral thinkingIMPROV-8 
 4 
5 
IT Governance 
and Regulatory 
Compliance 
Strategic  Being inspiredIMPROV-2 
Rational 
adaptiveIMPROV-3   
CreativenessIMPROV-4 
ResourcefulIMPROV-5 
  Lateral 
thinkingIMPROV-8 
Rational 
adaptiveIMPROV-12 
6 
Tactical  Getting byIMPROV-6  
Managing IMPROV-11 
Being novelIMPROV-1.   3 
Operational    ManagingIMPROV-7 
 
CreativenessIMPROV-
10 
Being 
ingenuousIMPROV-9   
3 
6  
Disaster Recovery 
and Business 
Continuity 
Strategic  Being quick-
wittedIMPROV-1   
Lateral thinkingIMPROV-
5 
   2 
Tactical  Rational 
adaptiveIMPROV-6 
 Rational adaptiveIMPROV-4  2 
Operational  ManagingIMPROV-2 
 
Being quick-
wittedIMPROV-9  
Getting byIMPROV-5   
Being resourcefulIMPROV-3     
ExceptionalityIMPROV-7  
Being innovativeIMPROV-10 
 6 
19 6 23 6 54 
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6.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
Based on the selected case, this chapter has offered solid, internally valid evidence of 
improvisation in ISRM activities as demonstrated by in-vivo codes. This has been 
demonstrated in each of the units of analysis. Improvisation has been demonstrated to occur, 
i.e. to be more conceptually dense, in some units of analysis as opposed to others. Based on 
clearly defined parameters of analysis, this chapter has offered reliable ways of identifying 
improvisation concepts. The chapter has relied heavily on grounded theory techniques (open 
coding) as a preliminary basis for theory development. The data dictum that “all is data” 
guided the researcher in this chapter. This chapter shows that practitioners’ engagement with 
information security was dependent on their perception of and attitude towards risk i.e. the 
risk appetite which was contextualized and at times improvised to suit circumstances.  
Additionally, this chapter used the data gathered from the interviews to develop a conceptual 
summary model as a basis for a preliminary theory of improvisation in ISRM. The data 
analysis chapter offers useful insights that have practical implications for helping to 
understand and develop future ISRM issues and agenda. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
 
 
This analysis chapter is a development from Chapter 6 and refines our knowledge of ISRM 
and the phenomenon of improvisation in relation to managerial issues. This chapter extends 
data analysis conducted in the previous chapter and introduces in-depth document analysis. 
Observation has also been documented in this chapter. As this chapter explains, documents 
were seen as being part and parcel of the research and are examined in detail. Finally, the 
chapter interprets and conceptualizes the summary of findings (Chapter 6 and 7) from all the 
units of analysis and presents a theoretical framework.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: DOCUMENT ANALYSIS AND 
CONCEPTUALISATION OF IMPROVISATION IN ISRM 
 
7.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
It has been demonstrated in the previous chapter that as a de facto measure, frameworks are 
used only as guides and in fact improvisation does take place in ISRM. This research 
accessed this “reality” through socially constructed means (information security 
practitioner’s language, consciousness and shared meaning). The social construction of 
improvisation in its variety of forms/types was demonstrated on all the units of analysis 
conceptualised. This chapter grounds the researcher’s interpretation of this reality by 
reviewing the organisation’s internal documents (organisation policy) and interpreting why 
practitioners acted the way they did.  
 
The chapter seeks to give a detailed interpretation of improvisation within the context of each 
unit of analysis and within the context of the organisation’s Corporate Information 
Security Policy (2007). This chapter also documents observations from ISRM activities 
relating to Business Continuity and Recovery. The chapter begins by defining a series of 
steps that were followed in document analysis.  What follows is a detailed examination of 
each unit of analysis using the Sensitizing Device developed in Chapter 4. This device was 
found to be useful in constant comparative analysis of functionalist and incremental 
approaches towards ISRM. The Sensitizing Device is contextualized for each unit of analysis. 
Finally from a summary of all the units of analysis, the chapter interprets and conceptualizes 
improvisation in ISRM. This interpretation is based on data analysis from Chapter 6 and 
Chapter 7 and a theoretical framework about improvisation in ISRM is drawn. 
7.1 DOCUMENT ANALYSIS  
 
 
Document analysis was a means by which this researcher elicited rich information that would 
determine the context for ISRM activities (and improvisation) identified by detailed data 
analysis. This was made possible courtesy of the organisation which made primary data 
available for the researcher in the form of documents. The primary data sources that were 
considered relevant to meet the objectives of this research were the [name withheld] 
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Corporate Information Security Policy (2007) (made available by the organization’s 
Business Continuity Manager) CobiT, ITIL and ISO IEC 17799 frameworks. 
 
The purpose of the document analysis was to compare interview data with stated policies and 
to find meaning for improvisation by understanding practitioner’s own interpretations of their 
actions. The chapter analysis Chapter 6 findings about improvisation in ISRM. This chapter 
is the researcher’s own explanation and interpretation of what was done.   
 
The following steps were followed in analysing the documents. It should be noted that for 
documentation purposes these steps have been listed in sequence. However, in the real sense 
these steps were iterative and went hand-in-hand with the Data Analysis (defined in Chapter 
6).  
7.1.1 STEP 1: Defining Relevant Documents in Use 
 
The first step was to peruse the documents available on the organisation’s intranet. The 
researcher wanted to stay within the scope of the research and so only picked out documents 
that would assist in the research. There were four documents that were found to be useful: 
 
a) [name withheld] Corporate Information Security  Policy (2007) 
b) [name withheld] User Password and Confidentiality Policy (2007) 
c) [name withheld] Policy on Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity (2007) 
d) [name withheld] Policy on Protection and the Proper use of Information Assets 
(2007) 
 
Out of these four documents, the researcher selected the first document for review since it 
was much broader and, moreover, incorporated aspects that related to the other policies. The 
researcher analysed the Corporate Information Policy (2007) document held in the intranet. 
The intranet also held other useful policies and guidelines for users in the IT department. 
Frameworks and standards including CobiT, ITIL and ISO IEC 17799 were analysed and 
compared with [name withheld] Corporate Information Security Policy (2007). The only 
secondary source of documents comprised the researchers own memo’s. 
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7.1.2 STEP 2: Ensuring Confidentiality by Documenting only Generic 
Aspects of Policy 
 
The researcher had agreed to be confidential towards disclosing any material that would 
easily have been traced back to the organisation. Since the research was conducted with the 
promise of confidentiality, the researcher only extracted generic policy statements from the   
[name withheld] Corporate Information Security Policy (2007) that were also freely 
available in the public domain. These generic policy statements are also available on CobiT, 
ITIL and ISO IEC 17799 frameworks and were selected since these could apply to any 
organisation that had a medium to large IT department. 
7.1.3 STEP 3: Extracting Appropriate Data from the Documents 
 
The researcher reviewed the [name withheld] Corporate Information Security Policy (2007) 
in cognisance with agreed confidentiality and extracted relevant but generic policy statement. 
The extraction took the form of content analysis.  Using this approach entailed focusing on 
actual content of the [name withheld] Corporate Information Security Policy (2007). The 
researcher used content analysis to determine the presence of certain words and themes 
within this document. The researcher coded these selected words, phrases and themes into 
manageable categories as inputs to the Sensitising Device. The researcher then extracted 
selected classified words and put them in the Sensitising Device in an objective manner. This 
was done for each unit of analysis. Words, phrases and themes that did not serve any purpose 
to the Sensitising Device for each unit of analysis were omitted. This approach of 
categorising words or phrases into specific categories is known as relational analysis.  The 
results are displayed in the Sensitising Device and these results were then used to make 
inferences about the messages inherent in the [name withheld] Corporate Information 
Security Policy (2007). These inferences have been incorporated in the subsequent statements 
and serve as foundations for understanding ISRM activities.  
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7.1.4 STEP 4: Constant Comparison, Interpretation and 
Conceptualisation of Improvisation in ISRM activities 
 
In this step the researcher re-visited improvisation concepts derived from Chapter 6 and 
,made a list. These conceptual instances were then illustrated diagrammatically using graphs. 
This step should not be construed to indicate that this research was in any way quantitative. 
The graphical illustration was selected as the easiest representation of conceptual density of 
improvisation for each unit of analysis by a glance. The researcher then used the Sensitising 
Device derived in Chapter 4 for each unit of analysis. The Sensitising Device was 
contextualised for each unit of analysis.  
 
The Sensitising Device was useful in helping the researcher present and document the 
conceptualisation process. It became easy for the researcher then to start a comparison 
analysis between unit and unit, between primary data and also between the organisation’s 
documents. That is why the Sensitising Device contains the following representative data 
elements: 
a) Concepts generated from data-sets for each unit of analysis 
b) Generic extracts of the [name withheld] Corporate Information Security Policy 
(2007) 
c) Combined/Mapped ISO IEC 17799, CobiT and ITIL frameworks and Standards 
d) The various typologies of improvisation for each unit and the conceptual density of 
improvisation for each unit. 
 
Once a complete picture of the Sensitising Device was created for each unit, the researcher 
then proceeded to conceptualise and interpret conceptual density of improvisation for each 
unit and then finally for all the units combined. This final combination and interpretation is 
covered in the last section of this chapter. This section conceptualises improvisation in ISRM 
and has proposed a theoretical framework that is a documentation of this understanding. The 
following sections are a unit by unit analysis of improvisation. These sections follow the 
above outlined steps. It should be noted these steps were iterative rather than in sequence. 
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7.2 INFORMATION ASSETS ACCESS AND DATA CONTROL 
 
The organisation was seen as setting context for the control of information assets based on 
the following extract of its Corporate Information Security Policy (2007): 
 
“Information is an asset which has value to the organization and 
consequently must be protected. Owners must take steps to ensure 
appropriate controls are utilized in storing, handling distribution, and usage 
of information under their control. Custodians must protect the information 
assets in their possession from unauthorized access, alteration, destruction by 
using logical access control mechanisms.” 
 
Source: Courtesy of [Name withheld] Corporate Information 
Security Policy (2007) 
 
The researcher discerned contextualisation of ISRM activities relating to information assets 
control with what was being stated in the above policy statement. The researcher’s 
interpretation of improvisation was based on information security practitioners' belief in their 
own ability to perform specific tasks related to controlling information assets. Findings reveal 
that there were 3 conceptual instances of collective improvisation and 2 conceptual instances 
of process improvisation regarding control of information assets. These are listed as follows:  
 
Collective improvisation 
 Manipulating 
 Quick reaction 
 Being deliberative 
Process improvisation 
 Being resourceful 
 Being Quick-witted 
 
There was no conceptual instance of individual or product improvisation identified for this 
unit of analysis. Figure 11. gives a graphical illustration of this. 
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Figure 11. Conceptual Density of Improvisation in Information Assets Access and Data 
Control (Activities) 
 
 
It can be discerned that the reason collective improvisation was conceptually dense for this 
activity was the inherent element of self-efficacy expressed and facilitated by quick reaction 
and being deliberative which in turn manifested as improvisation. Practitioners applied these 
attributes when engaging in ISRM activities related to information assets. These self- 
expressive attributes provided rich grounds for improvisation and were based on every 
practitioner’s own predisposition to security around processes relating to information assets.   
 
The manner in which information security practitioners as individuals exercised control over 
their thoughts and actions were improvised expressions of control. These expressions were 
noted as a progression and on-going confidence developed by practitioners as new knowledge 
reinforced previous knowledge about control (of information assets). Table 32 (page 221) 
regarded as the Sensitizing Device, shows five (5) conceptual instances of improvisation 
noted by the researcher when conceptualizing this ISRM activity.  
 
Table 32 (Sensitizing Device) can be interpreted as follows: the functionalist approaches to 
ISRM dictate formal procedures for the control of information assets as stated by ISO IEC 
17799. CobiT Section DS 5.9 suggests a mechanism for doing this. The organization’s own 
corporate information security policy document states that “owners must take steps to ensure 
appropriate controls are utilized in storing, handling distribution, and usage of information 
under their control”. What Table 32 shows is that, although these mechanisms have been 
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suggested, there were 5 conceptual instances where practitioners were using improvisation to 
by-pass these suggestions or were creative in applying these suggestions in ways that were 
not yet explicit. Table 32 also qualifies these improvisational activities as having been 
performed within the contexts of these guidelines and frameworks.  The two-direction arrows 
show that improvisational acts were drawn from what was already explicated in the literature 
and what was incremental. 
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7.2.6 Table 32. Sensitizing Device: Assessing Improvisation in Activities related to Information Assets Access and Data Control 
                  
 
 
STRUCTURED (FUNCTIONALIST) APPROACH 
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UNIT OF 
ANALYSIS  
(EMBEDDED 
CASES) 
 
ISRM Functional  Approach  
 
ISO 17799 ITIL CobiT INTERNAL  DOCUMENT 
ANALYSIS 
Organization’s Guidelines 
2.  Information 
Asset Control 
 
5.1 Inventory of 
information assets 
 
5.2 Information 
classification    
 
 
ITIL Section 4.2 
(Security Management) 
 
Section DS5.9 
gives a 
mechanism for 
centralised 
control of 
information 
assets 
Information is an asset which has 
value to the organization and 
consequently must be protected  
 
Owners must take steps to ensure 
appropriate controls are utilized in 
storing, handling, distribution and 
usage of information under their 
control. 
 
Custodians must protect the 
information assets in their possession 
from unauthorized access, alteration 
and destruction by using logical 
access control mechanisms. 
1  
2     
3    
  
 
 
 
 
 
4   
5  
1.  Manipulating 
2.  Quick reaction 
3.  Being deliberative 
4.  Being resourceful 
5. Being Quick-witted (5 Conceptual instances See 
Figure 9)  
 
 
 
These improvisational acts were seen to be working 
within the boundaries of the corporate policies, CobiT, 
ITIL and ISO IEC 17799. 
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7.2.1 Understanding Information Assets Access and Data Control Using the 
Sensitising Device  
 
Table 32 is best understood when considering the following statement from Cavusoglu 
(2004);  
“The first rule of IT security is that [firms] should never spend more to protect 
something than a thing is actually worth.” 
 
This means the responsibility of ensuring IT security by information security practitioners 
should be context specific. Specific descriptions of the Table 32 frameworks (CobiT, ITIL, 
and ISO IEC 17799) as applied in context specific scenarios are amplified by Table 33 
below. Table 33 prescribes specific measures as described by these frameworks when 
looking at the value of protection. The researcher interpreted the findings in this unit of 
analysis to mean that although the practitioners had the knowledge (prescriptive frameworks-
Table 33), they nevertheless exhibited context specific improvisation tendencies when 
following these frameworks. The reason for this is understood when Cavusoglu’s (2004); 
statement above is put into context. This it seems is what the practitioners did: they found 
mechanisms to contextualise and to be resourceful, deliberative and quick-witted for instance 
when finding the “best way to implement information security management measures” (ITIL 
Section 4.2). The understanding is also demonstrated by the findings of conceptual density of 
improvisation in information assets control shown in Table 33 below. Information security 
practitioners therefore appropriately balanced information security assets control needs and 
the costs involved (financial or otherwise).  
 
Table 33. Descriptive Frameworks for Information Assets Access Data Control and Improvisation 
ISO IEC 
17799 
CobiT ITIL Description Improvisation Concepts 
 CobiT 
Section  
DS5.9 
 The mechanism for centralised 
control and identification.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ITIL Section  
4.2 (Security 
Management) 
Best way to implement 
information security management 
measures.  
ISO IEC 
17799 Section 
  Information assets classification 
system restricts access to 
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Both Table 32  and Table 33 show that controlling information assets was a form of situated 
performance determined by the cognitive predisposition of what each practitioner understood 
in terms of the risk to the information asset and the level of confidentiality to be bestowed on 
this information asset.  The fact that the guidelines were open to interpretation by the 
practitioners created an avenue whereby the practitioners were able to use their knowledge 
and common sense to determine classification and information control needs. The findings 
and interpretation of this unit used as a build-up to Chapter 6 can be summarised as follows:  
 The practitioners overcame the emergent difficulties and challenges of controlling 
information assets by trusting in their own ability to handle these challenges. The 
information security practitioners’ capacity to contextually understand the immediate 
information assets control environment facilitated this e.g. by improvisational action. 
7.3 INFORMATION SECURITY ARCHITECTURE  
 
The organisation also established sound systems for designing architecture around 
information systems with information security in mind. The organisation’s corporate 
information security policy (2007) statement set the context for the way the information 
security practitioners’ reviewed information security architecture. The statement that follows 
describes this context:   
5.2.1 information when deemed 
necessary 
 
 
1. Manipulating 
2.  Quick reaction 
3.  Being deliberative 
4.  Being resourceful 
5. Being Quick-witted  
 
 
 
 
 
 CobiT 
Section  
DS5.3 
 Procedures for security of online 
access to data through providing 
measures for access security 
control 
  ITIL Section  
4.2.2 (Security 
Management) 
Guidelines on the implementation 
of security management 
measures 
ISO IEC 
17799 Section  
4.1.4 
  Authorisation process for 
information processing facilities 
 CobiT 
Section  
DS5.6 
 Determining user control, by 
creating designate user accounts 
(or group accounts) 
  ITIL Section  
4.1 (Security 
Management) 
Information security management 
measures for information control 
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“The level of protection required must be adequate and dependent on the value 
of information to the business and the risk of disclosure, loss or compromise. 
Information resources and supporting infrastructure are primarily for business 
purposes.” 
Source: Courtesy of [Name withheld] Corporate Information 
Security Policy (2007) 
 
The researcher discerned from the interviews that time and resource constraints at operational 
level were one of the contextual reasons why practitioners expressed a degree of flexibility 
identified as process improvisation. Collective improvisation was also demonstrated when it 
came to designing optimal and secure information system architecture. The practitioners 
wanted to spend as little time as possible understanding each system’s IT security 
requirements. A creative way around this was the identification and establishment of mission 
critical systems and the creation of a secure infrastructure around those systems. Mission 
critical systems were seen as those that would adversely affect business operations should 
anything interrupt these. The research findings show that collective and process 
improvisation were conceptually dense for this ISRM activity. From the discussions that took 
place with the information security practitioners, it was established that supporting 
infrastructure served specific business purposes (mission critical systems) and the 
architecture around these was modified, altered and re-designed.  
 
The following concepts that were generated from discussions helped the researcher 
understand and interpret the conceptual density. Findings reveal that there were 3 conceptual 
instances of collective improvisation and 4 conceptual instances of process improvisation as 
follows: 
Collective improvisation 
 Novel   
 Rational adaptive 
 Deliberative 
Process improvisation 
 Exceptionality 
 Rational adaptive 
 Lateral thinking 
 Being resourceful 
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Figure 12. gives a graphical illustration of this.  
 
Figure 12.  Conceptual Density of Improvisation in Information Security Architecture 
(Activities) 
 
 
 
Figure 12. demonstrates that collective and process improvisation at operational level for this 
ISRM activity seem to have been dependent on a combination of organizational and personal 
factors which, when examined closely, explain the social-contextual and novel approach used 
(as the information system architecture and technology changed and emerged).  
 
These improvised methods contextualized the organization’s current and on-going 
architecture and supporting infrastructure for its security processes, information systems, and 
personnel. The need for this was the justification for aligning information security 
architecture with the organization's core goals and strategic direction. This ISRM activity was 
also interpreted to be socially constructed.  As an illustration of this social construction, 
CobiT Section AI 5.9 provides a “criterion that determines final acceptance of information 
systems” criteria It should be noted that during the discussions held with the information 
security practitioners, it was established that the organisation’s strategic goals were emergent, 
meaning the adaptation for supporting infrastructure and architecture was also flexible and 
contextualised. For instance, acceptance of information systems was based on predicting 
threats to systems analysing risks presented in the infrastructure. Practitioners’ contextualised 
information architecture risk and the type of security threat underlying existing architecture 
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and re-modified this to account for appropriate countermeasures. Practitioners did not want to 
spend time on threats they did not understand. They contextualised risk to understand the 
consequences of threats and the “final acceptance of the information system” criteria. The 
proactive adaptation of these criteria was best illustrated by Table 34 (next page), the 
Sensitizing Device, which shows seven (7) conceptual instances of improvisation underlined 
in the CobiT, ITIL and ISO IEC 17799 framework. 
 
 
Table 34 (Sensitizing Device) can be interpreted as follows: the functionalist approaches to 
ISRM dictate formal procedures for Activities related to Information Security Architecture as 
stated by ISO IEC 17799. ISO IEC 17799 Section 12.1.1 suggests procedures management 
should follow in designing, operating and using information systems.  CobiT Section AI 
5.13 suggests a mechanism for evaluation and meeting user requirements through post-
implementation review. The organization’s own corporate information security policy 
document states that “The level of protection [of information] required must be adequate and 
dependent on the value of information to the business and the risk of disclosure, loss or 
compromise.” What Table 34 shows is that although these mechanisms have been suggested, 
there were 7 conceptual instances where practitioners were using improvisation to by-pass 
these suggestions or were creative in applying these suggestions in ways that were not yet 
explicit. Table 34 also qualifies these improvisational activities as having been performed 
within the contexts of these guidelines and frameworks.  The two-direction arrows show that 
improvisational acts were drawn from what was already explicated in the literature and what 
was incremental. 
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7.3.6 Table 34. Sensitizing Device: Assessing Improvisation in Activities related to Information Security Architecture 
 
                  
 
 
STRUCTURED (FUNCTIONALIST) APPROACH 
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UNIT OF 
ANALYSIS  
(EMBEDDED 
CASES) 
 
ISRM Functional  Approach  
 
ISO 17799 ITIL CobiT INTERNAL  DOCUMENT 
ANALYSIS 
Organization’s Guidelines 
3.  Information 
Architecture 
Security 
 
Section  12.1.1 
management 
obligation to 
design, operate 
and use 
information 
systems 
 
Section  4.1 
Information 
security 
infrastructure 
 
 
 
ITIL Section  3.5.4 
(ICT Infrastructure 
Management) gives 
direction on system 
deployment and 
acceptance  
 
ICT Infrastructure 
Management, Design 
and Planning; 2.4, 2,5 
2.8, 4.3. 6.14,  
Section  AI5.13 
suggests a manner 
for evaluation and 
meeting user 
requirements 
through post-
implementation 
review 
The level of protection required 
must be adequate and dependent on 
the value of information to the 
business and on the risk of 
disclosure, loss or compromise. 
 
Information resources and 
supporting infrastructure are 
primarily for business purposes. 
1  
2  
3  
  4  
5  
6  
7  
5. Novel   
6. Rational adaptive 
7. Deliberative 
8. Exceptionality 
9. Rational adaptive 
10. Lateral thinking 
11. Being resourceful (7 Conceptual instances See 
Figure 10) 
 
These improvisational acts were seen to be working 
within the boundaries of the corporate policies, CobiT, 
ITIL and ISO IEC 17799. 
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7.3.1 Understanding Information Security Architecture Using the Sensitising 
Device 
 
Table 34 (above) was the Sensitizing device that served as a lens to show the reason behind 
the contextualization of information systems configuration.  The configuration, design and 
consequently the architecture of the information systems was based on the suggestions of the 
frameworks (CobiT, ITIL, ISO IEC 17799) shown on Table 35 below.  Collective and 
process improvisation (Table 34) was expressed, for instance, as resourcefulness and lateral 
thinking through the manner in which information security practitioners were able to meet 
users requirements. (Table 35, CobiT Section AI 5.3) in the following statement; 
 
“…Maybe our risk profile has got to be entirely different…from CobiT …maybe 
we have to re-look our risk profile too…right? Maybe that area that CobiT says 
is high…maybe low 121 
 
Table 35. Descriptive Frameworks for Information Security Architecture and Improvisation 
                                            
121
 C55-Appendix 10 
ISO IEC 
17799 
CobiT ITIL Description Improvisation Concepts 
ISO IEC 17799 
Section 12.1.1 
  Management obligation to design, 
operate and use information 
systems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.Novel   
2.Rational adaptive 
(collective) 
3.Deliberative 
4.Exceptionality 
5.Rational adaptive 
(process) 
6.Lateral thinking 
7.Being resourceful 
 CobiT Section  
AI5.13 
 Manner for evaluation and 
meeting user requirements through 
post-implementation review 
  ITIL Section  
3.5.4 (ICT 
Infrastructure 
Management) 
Direction on system deployment 
and acceptance testing. 
 CobiT Section  
AI5.9 
 Criteria that determine final 
acceptance of a system through 
formal evaluations of system 
requirements and the approval of 
tests 
  ITIL Section  
9.6.3 (Service 
Support) 
Direction of release management 
procedure for system acceptance 
and testing 
 CobiT Section   Determines information security 
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From Table 35 above, it can be seen that information security practitioners looked at the 
framework (CobiT, ITIL, ISO IEC 17799) from a pragmatic and contextual approach. This 
pragmatic approach helped them re-design information architecture and scrutinise designs 
before approval. This collective process was seen to be a popular, innovative and resourceful 
way of ensuring an optimal information security posture.  The outcome was that the 
information architecture specifications developed were novel and context specific. For 
instance, it was mentioned in the discussion that information security practitioners would ask 
themselves important questions about what CobiT pro osed.  They also asked questions 
about the information security architecture around systems by considering the value of each 
information security control in relation to controls that already existed in place.  
7.4  INFORMATION SECURITY POLICIES  
 
One of the research activities conducted by the researcher was the review of the 
organisation’s corporate information security policy. This was the document set the tone for 
establishing control and protection requirements for information assets. According to this 
organisation:  
 
“Information security policy establishes procedures for the protection of 
information from a wide range of threats in order to ensure business 
continuity. The information security process links into and supports the 
business risk process and objectives.” 
 
Source: Courtesy of [Name withheld] Corporate Information 
Security Policy (2007) 
 
 
The discussions revealed that at both tactical and strategic levels, it was not easy to predict or 
establish with certainty how the corporate policy was to be applied. This was because of the 
emergent environment and the changing systems requirements. The overarching guide was, 
AI5.10 testing and accreditation, the need 
to understand the information 
security levels and the residual 
risk 
ISO IEC 17799 
Section  8.2.2 
  Acceptance criteria for new 
information systems, upgrades and 
new versions should be established 
and suitable tests of the system 
carried out prior to acceptance. 
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however, to do what was necessary to secure “the protection of information from a wide 
range of threats”. Since it was also not possible to establish with a high degree of certainty 
what the threat sources/incidents would be or the kind they would manifest themselves as, a 
wide window of opportunity for collective and process improvisation at both tactical and 
operational level was opened. Improvisation was a necessary measure to ensure that work 
continued and, at the same time, risks and threats were kept in check; this meant there was 
co-ordination in the manner policy was followed and implemented. This sort of tactical 
activity was interpreted by the researcher as an expression of concepts such as being 
imaginative and being ingenious. Findings reveal that there was 1 conceptual instance of 
collective improvisation, 1 conceptual instance of individual improvisation, 1 conceptual 
instance of product improvisation, and 4 conceptual instances of process improvisation as 
follows: 
 
Collective improvisation 
 Rational adaptive  
Individual improvisation 
 Lateral thinking  
Product improvisation 
 Being ingenious 
Process improvisation 
 Being imaginative 
 Being inventive  
 Being quick-witted   
 Being Creative  
 
Figure 13. gives a graphical illustration of the above concepts.  
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Figure 13.  Improvisation in Information Security Policies (Activities) 
 
From the discussions it was revealed that the emergent nature of computer security incidents 
and threats (considered undesirable phenomenon) and the way the practitioners followed 
policy to protect information systems against these incidents showed how policy acquired a 
different meaning. The way the information security practitioners applied policy was 
demonstrated effectively by how application of policy was occurring in the organization. This 
application is exemplified as follows: 
 
 “Due to certain design of our systems it becomes impractical to fully apply all 
our security policies particularly with regard to access to data. As a result 
hereof, full applications of the policies are not always fully supported.”122  
 
The idea that resonates from this statement was interpreted by the researcher to mean that the 
support for policy would go as far it was contextually relevant and essential. The researcher 
saw this as a way in which information security practitioners subjectively understood their 
interaction with emergent technology, processes and new information systems. This 
interaction was based both within a set of formal guidelines such as the corporate information 
security policy, CobiT, ITIL, and ISO IEC 17799 while  at the same time within the real-time 
composition of novel policy management and implementation processes. This was 
demonstrated as a form of process improvisation.  By conceptualising the duality of how the 
information security practitioners functioned within a set of formal guidelines and also real-
time composition (improvisation)  for this ISRM activity, the researcher noted that it was the 
                                            
122
 Q13-Appendix 8 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
 232 
 
“unknown” that provided avenues for collective acceptance of change and flexibility of 
information security policy thus yielding good grounds for improvisation.  
 
According to this understanding, the duality of the ISRM activity can be taken into 
consideration as follows. On the one side, information security practitioners were faced with 
emergent “unknown” incidents and threat issues. These issues were produced both by internal 
threats (unpredictable users’ behaviour) and external threats (hackers, viruses, worms) due to 
the nature of technology in the organisation. On the other hand, the practitioners devised 
mechanisms as stipulated by policy for protection against only those threats that were 
“predictable”. Unknown threats left the information security practitioners to be creative and 
imaginative on how to apply policy. Table 36 (next page), the Sensitizing Device, shows 
seven (7) of these conceptual instances of improvisation noted by the researcher when 
conceptualizing this ISRM activity.  
Table 36 (Sensitizing Device) can be interpreted as follows: the functionalist approaches to 
ISRM dictate formal procedures for activities related to Information Security Policies as 
stated by ISO IEC 17799. ISO IEC 17799 Section 4.1.2 suggests the need for an 
organization to have a cross-functional forum for the management of information security 
policy or its co-ordination. CobiT Section AI 6.1 stipulates the various kinds of policies and 
procedures that guide management in terms of changes in control of information. The 
organization’s own corporate information security policy document states that “Information 
security should protect information from a wide range of threats in order to ensure business 
continuity.” What Table 36 shows is that, although these mechanisms have been suggested, 
there were 7 conceptual instances where practitioners were using improvisation within these 
forums to collectively by-pass policies or creative avenues in which polices were 
contextualized. Table 36 also qualifies these improvisational activities as having been 
performed within the contexts of these guidelines and frameworks.  The two-direction arrows 
show that improvisational acts were drawn from what was already explicated in the literature 
and what was incremental. 
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7.4.6 Table 36. Sensitizing Device: Assessing Improvisation in Activities related to Information Security Policies 
 
                  
 
 
STRUCTURED (FUNCTIONALIST) APPROACH 
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UNIT OF 
ANALYSIS  
(EMBEDDED 
CASES) 
 
ISRM Functional  Approach  
 
ISO 17799 
Sections  
ITIL CobiT INTERNAL  DOCUMENT 
ANALYSIS 
Organization’s Guidelines 
1. Information 
Security policy 
Section 3.1  
Information 
Security policy 
 
Section 4.1.2  cross-
functional forum of 
management for 
policy co-ordination 
Security Management; 
Fundamental of 
Information Security; 
Section 4.1 Control 
 
Section4.2 (Service 
Support) change 
management suggests 
policies for change 
management 
DS  5  Ensure 
Systems Security 
 
Section AI6.1 
stipulates the 
policies and 
procedures that 
guide management 
in terms of changes 
in control of 
information 
 
Information security protects 
information from a wide range 
of threats in order to ensure 
business continuity. 
 
The information security 
process links into and supports 
the business risk process and 
objectives. 
1   2   3  4  
5  
6  
7  
1. Rational adaptive  
2. Lateral thinking  
3. Being ingenious 
4. Being imaginative 
5. Being inventive  
6. Being quick-witted   
7. Being Creative  (7 Conceptual instances See Figure 11) 
 
These improvisational act were seen to be working 
within the boundaries of the corporate policies, CobiT, 
ITIL and ISO IEC 17799. 
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7.4.1 Understanding Information Security Policy Using the Sensitising Device 
 
Table 36 is best understood when the subjective reasoning of the information security 
practitioners is put into context. It is the fusion of the dual nature of information security 
(following frameworks) based on predictive knowledge (Chapter 3, Section 3.1.1) and the 
emergent real-time composition of policy implementation based on the “unknown”, which 
allowed the researcher to conceptualize and understand policy implementation. It was 
understood that this fusion was expressed as collective improvisation. It should be noted that 
frameworks provided a mechanism whereby practitioners would collaborate and work 
together; “A cross-functional forum of management representatives” (Table 37, ISO IEC 
17799 Section 4.1.2).  
 
This improvisation manifested information security practitioners’ creativity and helped them 
to be rational adaptive to information security policy. The sense of collective responsibility 
helped create a synergy of contribution based on expertise and experience and, in this way, 
information security policy was easily disseminated to meet emergent information security 
requirements. Table 37 (below) illustrates how one side of the duality (frameworks) 
describes what needed to be done and that other side shows how this was done (improvised 
concepts). 
 
Table 37. Descriptive Frameworks for Information Security Policies and Improvisation 
ISO IEC 
17799 
CobiT ITIL Description Improvisation Concepts 
ISO IEC 
17799 Section 
4.1.2 
  A cross-functional forum of 
management representatives co-
ordinate the implementation of 
information security controls 
 
 
1.Rational adaptive  
2.Lateral thinking  
3.Being ingenious 
4.Being imaginative 
5.Being inventive  
6.Being quick-witted   
7.Being Creative   
 CobiT 
Section  
AI6.1 
 Stipulates the policies and 
procedures that guide management 
in terms of changes in control of 
information with regard to system 
  ITIL Section  
4.2 (Service 
Support) 
suggests policies for change 
management 
ISO IEC 
17799 Section 
  Employees of the organization 
should receive appropriate training 
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What was observed and can be interpreted was that the information security practitioners’ 
activities were a form of expression on the principle of continuous and reflexive 
transformation in the use, understanding and communicating guidelines to the users. The 
expressions were based on everyday meanings and common sense notions about information 
security requirements for specific systems in which the practitioners saw themselves as 
custodians. Understanding policy was more like problem-solving and at the same time 
improvising. The practitioners were seen to possess unique abilities to assess emergent 
changes in accordance to policy guidelines and act accordingly.  This sort of unique, 
immediate, personal intervention was interpreted to constitute ground for improvisation. 
7.5 INFORMATION SECURITY EVENT MONITORING  
  
The research established that the organisation had set procedures for tracking malicious 
activities and threats to information systems across its organisational networks. It also 
established that the corporate information policy had created provisions for who were to be 
responsible for monitoring information systems. The corporate information security policy 
6.2.1 and regular updates in 
organizational policies and 
procedures 
 CobiT 
Section  
DS7.1 
 Mechanism for identification of 
training needs, through a training 
curriculum for each group of 
employees 
  ITIL Section  
6.8 (Service 
Support) 
Establishes procedures for dealing 
with problems, through proactive 
problem management. 
ISO IEC 
17799 Section  
9.6.1 
  Guidelines for users of applications 
for information and application 
systems in accordance with defined 
access control policies 
  ITIL Section  
4.2.4(Security 
Management) 
The information security 
management measures to be taken 
on access controls. 
  ITIL Section  
7.9 (Service 
Support) 
Proper procedure for configuration 
management particularly with 
regards to relationships of 
information systems to other 
processes 
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therefore set the context for how information security event monitoring was to take place in 
the organisation: 
“Custodians are responsible for establishing, monitoring Information systems 
consistent with standards issued by the information security office. Users must 
report all suspicious activities and security breaches to management and the 
Information Security Office” 
 
Source: Courtesy of [Name withheld] Corporate Information 
Security Policy (2007) 
 
It was noted that for this process-based ISRM activity, process improvisation was 
conceptually dense. From an information security practitioner’s perspective, finding a good 
solution path for network monitoring was deemed a critical process activity. The research 
focused on how this monitoring was taking place. By revisiting Section 6 of this thesis; it 
was observed that there was a higher degree of conceptual density for process improvisation 
for this ISRM activity at operational level. 
 
 
The organisation had complex distributed software environments involving many processes 
and activities. The environments were faced with many kinds of events and information 
affecting these. The information security practitioner found rational adaptive ways of 
enabling the monitoring and quantification of the risk/threat to information systems 
particularly against the value and cost of protection. The practitioners were seen as 
resourceful and quick witted in the monitoring process.  
“Incidents are prioritised and “red flagged”. The “red flag” incidents become part 
of the audit report with the required management response.”123 
 
“This is done by means of both internal and external monitoring of both data 
access and network activity. Internet usage is also very closely monitored and 
measured.”124 
 
These expressions were seen as improvisation. Findings reveal that there were 2 conceptual 
instances of collective improvisation, 2 conceptual instances of individual improvisation, 1 
conceptual instance of product improvisation, and 8 conceptual instances of process 
improvisation as follows: 
Collective improvisation         
 Being practical  
                                            
123
 Q56-Appendix 8 
124
 Q47-Appendix 8 
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 Being ingenuous 
Individual improvisation    
 Being creative 
 Rational adaptive 
Product improvisation 
 Being ingenious 
Process improvisation 
 Being resourceful 
 Being practical 
 Being inventive 
 Being original 
 Rational adaptive 
 Being creative 
 Being novel 
 Lateral thinking                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Figure 14. gives a graphical illustration of the above concepts.  
 
 
Figure 14.  Improvisation in Information Security Event Monitoring (Activities) 
 
It was observed that the best monitoring solutions were those that were context specific and 
driven by creativity that would mitigate risk.  Since there probably was no single best 
solution, the number of solution paths to be taken given any monitoring process was limited, 
and this provided avenues for improvisation and hence the generation of the above concepts.  
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Table 38 (next page) the Sensitizing Device, shows thirteen (13) conceptual instances of 
improvisation noted by the researcher when conceptualizing this ISRM activity.  
 
Table 38 (Sensitizing Device) can be interpreted as follows: the functionalist approaches to 
ISRM dictates formal procedures for activities related to Information Security Event 
Monitoring as stated by ISO IEC 17799, CobiT and ITIL.  ISO IEC 17799 Section 9.7 
suggests the need for an organisation to put in place measures to monitor system access and 
use.  CobiT Section M 1.1 stipulates mechanisms an organisation may use for collecting 
monitoring data benchmarks, proprietary nature and integrity of data through looking at 
relevant performance indicators. The organization’s own corporate information security 
policy document states that “custodians [designated information security practitioners] are 
responsible for establishing, monitoring information systems consistent with standards issued 
by the information security office.” What Table 38 shows is that although these mechanisms 
have been suggested, there were 13 conceptual instances where practitioners were using 
improvisation to by-pass these suggestions or were creative in applying these suggestions in 
ways that were not yet explicit. Table 38 also qualifies these improvisational activities as 
having been performed within the contexts of these guidelines and frameworks.  The two-
direction arrows show that improvisational acts were drawn from what was already 
explicated in the literature and what was incremental. 
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7.5.4 Table 38. Sensitizing Device- Assessing Improvisation in Issues of Information Security Event Monitoring  
                  
 
 
STRUCTURED (FUNCTIONALIST) APPROACH 
IMPROVISATION  
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UNIT OF 
ANALYSIS  
(EMBEDDED 
CASES) 
 
ISRM Functional  Approach  
 
ISO 17799 
Sections  
ITIL CobiT INTERNAL  DOCUMENT 
ANALYSIS  
Organization’s Guidelines 
4  Security Event 
Monitoring  
 
 
 
Section 9.7 
Monitoring system 
access and use 
 
 
Section 6.8 proactive problem 
solving and notes the importance of 
system monitoring in order to allow 
the effectiveness of controls 
adopted to be checked.  
 
Service Level Management ; 4.4.8 
Establish monitoring capabilities 
 
Security Management Measures; 
6.8 Audit and Evaluate security 
reviews of IT systems 
 
 
Section M1.1 
mechanism for collecting 
monitoring data 
benchmarks, proprietary 
nature and integrity of 
data through looking at 
relevant performance 
indicators  
 
DS 10   Manage 
Problems and Incidents 
Custodians are responsible for 
establishing, monitoring Info 
systems consistent with 
standards issued by the info 
security office  
 
Users must report all suspicious 
activities and security breaches 
to management and the 
Information Security Office. 
1  
2  
3  
4  
5   6   
7   
8   
9   
10  
11  
12  
13  
1 Being practical       2 Being ingenuous 
3 Being creative        4 Rational adaptive 
5 Being ingenious     6 Being resourceful 
7 Being practical      8 Being inventive 
9 Being original      10 Rational adaptive 
11 Being creative    12 Being novel 
13 Lateral thinking     (13 Conceptual instances See 
Figure 12)                                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
These improvisational acts were seen to be working 
within the boundaries of the corporate policies, CobiT, 
ITIL and ISO IEC 17799. 
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7.5.1 Understanding Information Security Event Monitoring Using the 
Sensitising Device 
 
Table 38 can be looked at from an operational level. The information security practitioners 
were practical and original in the monitoring procedures. This was possible since the 
frameworks were open to interpretation and were left to the practitioners to come up with “a 
mechanism for collecting monitoring data benchmarks” (Table 37, CobiT Section M1.1) 
 
Table 39 (below) which is an amplification of Table 38, shows suggested procedures for 
monitoring and the concepts generated from discussions that explained how the monitoring 
was done. This interesting insight reveals the way practitioners at process level used integrating 
monitoring tools creatively.  
 
Table 39. Descriptive Frameworks for Information Security Event Monitoring and Improvisation 
ISO IEC 
17799 
CobiT ITIL Description 
 
Improvisation Concepts 
ISO IEC 17799 
Section 9.7 
  issues guidelines for monitoring 
systems in order to detect 
deviation from access control 
policy 
 
1 Being practical        
2 Being ingenuous 
3 Being creative         
4 Rational adaptive 
5 Being ingenious      
6 Being resourceful 
7 Being practical       
8 Being inventive 
9 Being original       
10 Rational adaptive 
11 Being creative     
12 Being novel 
13 Lateral thinking      
 CobiT 
Section  
M1.1 
 suggests a mechanism for 
collecting monitoring data 
benchmarks, proprietary nature 
and integrity of data 
  ITIL Section  
6.8 (Service 
Delivery) 
proactive problem solving  and the 
importance of system monitoring 
to allow the effectiveness of 
controls adopted to be checked 
ISO IEC 17799 
Section 9.7.2 
  proper procedures and areas of 
risk when monitoring 
system/application use 
 CobiT 
Section  
M1.2 
 assessing performance targets on 
a continued basis 
 CobiT 
Section  
DS3.8 
 resources availability, and talks of 
procedures for monitoring 
application use through looking at 
availability requirements, fault 
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The way the monitoring process as an operational activity was carried out revealed that the 
practitioners were practical
 
while improvising. As part of the monitoring process, they had 
firmly established in their minds the information security tenets of confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of information as they performed the monitoring activities. There was bricolage 
with monitoring tools, with bricolage representing the capacity of the information security 
practitioners to tinker with the monitoring tools currently available within the organisation. In 
this manner, a group of monitoring tools were combined according to the needs of a specific 
context contributing to new ways of acting.  
 
“…they have monitoring tools monitoring the network, we have the 
monitoring tools monitoring Microsoft users, so we actually have two…we 
have the small…one and then we have the big one, called the Microsoft 
operations Manager (MsOM)…” 125  
 
 
“…The small one, we find is quite nice, and flexible, because it is quick and 
easy and it can monitor. Say you need something immediately, it can do it for 
you immediately, and then we can move it on to the other one, as an additional 
kind of monitoring, .in a different kind of way…” 126 
 
The analysis of the above data by the researcher was interpreted to constitute improvisation. 
This was noted where the monitoring tools, the technology and the practices were re-
interpreted by the information security practitioners.  
 
                                            
125
 C91-Appendix 10 
126
 C92-Appendix 10 
tolerance 
  ITIL Section  
8.3 (Service 
Delivery), 
proper manner of monitoring 
application use by considering the 
availability management process 
 CobiT 
Section  
M1.3 
 the need to monitor satisfaction 
levels of customers while 
highlighting on the shortfalls 
  ITIL Section  
4.4.8(Service 
Support) 
monitoring the applications for the 
purpose of understanding 
customer satisfaction 
ISO IEC 17799 
Section  10.5.2 
  continuous reviewing and 
monitoring of applications in 
terms of any changes to these 
applications 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
 242 
 
 
7.6 IT GOVERNANCE AND REGULATORY COMPLIANCE  
 
The research revealed that IT governance was championed by the organisation’s executives 
and the board of directors. The executive fostered leadership and established organisational 
structures and processes which ensured that the organisation’s IT facilitated strategies and 
business objectives. There were also measures taken by the organisation to ensure compliance 
with IT governance procedures and other external requirements as stipulated by the corporate 
information security policy as follows: 
 
“The Internal Audit periodically performs compliance checks to make sure that 
information security requirements are consistently observed. Custodians are 
forbidden from changing the production information in their possession unless 
given explicit permission from the Owner or authorized User.” 
 
Source: Courtesy of [Name withheld] Corporate Information  
 
 
The IT governance frameworks were seen to lack expressiveness and were detached from the 
practitioners. That was the reason the component of improvisational skill, inventiveness and 
the achievement of coherence enabled the practitioner to fix skill and experience into the IT 
governance mechanism i.e. to give IT governance a human feel. Findings reveal that there were 
6 conceptual instances of collective improvisation, 1 conceptual instance of individual 
improvisation, 4 conceptual instances of product improvisation, and 1 conceptual instance of 
process improvisation as follows: 
 
Collective Improvisation 
 Being inspired 
 Rational adaptive  
 Being Creative 
 Resourceful 
 Getting by 
 Managing 
Individual Improvisation 
 Being novel 
Product Improvisation 
 Lateral thinking 
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 Rational adaptive 
 Creativeness 
 Being ingenuous 
Process Improvisation 
 Managing 
 
Figure 15. gives a graphical illustration of the above concepts. The above concepts illustrate 
the improvisational expressions by the information security practitioners who applied flexible 
methods.  
 
Figure 15.  Improvisation in IT Governance and Regulatory Compliance (Activities) 
 
 
 
There was a greater conceptual density for collective improvisation for this IRSM activity. At 
strategic level, the information security practitioners were governed in the way they conducted 
audits. They had established a vision for adopting CobiT as a guiding control framework to 
assist in IT governance and compliance requirements.  The research identified improvisational 
concepts that demonstrated the flexibility on the IT governance and compliance procedures 
implemented on the ground. 
 
It was established that the lack of clear guidelines inspired information security practitioners to 
find new ways to deal with emergent situations but at the same time to ensure compliance.  
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“…Yes, a lot of Acts have been…introduced… but…I don’t think they have been tested 
yet….so we want to comply to the bare minimum…” 127 
 
In the discussions, the practitioners also mentioned flexibility in compliance requirements and 
it seems likely that this sort of flexibility created room for the increasingly efficient application 
and implementation of compliance methods. This was achieved through the following:  
 
1. Understanding guidelines well enough to draw up patterns of knowledge/skill sufficient 
to facilitate compliance.  
2. Focusing attention on compliance activities and contextualisation.  
 
Table 40 next page (Sensitizing Device) can be interpreted as follows: the functionalist 
approaches to ISRM dictates formal procedures for activities related to IT Governance and 
Regulatory Compliance as stated by ISO IEC 17799, CobiT and ITIL.  ISO IEC 17799 
Section 12.1 suggests the way an organisation should carry out compliance requirements with 
regard to information security policies and standards. CobiT Section M 3.5 gives guidance on 
how organisations should independently assure themselves of compliance with laws, regulatory 
requirements and contractual commitments through routine, independent compliance checks. 
The organization’s own corporate information security policy document states that “the 
Internal Audit [designated information security practitioners] periodically performs 
compliance checks to make sure that information security requirements are consistently 
observed.” What Table 40 shows is that there were 12 conceptual instances where 
practitioners were using improvisation to by-pass these suggestions or were creative in 
applying these suggestions in ways that were not yet explicit. Table 40 also qualifies these 
improvisational activities as having been performed within the contexts of these guidelines and 
frameworks.  The two-direction arrows show that improvisational acts were drawn from what 
was already explicated in the literature and what was incremental. 
                                            
127
 C31-Appendix 10 
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7.6.6 Table 40. Sensitizing Device: Assessing Improvisation in IT Governance and Regulatory Compliance  
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IMPROVISATION  
 
 
 
 
INCREMENTAL   
APPROACH 
C
o
ll
e
c
ti
v
e 
Im
p
ro
v
is
a
ti
o
n
 
In
d
iv
id
u
a
l 
Im
p
ro
v
is
a
ti
o
n
 
P
r
o
d
u
c
t 
Im
p
ro
v
is
a
ti
o
n
 
P
r
o
c
e
ss
 
Im
p
ro
v
is
a
ti
o
n
 
 
UNIT OF 
ANALYSIS  
(EMBEDDED 
CASES) 
ISRM Functional  Approach   
ISO 17799 ITIL CobiT INTERNAL  DOCUMENT 
ANALYSIS  
Organization’s Guidelines 
5 Governance and 
Regulatory 
Compliance 
 
Section 12.1.1 suggests that 
the way an organisation should 
carry out compliance 
requirements with regard to 
information security policies 
and standards. 
 
Section 12.3 System audit 
considerations 
 
 
Section 4.2 
(Security 
Management) 
procedures for the 
need to have audits 
and evaluate 
information security 
reviews of IT 
systems.  
 
Operations 4.4.1 
Management of all 
ICT infrastructure 
events, 4.4.2 
Operational control, 
components and 
their configuration 
 
PO  8   Ensure compliance 
with external requirements 
 
M3.5 independent 
assurance of compliance 
with laws and regulatory 
requirements and 
contractual commitments, 
through routine 
independent compliance 
checks 
The Internal Audit periodically 
performs compliance checks to 
make sure that information 
security requirements are 
consistently observed. 
 
Custodians are forbidden from 
changing the production 
information in their possession 
unless given explicit 
permission from the Owner or 
authorized User. 
1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  8  
9  
10  
11   
12  
1 Being inspired            2 Rational adaptive  
3 Being Creative            4 Resourceful 
5 Getting by                   6 Managing 
7 Being novel                 8 Lateral thinking 
9 Rational adaptive      10 Creativeness 
11 Being ingenuous      12 Managing  
 
   (12 Conceptual instances See Figure 13)            
 
 
These improvisational acts were seen to be working 
within the boundaries of the corporate policies, CobiT, 
ITIL and ISO IEC 17799. 
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7.6.1 Understanding IT Governance and Regulatory Compliance Using the 
Sensitising Device 
 
Table 40 illustrates that IT governance decision-making was an issue (strategic) that was 
emphasised when the information security practitioners’ understanding of the contextual 
situation affected the decisions to be made and the solving of practical solutions thereof. The 
information security practitioners were guided by frameworks which gave “provision for 
technical compliance and technical support” (Table 36, CobiT Section M.2). It was 
established that the issues regarding how each decision was carried out, such as assigning 
decision-making authority, coordinating resources, and aligning IT decision-making with 
external factors was done flexibly and contextually.  
 
“in terms of how we…have been meeting certain compliance requirements in terms of 
ECT Act…” 128 
 
“or any other critical ACT in line with all the information reporting …129 
 
The researcher interpreted this to mean that that the decision-making processes that facilitated 
compliance provided the practitioners an enriched personal perspective. This enriched 
perspective contextualised scenarios and guided the information security practitioner on how 
best to respond and undertake compliance measures. It is this enriched experience that draws 
from the cognitive and taps into reality that was seen to encourage improvisation. The 
improvisation concepts generated for this ISRM activity included creativity and 
inventiveness. Other concepts are listed on Table 41 below.  
 
Table 41. Descriptive Frameworks for IT Governance / Compliance and Improvisation 
 
                                            
128
 C29-Appendix 10 
129
 C30-Appendix 10 
ISO IEC 
17799 
CobiT ITIL Description 
 
Improvisation Concepts 
ISO IEC 
17799 
Section 
12.2.2 
  Guideline for technical 
compliance checking to be 
carried out by specialists 
and authorised persons. 
 
 
1 Being inspired             
2 Rational adaptive  
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The above concepts (Table 41) suggest that the aggregation of decision-making for meeting 
compliance requirements formed the basis of cognitive assembles (new skills and knowledge) 
and the practitioners would then autonomously access these new assembles as guides to 
creative compliance. This meant that IT governance and compliance was seen as a 
complicated and interconnected process of applying knowledge structures and explicated 
frameworks. 
7.7 DISASTER RECOVERY AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY  
 
The research established that the organisation had developed plans that enabled the 
organisation to deal with unanticipated contingencies. These plans were seen as proactive 
measures that were designed to reduce the impact of a disaster should this happen. The plans 
 CobiT 
Section  
M.2 
 Procedures for technical 
compliance to take into 
account operational 
security and internal 
control assurance 
3 Being Creative             
4 Resourceful 
5 Getting by                    
6 Managing 
7 Being novel                  
8 Lateral thinking 
9 Rational adaptive       
10 Creativeness 
11 Being ingenuous       
12 Managing 
  ITIL Section  
4.2 (ICT 
Infrastructure 
Management) 
Provision for technical 
compliance which 
procedures for technical 
support and the processes 
that require technical 
support. 
ISO IEC 
17799 
Section 
12.2 
  Having appropriate audit 
tools to review information, 
security policy and 
technical compliance. 
 CobiT 
Section  
M3.3 
 Manner for independent 
reviews and assurance of 
effectiveness of IT services 
through conducting routine 
independent checks of 
effectiveness 
 CobiT 
Section  
M3.5 
 Assurance of compliance 
with laws and regulatory 
requirements and 
contractual commitments, 
through routine 
independent compliance 
checks 
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were set up to ensure business continuity as explicated by the organisation’s corporate 
information security policy.  
 
“Business Risk Management will provide input into the information security 
process related to risk and continuity planning. Business Continuity Plans must 
be implemented and regularly tested to ensure availability of critical 
information.” 
 
Source: Courtesy of [Name withheld] Corporate Information 
Security Policy (2007) 
 
At the heart of this corporate information policy was a proactive measure to ensure that 
creative ideas and skills would be developed by the practitioner. The practitioners would in 
turn have an increased knowledge about better ways of designing disaster recovery 
frameworks for business continuity, equipment failure, floods, fire etc. The objective would 
therefore be: 
 
1) To better the management of business continuity;  
2) To benchmark the actual way in which business continuity was management against 
emergent frameworks. 
 
Section 6 of this thesis revealed that there was a high degree of conceptual density for 
collective and process improvisation for this IRSM activity specifically at operational level.  
It was established that the organisation prioritised these in terms of their role in reviving 
operations. The information security practitioners assessed the relative value of continuity of 
business along the dimensions of availability.  
 
“…if we get a call on a Saturday…for something that is down,  [we] don’t 
worry, we will look at it on a Monday...since it is not a high level one...but if 
you get a call for something that you know is high level you will come in…” 130 
 
“…yes and [we] categorised those items… we specifically focused on [those 
items], particularly from a disaster recovery and also business continuity…” 131 
 
It was by understanding the meaning behind these statements that the researcher realised that 
it required skills and experience to be rational adaptive towards emergent contingencies. 
Concepts such as these were recorded as forms of information security practitioners’ 
creativeness and improvisation.  This was seen as the information security practitioners’ 
                                            
130
 C147-Appendix 10 
131
 C52-Appendix 10 
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unique way of handling situations. Findings reveal that there were 4 conceptual instances of 
collective improvisation, 2 conceptual instances of individual improvisation and 4 conceptual 
instances of process improvisation as follows: 
Collective improvisation 
 Being quick-witted 
 Lateral thinking 
 Rational adaptive 
 Managing 
Individual improvisation     
 Being quick-witted  
 Getting by 
Process improvisation 
 Rational adaptive 
 Being resourceful 
 Exceptionality 
 Being innovative 
 
Figure 16. gives a graphical illustration of the above concepts.  
 
 
Figure 16.  Improvisation in Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity (Activities) 
 
The above concepts derived from interviews with information security practitioners and 
interpretation by the researcher demonstrated the way the organization’s information security 
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practitioners handled the disaster recovery procedures. Other activities that show varied 
levels of improvisation included the way the disaster recovery tests were carried out.  The 
researcher was able to observe the disaster recovery exercise at location and recorded this in 
Appendix 3.  
 
The following was observed in the following Table 42. (See Appendix 3 for full details).  
 
Table 42. Observation: Disaster Recovery Management exercise  
Start  
9: 00 am  
 
1. Equipment testing  
Notes  
 
Disaster Recovery Site has 12 PC’s. There were also 6 personnel 
manning PC’s each with a designated duty.   
 
At this stage the development area Switch (a virtual section in the 
database designated for testing data) had earlier on been switched off, 
meaning the activities were delayed.  
 
 
2. Data testing  
 
 
9:30 am  
 
 
1. Isolation of Development 
Area 
 
For the Disaster recovery process to continue, the Development Area 
Switch had to be switched on again.  (This usually takes time due to 
formal procedures to be followed). Apparently the development team 
were unaware of the timing of the disaster recovery date.   
 
To address this, the Disaster Recover Manager made frantic calls back 
to the Office. After the call, he leaves the venue. In a matter of time the 
area was switched on.  
 
At this stage another person enters the secure room. Soon after, the 
Disaster Recover Manager comes back again.  
 
He explains that on normal occasions there are 2 tests of this nature 
once a year.  
 
Manifest file 
A manifest file (a check list ) of the recovery procedures is produced. It 
documents the steps to be followed in the recovery process. 
 
 
1 Disaster recovery 
Manager leaves after 
making the call 
2 The rest of the 5 people 
seem busy concentrating 
on 1 particular PC.  
1 Unix systems link up to 
the main frame. 
2 Select data date and 
time. Restore data based 
on selected data and 
time 
3 Restore from back-ups 
brought using the main 
frame channel.  
10:00am  1 Review of Manifest file 
2 Unix environment goes 
live for recovery.  
3 Back-ups selected for 
recovery.  
 
There is a Data Analysts who sits and observes everything.  The 
Analyst seems to give instruction to the *CSC personnel about the 
recovery process.  
 
The four essential items to be checked in the back-ups include; 
 The back-up date 
 Return Number 
 Seal number 
 Container number 
 
While one person reads the manifest file the other types the instructions 
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From the observations (Table 42), it was noted that the exercises were very technical and 
comprehensive and were aimed at covering all relevant aspects (predictive knowledge) and 
factors that would adversely affect the running of the information systems. Also critical was 
the down-time (the duration systems were be out of operation) and how long it would take to 
revive these systems and data from backed-up data and standby servers.  
 
It was observed that the framework used in the disaster recovery exercises for managing
 
contingencies was created to categorise data and list items of criticality though this was not 
sufficient enough to apply to all situations. This rendered some plans unworkable, and hence 
required practitioners to draw cognitively from their own skills and past experiences. Table 
43 (next page) the Sensitizing Device, shows how this was done and the concepts that were 
derived by the practitioner in understanding creativity in these ISRM activities. There were 
ten (10) conceptual instances of improvisation noted by the researcher when conceptualizing 
this ISRM activity.  
 
Table 43 (Sensitizing Device) can be interpreted as follows: the functionalist approaches to 
ISRM dictate formal procedures for activities related to Disaster Recovery and Business 
Continuity as stated by ISO IEC 17799, CobiT and ITIL.  ISO IEC 17799 Section 11.1 
defines the various aspects of Business Continuity Management. CobiT Section DS 4.2 
proposes the need for an organisation to establish an IT continuity plan, a strategy and 
philosophy which align with the overall business continuity plan. What Table 43 shows is 
in the UNIX environment. 
 
* Computer Science Corporation (CSC) have been sub-contracted to 
handle the mainframe capability although the equipment is owned by 
[name withheld] .  
 
 
10:30  1 Two serves restored 
successfully  
At this time 2 servers have been restored successfully, the time taken 
being 30 minutes.  
Information from these two contains server information about the 
following; 
Food Server P670 
Textile Server P 670 
RMS Server  P570 
FDS/TMS Server P650 
ECS/APPWORX Server P650 
QUEST Server P615 
 
The reason given for the quick recovery by the teams is that they have 
done this more than once and have internalised the process. 
 
It was noted that no documentation is being taken. 
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that there were 10 conceptual instances where practitioners were using improvisation to by-
pass these suggestions or were creative in applying these suggestions in ways that were not 
yet explicit. Table 43 also qualifies these improvisational activities as having been performed 
within the contexts of these guidelines and frameworks.  The two-direction arrows show that 
improvisational acts were drawn from what was already explicated in the literature and what 
was incremental. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
 253 
 
7.7.4 Table 43. Sensitizing Device: Assessing Improvisation in Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity 
 
                  
 
 
STRUCTURED (FUNCTIONALIST) APPROACH 
IMPROVISATION  
 
 
 
 
INCREMENTA
L   
APPROACH 
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UNIT OF 
ANALYSIS  
(EMBEDDED 
CASES) 
ISRM Functional  Approach   
ISO 17799 ITIL CobiT INTERNAL DOCUMENT 
ANALYSIS  
Organization’s Guidelines 
6. Disaster 
Recovery and 
Business 
Continuity 
Section 11.1 
Aspects of Business 
continuity 
management 
 
Availability 
Management;  8.3 The 
availability management 
process 
 
Section 7.3 (Service 
Delivery), the IT Service 
Continuity Management, 
postulates the need for a 
risk-based approach in 
the continuity of IT 
processes and services.   
DS  4  Ensure 
Continuous Service 
 
DS4.2 need to establish 
an IT continuity plan, a 
strategy and philosophy 
which aligns with the 
overall business 
continuity plan 
 
DS 10   Manage 
Problems and Incidents 
 
 
Business Risk Management 
will provide input into the 
information security process 
related to risk and continuity 
planning 
 
Business Continuity Plans 
must be implemented and 
regularly tested to ensure 
availability of critical 
information. 
1    
2  
3  
4   
5  
6   
 7   
8   
9  
10   
 
1 Being quick-witted       2 Lateral thinking 
3 Rational adaptive        4 Managing    
5 Being quick-witted      6 Getting by 
7 Rational adaptive       8 Being resourceful 
9 Exceptionality            10 Being innovative 
(10 Conceptual instances See Figure 14)            
 
 
These improvisational acts were seen to be working 
within the boundaries of the corporate policies, CobiT, 
ITIL and ISO IEC 17799. 
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7.7.1 Understanding Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity Using the 
Sensitising Device 
Table 43 illustrates extemporaneous acts for continuity management catalysed by 
training/experience and expressed as improvisation practice. The context laid for the 
organisation’s information security practitioners was set by frameworks that explicated the 
“need to establish an IT continuity plan, a strategy and philosophy which aligns with the 
overall business continuity plan” (Table 44, CobiT Section DS 4.2).  The research 
established that the issues regarding how business disaster recovery and business continuity 
decisions were carried out, such as deciding on the data and application software that need to 
be recovered and restoring this for the business to resume in case of a disaster. The researcher 
interpreted this to mean that it was difficult to establish what would be lost (i.e. predict the 
future) and to estimate the recovery time for that data. One simple way was to devise 
mechanisms for whole data recovery rather than parts. This option, however, proved 
expensive for very large data sets for this specific organisation. 
 
That is the reason why understanding these activities made it possible to find the essence of 
creativity, flexibility and rational adaptation and to see that the practitioners were trying to 
find the best way to establish a risk-based approach in the continuity of IT processes and 
services (Table 44, ITIL Section 7.3 Service Delivery) It was thus noted that the business 
continuity management process was filled with creative activities spontaneously arising 
during normal operating conditions while at the same time following the predefined 
frameworks. These activities were characterised in part by the selection of appropriate 
procedure in the event that planned-for contingencies arose.  Table 44 (below) shows some of 
the guidelines proposed by the frameworks and the concepts that were derived by the 
researcher to establish how this was done on the ground.  
 
Table 44. Descriptive Frameworks for Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity 
ISO IEC 
17799 
CobiT ITIL Description 
 
Improvisation Concepts 
ISO IEC 17799 
Section 11.1.1 
  need for putting in place a 
managed process for 
developing and 
maintaining business 
continuity  
 
 
1 Being quick-witted        
2 Lateral thinking 
3 Rational adaptive         
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 CobiT Section  
DS4.2 
 need to establish an IT 
continuity plan, a strategy 
and philosophy which 
aligns with the overall 
business continuity plan 
4 Managing    
5 Being quick-witted       
6 Getting by 
7 Rational adaptive        
8 Being resourceful 
9 Exceptionality             
10 Being innovative  14. Being quick-witted 
  ITIL Section  
7.3 (Service 
Delivery) 
postulates the need for a 
risk-based approach in 
the continuity of IT 
processes and services 
ISO IEC 17799 
Section  7.2 
  general information 
security of 
equipment/systems and 
the risks associated with 
those that impact on 
business continuity 
 CobiT Section  
DS4.10 
 need for a framework that 
establishes critical IT 
resources which should 
be identified. 
ISO IEC 17799 
Section  11.1.1 
  making on-the-spot 
decisions and 
understanding the impact 
interruptions to business 
processes are likely to 
have on the business 
 CobiT Section  
DS4.13 
 the need to have “wrap-
up” procedures which 
entail assessing adequacy 
of plans and planning 
updates 
 CobiT Section  
DS4.11 
 cognisance of the need for 
decision making on back-
up site and hardware, 
while identifying 
contracts for service 
provision 
  ITIL Section  
7.3.4 (Service 
Delivery), 
IT Service Continuity 
Management, stipulates 
procedures for 
operational management 
in continuity of operations 
ISO IEC 17799 
Section  11.1.4 
  clear framework to deal 
with emergencies and 
provide a need for 
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Table 44 above demonstrates that the process of supporting business continuity and disaster 
recovery management was subject to creativity and flexibility giving rise to decisions based 
on the contextual event and the criticality of the incident.  It is this quick decision making that 
gave rise to improvised acts.  
 
“…correct…something will always happen…” 132 
 
“…I think our main thing here is to keep [going]… I mean we have a lot of 
good uses in policies when it comes to keeping the system going,  certain time 
we do what we have to do to keep the [systems] going…and sometimes we 
don’t…know if it is  the right thing to do…” 133 
 
The previous statements show that in reality systems at times went down due to unanticipated 
causes and this often called for information security practitioners to be quick witted.  It seems 
that the way the specific disaster recovery activities were carried out depended on 
requirements as dictated by contextual business needs, costs, extent of exposure to disaster, 
type of disaster and the disaster recovery opportunities within the organization. The following 
were noticed as activities that demonstrated this contextual understanding by information 
security practitioners:  
 Choices were “composed” (in real-time) based on the available disaster recovery 
exercises options present e.g. on-site mirror arrangement for backups.  
 Choices to be made based on remote arrangement within organization, such as “hot”, 
“warm” or cold sites”. Where hot sites would be accessed immediately if the main 
applications in the organisation went down, cold sites would experience some delay 
ranging from hours to days, with warm sites being somewhere in the middle.  
 
It was concluded that the individual information security practitioner’s capacity to understand 
and utilise disaster recovery and business continuity planning tools and the holistic manner in 
which all these activities were performed contained elements of improvised acts. The 
researcher interpreted that a successful rational adaptive
 
response to disaster recovery and 
                                            
132
 C133-Appendix 10 
133
 C124-Appendix 10 
emergency response 
procedures, and manual 
fallback plans  
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business continuity planning as expressed by the practitioner was not to be seen as a failure of 
pre-event/continuity or recovery time planning, but as an emergent creative act.  
7.8 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS OF ALL UNITS: CONCEPTUALISATION 
OF IMPROVISATION IN ISRM ACTIVITIES 
 
The researcher summarized all the units that were analyzed and interpretations drawn into 
Table 45 below. Table 45 (Extracted from Table 31) summarizes findings from analysis of 
all the ISRM units as follows.  
Table 45. Numeric Summary of Conceptual density of Improvisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 45. can be interpreted by understanding the number of conceptual instances of 
improvisation, (denoted in numeric form) for each unit of analysis. The number of conceptual 
instances in each unit of analysis denotes conceptual density of improvisation for that unit. 
Units of Analysis 
 
Activities related 
to; 
Level  
Number of instances of improvisation 
Conceptual 
Density 
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1  
Information Assets 
Access and Data 
Control 
Strategic  1    1 
Tactical  1    1 
Operational  1  2  3 
2 
Information 
Security 
Architecture 
Strategic  1    1    2 
Tactical  2  
 
  2 
Operational    3   3 
3 
Information 
Security Policies 
Strategic  1 1   
 
  2 
Tactical    2 1   3 
Operational    2  2 
4 
Information 
Security Event 
Monitoring 
Strategic    2 1 3 
Tactical   2 4  6 
Operational  2 
 
 2 
 
 4 
5 
IT Governance 
and Regulatory 
Compliance 
Strategic  4   2 6 
Tactical  2 1   3 
Operational    1 
 
2   3 
6  
Disaster Recovery 
and Business 
Continuity 
Strategic  2    2 
Tactical  1  1  2 
Operational  1 
 
2   3  6 
19 6 23 6 54 
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Table 45 therefore shows process improvisation as being the most conceptually dense form 
of improvisation and more specifically in activities related to Event Monitoring. – CLAIM 1. 
(monitoring information security breaches and incidents). Table 45 also shows that both 
individual and product improvisation were the least observed forms of improvisation in 
ISRM activities. – CLAIM 2. This conclusion was based on the conceptual density of both.  
 
For easier representation of Table 45, Figure 17 below was developed. Figure 17 clearly 
shows that process improvisation is the most pronounced improvisational type in ISRM 
activities relating to Event Monitoring. This is because these activities are operational 
activities subject to unplanned changes, incidents and contingencies. These activities 
therefore comprise elements of flexibility. In contrast, collective improvisation is more 
pronounced in activities relating to IT Governance and Regulatory Compliance.-
CLAIM 3.
 This 
is perhaps because IT Governance entails assigning decision rights jointly or collectively.  
 
Figure 17. Summary of Conceptual Density of Improvisation in ISRM Activities 
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Analysis of Figure 17 does not support the claim that individual improvisation is present in 
ISRM activities relating to assets control and information architecture and design.-
CLAIM 4. 
Because individual improvisation concepts relating to these ISRM activities were not coded, 
it would be interpreted to mean that practitioners were hesitant to act as individuals in 
sensitive matters such as security of information assets. 
 
7.8.1 Density of Types of Improvisation in ISRM 
 
The researcher took a summary total of the various typologies of improvisation (Process, 
Product, Individual and Collective) and compared the number of conceptual instances 
(conceptual density). Table 46 gives a numeric summary of the conceptual density as 
follows: 
Table 46. Summary of Conceptual density of Improvisation 
 
 
The researcher then graphically represented this data in Table 46 above to come up with 
Figure 18.  It can be noted that Figure 18 shows process improvisation as the most 
pronounced type of improvisation in ISRM activities.  Process improvisation was also more 
pronounced at operational level as opposed to any other level.-
CLAIM 5.
  Both product and 
individual improvisations were the least pronounced improvisations in ISRM activities. This 
can be interpreted to mean that information security practitioners would rarely opt to work or 
do things alone. Given alternatives, they seemingly would prefer to work or collaborate 
jointly with others. That is why collective improvisation seems to be much more pronounced 
than individual improvisation.- 
CLAIM 6.
  Figure 18 also shows that there was a greater level of 
conceptual density of collective improvisation at strategic level.- 
CLAIM 7.
  This meant that 
joint consultation was valued greatly more-so at strategic level than any other level.  
 
 
 
 
 
Level 
 
Conceptual Density of types of improvisation  
(in numeric form) 
Conceptual 
Density (Total) 
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Units of  
Analysis 
 
 
Strategic  
 
9 1 3 3 16 
Tactical  
 
6 3 7 1 17 
Operational 4 2 13 2 21 
Total  
19 
 
6 
 
23 
 
6 
 
54 
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Figure 18. Summary of Conceptual Density of Types of Improvisation in ISRM 
Activities 
7.8.2 Density of Improvisation at Various Organisational Levels 
 
The researcher also wanted to know, at which organizational level (Strategic, Tactical and 
Operational), improvisation was more conceptual dense. Data extracted from Table 31 and 
Table 47 was then generated into a summary total of the various typologies of improvisation 
at the three levels. 
 
Table 47. Summary of Conceptual density of Improvisation 
 
Figure 19 below is a graphical illustration of Table 47 and shows that improvisational 
activities were more pronounced in operational activities and least pronounced in strategic 
activities. This can be explained as follows: improvisation by nature is expressive and this 
expressive nature is more pronounced in the routine day-to-day activities which are primarily 
Conceptual Density of 
Improvisation 
 
Organisational Level 
Strategic  Tactical Operational Totals 
collective improvisation 9 6 4 19 
individual  improvisation 1 3 2 6 
process  improvisation 3 7 13 23 
product  improvisation 3 1 2 6 
 (Totals) 16 17 21 
 
54 
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operational activities.-
CLAIM 8.
 Improvisation is least pronounced in strategic activities because 
these activities are not regular and occur infrequently.-  
 
 
Figure 19. Summary of Conceptual Density of Improvisation at Organisational Levels 
7.8.3 Density of Improvisation in Various ISRM Units of Analysis 
 
Finally the researcher wanted to determine the conceptual density of improvisation and 
compare this data by unit of analysis. Data was also extracted from Table 48 and Figure 20 
was generated.  
Table 48. Summary of Conceptual density of Improvisation in Units of Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20 below is a graphical illustration of Table 48. This figure shows that improvisation 
was more conceptually dense in activities relating to Event Monitoring and least pronounced 
in activities relating to information assets control. 
Units of Analysis 
 
Activities related to; 
Conceptual Density 
(Total) 
 
 
1   Information Assets Access and Data Control 
 
5 
 
2  Information Security Architecture 
 
7 
 
3  Information Security Policies 
 
 
7 
 
4  Information Security Event Monitoring 
 
13 
 
5 IT Governance and Regulatory Compliance 
 
12 
 
6   Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity 
 
10 
 
TOTAL  
 
54 
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Figure 20. Summary of Conceptual Density of Improvisation in Various ISRM Activities 
 
Figure 20 also shows that ISRM activities relating to IT Governance and Regulatory 
Compliance had the second most conceptually dense forms of improvisations.  
 
A summary of conceptualization of improvisation in ISRM activities was carried out. This 
enabled the researcher to conclude and make the following statements or knowledge claims 
for this case about improvisation in ISRM activities. The knowledge claims for this case 
stem directly from the premises and work done in the previous sections and are listed as 
follows: 
 
a) Improvisation is generally manifested in ISRM activities and these manifestations 
occur in a variety of ways as follows: 
 
 
1. The general trend was that process improvisation was a more conceptually dense form 
of improvisation than any other improvisation, and was generally evident in ISRM 
activities that related to Information Security Event Monitoring. Process 
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improvisation was also generally more evident in operational level ISRM activities as 
opposed to tactical or strategic ISRM level activities. 
(CLAIM 1 and 5)
. 
 
This can be interpreted to mean that operational level monitoring activities are 
continuously subject to unplanned changes, incidents and contingencies. These 
activities therefore comprise elements of flexibility and spontaneity. 
 
2. The general trend was that collective improvisation was a more conceptually dense 
form of improvisation in ISRM activities relating to IT Governance and Regulatory 
Compliance and was generally more pronounced than individual improvisation. 
Collective improvisation was also generally more evident at strategic level.  
(CLAIM 3, 6 
and 7).
 
This can be interpreted to mean that because of the nature of risk, the information 
security practitioners would rarely opt to work alone or do things along. 
 
3. The general trend was that individual improvisation was more pronounced at 
operational level and least pronounced at strategic level. Generally this form of 
improvisation was not observed in ISRM activities relating to assets control and 
information architecture and design 
(CLAIM 4 and 8)
. This, however, may not always be 
the case in other organizations. Individual improvisation was also among the least 
conceptually dense forms of improvisation 
(CLAIM 2)
.  
 
This can be interpreted to confirm the social institutions theory (Scott 2001) which 
suggests that social institutions impose diffusion from the top–down while actors 
from the bottom–up can individually engage in invention and negotiation although 
they would prefer not to do this alone. 
 
4. The general trend was that, product improvisation was among the least observed form 
of improvisation in ISRM activities for this particular case study 
(CLAIM 2)
. 
 
This can be interpreted to mean that product improvisation affects the substantive 
nature of new products with the tendency to exacerbate risk; this was to be avoided 
unless it was of paramount importance. 
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7.8.4 Holistic Conceptualisation of Improvisation in ISRM Activities 
 
Findings by the researcher reveal that improvisation was more conceptually dense in Business 
Continuity activities, and more pronounced in the operational based activities of that unit. 
ISRM activities relating to Governance and Control also had an almost equivalent level of 
conceptual density of improvisation. However, improvisation was more pronounced in 
strategic activities relating to governance and control. The researcher has illustrated these 
finding in Figure 21.  
 
  
Figure 21. Holistic Conceptualisation of Improvisation in ISRM Activities at 
hierarchical levels 
Figure 21 illustrates the 6 units of analysis that represent the distinct ISRM activities at the 
hierarchical levels of strategic, tactical and operational levels.  These six distinct activities are 
oval “egg” shaped representations that overlap each other. The reason for the overlap is 
because in the real sense ISRM activities by nature overlap and usually are closely tied. It can 
be seen from Figure 21 that conceptual density of improvisation was least exemplified in 
ISRM activities relating to assets control, information architecture and information security 
policy. Deeper insights reveal that the internalized knowledge of information security 
practitioners resulted in improvised acts relating to two important ISRM activities namely 
Business Continuity and Governance and Regulatory Compliance. What was happening was 
that the practitioners were expressing improvisation in settings that were non-routine and 
characterised by a minimal amount of supervision. It can be seen that in an ISRM such as 
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event monitoring which is often characterised by crisis and contingencies, the result is a 
greater conceptual density. In event monitoring, security incidents were disrupting or 
challenging the set order and required extemporaneous interventions (improvised action).  
 
7.9 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
This discussions and interpretation chapter has demonstrated that the fusion (mixing) of 
paradigmatic approaches leads to understanding the, interesting and creative ISRM solutions. 
The chapter argued that to holistically understand these ISRM approaches by using the 
Sensitizing Devic, meant relying on understanding and interpreting the inventiveness and 
creativeness of practitioners who may or may not have been conscious of the philosophical 
assumptions belonging to alternative paradigms and approaches. This chapter has contended 
that advancement of improvisational knowledge in ISRM practices should come from 
explicating the holistic approach. This explicated knowledge would permit the understanding 
of creative solutions to practical problems employed by practitioners as they engage in the 
ISRM activities. The chapter’s intention was to help practitioners become better aware of the 
assumptions and beliefs that they employ in their day-to-day activities. A better 
understanding of the conceptual framework developed and extended in this chapter is meant 
to lead practitioners to gain insights to creative solutions using the strengths of each approach. 
Without a systematic documentation of alternative approaches, improvisation would have 
escaped the attention of the practitioners.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
 
 
This chapter gives a conclusion to the ISRM practices and draws on the new knowledge 
obtained and how this is evidenced in current contemporary setting. The chapter highlights 
the implications for the research findings to both practitioners and theorists. It is hoped that 
this concluding chapter positions this thesis as having served its purpose by showing how it 
has contributed both to theory and practice.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION  
 
8.0   INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter concludes the research work carried out and shows why it was indeed necessary 
to carry out the research. The concluding chapter outlines the rich insights derived from the 
conceptualisation of improvisation in ISRM activities. As explained in this chapter, these 
insights have helped formulate a Meta level understanding of information security 
practitioners’ ISRM activities and it is hoped that these insights will serve as an ideal 
platform for further theoretical development. Theory development that proceeds from this 
research, it is hoped, should be open for consideration of socio-contextual elements within 
information security risk management.  
 
The chapter is divided into five sections. The first section discusses the accomplishments of 
this research. This section revisits the research problem statement and discusses how this was 
addressed. The second section discusses what this research means from a theoretical 
perspective. It gives implications for theory. The third section discusses what this research 
means to practice and to practitioners. It gives implications for practice. The fourth section 
outlines some of the limitations for this study. The last section wraps up the understanding of 
improvisation in ISRM activities. The researcher assesses his own work in this section and 
shows how this research has contributed to theory and practice. This last section proposes the 
establishment of criteria for accepting improvisational skills as genuine expressions that add 
value to the whole ISRM process.  
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8.1  ACCOMPLISHMENT: HOW THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS WERE 
ANSWERED 
 
Revisiting the Research Questions 
 
In order to successfully assess what was initially set out to be accomplished, the research 
questions are re-visited. The accomplishment of this research is measured against how the 
research questions are assessed against the research problem statement. 
 
Revisiting the research questions addressed by this research, the following was main problem 
statement:  
How is improvisation manifested in Information Security Risk Management 
(ISRM) activities and how can improvisation in ISRM be conceptualised? 
 
This research was organised and structured in such a manner as to systematically allow the 
researcher to progress towards understanding how the problem statement listed above would 
be tackled. The problem statement raised issues about ISRM activities. The general idea was 
that improvisation had been manifested in organisations (Cunha et al. 1999); however, no 
research had ever been conducted to show improvisation in ISRM activities. It was therefore 
important to understand what ISRM was and what activities were inherent.  The first sub-
question raised was: 
 
 What ISRM activities are in an organisation and how are they carried out? 
 
The researcher conducted a literature review and established what these ISRM activities were. 
These have been discussed in detail in Chapter 2, Section 2.4 (understanding ISRM). 
Chapter 2 unpacked the concept of information security risk and ISRM activities. This 
chapter enabled a clear understanding of the nature of risk and why certain ISRM activities 
are carried out to mitigate this risk. Chapter 2 also suggested a predominant following by 
those who advocate the structured functionalist way of designing policies and frameworks 
devoid of contextualisation. This chapter introduced the technical and social issues pertinent 
to managing information security risk and placed significance on the need to further 
conceptualize this risk against the backdrop of emergent social contextual factors. The 
researcher believes this question was adequately addressed.  
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It was also important to consider another issue raised by the problem statement. This issue 
was the idea that improvisation is present in ISRM activities. How it was manifested was the 
general problem area requiring research. That was why the second sub-question was raised:  
 
 How is improvisation manifested in these ISRM activities in the organisation? 
 
The researcher embarked to understand and document the manifestation of improvisation 
generally by conducting an extensive literature review. Improvisation terminology was 
unpacked and the researcher identified the typology of improvisation as four distinct forms: 
collective, individual, product and process. The typology was found to be useful since it laid 
the foundation for the development of a preliminary model for conceptualisation. The model 
has been described in this research as the Sensitising Device (Chapter 4, Section 4.5.2). The 
Sensitising Device was to be a useful lens in discovering improvisation in ISRM activities and 
was the first step towards understanding how improvisation is manifested in ISRM.  The final 
step towards the actual manifestation was through the researcher’s knowledge claims about 
the various manifestations of improvisation in ISRM activities. These knowledge claims are 
listed in Section 7.8.3. The researcher believes that by documenting these knowledge claims, 
this question was adequately addressed in this research.  
 
It was also important to understand how improvisation could be conceptualised, what 
methodology would be suitable and what methods would be used to “unearth” this 
phenomenon at an organisational setting. That was why the following sub question was 
raised: 
 How can improvisation in ISRM be conceptualised? 
 
Chapter 5 described in detail the methodology and the methods the researcher deemed 
suitable for accomplishing this. Some of the information obtained was by happenstance as 
opposed to well a calculated structure for obtaining information by using these stated 
methods. For instance, not all practitioners were able to attend scheduled interviews. Also, the 
large private sector organisation that accepted the case study research was not the 
organisation that was initially targeted for research. The initial organisation was a government 
organisation that dealt with large volumes of sensitive public data. This organisation proved 
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too sensitive for such a case study and this organisation declined the research. The upside of 
this was that the methods used, the organisation researched, and the data obtained still met the 
criteria for this research.  
 
Using the Sensitising Device as a lens, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 embarked on the 
conceptualisation process for the organisation that accepted the research. While Chapter 6 
primarily dwelt on primary data analysis from this organisation, Chapter 7 detailed 
document analysis and observations. Improvisation was found to manifest itself in various 
types (collective, individual, process and product) contextually and differently across the 
different units of analysis for this organisation. Chapter 7 discussed in detail this 
manifestation of improvisation across the type, against the unit of analysis, and across the 
three organisational levels of strategic, tactical and operational.  
 
Chapter 7 conceptualised improvisation in ISRM activities and embarked to establish 
meaning and impact of improvisation on ISRM outcomes. Although Chapter 7 was limited 
to conceptualisation, contexts for understanding and exploring in-depth improvisation were 
incorporated into this chapter. The researcher believes that the conceptualisation of 
improvisation in ISRM activities was done in a manner that meets scientific rigour and 
adequately answers this question.  
 
Finally it was important for the researcher to understand the context of improvisation in 
ISRM. Was it to be considered a good thing or a bad thing? It should be noted from the 
researcher’s discussion that the disposition for improvisation to be a good thing was an 
acceptable proposition. That was why the following question was raised: 
 
 How is improvisation used as a foundation for Positive ISRM  
 
Insights obtained from this research constitute the idea that improvisation as a product of 
extemporaneous and creative thinking was evident in ISRM activities at all hierarchical levels 
of decision making (strategic, tactical and operational) and that this was indeed a positive 
thing.  This research has embarked to justify this. The following sections therefore detail the 
positive aspect of improvisation in ISRM by understanding its implications to both theory and 
practice. The researcher believes that once these sections are explained in detail then this last 
question will be addressed. From a holistic perspective, the researcher notes that what was 
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initially set out to be accomplished in the form of a problem statement and research questions 
has indeed been accomplished by work done on all these chapters. 
 
8.2 IMPROVISED ISRM ACTIVITIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY  
A theoretical understanding of improvisation in ISRM emerged from the data collected, 
analysed and interpreted through interviews, observations and document analysis.  While the 
researcher notes that this theoretical understanding is grounded in the data, it is also found to 
be supported by information security literature. What the information security literature has 
not as yet highlighted, however, is the potential positive benefit improvisation may induce in 
ISRM activities. This is the gap in literature that this theoretical framework has attempted to 
fill and is the basis for which a more general theory may be developed.  Central to the 
framework was the inferred relationship between the various ISRM “egg shaped” activities 
which tended to overlap and of the knowledge claims about improvisation in ISRM.   
 
As laid out in the knowledge claim, improvisation was manifest in ISRM activities and these 
manifestations occurred in different forms (see Section 7.8.3). Theoretically it follows that 
this research showed that practitioners were driven by extemporaneous and improvised 
decision-making within ISRM activities when activities were triggered by contingencies and 
emergent security incidents. As an implication to theory, this then is seen as a theoretical 
development in ISRM. ISRM is now endowed with this theoretical understanding. 
 
8.2.1 Theoretical Framework: Demystifying “Pure organic structures” in ISRM  
 
Another implication for theory is the new insights demonstrated by knowledge claims, which 
demystify early suggestions in literature that organisations need “pure organic structures” in 
ISRM (functionalism) to support complex actions. These organisations need structures 
characterised by rationality, coherence and amenability to computerization (Westrup 1996). 
By systematising differences among various information security practitioners’ forms of 
managing information security risk, knowledge claims exhibited in this thesis suggests socio-
contextual behaviour (incremetalism and functionalism as improvisation) as being of 
potential positive benefit. By doing so, the substantive framework reinforced the importance 
of improvisation in ISRM. 
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The improvising organisation is one that was seen by this research as endowed with 
information security practitioners who are socio-constructive agents. In the improvising 
organisation, the research demonstrated that the gaps in functionalism in ISRM were filled 
by the agency of individuals, whose value and appreciation of improvised activities created 
avenues for continuous renewal of ISRM methods. 
 
Also it is worth noting that the exploration of practical applications of ISRM activities has 
lead to the formulation of this theory. It should be appreciated that this theory reveals an 
important facet of information security risk practitioners. This theory in its simplicity can lead 
to a better conceptualization of practice. The following section shows why it is important to 
recognize improvisation in practice. 
 
8.3 IMPROVISED ISRM ACTIVITIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE    
By presenting examples where improvisation occurs and why certain improvisations served 
their purpose, the argument should be that improvisation gives strength to the decision 
making processes. In its various forms (collective, individual, product and process), 
improvisation should be encouraged in practice.  
8.3.1 Improvisation Is Evident In ISRM Activities: Coping With This Fear 
 
It can be seen that the sets of improvisations (collective, individual, process and product) 
presented in this research were essential and proved effective in ISRM processes. It can be 
seen that in general, however, improvisations proved only effective provided the 
practitioners were skilled enough, utilised the best available material and had a firm 
determination to achieve the intended purpose. It should therefore be suggested that so long 
as practice is endowed with practitioners who are capable of skilfully manifesting improvised 
acts, these acts should not be stifled, but made to flourish since they have been proven to be 
of value to ISRM. Practice should establish mechanisms to cope with the fear that various 
improvisations will override long nurtured functionalist structures. Various improvisations 
will actually give contextual meaning to these very functionalist structures. 
8.3.2 Why Practitioners should not Attempt to Dilute Improvisation In 
ISRM Activities 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
 274 
 
 
Having no control over the outcome of interpretation and use of this research, the researcher 
is well aware that perhaps the findings would be construed as a way of highlighting ‘what 
should not be happening’ in the information security environment. While there is reasonable 
justification for this assumption from a technical and natural science perspective, it should be 
noted that this assumption, when applied within the social sciences, poses sound theoretical 
conclusions i.e. ‘this is what is meant to be happening’. 
 
These conclusions show that improvisation can lead to a rich and good ISRM practice. The 
researcher is of the opinion that it takes a discrete, bold, conscious step towards bridging this 
theory and practice. The need to encourage improvisation would be justified since: 
 
 Improvisation offers information security practitioners and practices various ways to 
remain flexible and adaptive in turbulent situations; 
 Improvisation allows for co-presence efficiency and effectiveness in detecting change 
and immediately taking advantage of this change.  
 
The following sections list the possible benefits of improvisation as a rich and good ISRM 
practice: 
8.3.3 Creativity Should Be All Inclusive  
 
Practice through its organisational leaders (seen as managers of meaning and as catalysts of 
sense making, Weick 1993c) would be best advised to nurture creativity as a building block 
for various improvisations. Management should recognise the need to abandon stored 
procedural memory when faced with difficult tasks and be encouraged not to stifle the efforts 
of practitioners who are willing to improvise and to be creative while making use of their 
cognitive expressions. 
 
Management of practice should be involved in as many information security practitioners’ 
ISRM efforts as possible. This is because in emergency and crisis situations which impact the 
entire organisation, improvisation and creativity will thrive. This way management will have 
a first-hand encounter with this creativity and appreciate why practitioners have a: 
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 Willingness to forego formal functionalist approaches in favour of creatively acting in 
real time; 
 Well-developed extemporaneous understanding of internal resources and the materials 
that are at hand;  
 
It should be recognised that creativity should be accommodated in the planning, management 
and monitoring of information security risk within an organisation. Such an organisational 
culture that accommodates creativity should be open to: 
 
1. The need for minimal structures for embellishing; 
2. Re-assembly of and departures from routines;  
3. Proficiency without structure. 
 
8.3.4 Innovation and the Emergence of a Collective Mind   
 
Practice should also be made aware of the emergence of and encourage a collective mind. 
This collective mind is also one of the building blocks for various improvisations in an 
organisation.  This researcher has shown that collectively, teams will bear some 
responsibilities that individuals would be reluctant to take on. This finding is confirmed by 
Leede et al. (1999).   
 
This research has also shown that collectively, teams will increase rates of innovation and/or 
solutions within the ISRM spectrum since collectively, teams are endowed with the ability to 
rational-adapt and to continuously innovate. This research finding is confirmed by Cunha 
and Cunha (2006). Practice should be encouraged to embrace collective improvisation as an 
expression of management culture and more specifically where there are greater bureaucratic 
measures which are less tolerant to collective creativity.  
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8.3.5 Organisational learning: Conceiving, Articulating, and Remembering. 
 
 
The research has articulated the manner by which organisations staffed with skilled 
information security practitioners used various improvisations to thrive in challenging 
competitive contexts. Practice could benefit from this finding in the following manner: 
 
The ability for information security practitioners to thrive in challenging circumstance is best 
conceived by understanding improvisation as a learning process. Improvisational skill would 
be encouraged when information security practitioners: 
 
1. learn to develop a high degree of confidence in  their skills  to deal with non-routine 
events; 
2. learn to develop competence at impromptu activities; 
3. learn to be skilful at paying attention to their own performance and the performance of 
others while building on this new knowledge in order to keep the interaction going; 
4. learn to maintain the pace and tempo at which others are extemporizing. 
5. learn to focus on coordinating the contextual present (here and now) and not to be 
distracted by functionalism (structure/anticipation). 
 
8.4   LIMITATION OF STUDY AND IDEAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
This section, while in no way attempts to qualify the research done, does make note of the 
limitations of the research.  
8.4.1 Research Limitations  
 
This research was described as a single case study from multiple situations or units of 
analysis. Quite rightfully, a single case study using non-pure grounded theory research 
techniques would not be expected to generate formal theory.  However, while it is true that 
formal theory emerges over time (Glaser 1978) and with reflection (Strauss and Corbin 
1998), this case study did in fact derive a conceptual abstraction of improvisation in ISRM 
activities in a novel way.  The findings may not be generalisable nor may they pertain to other 
contextual and specific situations in other cases. This is rightfully understood and agreeable. 
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It will nevertheless remain feasible to generalize the methodology to an alternate 
phenomenon and an alternate case (this is discussed in Section 8.5.5). It would be interesting 
to see the results of this. 
 
It should be noted that the conclusions and knowledge claims (see Section 7.8.3) for this 
study have been derived both inductively and deductively as explained in the previous 
sections. A limitation for this would be that this research would perhaps be construed as non-
scientific in its analysis of data since it did not incorporate fully the deductive methods.  A 
clear strength from this limitation is that the social scientists tell us that all human reasoning 
is a balance between deductive and inductive (Simon 1957). It could be argued that it is 
through inductive inference, based on our experience of the world, that we survive.  
  
8.5 EVALUATION OF CONTRIBUTION  
 
The following sections describe this research’s contribution to literary work. This first part 
discusses some general areas the researcher felt this research contributed to literature and the 
second part consists of discussions about specific areas the researcher felt this research 
contributes to literature and practice. 
 
As a matter of acknowledgement, this research initiated a way in which analysis from open 
coding of data and the identification of concepts of improvisation in ISRM enabled the 
researcher to capture deep insights on how the concepts and categories were and are related. 
The improvement of this theory should perhaps become evident over time when enough 
studies have been conducted to justify the proposal of a formal theory.  Also, as a matter of 
acknowledgment, this research was an empirical attempt at conceptualising and validating 
improvisation in ISRM activities through the use of qualitative methods (i.e. hermeneutics). 
The in-depth case study allowed for the generation of concepts that represent issues 
previously perceived as implicit to the domain of ISRM (i.e. rational-adaption, improvisation, 
creativity) as contrasted with the explicit (ISO IEC 17799 standards, CobiT etc.) The 
objective was to reach an interpretive understanding of all these concepts (explicit and 
implicit) as a complete whole. The Sensitising Device was used as a lens for this. 
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8.5.1 Contribution in General  
 
The researcher envisions a stage where this research work will be “constructed as important 
by the members of the scholarly community, relative to the accepted knowledge constituted 
in literature” (Locke and Golden-Briddle 1997).   
 
The contribution this qualitative research can offer to information security practitioners is 
deep insights seen through detailed retrospective analysis, where the information security 
practitioners were without exception interested in the contextual ways of improving the ISRM 
techniques. Retrospectively, it should be acknowledged that this research provides rich and 
deep insights on the relationship the information security practitioners have with the 
emergent technology and the environment where they operate as social agents.  
 
Barrett and Walsham (2004) list four specific areas of contribution that interpretive research 
work can be considered as making contribution to the scholarly community and practice. 
These are listed as follows: 
 Structuring Intertextual Coherence 
 Problematising Context for Contribution 
 Positioning as Translating Interests  
 Qualitative Generalisations as Contexts of Contribution 
 
Each of these is discussed in turn in the following sections: 
 
8.5.2 Specific Contribution: Structuring Intertextual Coherence 
 
Lock and Golden- Briddle (1997) identified the process of structuring intertextual coherence 
as contributing to literary work for qualitative research. Intertextual coherence refers to the 
need for texts to establish contribution by re-presenting and organizing “existing knowledge 
so as to configure a context for contribution that reflects the consensus of previous work”. 
Barrett and Walsham (2004) cite three suggested intertextual coherences as given by Lock 
and Golden- Briddle (1997).  
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a) Synthesized coherence: when manuscripts “cite and draw connections between works 
and investigates streams not typically cited together to suggest the existence of the 
underdeveloped research areas” (Barrett and Walsham 2004). 
b) Progressive coherence: this indicates the “networks of researchers linked by shared 
theoretical perspectives and methods working on research programs that have 
advanced over time” (Barrett and Walsham 2004). 
c) Non-coherence: refers to “referenced works that are presented as belonging to a 
common research program but as linked by disagreements” (Barrett and Walsham 
2004). 
 
The specific contribution envisioned by this research was that of achieving synthesized 
coherence i.e. by re-presenting and organizing existing knowledge about improvisation in a 
novel and unique way than was traditionally anticipated. This research work cited and 
combined works from social scientists like Ciborra C, (1994); Ciborra et al.  (2000); Crossan 
and Sorrenti (1997); Cunha (2004); Cunha and Cunha (2006) who have conducted scholarly 
work about improvisation in jazz music with the more technical work in information security 
risk management from scholarly work by among others Baskerville (1991); Baskerville and 
Portougal 2003); Baskerville and Siponen (2002); Chambers et al. (2005) and Choobineh et 
al. (2007). This combination of scholarly work about improvisation and ISRM has drawn 
connections between works and has investigated streams not typically cited together.  
 
The researcher exploited this underdeveloped research area in a novel and interesting way. 
The nature of this contribution was to configure a context for contributing to information 
security by in depth analysis of literature in IS risk management and the social sciences.   
 
8.5.3 Specific Contribution: Problematising Context for Contribution 
 
There are three ways of problematising an intertextual field that were identified by Lock and 
Golden- Briddle (1997). These three ways include: 
 
a) Incompleteness: this is where it is claimed that the existing literature is not finished 
and that the present work further develops or specifies this.  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
 280 
 
b) Inadequacy: this is where it is claimed that the existing literature does not sufficiently 
incorporate different perspectives (relevant and important) and views to better 
understand the phenomena under investigation. 
c) Incommensurability: this is where it is claimed not only that existing literature 
overlooks different and relevant perspectives but that claims in this literature are 
inaccurate. 
 
The researcher problematised and provided locations and raison d’etre for the research efforts 
(Locke and Golden-Briddle 1997) by considering the present research in ISRM as being 
inadequate. By problematising contexts, this research showed that it is possible to 
independently integrate previous studies about improvisation (derived from the social and 
cognitive sciences) into the discipline of ISRM.  
 
This is because research in ISRM has focused primarily in functionalism. The raison d’etre 
for this research therefore was that functionalist ISRM literature was inadequate, and this 
void was to be filled by looking at a more holistic socio-cognitive approach that also 
incorporated the incrementalist perspective. This fusion would be improvisation. It was the 
need to understand improvisation and find a method that allowed for its conceptualisation in 
ISRM that drove this research.  This research showed that it remained possible to demonstrate 
that the theme of improvisation can establish a common framework of new knowledge into 
ISRM activities derived from information security practitioner insights. The intention of the 
researcher was an attempt to establish completeness, adequacy and commensurability of 
ISRM literature and improvisation literature (Barrett and Walsham 2004).  
 
This research showed that it is possible to provide the existence of different levels of 
understanding and contexts when dealing with human behaviour in ISRM and providing a 
subjective understanding consistent with the everyday meanings and common sense notions 
which inhibit ISRM activities. This research showed it is possible to understand ISRM from 
the understanding bestowed by the practitioners themselves.  The researcher feels that this 
research work is one step closer towards filling these gaps in ISRM literature. 
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8.5.4 Specific Contribution: Positioning as Translating Interests  
 
Translation has been described by Barrett and Walsham (2004) as being the ongoing process 
by which the researcher attempts to have control over his/her knowledge claims through 
positioning texts in such a manner as to protect their stated contributions. It terms of 
positioning as translating interests, research work/articles in interpretive case studies can 
make a contribution when knowledge claims are accepted.  It should be noted that knowledge 
claims are not always accepted and can be “black boxes” i.e. they are either accepted as 
unproblematic and uncontested or rejected (Barrett and Walsham 2004). Also important is 
that fact that the fate of the researcher’s knowledge claim is always in the hands  of later 
researchers/authors.  In interpretive case studies, contributions as knowledge claims are 
always soft facts.  
 
Drawing from Latour’s (1987) work, there are strategies that interpretive researchers can use 
as positioning strategies i.e., strategies for “hardening” soft facts. These include:  
 
a) Capitation: where the researcher leaves a margin of negotiation for each of the 
“actors to transform it as he or she sees fit and to adapt it to local circumstances”. 
Capitations recognise and provide a margin of negotiation in allowing later authors to 
translate their contribution while simultaneously recognising the need to retain subtle 
control (Barrett and Walsham 2004). 
b) Framing: where the researcher carefully considers the audience. The aim of framing 
is to consider specific readership by carefully selecting words and anticipating 
readers’ objections in advance (Barrett and Walsham 2004). 
c) Staging: where researchers highlight what should be discussed, what is really 
interesting, and what is admittedly disputable (Barrett and Walsham 2004).  
d) Stacking: where the research work draws on and extends evidence in supporting 
theories. In this strategy, researchers use their findings to move from specific 
instances to suggested applicability in the general field.  
 
The researcher laid a series of knowledge claims (See Chapter 7, Section 7.8) that have 
been carefully considered and which the researcher feels he should be able to maintain a 
small element of control of. The researcher envisioned the contribution made to ISRM about 
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these knowledge claims and also the overall general research using the following positioning 
strategies: 
 
 The research needed to frame discussions to particular audiences. The specific target 
audience for this research were people in the general profession of management of 
information security and also researchers interested in the field of information security 
risk management. The researcher feels that framing discussions to these target 
audiences has made some contributions.  
 
 Need for staging which the particular audiences would find interesting. The research 
presented gaps in the literature that information security practitioners saw as being 
useful in exploring. These gaps provided ground for co-operation by information 
security practitioners in the dissemination of research information. The general 
contribution is that these information security practitioners will appreciate their own 
contribution in this research as seen from the eyes of this researcher.  
 
 Captation: the researcher perceived that understanding improvisation as 
complementing ISRM functionalist approaches was an interesting way of looking at 
ISRM.  The publication of some of the research work Njenga (2007); Njenga and 
Brown (2006a); Njenga and Brown (2006b); Njenga and Brown (2008) provided 
grounds for a warm reception of the work. Where there were objections or 
suggestions, these were incorporated in the main work. The main research work has 
also been done in such a way as to leave a margin of negotiation.  
 
 Stacking: there was ample evidence of improvisation, from both the literature about 
organisational improvisation and the actual discovery of improvisation in ISRM 
activities. The fact that this was not the first research about improvisation in 
organisations revealed that the information security community showed an early 
interest about this phenomenon in relation to their discipline and profession. This 
research justified the presence of improvisation in ISRM and the Information Security 
domain as a contribution. 
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8.5.5 Specific Contribution: Qualitative Generalisations as Contexts of 
Contribution  
 
When it comes to constructing qualitative generalisation as contexts for interpretive research 
contribution, it has been suggested that researchers/readers look for the content of 
contribution (Barrett and Walsham 2004).  There are four types of generalisation for 
interpretive research identified by Walsham (1995). These include:  
 
a) Development of concepts 
b) Generation of theory 
c) Drawing specific implications 
d) Providing rich insights 
 
This researcher discusses each of the points listed above in ways that justify contribution of 
this research work. 
 
Development of concepts 
This research used grounded theory techniques (open coding) to provide conceptual linkages 
between concepts. This research made conceptual linkages with a clear chain of analysis and 
discussions. The grounded theory techniques required concepts and categories to be tightly 
linked, while perceiving theoretical/conceptual density in terms of their properties. The 
research demonstrated the techniques of using the use of open coding process till theoretical 
saturation (Strauss 1987). The researcher notes that the methods used for the development of 
concepts can be generalized and thus this research makes a contribution.  
 
Generation of theory 
In general terms, this research used concrete, methodological choices as part of the overall 
analytical design of the research. The methodological choices made were in accordance with 
the problem statement raised and the research questions that followed.  This research aimed at 
tightly linking these. Also the research at operational level developed theoretical concepts 
about improvisation which can be seen as valid in relation to this research. The choice of 
selecting information security practitioners in their various distinct departments as informants 
of primary data and the choice of selecting appropriate documents for review was in 
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accordance to the research objectives and problem statement.  The data also produced and the 
interpretation can be seen as reflecting workmanship that is sound. Although this theory may 
be perceived as context specific and therefore not easy to generalise, it remains possible to 
generalise the methodology and the methods towards theory generated by this research and 
this is to be seen as a contribution. 
 
Drawing specific implications 
The specific implication drawn for this research was that the information security literature 
had not yet highlighted the potential positive benefit improvisation could induce in ISRM 
activities. This is what this research has attempted to highlight and this is to be taken as a 
small contribution to the scholarly community in information security.  
 
Providing rich insights 
One final contribution the researcher felt was of benefit to the broader scholarly community 
was that of providing rich insights to the scholarly community. The researcher presented 
some of the baseline ideas to practitioners in the industry and the scholarly community 
through peer reviewed publications (Njenga 2007; Njenga and Brown 2006a; Njenga and 
Brown 2006b; Njenga and Brown 2008). These publications were a necessary means of 
evaluating not only credibility of the work but of contributing additional insights to the 
community. The researcher’s confidence in the research’s contribution and insights was made 
possible by the following undertakings: 
 
 Making informal conversations with information security practitioners of the host 
organization regarding interests in the setting being studied. 
 Providing copies of a preliminary research finding to interested stakeholders and asking 
for written or oral commentary on the report. 
8.6 FURTHER WORK  
 
Ideally, the themes and knowledge claims about improvisation in ISRM activities presented 
in this research will assist future researchers in information security. The ideas presented here 
present a coherent substantive theory of how information security practitioners might 
approach this complex emergent area. The following suggestions for further work are offered: 
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 The researcher has come up with a list of knowledge claims about 
improvisation in ISRM activities to which further work may be justified to 
prove or disprove these claims. 
 
 This research did not explicitly address the role of improvisation as seen 
from a tacit knowledge perspective. Further work is needed to understand 
the role tacit knowledge play in terms of the development of shared 
meaning in ISRM activities. Tacit knowledge was briefly mentioned in the 
research.  
 
This research has aimed to providing an understanding of how improvisation is manifested in 
ISRM activities. As with all research, the utility of the framework for understanding 
improvisation in ISRM activities will be demonstrated by its uptake amongst the IS 
community and information security professionals.  To conclude: from the richness and 
insights generated by this research, the reader may take comfort that the conclusions and 
knowledge claims have been derived from an intense validation and constant comparison of 
data (completing an inductive-deductive reasoning cycle). It is hoped that the research itself 
demonstrated both ‘rigour and relevance’ put forward as a requirement for IS research (Keen 
1991). In the end, the proposition should be noted that improvisation can be formally 
recognised and appreciated within ISRM. 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS DIRECTED TO INFORMATION SECURITY RISK PRACTITIONERS 
 
General Questions 
 
1. How does your organisation carry out ISRM activities in general? 
2. How is the organisation structured, generally in terms of information security? 
3. Who is responsible for information security needs for the organisation?  
4. When do you ever delegate responsibilities?  
Specific: Information Assets Access and Data Control 
 
5. How does your organisation ensure accountability and confidentiality of information?  
6. How do you make sure that information is not passed to unauthorised persons?  
7. Who classifies sensitive information?  
Specific: Information Security Architecture 
 
8. What do you consider confidential information? What systems do you consider critical? How do you protect these systems? 
9. How do you establish procedures/policies for information security architecture/design e.g. for password system?  
10. What are the organisation’s security roles and responsibilities were based on?  
11. What sort of information security forums are there and what is the role of forums? 
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Specific: Information Security Policies 
 
12. What criteria does the organisation use to determine and assign responsibilities for implementing information security policy? 
13. Who plays a greater role towards helping define the organisation’s information security needs and policy? 
14. Do you ever follow procedures/policies when carrying out ISRM activities? 
 
15. What established procedures/policies are there for accessing programmes/applications? 
16. How do you co-ordinate your ISRM efforts? When is experience important in this co-ordination?  
17. What assurances does the organisation have with regard to ensuring users are capable of applying information security policy and 
procedures?  
Specific: Information Security Event Monitoring 
 
18. How do you monitor the organisation’s network systems?  How do you use the intrusion detection systems? 
19. Who monitors unauthorised system usage? 
20. How do you respond to intrusions and incidents? 
21. Who ensures and checks and monitors for the following? (a) dormant accounts; (b) antivirus updates; (c) shared files; (d) account lock 
out; (e) the use of regular passwords?  
22. How do you respond to the monitoring process when carried out based on set standards specified when there are deviations?  
Specific: IT Governance and Regulatory Compliance 
 
23. Who influences compliance efforts? Who is responsible for IT Governance?  
24. How do you rate your compliance efforts?  What best practices are used?  
25. Do you follow any guidelines? Is so which ones are they?  
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26. How does the organisation ensure the co-ordination of security controls are representative of the organisation’s needs?  
27. Are there times that users do not follow procedures? 
28. What sorts of measures are taken to encourage a multi-disciplinary approach to information security?  
29. Do you feel that policies and procedures tie you down in some way?  
Specific: Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity 
 
30. How do you ensure business continuity? 
31. How do you conduct your disaster recovery exercises? 
32. What happens if systems go down? How do you respond? Who co-ordinates these efforts? 
33. Can you recollect on moments that reveal how you responded to emergency situations?  
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APPENDIX 2: OPEN CODING UNIT OF ANALYSIS ONE – INFORMATION ASSETS ACCESS AND DATA CONTROL 
 
STEP 1  
 
Data Incidents 
( Transcribed Interviews)   
 
STEP 2 
 
 
Context of Data Incident 
 
STEP 3  
 
Researcher’s memos  
Determine Codes 
 
 in vivo and other 
generated  as underlined) 
 
STEP 4  
 
Level 
STEP 5  
 
Concepts 
generated 
 
 
STEP 6  
 
Categories 
(See Section  
4.4.1) 
 
 
 
 
so we quickly had to make [create]  a 
few more categories…so it doesn’t  just 
get as simple as you just having internet 
access ..and you don’t get this.. [but 
rather] you having internet access and  
you belong to marketing…and you 
belong to IT 
134
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Profiling users based on user  
activities was found to be critical. 
However, the nature of the observed 
profiling was most interesting. 
Multiple users had multiple 
requirements. The creation of extra 
categories outside of the normal 
categories was improvised–this had 
never been done before. i.e. new 
ways of defining categories that 
allowed for innovative information 
access. 
Classification and Control of Information 
Assets 
2. Implies  quick reaction  in terms of 
profiling users and determining data 
security and classification levels based 
on information  requirements 
 
 
 
Operational 
Activity 
Quick reaction 
to data access 
security levels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Process) 
Improvisation 
and we did and worked on exactly what 
they said.. and of course within the first 
few days.. of putting access controls in 
[the system]…we got hundreds and 
hundreds of calls…saying they couldn’t 
get through.. they said that they wanted 
to go to selling sites.. whatever…and 
they couldn’t go to see what was on 
hundreds of other sites 
135
 
The IT team improvised (employed 
automatic thinking towards)  new 
control frameworks that guided the 
abuse of internet by users and helped 
place appropriate security controls to 
users.  
Accountability of information assets 
through access control 
6. Implies  being resourceful and 
providing reflexivity by placing data 
security controls 
Operational 
Activity 
Being 
resourceful in 
placing data 
access security 
controls  
 
 
 
 
 
(Process) 
Improvisation 
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STEP 1  
 
Data Incidents 
( Transcribed Interviews)   
 
STEP 2 
 
 
Context of Data Incident 
 
STEP 3  
 
Researcher’s memos  
Determine Codes 
 
 in vivo and other 
generated  as underlined) 
 
STEP 4  
 
Level 
STEP 5  
 
Concepts 
generated 
 
 
STEP 6  
 
Categories 
(See Section  
4.4.1) 
 
 
 
 
it happens all the time…so in a lot of 
the applications and cases we have 
established that we don’t have to give 
them that [admin] kind of access, but 
then there are I mean… it happens, … 
internet access…we used to talk about 
restricting internet access…obviously, 
but so far [for instance unlike] in 
[name withheld]  America where they 
have a big database where they 
categorizing data… (internet 
restrictions) by but obviously in [back 
here] 
136
 
There is no clearly defined way of 
restricting user access by these 
practitioners so they formulate new 
ways of restricting based on their 
own understanding of security and 
that of the user’s access requirements. 
In a sense, they improvised on 
information access 
Authorization process of Information  
facilities 
1. Implies  being imaginative in 
strengthening security controls on 
defined user roles and business 
security needs 
Operational 
Activity 
Being 
imaginative in 
data access 
security 
controls 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Process) 
Improvisation 
in terms of safety of information, 
manipulating information, metadata 
around information and stuff like that 
137
 
 
The guy who heads up the department 
in respect to information system’s 
intelligence is Peter Versfield…so 
we’ve go a whole department 
structured around data warehousing 
138
 
Information is (in a data warehouse) 
is considered a high value assets. The 
security measures taken around 
information manipulation from the 
warehouse are structured around 
information system intelligence. The 
practitioners suggested that the 
activities they carried out revolving 
around securing information were 
emergent as the information and 
systems changed. 
Inventory Management and Information 
Asset Classification 
1. Implies being practical in  
data/information assets 
classification  and information 
intelligence ensuring information 
security  
Strategic 
Activity 
Being 
practical in 
data Structuring 
 
 
 
 
(Collective) 
Improvisation 
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STEP 1  
 
Data Incidents 
( Transcribed Interviews)   
 
STEP 2 
 
 
Context of Data Incident 
 
STEP 3  
 
Researcher’s memos  
Determine Codes 
 
 in vivo and other 
generated  as underlined) 
 
STEP 4  
 
Level 
STEP 5  
 
Concepts 
generated 
 
 
STEP 6  
 
Categories 
(See Section  
4.4.1) 
 
 
 
 
Coz, we had to do it… but in those 
groups…and what happens in the 
access aspect is that they can actually 
modify the database…and Derek is 
actually the one who approves this 
139
 
 
 
 
 
How systems are modified is often 
forced by exceptional circumstances 
such as users’ information and data 
access demands. Such modification 
has to be balanced in such a way as 
not to compromise security while at 
the same time not to stifle business 
processes. In this case, the 
modification was improvised  
Authorization process for database 
modification 
1. Implies  that with limited options 
being quick witted in reacting to 
information database modifications  
 
Operational 
Activity 
Being Quick -
witted in 
database  
modification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Process) 
Improvisation 
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APPENDIX 3: OPEN CODING UNIT OF ANALYSIS TWO - INFORMATION SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 
 
STEP 1  
 
Data Incidents 
( Transcribed Interviews)   
 
STEP 2 
 
 
Context of Data Incident 
 
STEP 3  
 
Researcher’s memos  
Determine Codes 
 
 in vivo and other 
generated  as underlined) 
 
STEP 4  
 
Level 
STEP 5  
 
Concepts 
generated 
 
 
STEP 6  
 
Categories 
(See Section  
4.4.1) 
 
 
 
 
and whether there is compliance you 
know considering security you know 
whether there are best solutions to 
match the technology platform… stuff 
like that 
140
 
 
 
 
 
 
The current architecture and  technology 
platform (a fusion of many platforms) 
could not be matched with proposed policy 
compliance models so the nature of 
compliance had to be innovative  based on 
the technology architecture, resulting to 
the process of compliance being 
improvised 
Compliance efforts and Information 
Architecture Specification 
2. Implies being rational adaptive in 
ensuring compliant information 
architecture. 
(Process) 
Improvisation 
Tactical 
Activities 
Being rational 
adaptive in 
determining 
compliant 
architecture 
 
 
 
[The] middleware team...gives a 
human aspect to the way we design 
things...such that the whole way we 
design things is very middleware 
driven.. we’ve got a rich...middleware 
architecture 
141
 
 
 
 
The middleware team was socially driven 
with the social conditions permitting the 
middleware team to explore and discover 
new  technical designs  that interfaced 
between people, business processes and 
technology. Their discoveries were shaped 
by time and resources. 
Security Design requirements and 
Specifications 
2. Implies lateral thinking by the 
middleware team charged with 
designing  the security requirements 
of middleware architecture   
(Process) 
Improvisation 
Tactical 
Activities 
Lateral 
thinking in 
designing 
middleware 
architecture 
 
 
 
 
 
yes, but then it  has to.. .it is going to 
be another workshop, to actually 
Based on the feedback obtained, the 
practitioners were in the process of 
Information architecture requirements on 
Risk 
(Process) 
Improvisation 
Tactical 
Activities 
Being 
imaginative in 
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STEP 1  
 
Data Incidents 
( Transcribed Interviews)   
 
STEP 2 
 
 
Context of Data Incident 
 
STEP 3  
 
Researcher’s memos  
Determine Codes 
 
 in vivo and other 
generated  as underlined) 
 
STEP 4  
 
Level 
STEP 5  
 
Concepts 
generated 
 
 
STEP 6  
 
Categories 
(See Section  
4.4.1) 
 
 
 
 
realign our risk profile...to align with 
the corporate risk profile 
142
 
 
 
 
innovatively realigning the technology and 
operational risk profile with that of the 
corporate risk profile in ways not 
contemplated before.  
1. Implies being imaginative by 
providing workshops for reviewing 
structure and architecture. 
 
reviewing 
structure and 
architecture 
 
 
 
 
there has been a lot…[of] good stuff 
that the[se] guys for instances like 
Etienne (Enterprise Risk]… they have 
done a lot of work… they have 
complied with every possible standard/ 
framework 
143
 
 
We have got the Architecture forum, 
which sits under Kevin Cricker… and 
uum. We also had a.. the stuff that I’m 
more involved in, in making sure that.. 
there is a compliance architecture in 
terms of business
144
 
A deeper enquiry revealed that although 
there was a feeling that compliance was 
achievable in every possible way, this was 
not the case. The practitioners did not 
realize that they filled their own 
compliance objectives by improvising in 
one form or another.  
 
Information Architecture Forum for 
Information Security 
1. Implies exceptionality in applying 
implicit knowledge that ensures 
architecture  compliance  
(Collective) 
Improvisation 
Strategic 
Activities 
Exceptionality 
in compliant 
Architecture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
so that’s more in the area that I’m 
based in…all our designs… all the 
designs that the guys do have to go 
through  the architecture forum…so the 
Architecture forum have to pull it apart 
The technology and the design must 
always make business sense. In this case a 
large number of technologies coupled with 
a variety of designs, created an avenue for 
the forum to devise improvised solutions 
Information Architecture Design  and 
Acceptance 
1. Implies being inventive in vetting 
designs for  Information Architecture 
as technology  and designs are 
(Collective) 
Improvisation 
Strategic 
Activities 
Being inventive 
in vetting 
Information 
Architecture 
designs 
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STEP 1  
 
Data Incidents 
( Transcribed Interviews)   
 
STEP 2 
 
 
Context of Data Incident 
 
STEP 3  
 
Researcher’s memos  
Determine Codes 
 
 in vivo and other 
generated  as underlined) 
 
STEP 4  
 
Level 
STEP 5  
 
Concepts 
generated 
 
 
STEP 6  
 
Categories 
(See Section  
4.4.1) 
 
 
 
 
to see whether it makes sense from a 
technology point of view 
145
 
 
 
….Um to ensure that they comply with 
whatever policy and standards that 
they have devised or as defined by the 
board 
146
 
that made business sense and that there is 
compliance 
constantly vetted for rollout and use.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
well…that’s actually where the mind 
set has to change…that’s why the 
Information Security office used to be 
in IT…but now I’m actually reporting 
top Corporate governance board 
147
 
 
The unprecedented complexities of 
information security necessitated the 
creation of a seat in the board. The 
creation was also unprecedented, and 
aimed at facilitating compliance 
requirements.  
Architecture Compliance and Reporting 
Requirements 
1. Implies the rational adaptive way of 
organisational restructuring to 
facilitate reporting requirements 
 
(Collective) 
Improvisation 
Strategic 
Activities 
Rational 
adaptive 
Organisational 
restructuring 
 
 
 
 
where we develop requirements 
specifications for reviewing the 
process.. we’ve got systems 
requirement specifications…doing all 
the system’s stuff with the data…and 
then we’ve got integration 
specifications…in terms of how does 
this system send information to another 
system…or the middleware stuff…and 
It was understood that the ideas for the 
development of compliant specifications, 
and system integrations were conceived as 
events unfolded. As new systems were 
introduced new ways and ideas were 
conceived on how to integrate these into 
the mainstream applications. 
Operational Procedures and Responsibilities 
1. Implies  being resourceful in 
developing home-grown holistic 
Information Architecture Integration 
solutions  
 
(Process) 
Improvisation 
Tactical 
Activities 
Being 
resourceful in 
information 
Architecture 
Integration 
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STEP 1  
 
Data Incidents 
( Transcribed Interviews)   
 
STEP 2 
 
 
Context of Data Incident 
 
STEP 3  
 
Researcher’s memos  
Determine Codes 
 
 in vivo and other 
generated  as underlined) 
 
STEP 4  
 
Level 
STEP 5  
 
Concepts 
generated 
 
 
STEP 6  
 
Categories 
(See Section  
4.4.1) 
 
 
 
 
all of that stuff has to go as either 
system’s methodology 148 
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APPENDIX 4: OPEN CODING UNIT OF ANALYSIS THREE - INFORMATION SECURITY POLICIES 
 
STEP 1  
 
Data Incidents 
( Transcribed Interviews)   
 
STEP 2 
 
 
Context of Data Incident 
 
STEP 3  
 
Researcher’s memos  
Determine Codes 
 
 in vivo and other 
generated  as underlined) 
 
STEP 4  
 
Level 
STEP 5  
 
Concepts 
generated 
 
 
STEP 6  
 
Categories 
(See Section  
4.4.1) 
 
 
 
 
what they did was… they took the 
notebooks…they gave those new 
notebooks to people…and they 
gave the old notebooks that people 
had that were still on working 
conditions to other people 
149
 
 
 
Policy dictated that the old laptops be 
replaced by new ones. The old could not 
be used as their warranty had lapsed and it 
could be expensive to maintain them. A 
way was devised and the practitioners 
improvised by rotating the old with new to 
control costs. This had never been done 
before. 
Information Security Policy Co-ordination 
2. Implies being ingenious in situations 
resulting from limited resources 
 
Tactical 
Activity 
Being ingenious 
on  Information 
Security Policy 
 
 
 
 
(Collective) 
improvisation  
and most of them.. they cant even 
document all that stuff 
150
 
 
 
 
 
The lack of documentations of some of the 
critical activities done, provided clear 
motivation for some activities to be 
improvised as there were no explicit 
guidelines to follow upon. 
Accountability and Reporting of Information 
incidents 
2. Implies unexpected incidents where 
practitioners lack of documentation 
have to be imaginative in their 
contextual activities  providing  grounds 
for improvisation. 
Tactical 
Activity 
Being 
imaginative with 
policies when 
none  
 
 
 
 
(Process) 
improvisation 
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STEP 1  
 
Data Incidents 
( Transcribed Interviews)   
 
STEP 2 
 
 
Context of Data Incident 
 
STEP 3  
 
Researcher’s memos  
Determine Codes 
 
 in vivo and other 
generated  as underlined) 
 
STEP 4  
 
Level 
STEP 5  
 
Concepts 
generated 
 
 
STEP 6  
 
Categories 
(See Section  
4.4.1) 
 
 
 
 
so that was the real challenge in 
terms of getting...their minds [my 
mind] to change…nobody wants 
to be [held responsible]…151 
 
 
it was perfect…when they actually 
saw the CobiT…exception 
results…they actually came to 
like. It… coz we are here to 152 
One practitioner took it upon himself to 
convince the rest in an innovative manner 
about the benefits of CobiT.  He was faced 
with time pressures of CobiT 
implementation, so as a matter of 
improvising in the situation,  he rolled out 
a preliminary compliance filing report 
which was ‘tweaked’ favorably on the 
user’s side, and immediately there was 
buy-in. 
Co-operation and training on Informatio  
Security policy 
1. Implies lateral thinking to change 
existing mind-sets and thus motivation 
of training on policies to users. 
 
Tactical 
Activity 
Lateral thinking 
on information 
security policies  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Individual) 
improvisation 
Well most of the times we…try and 
keep us much structure as we can 
but most of the time that we 
do…people don’t follow the right 
procedures…[for instance] 
logging in a call the structure,  
would be broken by uuh them [ IT 
USERS]  coming straight to 
us…because there is obstruction 
at the border and they need to go 
through…and obviously to them it 
is a great thing…because I mean 
they are willing to [jump levels] 
and would do what  ever they need 
Time pressures, uncertainties, break-down, 
downtimes are all factors that influence 
‘on-the-spur’ decision making and 
improvisation. In this particular case, the 
designed structures inhibited normal 
business processes, and the practitioners 
had to devise and improvise using their 
skills on ‘how to get stuff across the 
border’.  
Policy on Access, Classification and Control of 
information  
1. Implies being quick-witted to 
understand and instruct on procedure   
so that things are done according to plan 
 
Operational 
Activity 
Being quick-
witted on  
Information 
Security policies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Process) 
Improvisation 
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STEP 1  
 
Data Incidents 
( Transcribed Interviews)   
 
STEP 2 
 
 
Context of Data Incident 
 
STEP 3  
 
Researcher’s memos  
Determine Codes 
 
 in vivo and other 
generated  as underlined) 
 
STEP 4  
 
Level 
STEP 5  
 
Concepts 
generated 
 
 
STEP 6  
 
Categories 
(See Section  
4.4.1) 
 
 
 
 
to do to get their stuff across the 
border 
153
 
 
and obviously now when we 
reflect on it…[policy] it has not 
been too bad on business, but now 
when we hit certain areas, is that 
we have to make some kind of 
adjustments… because there are 
so many applications out 
there…and the thing is that, to be 
working…these needs to run on 
the administration rights of the 
machine 
154
 
Implementing policies was seen as 
producing some stability in processes. 
However, with emergent applications, the 
stability was hampered. The 
implementation was interactive with many 
applications with unique improvised 
approaches. 
Policy on Incident Management Procedures 
1. Implies conceptual understanding of 
environmental changes and hence being 
rational adaptive on policies towards 
business processes  
2. Implies emergent and numerous 
applications in the market making 
practitioners overwhelmed 
Strategic 
Activities 
Rational 
adaptive on 
Information 
security policies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Collective) 
Improvisation 
 
and those kind of things…and…so 
we actually made provisions, that 
we could do it..[amend policy] 
when we looked at the group 
policy…on administration rights 
issues 
155
 
 
 
In this instance, the ‘thinking’ about 
making provisions and the actual ‘doing 
it’,  i.e. amending group policy, comprised 
the ingredients for improvisation 
Policy on Change Management 
 
1. Implies that circumstances could arise 
that make it necessary to be inventive on 
policy  and make amendments as 
deemed fit. 
 
 
Tactical 
Activity 
Being inventive  
policy 
amendments 
 
 
(Process) 
improvisation 
we could give those 
users…whatever…administration 
rights on the machine centrally.. 
This particular case called for 
circumventing policy that restricted the 
issuance of administrative rights (full 
Policy on Change Management 
 
1. Implies that for practitioners to achieve 
Operational 
Activity 
Creativeness on 
applying 
Information 
Security Policies 
(Process) 
improvisation 
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STEP 1  
 
Data Incidents 
( Transcribed Interviews)   
 
STEP 2 
 
 
Context of Data Incident 
 
STEP 3  
 
Researcher’s memos  
Determine Codes 
 
 in vivo and other 
generated  as underlined) 
 
STEP 4  
 
Level 
STEP 5  
 
Concepts 
generated 
 
 
STEP 6  
 
Categories 
(See Section  
4.4.1) 
 
 
 
 
but [only] if we could manage 
those users who got admin rights 
on the machine…so that was on 
the agenda then…we didn’t want 
to 
156
 
 
 
 
access to computer resources) which posed 
as security risk, in the hope that such rights 
would be properly controlled and 
managed.  The thinking then was that users 
needed these rights. 
required objectives this may call for 
creativeness on applying  policies 
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APPENDIX 5: OPEN CODING UNIT OF ANALYSIS FOUR - INFORMATION SECURITY EVENT MONITORING 
 
STEP 1  
 
Data Incidents 
( Transcribed Interviews)   
 
STEP 2 
 
 
Context of Data Incident 
 
STEP 3  
 
Researcher’s memos  
Determine Codes 
 
 in vivo and other 
generated  as underlined) 
 
STEP 4  
 
Level 
STEP 5  
 
Concepts 
generated 
 
 
STEP 6  
 
Categories 
(See Section  
4.4.1) 
 
 
 
 
Which increases the admin side 
which increases everything else, but 
in the long run it is probably [felt] it 
is the right thing to do 
157
 
 
well… what you see… well what 
happens is that it is all about saving 
money 
158
 
The downside for implementing  
innovative measures and controls for 
information security  was the  increased 
costs, with which the practitioners were 
not comfortable though  deemed 
necessary.  
Monitoring Equipment Placement and 
Protection 
2. Implies even though there are 
security control implementation 
challenges for ensuring robust 
security posture the practitioners 
have to be practical about it  
 
Operational 
Activity 
Being 
practical on 
Security 
controls 
Implementation  
 
 
 
 
(Process) 
improvisation 
so there are those little things…that 
we do just to help us and to help the 
business.. coz its those quick little 
things that…we need to do better 159 
 
 
 
Through continuous internal control 
assessments, the practitioners 
appreciated that they were not 
operating at optimally and would 
continually open up to new ways of 
improving controls, discovering novel 
purposes and accomplishing desired 
objectives.  
Monitoring Security incidents and 
requirements 
2. Implies being  reflexive  and being 
quick-witted in dealing with  
internal controls  
 
Operational 
Activity 
Being quick-
witted in 
Internal control  
 
 
 
(Process) 
improvisation 
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STEP 1  
 
Data Incidents 
( Transcribed Interviews)   
 
STEP 2 
 
 
Context of Data Incident 
 
STEP 3  
 
Researcher’s memos  
Determine Codes 
 
 in vivo and other 
generated  as underlined) 
 
STEP 4  
 
Level 
STEP 5  
 
Concepts 
generated 
 
 
STEP 6  
 
Categories 
(See Section  
4.4.1) 
 
 
 
 
so I mean yeah.. everyday... I   mean 
, it would be actually be.. it would 
be too easy if  people followed 
procedure....coz notebooks [things] 
break everyday… I mean...we just 
had a big change…and that was 
it…we just bought some extra 
amount of notebooks and that was it 
160
 
 
I  mean they also…in doing it… I 
mean.. they are also creating a 
more mobile environment  where 
people also can work…with that...so 
for those people that are... I 
mean....if a person has got a broken 
notebook…then they cant 
work…you see?… so I mean they 
had to do something…and we’ve 
been trying to…giving them little 
injections with these notebooks to 
keep them going…know  what I 
mean? 
161
 
Practitioners were always weary of 
users who did not follow procedure,  
creating security risk, damage etc. 
Being exposed to these situations 
practitioners became spontaneous to 
changes, re-altering routines to 
accommodate this indifference to 
procedure, sometimes employing 
improvised guidelines.  
Monitoring Security incidents and 
requirements 
1. Implies being inventive to  
information system planning 
methods  
 
Strategic 
Activity 
Being 
inventive in 
Information 
systems 
planning 
methods 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Process) 
improvisation 
changing the mouse… then 
changing this… I mean some of 
them…these people have 
With limited resources practitioners 
had to improvise with the tools at hand 
and work needed to be done  
Monitoring Equipment Placement and 
Protection 
1. Implies creativeness in  
Tactical 
Activity 
Creativeness 
in Determining 
system resource 
(Product) 
improvisation 
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STEP 1  
 
Data Incidents 
( Transcribed Interviews)   
 
STEP 2 
 
 
Context of Data Incident 
 
STEP 3  
 
Researcher’s memos  
Determine Codes 
 
 in vivo and other 
generated  as underlined) 
 
STEP 4  
 
Level 
STEP 5  
 
Concepts 
generated 
 
 
STEP 6  
 
Categories 
(See Section  
4.4.1) 
 
 
 
 
got…notebooks that has got a 
mouse in it and they’ve got a 
keyboard in it…and they’ve got it 
attached to a monitor…because they 
don’t have a PC 162 
 
because the monitor is not 
working…the mouse isn’t 
working...and the keyboard isn’t 
working…so 163 
determining system resource 
requirements  
 
requirements 
 
 
I’d say a lot because...the whole 
way that.. we do run…from a WAN 
[view]…we run Microsoft and all 
that…but the way the things are put 
together.. and that’s the 
difference…every one is running 
Microsoft stuff.. and every one has 
got databases…everyone’s got 
users…and everyone’s got PCs and 
servers…but it is the way 164 
The practitioners admit that although 
they use applications similar to those 
found in any other organization, the 
way they design and integrate these is 
innovative. There is improvisation 
within the context of using off-the-
shelf applications and running business 
processes. 
Monitoring Operational Procedures and 
responsibilities 
1. Implies being ingenious and 
contextual in they way practitioners 
design and integrate systems  
Operational 
Activity 
Being 
ingenious in 
designing and 
integrating 
Systems  
 
 
 
 
 
(Product) 
improvisation 
[We carried out] particular checks 
around [form ] abuse…which forms 
part of our information security 
requirements to ensure 
confidentiality and integrity 
Although there were explicit guidelines 
on how security checks were to be 
done, in some instances, innovation 
was applied in the checking mechanism 
that guaranteed confidentiality and 
Monitoring Security incidents and 
requirements 
1. Implies being practical in the way 
information risk checks are carried 
out. 
Operational 
Activity 
Being 
practical in  
carrying out 
information 
security risks 
(Collective) 
improvisation 
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STEP 1  
 
Data Incidents 
( Transcribed Interviews)   
 
STEP 2 
 
 
Context of Data Incident 
 
STEP 3  
 
Researcher’s memos  
Determine Codes 
 
 in vivo and other 
generated  as underlined) 
 
STEP 4  
 
Level 
STEP 5  
 
Concepts 
generated 
 
 
STEP 6  
 
Categories 
(See Section  
4.4.1) 
 
 
 
 
basically at more or less 
operational level 
165
 
 
 
 
 
 
integrity of information. The 
innovative ways these checks were 
done were not explicit in any 
framework although they achieved 
their purpose. 
 checks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[name withheld] … it’s the 
way…the applications…and the 
people that use them…everyone’s 
uses are a bit…different… 
so…[name withheld]  uses are quits 
different from [name withheld]  
uses…because they’ve got different 
applications running on the 
servers…and they’ve got probably 
different ways of logging in 
166
 
The combined skills of practitioners 
and the technology makes for novel use 
of technology  in the monitoring user 
activities in ways not experienced 
elsewhere, with high level of 
reflexivity that influence routines.  
Monitoring application usage 
1. Implies acknowledgment of being 
original within the context of  using 
different application   
Operational 
Activity 
Being original 
in the context 
of using 
different 
applications  
 
 
 
 
 
(Process) 
improvisation 
and we’ve configured those things 
together and we’ve come up with 
‘IBAS’ which stands integrated 
business architecture solutions 
167
 
 
 
 
The practitioners devised a hybrid 
methodology that fuses other 
methodologies since the architecture 
and components used differs with other 
organizations. The understanding of the 
system processes has necessitated this.  
Monitoring processes and application 
integration 
1. Implies being resourceful in 
configuring systems as, home 
grown solutions (IBAS). 
 
Tactical 
Activity 
Being 
resourceful in 
configuring 
systems 
 
 
 
(Process) 
improvisation 
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STEP 1  
 
Data Incidents 
( Transcribed Interviews)   
 
STEP 2 
 
 
Context of Data Incident 
 
STEP 3  
 
Researcher’s memos  
Determine Codes 
 
 in vivo and other 
generated  as underlined) 
 
STEP 4  
 
Level 
STEP 5  
 
Concepts 
generated 
 
 
STEP 6  
 
Categories 
(See Section  
4.4.1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
yeah what they are trying to do… 
holistically… what they have been 
trying to do… the business process 
…it is all based on the criticality of 
the business process…and what’s 
important and what’s not 168 
The laying down and prioritizing based 
of criticality of systems and security 
risk posture, has produced innovative 
ways of balancing process risk 
exposure. In this case, the holistic 
examination was never done before. 
Monitoring processes and application 
integration 
 
1. Implies lateral thinking in 
understanding what is important 
and determining risk in the 
emergent business processes at any 
given time 
 
Tactical 
Activity 
Lateral 
thinking in 
determining  
business 
process risk 
 
 
 
(Collective) 
improvisation 
I put a  huge enterprise around 
that…I picked all the main 
applications and put them on a 
spreadsheet 
169
 
 
 
 
The background to this exercise was 
that no one had previously examined 
each application against process 
criticality. The fact that a simple 
spreadsheet was used to achieve this 
displayed a level of innovation and 
improvisation. 
Monitoring Application Classification 
Guidelines 
1. Implies ingenious personal 
initiative to catalogue critical 
business processes in the aim of 
identifying risk in use of critical 
applications.  
 
Tactical 
Activity 
Being 
ingenious in 
identifying risk 
in applications 
 
 
 
 
 
(Individual) 
improvisation 
Communicating aims?…and…and 
also…they must like… as you 
say…’assessing the risk’…if the 
machine is out of warranty and it is 
a  tier one applications it is going to 
be down for some time and… the 
Without proper resources due to 
breakdown, the situation motivated 
variations of how the processes were 
going to run, and the assessment of risk 
in such instances. The variations gave a 
high need to improvise. 
Monitoring and assessing application risk 
1. Implies being capable in 
performing risk assessments based 
on criticality of systems (I tier) and 
the down-time. 
 
Operational 
Activity 
Being capable 
in performing 
risk assessment  
 
 
 
(Process) 
improvisation 
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STEP 2 
 
 
Context of Data Incident 
 
STEP 3  
 
Researcher’s memos  
Determine Codes 
 
 in vivo and other 
generated  as underlined) 
 
STEP 4  
 
Level 
STEP 5  
 
Concepts 
generated 
 
 
STEP 6  
 
Categories 
(See Section  
4.4.1) 
 
 
 
 
vendor might say come 
tomorrow…then you might get parts  
from uumm, I don’t 170 
 
 
 
sure, I mean I haven’t really worked 
anywhere else.. i wouldn’t be able 
to say so much.…I mean…our 
actions.. we base it on the criticality 
of the 
application…obviously…uum.. 
experience…obviously if the heat 
comes from the executives and that 
kind of thing ... we know which 
applications are critical and which 
and which are not 
171
 
The pressures from the executives and 
senior management often catalyse 
creative and incremental changes to the 
applications, and in the long run, the 
improvised actions forced by these 
pressures create change that is difficult 
to articulate. 
Monitoring and assessing application risk 
1. Implies being practical  in  risk 
analysis   
 
Operational 
Activity 
Being 
practical in 
risk analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Process) 
improvisation 
so Derek run certain exception 
reports and actually reported the 
behavior 
172
  
 
Without preparation and sufficient 
resources, exception reports were 
generated  
Exceptional reporting 
1. Implies getting by on security 
checks and assessments 
 
Tactical 
Activity 
Getting by on 
security checks 
and 
assessments  
 
(Individual) 
improvisation 
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APPENDIX 6: OPEN CODING UNIT OF ANALYSIS FIVE - IT GOVERNANCE AND REGULATORY COMPLIANCE 
 
STEP 1  
 
Data Incidents 
( Transcribed Interviews)   
 
STEP 2 
 
 
Context of Data Incident 
 
STEP 3  
 
Researcher’s memos  
Determine Codes 
 
 in vivo and other 
generated  as underlined) 
 
STEP 4  
 
Level 
STEP 5  
 
Concepts 
generated 
 
 
STEP 6  
 
Categories 
(See Section  
4.4.1) 
 
 
 
 
yes and when I developed that 
spreadsheet and showed it to the 
management…it was [an eye 
opener]…I was like jeez… I mean it 
was like we were focusing on 
applications [that were not critical] 
173
 
 
so they actually have to adjust…I mean 
the big guys.. the executives… 
committee,…whatever…so we gave 
them all the facts and figures…all the 
notebook stuff 
174
 
 
This was an instance when planning 
and action were occurring together 
in a synthesized ‘real-time’ strategy. 
The management took note of the 
innovative ideas of the practitioner 
planner and approved of them. 
Technical Compliance Checking 
2. Implies  inventive in planning and 
checking measurement tools to achieve 
compliant technology  
 
Tactical 
Activity 
Being 
inventive in 
developing 
measurement 
tools 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Individual) 
improvisation 
yes but …like I said…had we not 
adopted CobiT at the board level, we 
would have made it far more difficult 
[to implement], but … and the 
challenge being the audit report 
175
 
Prior to this, CobiT was the accepted 
and understood framework at board 
level, so an innovative way was 
proposed to use the same tool in IT 
security governance, which was 
Compliance and System Audit Control 
2. Implies being inspired to adopt CobiT 
tool and fit this with  processes that 
ensured information compliance and 
monitoring international standards  
Strategic 
Activity 
Being inspired 
to ensure best 
compliance 
methods 
 
(Product) 
improvisation 
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generated 
 
 
STEP 6  
 
Categories 
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4.4.1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
done with minimal implementation 
challenges 
  
 
 
 
So in line with that.. approach   it was a 
good idea that the strategy that I’m 
formulating made it so much easier to 
adopt [CobiT]  
176
 
 
 
 
 
Sometimes, as in this specific case, 
strategic thinking called for an 
acceptable framework to be followed 
that serves long term security 
interests. Not all were in support so 
there had to be means to devise ways 
to allow the acceptance of  CobiT  
Compliance and System Audit Control 
1. Implies rational adaptive as part of 
strategic thinking 
 
Strategic 
Activity 
Rational 
adaptive  
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Individual) 
improvisation 
so you’ve got a methodology…so 
basically all of this stuff that comes out 
…goes through the architectural 
forum…for scrutiny 177 
 
 
The architecture forum collectively 
scrutinizes every proposal and 
methodology and finds best fit. The 
forum draws on cognitive, affective, 
technical and social resources in an 
improvised way. 
Security Reviews  
1. Implies creativeness on the process of 
implementing methodologies  
 
Strategic 
Activity 
Creativeness 
in 
Implementing 
methodologies 
 
 
 
 
(Collective) 
improvisation 
in terms of how we…have been meeting 
certain compliance requirements in 
terms of ECT Act 
178
 
 
or any other critical ACT in line  with  
The practitioners were honest about 
the methods engaged in meeting 
compliance requirements. They 
suggested that these methods were 
reflexive to the point of minimal 
Compliance with information protection 
legislation and IT Governance 
1. Implies exceptionality and reflexive 
ways of meeting regulatory 
requirements such as ECT Act. 
Strategic 
Activity 
Exceptionality 
in meeting 
regulatory 
requirements 
 
(Collective) 
improvisation 
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all the information reporting and all 
this … do we  all  ****  play 179\ 
 
YES.. a lot of ACTS have 
been…introduced… but…I don’t think 
they have  been tested yet….so  we want 
to comply to  the bear minimal 
180
 
 
compliance. The contradiction here 
is that there is both intention to 
comply and not to comply. The 
reason being resources and 
motivation. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
but I still have a role to play in terms of 
compliance 
181
 
 
my approach,  my strategy… is that was 
that we excel on the CobiT framework.. 
the principles of 
confidentiality…integrity and 
availability 
182
 
 
if you look at the CobiT core systems 
there are certain modules that relate to 
theses core requirements 
183
 
The notion of Human Agency posits 
that humans are free to enact 
technologies the way they wish to. 
The role played by this practitioner 
in meeting technical compliance 
requirements is the agent of 
compliance making the compliance 
process the product of novel 
consequences. (thinking and action) 
Compliance with information protection 
legislation and IT Governance 
 
1. Implies getting by in terms of 
compliance requirements with the help 
of a champion or role player to oversee 
the framework compliance process. 
 
Strategic 
Activity 
Getting by in 
using the 
compliance 
framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Individual) 
improvisation 
Do you know CobiT processes? the 34 
processes [in CobiT]? Once you adopt 
CobiT, there are certain levels of every 
The CobiT framework as envisioned 
is generic and has left the 
practitioners to imagine new forms 
Compliance with information protection 
legislation and IT Governance 
 
Strategic 
Activity 
Managing 
Frameworks 
 
(Product) 
improvisation 
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process that you have to accept. There 
is high, low and medium 
184
 
 
from the CobiT exception results they 
actually saw from the lower….extreme 
they actually saw from the level of 
reporting, you know, the  
approaches…on the low and 
medium…they were all…4 to 5 185 
of its application, to which the 
practitioners have appropriated some 
features for purposes other than 
previously envisioned. This has lead 
to the innovative application of 
CobiT. 
1. Implies managing the framework 
against the targeted processes to achieve  
best practice/expectations  
 
 
I think frameworks can be deceiving… 
we actually incorporate 3 
frameworks…we incorporate the 
overall framework, to govern the 
enterprise architecture solution 
distribution which is basically the 
Zachman  Framework. 
186
 
 
but if you look in the Zachman’s 
framework and you go right down 
to….the system’s design.. basically 
those  three  of the Zachman’s 
Framework.. then there is the  CobiT 
and ITIL… are the ones that come into 
play in governing mostly  the IT… 
processes…uum.. so we have an over-
This observation has motivated the 
practitioners to creatively deviate 
from requirements that dictate 
unquestionable observance of 
frameworks, to that of tailoring 
frameworks to fit needs (Zachman’s 
Framework). 
Compliance with information protection 
legislation and IT Governance 
 
1. Implies lateral thinking in understanding 
frameworks and  selecting alternative 
options and creative solutions 
 
 
 
Strategic 
Activity 
Lateral 
thinking in 
applying 
frameworks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Product) 
improvisation 
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encapsulating…methodology…which is 
the Zachman’s Framework 187 
The Zachman framework consists of 
rows across (which are ITIL, CobiT) 
but the same principles are applied 
because there has to be an 
understanding of the business process 
for all the different areas 
188
 
to suit their environment...more than it 
does anywhere else…so everywhere its 
just the gaps around…what you need.. I 
mean…ITIL and CobiT…are great 
frameworks but…its impossible to 189 
The creation and modification of a 
fusion framework allows for 
reflexivity. The framework shows a 
paradoxical existence between 
change and stability. The change 
stemming from use of existing 
frameworks, with stability 
maintaining security posture in 
business processes. 
Compliance with information protection 
legislation and IT Governance 
 
1. Implies being ingenious in fusing 
frameworks of ITIL, CobiT 
simultaneously where applicable  
 
Operational 
Activity 
Being 
ingenuous in 
Fusing 
Frameworks  
 
 
 
 
(Product) 
improvisation 
Now in terms of the high, we were 
getting 2 to 3 security, but in terms of 
the lower and medium we were getting 
4’s to 5’s 190 
 
So we got certain maturity 
requirements  *** which we met ..and 
some  which we had to improve on.. 
and then the  focus 
191
 
 
As part of the understanding of what 
was being said, it was noted that the 
human agency (Practitioners) and 
the technical and material agency 
(CobiT)  were operating in dial ctic 
and emergent fashion, whereby the 
resulting  maturity requirements 
were influencing the practitioners, 
and the practitioners activities aimed 
to achieve certain results. This lead 
Security Reviews of IT Application  Systems 
1. Implies creativeness on the part of  
practitioners when customising maturity 
requirements 
Tactical 
Activity 
Creativeness 
on customising 
Maturity 
requirements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Product) 
improvisation 
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so it sort of made my job so much more 
easier, but now when I talk to them 
around these components, you know 
immediately the guys want to go for 
4’s…targeting a maturity level of 4 192 
to creativity.   
 
 
yes it was a dream come 
true…[laughter] as the security 
[maturity] levels of CobiT… are  
brilliant…when you give a presentation 
on that and  you say look here guys…if 
you have managed 31 of the 
requirements…maturity level number 
4’s 193 
yes 4’ and 5’s…you certainly felt that 
you would attempt higher say 3 or 4 … 
after 3 …. So it is manageable and 
practicable 
194
 
There was a complex interplay 
between the practitioners and how 
CobiT was implemented with 
intangible by-products being 
produced such as confidence, 
acceptance and reflexivity, all 
occurring in an improvised fashion.  
Security Reviews of IT Application  Systems 
 
1. Implies the process managing 
framework implementation to the level 
of user acceptance requires creativity 
 
Operational 
Activity 
Managing 
Framework 
implementation 
 
 
 
 
 
(Product) 
improvisation 
and the irony is… and I’ve got to give 
them credit for it…they’ve been doing a 
lot of work, but they’ve probably been 
focusing on the wrong way 
195
 
 
 
Maybe our risk profile has got to be 
The practitioners consulted with 
each other and realized without the 
clear feedback that they were 
obtaining based on the risk profile, 
they needed to re-think CobiT as 
they were implementing it, and 
improvise on the risk-profile while 
Review of Risk  
Implies getting by with the framework 
implementation process, without an explicit 
approach to risk  
Strategic 
Activity 
Getting by in 
the framework 
Implementation 
 
 
 
 
(Product) 
improvisation 
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entirely different…from the CobiT 
one…maybe we have to re-look our risk 
profile too…right? maybe that area that 
CobiT say’s is high…maybe low 196 
 
obtaining feedback from both the 
model and users 
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to give to the people …that they 
gave…and got the ones that [were] 
broken…they had to think quick...and 
make that kind of a judgment… 197 
 
 
Practitioners were initially not thought of as 
being rational when they re-issued old 
laptops to ensure processes continued to run 
but no one could predict that their quick 
judgment would  later prove useful  
Business Continuity management Process 
 
2. Implies being quick-witted in  
unpredictable and unexpected 
circumstanc s in information 
decision making  
 
Strategic 
Activity 
Being quick-
witted in 
decision making 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Collective) 
improvisation 
and it all boils down to budgeting.... 
now they didn’t budgets for it … so 
they had to justify why…they had to 
do it… so that was the main kind of 
thing 
198
 
 
The efficient operation of Processes were 
hampered when laptops broke, creating a 
need for extra resources. With limited 
resources, an innovative budget 
(justification) was generated 
Business Continuity Planning Framework 
 
1. Implies being resourceful in 
ensuring business continuity  and 
limited budgets overruns   
Operational 
Activity 
Being 
resourceful and 
ensuring 
business 
continuity  
 
 
 
 
(Process) 
improvisation 
yes and categorised… them because 
those are the items…that we 
specifically  focus on, particularly 
from a disaster recover and also 
business continuity…the BM5 
security and the components so the 
initial aim was building an 
While building a secure architecture around 
data classification, observation of discourse 
revealed that this particular planner 
embraced approaches characterized by 
individual creative capacities and 
reflexivity. 
Business Continuity Planning Framework 
 
1. Implies managing risk by 
analysing  data classification  
 
Operational 
Activity 
Managing data  
classification 
 
 
 
 
 
(Individual) 
improvisation 
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architecture around the data 
classification 
199
 
 
Well this is how we draw their 
attention…when it goes 
down…well…we tell…them “we told 
you not to [rely on]  this business 
tool 
200
 
 
 
 
 
The strength of the business continuity 
process particularly in this case was that 
there was not enough to simply point out 
“we told you so”  but rather that this 
practitioner demonstrated the ability to 
adopt and improvise under situations of 
uncertainties. 
Continuity on Critical Operations 
 
1. Implies being inspired particularly 
from uncertainties caused by  
system downtime  
Operational 
Activity 
Being inspired 
resulting from 
system 
downtime 
 
 
 
 
(Individual) 
improvisation 
mmhhh..I think …our main thing 
here is to keep basically… I mean we 
have a lot of good uses in policies 
when it comes to keeping the system 
going…so certain time we do have to 
do what we have to do to keep them 
[systems] going…and sometimes we 
don’t…know if it is  the right thing to 
do 
201
 
 
It was observed that at times practitioners 
did not have concrete directions for how to 
do things. In such situations they would do 
whatever it took, to avoid system downtime. 
Their skills and knowledge made their 
activities amenable to complex variations 
and transformations that mitigated systems 
downtime.  
Business Continuity Measures 
 
1. Implies being rational adaptive 
when faced with challenges to 
maintain system uptime.  
 
Tactical 
Activity 
Rational 
adaptive in 
maintaining  
system uptime  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Process) 
improvisation 
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And that’s when they normally 
start...start taking notice of uuhmm 
maybe we should actually do this in a 
different way.. I mean we have a 
whole...middle tier uuuh...application 
integration system...that does this 
kind of things….that makes you do 
all the right kind of stuff… but 
uuuhmm for simple things like 
uuhhm..email its amazing that 
uummh..the email being down 
202
 
When systems (email) goes down and 
creates a crisis, the practitioner was not 
dictated to on how to handle the crisis but 
rather operated in an environment where 
reflexivity was encouraged to which the 
success of the response was laid in 
unscripted activities. 
Decision Making Procedures and 
Communication arrangements 
 
1. Implies quick  reaction in crisis 
situations (email system 
downtime)  
 
Operational 
Activity 
Quick reaction 
in preventing 
email system 
downtime 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Collective) 
improvisation 
so those kind of things is hard to… 
because.. they do it because…they 
are under a lot of pressure...at the 
time.. and those kind of things 
203
 
 
 
 
Certain activities were pointed out that by 
nature entailed a lot of pressures 
(environmental, or organizational).  The 
pressures give rise to activities that are 
carried out in non-routine and unexpected 
ways. 
Decision Making Procedures and 
Communication arrangements 
 
1. Implies exceptional performance 
when working under tremendous 
pressure  
Operational 
Activity 
Exceptionality  
 
 
 
 
 
(Individual) 
improvisation 
correct…something will always 
happen 
204
 
 
 
 
 
With the use of technology, order in not 
always guaranteed and there was 
acknowledgement by practitioners that that 
was the case. With that in mind, their 
activities were certainly not scripted and 
were bound to reflect the emergent nature of 
Disaster scenarios and critical operations 
 
1. Implies being innovative in 
disaster planning noting that 
uncertainties occur   
 
Strategic 
Activity 
Being 
innovative in 
disaster 
planning 
 
 
(Collective) 
improvisation 
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these changes, creating situational based 
behavior and improvisation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Knowing things like] how…long 
you’ve been here? know what … I 
mean…a lot of it is in based on 
experience…and just knowing what 
is important and what’s not… and we 
sit…and we put together our 
plan…for next year… ere..a lot of 
them don’t know what the 
application…is running on 205 
The type of planning postulated by 
practitioners goes beyond the normal 
mandate and considers individual skill 
areas, experience and expertise which calls 
for reflexivity and not rigidity and structure. 
Decision Making Procedures and 
Communication arrangements 
 
1. Implies lateral thinking guided by 
experience is critical to making 
important decisions in risk 
management  
 
Strategic 
Activity 
Lateral 
thinking in  
Risk 
Management 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Collective) 
improvisation 
than on the low level ones…so… and 
we also know that…like if we get a 
call on a Saturday…for something 
that is down…. don’t worry…we will 
look at it on a Monday...since it is 
not a high level one...but if you get a 
call for something that you know is 
high level you will come in 
206
 
The practitioners revealed that they were 
reflexive in prioritizing responses to crisis 
and ambiguity. 
Decision Making Procedures and 
Communication arrangements 
 
1. Implies being quick-witted in 
responding to crisis making 
disaster  planning  activities 
reflexive 
Strategic 
Activity 
Being quick 
witted in 
disaster 
planning 
 
 
 
 
 
(Collective) 
improvisation 
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no…they have their own 
little...monitoring tools monitoring 
the network… we have the 
monitoring tools monitoring the 
users..(Microsoft users)…so we 
actually have two…we have the 
small…one….I’m not sure what’s its 
called and then we have the big 
one…called the Microsoft operations 
Manager (MsOM) 
207
  
 
The small one.. we find its quite 
nice….reflexive.. because its quick.. 
easy…and it can monitor.. say you 
need something.. now.. it can do it 
for you now..……and then we can 
move it on to the other one…as an 
additional kind of monitoring...in a 
different kind of way 
208
 
One way the practitioners have shown 
reflexivity in incident monitoring is by 
considering the use of computer technology 
tools as supplementing their work, and not 
as the driving  force. That means they 
exercise choice in what to use and when, 
particularly in prioritizing responses and 
incident recovery needs.   
Recovery time monitoring and objectives 
 
1. Implies  being resourceful over 
choice and priority over use of 
computer technology tools  that 
help in incident monitoring   
 
Operational 
Activity 
Being rational 
adaptive in 
Incident 
monitoring 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Collective) 
improvisation 
well, to tell you the…well…we’ve 
always had both…its always been the 
kind of thing that its just easier…coz 
The practitioners have realized the potential 
of working with more than one monitoring 
tool in a reflexive realistic manner and not 
Recovery time monitoring and objectives 
 
1. Implies being innovative in the use 
Operational 
Activity 
Being 
innovative in 
Incident 
(Collective) 
improvisation 
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we actually use the one…to 
monitor...and seek…and give us a 
better clearer  indication of…if the 
things that are up or down...it gives 
you  a nice green, red or orange.. 
know what I mean…? Very simple209 
rigidly following original intentions which 
could be overstated. This means creativity is 
not impeded.  
of different technologies and 
combining in new ways to 
achieved optimal incident 
monitoring objectives 
Monitoring 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
its probably more critical…for [name 
withheld] . to have a lot more 
systems being up…because every one 
relies on them.. .see what I mean 
210
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this case, practitioners expressed great 
dependency on technology to run operations 
within the backdrop of crisis situations. i.e. 
system downtime.  A realistic planning 
mechanism expressed was one that 
considered not technical solutions but social 
solutions which account for ingenuity and 
creativity. 
Recovery time monitoring and objectives 
 
1. Implies managing system uptime  
 
Operational 
Activity 
Managing 
system uptime 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Collective) 
improvisation 
Well… it is kind of working at the 
moment...its just that it is a bit slow… 
at the moment 
211
 
 
System testing on speed or slowness, as 
potential risk areas, were activities 
expressed by practitioner. The reflexivity 
demonstrated by practitioners was in 
exercising  the  choice of either accepting a 
status quo of the system or intervening in 
Business Continuity Measures 
 
1. Implies getting by as practitioner 
relying on technology to run business 
processes  
 
Operational 
Activity 
Getting by  
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Collective) 
improvisation 
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the system to mitigate the risk.  
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APPENDIX 8 - HIGH LEVEL QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
ANSWERED BY A SENIOR SECURITY MANAGER 
 
General Risk  
 
Security Policy and Management 
 
1. What do you base (document or other) your organisation’s security roles and    
responsibilities on? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Have you documented your organisation’s security roles and responsibilities? 
 
 
 
 
 
Our roles and responsibilities are based on providing the 
preservation of confidentiality, integrity and availability. 
Confidentiality – ensuring that accessibility is only for those 
authorised. 
  Integrity – safeguarding of accuracy and completeness of 
information. 
Availability – ensuring authorized users have access to 
information.  
Our organisations security roles and responsibilities are 
documented in the [name withheld]  Corporate Information 
Security Policy. 
Researcher’s Memo’s 
 
(NIST SP 800-30)  System and Information Owners. The system and 
information owners are responsible for ensuring that proper controls are in 
place to address integrity, confidentiality, and availability of the IT systems 
and data they own. 
 
(Octave 2003) By using the OCTAVE approach, an organization makes 
information-protection decisions based on risks to the confidentiality, 
integrity, 
and availability of critical information-related assets. 
 
 
(NIST SP 800-30)  Document Review. Policy documents (e.g., legislative 
documentation, directives), system documentation (e.g., system user guide, 
system administrative manual, system design and requirement document, 
acquisition document), and security-related documentation (e.g., previous audit 
report, risk assessment report, system test results, system security plan5, 
security policies) can provide good information about the 
security controls used by and planned for the IT system. 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
 335 
 
UCT – Department of Information Systems  
 
 
 
3. Between your employees and third parties, who plays a greater role in terms of 
helping define your security needs and policy? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Are there instances you may feel that there lacks commitment by employees 
regarding certain clauses in the security policy? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Do you feel liberated or constrained by security policy?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is an equal level of contribution in balancing the needs of 
the company and those advised by third parties.  
Adherence to the e-mail usage policy seems to be disregarded 
by many users. 
I feel that the policy provides both a liberating and constraining 
feeling insofar that you are aware of the parameters within which 
you have to work. 
(Octave 2003) OCTAVE is self-directed, meaning that people 
from an organization assume responsibility for setting the 
organization’s security strategy. The technique leverages 
people’s knowledge of their organization’s security- related 
practices and processes to capture the current state of security 
practice within the organization 
 
(SP 800-30) 3.2.1 Threat-Source Identification a situation and method 
that may accidentally trigger a vulnerability. Vulnerability: A flaw or 
weakness in system security procedures, design, implementation, or 
internal controls that could be exercised (accidentally triggered or 
intentionally exploited) and result in a security breach or a violation of 
the system’s security policy. 
 
(Octave 2003) OCTAVE is self directed, requiring an organization to manage 
the evaluation process and make information-protection decisions 
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6. What mechanisms are used to communicate security policy to employees? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contractual Terms  
 
7. Do you use contractual terms and conditions to specify your employees  
or third party information security responsibilities? Are you aware of any breaches? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We use our Intranet, Imbizo. Information days, regular e-mails are 
posted as reminders of the policy.  
Contractual terms are very clearly defined and there have been 
breaches which have resulted in litigation. 
(Burton Group 2003) Promoting appropriate security awareness 
requires a program of written policies, training, incentives, penalties, 
and continuous reminders. As described in the Security and Risk 
Management Strategies 
overview, “Concepts and Definitions,” simple memos such as “no 
privilege without identity,” as well as zero tolerance can be used to 
promote awareness 
 
(Burton Group 2003) Legal processes provide input to risk 
management and compliance1 assessment  personnel. Legal 
issues associated with contracts, vendors, contractors, employees, 
and other personnel and entities must be intimately 
involved with the enterprise risk-management process. Legal 
issues play a leading role in risk transfer and risk avoidance. 
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8. Do all new employees and third party users sign confidentiality or  
nondisclosure requirements before you allow them to use sensitive information? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Information Security Forum 
 
9. Do you have a management forum that you utilise to implement, 
review, assign roles and approve your information security policy?  
Who are the designated persons? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10. When was the last time your organisation promoted the importance of  
information security to its employees through e.g. workshops? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As part of letter of acceptance of employment, staff are made aware 
of the requirements of the policy. 
There is a joint approach between IT and Corporate Governance, 
with the IT Risk and Continuity Manager being the designated 
person in IT. 
A formal notification was done a year ago, “Security Awareness 
Week”. This done in the form of an internal competition with staff 
having to answer certain aspects of the policy.  
(Burton Group 2003) Personnel security starts with the hiring 
process and goes throughout the lifecycle of the interaction of the 
individual and the enterprise. This discipline addresses pre-
employment screening and disciplinary action, as well as giving 
personnel proper guidance, periodic reassessments, and 
management controls. 
 
(Octave 2003) When applying OCTAVE, a small team of people 
from the operational (or business) units and the information 
technology (IT) department work together to address the security 
needs of the organization, balancing the three key aspects 
illustrated in Figure 1: operational risk, security practices, and 
technology. 
 
(Burton Group 2003 ) Personnel Security includes personnel 
related principles and concepts such as security awareness, 
roles, clearances, ethics, separation of duty, and appropriate use 
of information and facilities. Personnel security must address 
employee and contractor lifecycles such as hire-transfer-
terminate. 
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11. Who is mandated to review and evaluate information security incidents? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12. How often are reviews and approvals of information security policies  
conducted? Who conducts them? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13. Are there moments when information security methods, techniques  
or initiatives not entirely supported by designated persons of authority?  
If so, are there special considerations as to why this maybe the case? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The IT Risk and Continuity Manager.  
Reviews of the policies are conducted by both our internal and 
external auditors. These reviews are held annually. 
Due to the design of certain of our systems, it becomes impractical 
to fully apply all our security policies particularly with regard to 
access to data. As a result hereof full application of the policies are 
not always fully supported.  
(Burton Group 2003) Top management typically takes 
responsibility for decisions about deterrence, while project 
management adapts the protection system, and project teams, 
operations, and users undertake prevention, detection, and 
response. 
 
(NIST SP 800-30) IT security program managers and computer 
security officers are responsible for their organizations’ security 
programs, including risk management. 
 
(Burton Group 2003) Auditing processes are conducted by internal 
and external auditors to verify compliance with policies, standards, 
regulations, and other requirements. Internal auditors provide critical 
feedback for management at all levels, while external auditors 
perform an independent verification that internal auditors are doing 
their jobs properly. 
 
(Octave 2003) The team develops an organization-wide 
protection strategy focused on improving the 
organization’s security practices as well as mitigation 
plans to reduce the important risks to critical assets. 
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14. How does the forum (if any) assist in the promotion of the importance of 
 information security? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15. How often are information security incidents reported to the forum (if any)?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Co-ordination of Security Implementation 
 
16. Who co-ordinates the implementation of security controls? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We ensure that we place security awareness on our balanced 
scorecard.  
They are reported as they occur or are detected by our external 
service providers who monitor our network activity. We have a 
monthly meeting to analyse incidents received. 
The technical component resides within TEG (technology 
enablement group) as they respond to the policies and procedures 
provided by the IT Risk and Continuity management.  
(NIST SP 800-30) A successful risk management program will rely 
on…(1) senior management’s commitment;… (4) the awareness and 
cooperation of members of the user community, who must follow 
procedures and comply with the implemented controls to safeguard 
the mission of their organization; 
 
 
 
(Burton Group 2003) The sensors provide feedback by observing 
behaviors and reporting them to audit services and repositories for 
long-term orientation and analysis, to security management services 
and repositories for tactical orientation, and to detection services for 
real-time orientation. Detection services then feed policy decision 
points or security management services that determine responses to 
the current situation, and act by passing control to actuators in the 
resources or control services to perform the necessary actions. 
 
(NIST SP 800-30) A successful risk management program will rely 
on…(3) the competence of the risk assessment team, which must 
have the expertise to apply the risk assessment methodology to a 
specific site and system, identify mission risks, and provide cost 
effective safeguards that meet the needs of the organization; 
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17. Who distributes information security roles and responsibilities throughout 
your organisation?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18. How does your organisation ensure that the co-ordination of security controls 
 by members are representative of the organisation’s needs as well as the need 
 of the employees? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Information Security Infrastructure 
 
 
19. When did you last feel necessary to establish a management framework  
that controls your organisation’s implementation of information security? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is a joint activity of Corporate Governance and IT.  
The intent of our policies is  to offer our organisation the necessary 
protection , but also to provide the assurance of the protection of the 
integrity of the individuals who use the system.   
This was undertaken last year with the inclusion of Information 
Security into Business Intelligence competency.   
(Burton Group 2003) Senior management and the enterprise 
security team develop security objectives and a security posture for 
managing risks. Risk prioritization, objectives, and posture then drive 
policies, which drive security governance of people, organizations, 
processes, and technologies. Policies also determine the roles for 
specific technologies and processes. 
 
(Burton Group 2003) Governance of the security structure must 
ensure that the security organizational model fits the enterprise 
organization structure, and that the organization's structure and 
policies provide adequate resources, chains of command, and 
appeals or exceptions processes to allow reasonable coordination 
mechanisms for risk management. 
 
(Burton Group 2003) A framework is both a vehicle for 
understanding the overall security approach and an inventory of the 
applicable technologies, which remain the primary concern of Burton 
Group's in-depth coverage. 
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20. When did you last have to access external expert help/opinion to 
 information security? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21. Have you recently felt a need to revamp your internal information  
security expertise? If so why? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22. Who is designated to monitor changes in information security standards  
and methods? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23. Have you had incidents where there was conflict of opinion between  
 your internal experts and external experts in relation to information security policy? 
We have an on-going relationship with an external service provider 
to hold regular consultations of market trends with security.   
No. 
The IT Risk and Continuity Manager  
(Burton Group 2003) External auditors verify compliance with 
policies, standards, regulations, and other requirements by 
performing an independent verification that internal auditors are doing 
their jobs properly. External 
audits may be required for legal or other reasons. 
 
 
(NIST SP 800-30) As changes occur in the existing IT system 
environment infrastructure and organizational policies, introduction 
of new technologies), the IT security practitioners must support or 
use the risk management process to identify and assess new 
potential risks and implement new security controls as needed to 
safeguard their IT systems (e.g., expansion in network 
connectivity, changes to the existing. 
 
(NIST SP 800-30) IT security trainers or security/subject matter 
professionals must understand the risk management process so 
that they can develop appropriate training materials and incorporate 
risk assessment into training programs to educate the end users. 
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Information Security Responsibilities 
 
24. What measures have you taken to encourage a multi-disciplinary approach  
to information security?   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25. How do you carry out the security process of information assets control? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26. Kindly specify the security roles and responsibilities that are distribute 
 amongst the various users and services. 
I would not regard it as conflict, rather a variance of views in terms 
of company needs and external stringent adherence to best 
practices.  
By regular communications with the broader [name withheld]  
community we have heightened the need for corporate response to 
security. 
All requests for access are done via application which is authorised 
by the relevant executive, with final authorization given by the IT 
Risk and continuity manager.   
(NIST SP 800-30) A risk assessment report should not be presented in 
an accusatory manner but as a systematic and analytical approach to 
assessing risk so that senior management will understand the risks 
and allocate resources to reduce and correct potential losses. 
 
(Octave 2003) When applying OCTAVE, a small team of people 
from the operational (or business) units and the information 
technology (IT) department work together to address the security 
needs of the organization, balancing the three key aspects 
illustrated in Figure 1: operational risk, security practices, and 
technology. 
 
(NIST SP 800-30) An organization’s security standards should establish 
a set of controls and guidelines to ensure that security procedures 
governing the use of the organization’s IT assets and resources are 
properly enforced and implemented in accordance with the organization’s 
goals and mission. 
Management plays a vital role in overseeing policy 
implementation and in ensuring the establishment of 
appropriate operational controls. 
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27. Is there delegation of security responsibilities between asset owners? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Information Security Advisers 
 
28. How does your organisation co-ordinate your information security  
knowledge base and experience?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Roles are specifically split into two areas, technical response and 
the process, procedures and people element.  
Delegation, yes, in terms of recommendation levels of access. 
We use our own experiences and solicit the expertise of outside 
agencies such as Gartner, etc. 
(Burton Group 2003) Knowledge arms key people with the long-
term understanding required to perform their security roles. The 
enterprise must instill appropriate levels of knowledge in systems 
administrators, data owners, system and application designers, 
management, and administrators. 
 
(Burton Group 2003)Top management typically takes 
responsibility for decisions about deterrence, while project 
management adapts the protection system, and project teams, 
operations, and users undertake prevention, detection, and 
response. 
 
(Octave 2003) OCTAVE is self-directed, meaning that people from 
an organization assume responsibility for setting the organization’s 
security strategy. The technique leverages people’s knowledge of 
their organization’s security- related practices and processes to 
capture the current state of security practice within the 
organization. 
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29. Has your organisation identified an ‘in-house’ information security 
advisor or champion?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30. How does the ‘in-house’ information security advisor help your 
organisation to make information security decisions? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31. Does the ‘in-house’ information security advisor have access to external 
security experts and advisors? Please specify who.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32. Has the information security advisor ever been asked to assess security 
problems, threats and vulnerabilities and investigate security incidents or breach? 
 
Yes, it is a joint role filled by the IT Risk Manager and our 
Telecommunications Architect and specialist. 
We present to the organisation’s potential breaches of security and 
offer solutions thereof. 
Yes, we primarily use [name withheld] . 
Yes 
(NIST SP 800-30) Risk management is a management responsibility. 
This section describes the key roles of the personnel who should 
support and participate in the risk management process; Senior 
management, Chief Information Officer, System and Information 
Owners, Business and Functional Managers, IT security program 
managers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Burton Group 2003) Risk management is not a one-size-fits-all 
proposition. For example, some enterprises only establish 
protections on a risk-justified, case-by-case basis, but others raise 
their protective baseline to a level dictated by assumed standards 
of due care in a particular industry before undertaking risk 
analyses. 
 
(NIST SP 800-30) Appropriate persons (in-house personnel or 
external contracting staff) who have the appropriate expertise and 
skill-sets to implement the selected control are identified, and 
responsibility is assigned. 
 
(NIST SP 800-30) Appropriate persons (in-house personnel or 
external contracting staff) who have the appropriate expertise and 
skill-sets to implement the selected control are identified, and 
responsibility is assigned. 
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33. Does the information security advisor have access to th 
 organisation’s management personnel? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34. Are there times the security advisor is not consulted in case of security 
incident or breach?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
None of which I’m aware. 
(Octave 2003 Self direction is one of the principles of OCTAVE. 
The concept of self direction means that people inside the 
organization are in the best position to lead the evaluation and 
make decisions. 
 
(Octave 20003) There is more than one set of activities that can 
produce the outputs of OCTAVE; for this reason, a unique set of 
activities is not specified. The outputs define the outcomes that 
an analysis team must achieve during the evaluation 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
 346 
 
 
 
 
Other Organisations 
 
35. Do you have a co-operative relationship with law enforcement authorities? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36. Does your organization maintain a relationship with other organisations 
that could help it cope with incidents and breaches? 
( regulatory bodies, CERT, information service providers, telecomm operators etc) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37. Does your organisation belong to security groups and associations (CERT etc)? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent on the nature of the security breach eg fraud we would 
have a cooperative arrangement with SAPS 
Yes, we are also members of a special interest group hosted by 
[name withheld]  
As above. 
(NIST SP 800-30) IT-related risks arise from legal liability or 
mission loss due to— 1. Unauthorized (malicious or accidental) 
disclosure, modification, or destruction of information 2. 
Unintentional errors and omissions 3. IT disruptions due to natural 
or man-made disasters 4. Failure to exercise due care and 
diligence in the implementation and operation of the IT system. 
 
(CobiT)  Business process owners bear the final responsibility for the 
information technology as deployed within the confines of their 
business process. Of course, they will make use of services provided 
by specialised parties like the traditional IT department or the third 
party service provider. 
 
(CobiT)  Business process owners bear the final responsibility for 
the information technology as deployed within the confines of 
their business process. Of course, they will make use of services 
provided by specialised parties like the traditional IT department 
or the third party service provider. 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
 347 
 
 
38. How does your organisation ensure that confidential information is not 
accidentally passed on to any unauthorised person in or out of the organisation? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent Security Reviews 
 
39. When did you last conduct an independent review of your information 
security policy? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40. Did this review find consistency between policy and practise? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41. Did this examination reveal effectiveness of security policy? 
We do this by developing access hierarchies and permissions. 
One is currently being conducted by our external auditors as part of 
an annual process. 
There were certain inconsistencies highlighted from the last review 
and these were addressed and remedied.  
(Octave 20003) By using the OCTAVE approach, an organization 
makes information-protection decisions based on risks to the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of critical information-related 
assets. All aspects of risk (assets, threats, vulnerabilities, and 
organizatio al impact) are factored into decision making, enabling an 
organization to match a practice-based protection strategy to its 
security risks. 
 
(CobiT)  Monitoring All IT processes need to be regularly assessed 
over time for their quality and compliance with control requirements. 
This domain thus addresses management’s oversight of the 
organisation’s control process and independent assurance provided 
by internal and external audit or obtained from alternative sources. 
 
(CobiT) CobiT also is useful in helping auditees evaluate and 
strengthen internal controls. There is a tremendous benefit for them 
to be better prepared for upcoming audits. Being aware of the review 
criteria means that auditees are aware of the control practices 
recommended for the IT processes. CobiT’s organisation makes it 
easy for the auditee to relate to and interpret auditors’ requests for 
information and subsequent recommendations. 
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42. What assurances do you have that the independent policy reviewers have 
the necessary skills and experience? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Job Description 
 
43. What criteria have you used to assign the responsibilities for implementing 
your information security policy with regard to job description? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
They come recommended from service provider used  
Relevant experience in an IT environment. 
Clear understanding of Information Security 
Extensive knowledge of IT strategies, best practise processes and 
standards. Thorough working knowledge of analysis and design 
methodology and modelling techniques 
 
  
(CobiT) CobiT also is useful in helping auditees evaluate and 
strengthen internal controls. There is a tremendous benefit for them 
to be better prepared for upcoming audits. Being aware of the review 
criteria means that auditees are aware of the control practices 
recommended for the IT processes. CobiT’s organisation makes it 
easy for the auditee to relate to and interpret auditors’ requests for 
information and subsequent recommendations. 
(CobiT) Using the CobiT control objectives as a basis for assessing 
IT audit and auditor skill requirements, effective and timely training 
can be provided to ensure that the audit can be performed 
successfully. 
 
(CobiT) Each [auditor’s] education, training and experience in IT is 
characterized based on these three skill sets: Basic Understanding: 
Broad knowledge of an IT process, purpose, objectives and goals. 
Working Knowledge: demonstrated ability to identify internal control 
strengths and weaknesses within an IT process. Expert Knowledge: 
Ability to design and use computer assisted audit techniques to 
identify, evaluate and correct internal control weaknesses. 
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44. Have you found it necessary to have a specific job description assigned  
responsibility for protecting specific information assets or is such assignment 
relative and contextual? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Training 
 
45. What assurances does your organisation have with regard to ensuring users  
are aware of information security threats and concerns? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46. What assurances does your organisation have with regard to ensuring  
users are capable of applying information security policy and procedures  
and in minimising security risks? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
We ensure that knowledge is kept current by the subscription to the 
relevant professional bodies and the attendance of conferences and 
seminars 
Whilst there are no absolute assurances, we believe that adherence 
to the Security policies would lend itself to that assurance. 
(NIST SP 800-30) Assign Responsibility: Appropriate persons (in-
house personnel or external contracting staff) who have the 
appropriate expertise and skill-sets to implement the selected control 
are identified, and responsibility is assigned. 
 
(NIST SP 800-30) Conduct security awareness and technical training 
to ensure that end users and system users are aware of the rules of 
behavior and their responsibilities in protecting the organization’s 
mission. 
 
(NIST SP 800-30) Conduct security awareness and technical training 
to ensure that end users and system users are aware of the rules of 
behavior and their responsibilities in protecting the organization’s 
mission. 
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Security Incidents 
 
47. How does your organisation monitor security incidents? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48. How has your organisation tried to minimise the damage caused by  
information security incidents? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49.  Do you have a formal or informal reporting procedure for security incidents? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is done by means of both internal and external monitoring of 
both data access and network activity. Internet usage is also very 
closely monitored and measured.  
By the application of access policies, use of Firewalls, message 
filtering, etc.  
Yes, Incidents are generally reported to IT Risk management or via 
our External Service provider through their network monitoring 
mechanism.  
(Burton Group 2003) Behavior, identity, method, and other contexts 
may be jointly monitored to detect threats or to determine access 
rights. 
(Octave 2003) Monitor the action plans for schedule and for 
effectiveness (This activity includes monitoring risks for any 
changes.) 
 
(NIST SP 800-30) An organization’s security standards should 
establish a set of controls and guidelines to ensure that security 
procedures governing the use of the organization’s IT assets and 
resources are properly enforced and implemented in accordance with 
the organization’s goals and mission. 
 
(NIST SP 800-30) Reviews of the history of system breakins; security 
violation reports; incident reports; and interviews with the system 
administrators, help desk personnel, and user community during 
information gathering will help identify human threat-sources that 
have the potential to harm an IT system and its data and that may be 
a concern where a vulnerability exists. 
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50. How does your organisation determine that all or most of the critical security  
incidents are reported? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
51. How does your organisation assure itself that the reporting procedures  
for security incidents have been correctly followed? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52. How does your organisation ensure that it has learnt from such events? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is a formal meeting held monthly, however if serious 
breaches are detected, emergency meetings are convened. There 
are also automated alerts prompting us of potential threats, 
specifically external threats. 
Formal reports have to be forwarded to the IT leadership team and 
a Risk Matrix is maintained and included in the Monthly Board 
report.  
By regular security reviews. 
(NIST SP 800-30) In most organizations, the network itself will 
continually be expanded and updated, its components changed, and 
its software applications replaced or updated with newer versions. In 
addition, personnel changes will occur and security policies are likely 
to change over time. These changes mean that new risks will surface 
and risks previously mitigated may again become a concern. Thus, 
the risk management process is ongoing and evolving. 
 
(CobiT) Reports are issued on the outcomes of IT activities, which 
are measured against the various practices and controls, and the 
cycle begins again. 
 
(CobiT) Management needs to identify the most important activities 
to be performed, measure progress towards achieving goals and 
determine how well the IT processes are performing. 
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53. How do you ensure that people report observed information security weaknesses? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Knowledge Management 
 
54.  Does your organisation maintain a repository of all incidents reported,  
mechanisms for monitoring and quantifying types of security incidents? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
55. Have you noted instances of recurring incidents? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Whilst nothing formal is in place, we depend on the various 
competencies within the organisation report potential breaches.    
Yes. 
Most corporates are faced with constant hacking and intrusion 
attempts. 
(NIST SP 800-30) People prefer to address the threat/vulnerability 
pairs as observations instead of findings in the risk assessment 
report. 
 
(Burton Group 2003) Another goal of the systematic, 
comprehensive approach to information security is to secure the 
systems, applications, and repository technologies that contain 
content or information. This should be done through a combination 
of covering approaches implemented in security infrastructure 
solutions, and by appropriately deploying controls within the assets 
themselves 
 
(Burton Group 2003) Behavior is a characteristic of people (as 
threats, potential threats, users, customers, etc.) and organizations. 
Security posture, security controls, and security processes such as 
awareness seek to assure desired behavior and limit undesired 
behavior. 
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56. How does your organisation ensure that by learning about the security  
incidents reported on there is improvement on information security 
and information security policy? 
 
 
 
 
 
Technology Risk 
 
 
Passwords, Firewalls and Encryption 
 
57. How does your organisation determine, and quantify risk relative  
to the machines particularly if these derive services from the central servers? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Incidents are prioritised and “red flagged”. The “red flag” incidents 
become part of the audit report with the required management 
response. 
Risk quantification is determined by the criticality of data on specific 
servers. 
(Burton Group 2003) Through conscious, systematic, and 
continuous development and documentation, procedures should 
control who makes decisions and under what circumstances, and 
policy should dictate the overall governance structure at a strategic 
level.  
 
(NIST SP 800-30) When a vulnerability can be exercised ➞ apply 
layered protections, architectural designs, and administrative controls 
to minimize the risk of or prevent this occurrence. 
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58. What does your organisation consider as confidential information and 
 how is this protected? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59. How secure do the computers have to be particularly if these are  
connected to the internet or the company’s network? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
60. How often does your organisation monitor the following;  
(a) dormant accounts, 
(b) the use of regular passwords, (c) shared files,  
(d) account lock out (e) antivirus updates? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Any information that would , if made accessible to the wrongs 
persons, negatively impact the brand, is regarded as confidential. 
We ensure that the level of security on these computers/servers 
would offer the company the necessary protection. 
This monitoring is done on a regular basis by our Active Directory 
administrators.  
(Burton Group 2003) Confidentiality: Prevent intentional or 
unintentional unauthorized or inappropriate disclosure of 
information. 
 
(Burton Group 2003) Use control: Ensure and verify appropriate 
use of information and IT systems by authorized personnel, 
prevent inappropriate use by authorized personnel, and prevent 
use by unauthorized personnel. 
 
(NIST SP 800-30) Identification. This control provides the ability to 
uniquely identify users, processes, and information resources. To 
implement other security controls (e.g., discretionary access control 
[DAC], mandatory access control [MAC], accountability), it is 
essential that both subjects and objects be identifiable. 
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61. Do you require encryption of confidential information when it is  
transmitted or stored electronically? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
62. What are your password requirements for user and system accounts?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes, specifically pertaining to all debit and credit card transactions 
User sign-ons are unique to each user and passwords are required 
to alpha/special character/numeric format and a 30 day expiry 
lifespan 
(NIST SP 800-30) Protected Communications. In a distributed 
system, the ability to accomplish security objectives is highly 
dependent on trustworthy communications. The protected 
communications control ensures the integrity, availability, and 
confidentiality of sensitive and critical information while it is in 
transit. Protected communications use data encryption methods 
(e.g., virtual private network, Internet Protocol Security [IPSEC] 
Protocol), and deployment of cryptographic technologies (e.g., 
Data Encryption Standard [DES], Triple DES, RAS, MD4, MD5, 
secure hash standard, and escrowed encryption algorithms such 
as Clipper) to minimize network threats. 
 
(NIST SP 800-30) Access Control Enforcement. Data integrity 
and confidentiality are enforced by access controls. When the 
subject requesting access has been authorized to access particular 
processes, it is necessary to enforce the defined security policy 
(e.g., MAC or DAC). 
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63. Are firewalls used to prevent unauthorized access connections from external 
networks and computer systems to internal networks?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
64. Are your network and computer systems monitored for network intrusions? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
(Burton Group 2003) Organizations should deploy firewalls and 
antivirus protections, and not allow users to surf the Web while 
logged into spyware-susceptible root or Windows Administrator 
accounts. They should also consider the Generally Accepted 
Information Security Principles (GAISP) outlined by the Information 
Systems Security Association (ISSA) and other security best 
practices. 
 
(NIST SP 800-30)  Detection controls warn of violations or 
attempted violations of security policy and include such controls as 
audit trails, intrusion detection methods, and checksums. Intrusion 
Detection and Containment. It is essential to detect security 
breaches (e.g., network break-ins, suspicious activities) so that a 
response can occur in a timely manner. It is also of little use to 
detect a security breach if no effective response can be initiated. 
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APPENDIX 9 - OBSERVATION ON DISASTER RECOVERY EXERCISE 
 
OBJECTIVE: TO MONITOR ACTIVITIES WHILE A DISASTER RECOVERY EXERCISE IS TAKING PLACE 
 
Location and Venue  
There was a particular instance when the organisation organised a disaster recovery test office in two locations, one which was 19 km from the 
organisation’s headquarters. The researcher was invited to observe the activities that were carried out in the disaster recovery process.  
 
Disaster Recover Process and Activities 
In the disaster recovery process, the researcher did not become part of “the furniture” but went to the scene to explore issues that would reveal 
more about the phenomenon of improvisation. The researcher intended exploring ways that he would collect data. 
 
An observation protocol/ schedule was designed prior to going to the site and the researcher used it to record what was observed.  
 
Site Location : Continuity South Africa (CSA)   
Pinelands- 19 Kilometres from Head office 
Access to this site is restricted and every one is issued a temporary access ID.  
Start  
9: 00 am  
 
1. Equipment testing  
Notes  
 
Disaster Recovery Site has 12 PC’s. There were also 6 personnel manning PC’s each with a designate duty.   
 
At this stage the development area Switch (a virtual section in the database designated for testing data) had earlier  been switched off, 
meaning the activities were delayed.  
 
 
2. Data testing  
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Site Location : Continuity South Africa (CSA)   
Pinelands- 19 Kilometres from Head office 
Access to this site is restricted and every one is issued a temporary access ID.  
 
 
9:30 am  
 
 
1. Isolation of Development 
Area 
 
For the Disaster recovery process to continue, the Development Area Switch had to be switched on again.  (This usually takes time due to 
formal procedures  being followed). Apparently the development team were unaware of the timing of the disaster recovery date.   
 
To address this, the Disaster Recover Manager made frantic calls back to the Office. After the call, he leaves the venue.  In a matter of 
time the area was switched on.  
 
At this stage, another person enters the secure room. Soon after the Disaster Recover Manager comes back again.  
 
He explains that on normal occasions there are 2 tests of this nature once a year.  
 
Manifest file 
A manifest file ( a check list ) of the recovery procedures is produced. It documents the steps to be followed in the recovery process. 
 
 
3 Disaster recovery 
Manager Leaves after 
making the call 
4 The rest of the 5 people 
seem busy concentrating 
on 1 particular PC.  
8 Unix systems link up to 
the main frame. 
9 Select data date and 
time. Restore data based 
on selected data and 
time 
10 Restore from back-ups 
brought using the main 
frame channel.  
10:00am  4 Review of Manifest file 
5 Unix environment goes 
live for recovery.  
6 Back-ups selected for 
There is a Data Analysts who sits and observes everything.  The Analyst seems to give instruction to the *CSC personnel about the 
recovery process.  
 
The four essential items to be checked in the back-ups include; 
 The back-up date 
 Return Number 
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Site Location : Continuity South Africa (CSA)   
Pinelands- 19 Kilometres from Head office 
Access to this site is restricted and every one is issued a temporary access ID.  
recovery.  
 
 Seal number 
 Container number 
 
While one person reads the manifest file, the other types the instructions in the UNIX environment. 
 
* Computer Science Corporation (CSC) have been sub-contracted to handle the mainframe capability although the equipment is owned 
by [name withheld] .  
 
 
10:30  1 Two servers restored 
successfully  
At this time 2 servers have been restored successfully, the time taken being 30 minutes.  
Information from these two contains server information about the following; 
Food Server P670 
Textile Server P 670 
RMS Server  P570 
FDS/TMS Server P650 
ECS/APPWORX Server P650 
QUEST Server P615 
 
The reason given for the quick recovery by the teams is that they have done this more than once and have internalised the process. 
 
It was noted that no documentation is being taken. 
 
11:00AM 10.8 Tivoli Storage 
Manager (TSM) 
 
10.9 Windows restored 
personnel take over.  
The Tivoli Storage Manager Application reconstructs the restored data from the UNIX Application (flat files) into formats recognised by 
the windows Application system.  
 
There is a connection initiated between these two systems to tunnel data using TELNET protocol.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Key notes;  
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Site Location : Continuity South Africa (CSA)   
Pinelands- 19 Kilometres from Head office 
Access to this site is restricted and every one is issued a temporary access ID.  
 It should be noted that the Personnel using TSM are not knowledgeable with UNIX hence had to wait until UNIX restoration is complete then they can take over. Each person seems 
to know what to do.  
 
 There is also distinct organisation with each specialised role player.  
 
 There was an instance when a lap-top (there is no policy in place about bringing personal lap-tops into the recovery site, anyone can bring their own) was plugged into the wrong net-
work and this seems to have affected the recovery of data perhaps corrupting portions of it. The entire recovered data had to be trashed and the whole process repeated again.  The 
reason was the one user wanted to read email in the live environment. (Using another switch).  
 
DISCUSSION  
 
The researcher developed field notes while conducting informal interviews to complement observation with data. This process shed light on the 
various parts of the inquiry. The advantage of this process was that the whole exercise was able to assist the researcher mentally organise and 
fit in specific pieces of information that would not have been obvious through interview only.  
 
The fact that preliminary observation showed that many activities were conducted with formal guidelines and were complemented by 
experience was ample evidence to suggest that the official corporate security risk policy document was hardly given any consideration. 
 
There was an initial belief that improvisation as a potential for action latent in most if not all human activities would be evident in these units of 
analysis.   The general assumptions made were that when the security risk practitioners improvised within these units of analysis, this activity 
was an existential act, which on a basic level could be understood via a qualitative assessment.  
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Site Location : Continuity South Africa (CSA)   
Pinelands- 19 Kilometres from Head office 
Access to this site is restricted and every one is issued a temporary access ID.  
 
The idea was to get practitioners to recollect on areas of innovation and improvisation that involved initiating processes based on previous 
experience and activities. These activities would then be compared with the other structure methodologies and frameworks explicitly drawn.  
Once the comparison has been made, they would attempt to extract revelations of new processes and thus methods of doing things.  The 
analysis of the units would enhance learning which in turn would help generate new insight and knowledge acquisition.  
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APPENDIX 10 - OPEN CODING FROM TRANSCRIBED INTERVIEWS 
 
Interviewee  Comment # DATA-SETS   (Compartmentalised Transcripts) 
EK C1 to get people to change their mind-set to doing things in a formalised manner you could  bring informal  
 C2 Ok basically just  to put into context… my role as opposed to Derek’s role… Derek’s role is more operational, is strategic… 
 C3 while performing IT governance…my role is more from a strategic ensuring that direct management confidence is facilitated  
 C4 
management confidence is facilitated if you talk of  IT Risk Management…that can be incorporated as part of the Information Security Risk 
Strategy… 
 C5 
Particular checks around [form ] abuse…which forms part of our information security requirements to ensure confidentiality and integrity 
basically at more or less operational level 
 C6 so Derek will run certain exception reports and actually report the behaviour…. 
 C7 Um to ensure that they comply with whatever policy and standards that they have devised or as defined by the board 
 C8 of the challenges…that we have as….*** .is that the academic part of it differs from reality….and the practical implementation 
 C9 
 there has been a lot… good stuff that the guys for instances like Etienne (Enterprise Risk]… they have done a lot of work… they have 
complied with every possible standard/ framework.. 
 C10 
... but when it comes to the practical implementation at operational level…by the *… would require so much in training…to actually bridge 
that gap…. 
 C11 most people . you know…actually in the retail  environment the challenge is…the bottom line…[profits]… 
 C12 
well…that’s actually where the mind set has to change…that’s why the Information Security office used to be in IT…but now I’m actually 
reporting top Corporate governance board..… 
 C13 well…yes.. so here is no longer…as part of the corporate governance model.. 
 C14 um. I’m actually now sitting there now…not in IT… 
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 C15 my approach,  my strategy… is that was that we excel on the CobiT framework.. the principles of confidentiality…integrity and availability 
 C16 if you look at the CobiT core systems there are certain modules that relate to theses core requirements 
 C17 so those core systems are…part of my approach.. they cover…operational..  and strategy… 
 C18 
the framework can be the requirements can actually   * measurement. because in the CobiT framework of the things that we did was we did 
a ****  
 C19 So we got certain maturity requirements  *** which we met ..and some  which we had to improve on.. and then the  focus  
 C20 So in line with that.. approach   it was a good idea that the strategy that I’m formulating made it so much easier to adopt 
 C21 .. since when they had adopted CobiT it made my work…so much easier.. so I don’t have to try to explain to them about CobiT…  
 C22 the executive were already familiar with it… they bought into it…and they already put it into working… 
 C23 it came from the board… 
 C24 no… I’m the group information security officer… 
 C25 
I think it was top-down…like I said corporate governance used to be.. previously at  [name withheld]  into various components of corporate 
governance… 
 C26 
like we would have legal…we would have retailing and others… now legal forms part of corporate governance… internal audit forms part of 
corporate governance…and IT security and also Risk Management 
JC C27 
But we would have Risk Management at a granular level, within IT security corporate governance…specifically in the ****compliance  part of 
it …so where do we meet? The compliance requirement … 
 C28 :  operationally, IT Governance would still be there. They still have a major role to play…but you know from a compliance perspective 
 C29 in terms of how we…have been meeting certain compliance requirements in terms of ECT Act 
 C30  or any other critical ACT in line  with  all the information reporting and all this … do we  all  **** play 
 C31 YES.. a lot of ACTS have been…introduced… but…I don’t think they have  been tested yet….so  we want to comply to  the bear minimal 
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 C32 
there was the initial; buying… [of the idea/ my position].. because when people think of information security…and me being the .. coz they 
could see me coming through the door [and go] “ooh here is Audit coming again…”. 
 C33 I used to be the Audit Manager before…I took on this position…there was the mind set change- I had to change… 
 C34 then I had to change… [since] I’m not Audit…I’m more on a consultative role now…  
 C35 but I still have a role to play in terms of compliance… 
 C36 but I [now] not here to follow up on people … 
 C37 
so that was the real challenge in terms of getting...their minds [my mind] to change…nobody wants to be [held responsible]… but then they 
saw…the CobiT compliance filing [report] part of it.. 
 C38 it was perfect…when they actually saw the CobiT…exception results…they actually came to like. It… coz we are here to… 
 C39 
from the CobiT exception results they actually saw from the lower….extreme they actually saw from the level of reporting, you know, the  
approaches…on the low and medium…they were all…4 to 5…. 
 C40 
Do you know CobiT processes? the 34 processes [in CobiT]? Once you adopt CobiT, there are certain levels of every process that you 
have to accept. There is high, low and medium. 
 C41 . Now in terms of the high, we were getting 2 to 3 security, but in terms of the lower and medium we were getting 4’s to 5’s.  
 C42 and theses are the components that I’m focusing on in terms of confidentiality, availability and integrity 
 C43 
so it sort of made my job so much more easier, but now when I talk to them around these components, you know immediately the guys 
want to go for 4’s…targeting a maturity level of 4… 
 C44 you get a buy in immediately… 
 C45 
yes but …like I said…had we not adopted CobiT at the board level, we would have made it far more difficult, but … and the challenge being 
the audit report  
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 C46 
that was coming …through which was highlighting certain risks…but the fact that this CobiT Implementation] was coming directly from the 
top…you know we always focused on reliance on the subject…I’m telling you… 
 C47 
yes it was a dream come true…[laughter] as the security [maturity] levels of CobiT… are  brilliant…when you give a presentation on that 
and  you say look here guys…if you have managed 31 of the requirements…maturity level number 4’s  
 C48 yes 4’ and 5’s…you certainly felt that you would attempt higher say 3 or 4 … after 3 …. So it is manageable and practicable 
 C49 it is actually putting more resources but then, on the items that are high risk…putting much more focus on… on those area  
 C50 
… the high risk is more on the direct Risk management side, risk profiling, then the other one is…the information architecture, it think it is 
AI5 or something around data classification and application technicality… 
 C51 I put a  huge enterprise around that…I picked all the main applications and put them on a spreadsheet,  
 C52 
yes and categorised… them because those are the items…that we are specifically to focus on, particularly from a disaster recover and also 
business continuity…the BM5 security and the components so the initial aim was building an architecture around the data classification… 
 C53 
yes and when it developed that spreadsheet and showed it to the management…it was [an eye opener]…I was like jeez… I mean it was like 
we were focusing on applications [that were not critical]… 
 C54 
and the irony is… and I’ve got to give them credit for it…they’ve been doing a lot of work, but they’ve probably been focusing on the wrong 
way..  
 C55 
Maybe our risk profile has got to be entirely different…from the CobiT one…maybe we have to re-look our risk profile too…right? maybe 
that area that CobiT say’s is high…maybe low  
 C56 yes, but then its has to.. .its going to be another workshop, to actually realign our risk profile...to align with the corporate risk profile 
 C57 maybe that area which I thought that CobiT  
EV C58 
The guy who heads up the department in respect to information system’s intelligence is [name withheld] …so we’ve go a whole department 
structured around data warehousing… 
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 C59 in terms of safety of information, manipulating information, metadata around information and stuff like that..  
 C60 
We have got the Architecture forum, which sits under [name withheld ]  … and um. We also had a.. the stuff that I’m more involved in, in 
making sure that.. there is a compliance architecture in terms of business processes 
 C61 
and supporting systems.. so that’s more in the area that I’m based in…all our designs… all the designs that the guys do have to go through  
the architecture forum…so the Architecture forum have to pull it apart to see whether it makes sense from a technology point of view 
 C62 
and whether there is compliance you know considering security you know whether there are best solutions to match the technology 
platform… stuff like that..  
 C63 So the architecture forum.. is up to date with that.. 
 C64 That’s um [name withheld] …they have got a big, big data warehouse department ., 
 C65 
Security and Confidentiality integrity, That’s [name withheld] . but security is also part of data warehouse so there are overlaps with Peter 
Versfild..** extends to reports and what information can be used…sometimes the reports are online…there is a combination.. 
 C66 
there is a middleware team...that gives a human aspect to the way we design things...such that the whole way we design things is very 
middleware driven.. we’ve got a rich...middleware architecture 
 C67 
that is handled in the architectural forum...If you look at this model over here…um you will see the business process… the supporting 
applications, we’ve got all the information supporting the application.. 
 C68 
then we’ve got the hardware and operating systems which we call the infrastructural components…as a whole solution...all of this has to 
support the business process...and so all these things we first look at the systems development life cycle… 
 C69 
where we develop requirements specifications for reviewing the process.. we’ve got systems requirement specifications…doing all the 
system’s stuff with the data…and then we’ve got integration specifications…in terms of how does this system send information to another 
system…or the middleware stuff…and all of that stuff has to go as either system’s methodology... 
 C70 so you’ve got a methodology…so basically all of this stuff that comes out …goes through the architectural forum…for scrutiny 
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 C71 
 but working with these things we also do pa*n reviews so we actually scrutinise each specification and we go through detailed.. analysis.. 
through...specifications 
 C72 There is also this job in this area… which is part of the architectural  
 C73 
I think frameworks can be deceiving… we actually incorporate 3 frameworks…so  we incorporate three frameworks... we incorporate the 
overall framework, to govern the enterprise architecture solution distribution which is basically the Zachman  Framework. 
 C74 
but if you look in the Zachman’s framework and you go right down to….the system’s design.. basically those  three  of the Zachman’s 
Framework.. then there is the  CobiT and ITIL… are the ones that come into play in governing mostly  the IT… processes…um.. so we have 
an over-encapsulating…methodology…which is the Zachman’s Framework 
 C75 and we’ve configured those things together and we’ve come up with ‘IBAS’ which integrated business architecture solutions.  
 C76 
The Zachman framework consists of rows across (which are ITIL, CobiT) but the same principles are applied because there has to be an 
understanding of the business process for all the different areas 
GA C77 
yeah so I mean…basically. we have… I mean there is a lot of…millions of processes ..in IT that run… so I mean from our side we also have 
a lot and there are certain systems that are …up at night and there are certain systems that run running during the day 
 C78 
and its just me being an old timer being bogged with SLA’s and OLA’s all those kind of things…coz I mean…those documents are 
whatever…  
 C79 and most of them.. they cant even document all that stuff… 
 C80 
yes I think in a lot of areas it is like that…I mean…unless you work in call centres and that kind of stuff…so a lot of stuff that is,… is  worked 
at from intellectual capital over the years…I mean someone probably in finance…who does the books or whatever…and they get rid of him 
or whatever… 
 C81 like that…they bring in someone new…yes...he might be a CPA or whatever…but he does not have experience…but the  
 C82 
:  I mean he doesn’t know how the company works…because thing are forever changing…so.. its those… things…and er.. it’s not his 
fault…know what I mean… and it would take him a long while…probably just to catch up… 
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 C83 
I’d say a lot because...the whole way that.. we do run…from a WAN [view]…we run Microsoft and all that…but the way the things are put 
together.. and that’s the difference…every one is running Microsoft stuff.. and every one has got databases…everyone’s got users…and 
everyone’s got PCs and servers…but it the way.. 
 C84 
[name withheld] … it’s the way…the applications…and the people that use them…everyone’s uses are a bit…different… so…[name 
withheld]  uses are quits different from [name withheld]  uses…because they’ve got different applications running on the servers…and 
they’ve got probably different ways of logging in 
 C85 
to suit their environment...more than it does anywhere else…so everywhere its just the gaps around…what you need.. I mean…ITIL and 
CobiT…are great frameworks but…its impossible to  
 C86 
Well…The impact on that.. I know really … would be that the whole import and export business is based on..this… um  email system…and 
uh its is not really down.. but  too….slow at the moment…like 2 hours slow..but the eventuality is that there is going to be um uh a massive 
impact on the…business 
 C87 so it [the continued communication operation] shouldn’t be based on the business kind of procedure… 
 C88 
I’d say the users probably tend to feel it more than we do…I mean a lot of stuff we do we do tech reasons [for the proper running of the  
system] … I mean we restrict what they can do…what they can install…and what they can mess around with… but ultimately the machine 
is a [name withheld]  company machine…and they need to do the work…they have been to do.. so we give them access to do…that.. 
 C89 
But I’d say on our side and from the tools point of view and that kind of stuff…we have most of the tools that we need and we use most of 
the generic stuff.. but the stuff that we feel that we really …really need , we do kind of budget for that and we do get it…so we budget for the  
 C90 
… I don’t know…we haven’t got that many....fancy tools... we use mostly generic stuff.. but its those little things that make our lives 
easier…like the little monitoring [network]  tools…besides the big ones.. ooh..we…run the big..operations manager…(Microsoft 
Operations Manager).  
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 C91 
no…they have their own little...monitoring tools monitoring the network… we have the monitoring tools monitoring the users..(Microsoft 
users)…so we actually have two…we have the small…one….I’m not sure what’s its calledr and then we have the big one…called the 
Microsoft operations Manager (MsOM).  
 C92 
The small one.. we find its quite nice….reflexive.. because its quick.. easy…and it can monitor.. say you need something.. now.. it can do it 
for you now..……and then we can move it on to the other one…as an additional kind of monitoring...in a different kind of way... 
 C93 
well, to tell you the…well…we’ve always had both…its always been the kind of thing that its just easier…coz we actually use the one…to 
monitor...and seek..and give us a better clearer  indication of…if the things that are up or down...it gives you  a nice green, red or orange.. 
know what I mean…? Very simple… 
 C94 
but the other one…usually gives you more information…the more technical…stuff on the technical side… so the one, would be geared more 
to the operating.. the operators…who get to see the lights…and stuff…and also have a quick feel on the…kind of things…people need 
 C95 
the other one the  Microsoft operations manager might sort of take the operators much time.. coz it is sort of complicated….to work. 
With...than the other one.. 
 C96 
so there are those little things…that we do just to help us and to help the business.. coz its those quick little things that…we need to do 
better… 
 C97 
so I mean yeah.. everyday... I   mean , it would be actually be.. it would be too easy if  people followed procedure....coz notebooks [things] 
break everyday… I mean...we just had a big change…and that was it…we just bought some extra amount of notebooks and that was it... 
 C98 that was it.. the board or whatever that said…460 notebooks or whatever.. and that was it… 
 C99 
: that was it…but what they did was… they took the notebooks…they gave those new notebooks to people…and they gave the old 
notebooks that people had that were still on working conditions to other people…  
 C100  now you have … and we didn’t buy notebooks for about three years… now you have five year, six year old notebooks… 
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 C101 
yeah...with no warranty and they are going to break… its just a matter of time…and so now they had to re-look that whole thing…they did.. 
.. it took a bit.. a couple… 
 C102 about a whole month however.. and they decided that they are going to buy and extra amount more… 
 C103 
to give to the people that they gave…and get the ones that are broken…they had to think quick...and make that kind of a judgment…they 
had to.. 
 C104 well… what you see… well what happens is that it is all about…saving money… 
FR C105 
and it all boils down to budgeting.... now they didn’t budgets for it … so they have to justify why…they had to do it… so that was a main kind 
of thing… 
 C106 
I  mean they also…in doing it… I mean.. they are also creating a more mobile environment  where people also can work…with that...so for 
those people that are... I mean....if a person has got a broken notebook…then they cant work…you see?… so I mean they had to do 
something…and we’ve been trying to…giving them little injections with these notebooks to keep them going…know what I mean?. 
 C107 
changing the mouse… then changing this… I mean some of them…these people have got…notebooks that has got a mouse in it and 
they’ve got a keyboard in it…and they’ve got it attached to a monitor…because they don’t have a PC… 
 C108 because the monitor is not working…the mouse isn’t working...and the keyboard isn’t working…so… 
 C109 
so they actually have to adjust…I mean the big guys.. the executives… committee,…whatever…so we gave them all the facts and 
figures…all the notebook stuff… 
 C110 including the new ones as well…the ones that were breaking… 
 C111 
you have to…[laughter]…  keep working…you see a lot of time… with the planning it is the main thing…because the business gives 
[priority]… obviously for certain projects…so that’s where IT can get its money from 
 C112 . or we can [for that matter] for hardware and stuff like that …  then there is capacity and replacements which comes from our budget… 
 C113 
and that’s how we get actually our money… because we basically.. so [if] its simple…if they don’t give us  the money and they basically 
want to grow.. by  [say] 50% we cant… 
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 C114 
so they…and.. and… we don’t…normally don’t bank a lot from our capacity and replacement money…ah so we do kind of  get more  of less 
something …from my side…coz they do cut it a little bit… 
 C115 
Communicating aims?…and…and also…they must like… as you say…’assessing the risk’…if the machine is out of warranty and it is a  tier 
one applications its going to be down for some time and… the vendor might say come tomorrow…then you might get parts  from um, I don’t  
 C116 
know…Jo-burg…and if Jo-burg haven’t got a part then you have to get parts from.. wherever.. States..[US].. so we might as well wait…and 
that’s all fine.. if they accept the risks… 
 C117 
it happens all the time…so in a lot of the applications and cases we have established that we don’t have to give them that [admin] kind of 
access, but then there are I mean… it happens, … internet access…we used to talk about restricting internet access…obviously, but so far 
[for instance unlike] in [name withheld] America where they have a big database where they categorising data… (internet restrictions) by 
but obviously in [back here]  
 C118 
[name  withheld]  you need access to retailing and selling sites.. coz that’s the business they are in.. and  there is also other sites that pop 
up all the time…aaah… whatever they are researching on…or whatever…at the time…and…it was kind of easy at the beginning because 
we gave them a list in and told them to choose the categories they said that they wanted internet access on..  
 C119 
and we did and worked on exactly what they said.. and of course within the first few days.. whatever…putting it [list] in [the system]…we 
got hundreds and hundreds of calls…saying they couldn’t get through.. they said that they wanted to go to selling sites.. whatever…and 
they couldn’t go to see what was on hundreds of other sites… 
 C120 
so we quickly had to make [create]  a few more categories…so it doesn’t  just get as simple as you just having internet access ..and you 
don’t get this.. [but rather] you having internet access and  you belong to marketing…and you belong to IT… 
 C121 coz IT needs to download certain things like codes…and that kind of stuff… 
 C122 Which increases the admin side which increases everything else, but in the long run it is probably [felt] it is the right thing to do… 
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 C123 
: Coz, we had to do it… but in those groups…and what happens in the access aspect is that they can actually modify the database…and 
[name withheld] is actually the one who approves this… 
BN C124 
hmmm..I think …our main thing here is to keep basically… I mean we have a lot of good uses in policies when it comes to keeping the 
system going…so certain time we do have to do what we have to do to keep them [systems] going…and sometimes we don’t…know if it is  
the right thing to do.. 
 C125 So a lot of the times, is ah..  we try and structure as much as we can but obviously things may fall outside the structure…um.. I’d say… 
 C126 
Well most of the times we…try and keep us much structure as we can but most of the time that we do…people don’t follow the right 
procedures…[for instance] logging in a call the structure,  would be broken by uh them [ IT USERS]  coming straight to us…because there 
is obstruction at the border and they need to go through…and obviously to them it is a great thing…because I mean they are willing to [jump 
levels] and would do what  ever they need to do to get their stuff across the border 
 C127 
so sometimes we perceive that the thing is not actually as important as something else sitting around that needs more priority…so a lot of 
[reasons] people break structure would be varied as much as they use email… because they rely on the email system for instance if you 
make email in the business [primary] basis of your communication  system… and system can go down… 
 C128 
its probably more critical…for [name withheld] ..to have a lot more systems being up…because every one relies on them.. .see what I 
mean… 
 C129 Well… it is kind of working at the moment...its just that it is a bit slow… at the moment… 
 C130 Well this is how we draw their attention…when it goes down…well…we tell…them “we told you not to [rely on]  this business tool”… 
 C131 
And that’s when they normally start...start taking notice of uuhmm maybe we should actually do this in a different way.. I mean we have a 
whole...middle tier uh...application integration system...that does this kind of things….that makes you do all the right kind of stuff… but um 
for simple things like um..email its amazing that um..the email being down..  
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 C132 so those kind of things is hard to… because.. they do it because…they are under a lot of pressure...at the time.. and those kind of things.. 
 C133 correct…something will always happen.. 
 C134 
Yooh…um.. yes, sure.. um…what would I say? I mean, this time  we just went through a new desk-top  kind of structure...now, and our 
policy was in place… 
 C135 that no one was going to have any administration rights to the machines… 
 C136 that no one was going to be able to install these third-party…[applications] whatever… 
 C137 
and obviously now when we reflect on it…[policy] it has not been too bad on business, but now when we hit certain areas, is that we have 
to make some kind of adjustments… because there are so many applications out there…and the thing is that, to be working…these needs 
to run on the administration rights of the machine… 
 C138 
and those kind of things…and…so we actually made provisions, that we could do it..[amend policy] when we looked at the group 
policy…on administration rights issues… 
 C139 
we could give those users,…whatever…administration rights on the machine centrally.. but [only] if we could manage those users who got 
admin rights on the machine…so that was on the agenda then…we didn’t want to…   
 C140 because obviously this could cause some problems…installing stuff.. those kind of things.. 
 C141 
we had actually had to give them…we try to narrow it down a lot…we also try to give them…and make sure that they are not running an 
extra link to the applications they don’t normally need… 
 C142 
the ones they don’t normally use…[though] we just cant try to just stop them running the applications [they don’t need], but we now don’t 
want them to do that… 
 C143 I um I mean …you make the.. I mean a decision whatever.. um.. 
 C144 
sure, I mean I haven’t really worked anywhere else.. I wouldn’t be able to say so much.…I mean…our actions.. we base it on the criticality 
of the application…obviously…um.. experience…obviously if the heat comes from the executives and that kind of .. coz we know which 
applications are critical and which and which are not… 
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 C145 
how…long you’ve been here…we know what … I mean…an lot of it is based on most of the things…in… in whatever…is based on…a lot of 
it is based on experience…and just knowing what is important and what’s not… and we sit…and we put together our plan…for next year… 
ere..a lot of them don’t know what the application…is running on… 
 C146 
we… need to say like [for instance] they are running out of disks …and.. I don’t know.. er the box [notebook]  is 5 years old…and it 
means now… the warranty…and this is the stats.[statistics] … it is kind of like under-performing…but we tend to focus more on the high 
level ones…. 
 C147 
than on the low level ones…so… and we also know that…like if we get a call on a Saturday…for something that is down…. don’t worry…we 
will look at it on a Monday...since it is not a high level one...but if you get a call for something that you know is high level you will come in… 
 C148 and a lot of that is just based… on… you know… that.. I mean you have to know…the whole.. 
 C149 
yeah what they are trying to do… holistically… what they have been trying to do… the business process …it is all based on the criticality of 
the business process…and what’s important and what’s not… 
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